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ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES

Volume XVII

Jain Philosophy (Part Three)

Edited by
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MOTILAL BANARSIDASS PUBLISHERS
PRIVATE LIMITED • DELHI

First Edition: Delhi, 2014

ISBN: 978-81-208-3645-7

MOTILAL BANARSIDASS
41 U.A. Bungalow Road, Jawahar Nagar, Delhi 110 007
8 Mahalaxmi Chamber, 22 Bhulabhai Desai Road, Mumbai 400 026
203 Royapettah High Road, Mylapore, Chennai 600 004
236, 9th Main III Block, Jayanagar, Bengaluru 560 011
Sanas Plaza, 1302 Baji Rao Road, Pune 411 002
8 Camac Street, Kolkata 700 017
Ashok Rajpath, Patna 800 004
Chowk, Varanasi 221 001

MLBD Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophy Vol. XVII
Jain Philosophy by Piotr Balcerowicz and Karl Potter
Includes bibliography and index
ISBN : 978-81-208-3645-7
I. Philosophy II. Jain Philosophy
III. Piotr Balcerowicz IV. Potter Karl
V. Encyclopedia VI. Indian Philosophy

Printed in India

by RP Jain at NAB Printing Unit,
A-44, Naraina Industrial Area, Phase I, New Delhi-110028
and published by JP Jain for Motilal Banarsidass Publishers (P) Ltd,
41 U.A. Bungalow Road, Jawahar Nagar, Delhi-110007

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INTRODUCTION

On Attempts to Formalise the *Syādvāda*

Piotr Balcerowicz[1]

Ontology and Epistemology of the *Syādvāda*

A contribution of Jainism to Indian philosophy which seems most stimulating, inspiring, debated and controversial, one which provoked the most opposition from other systems of India, is beyond doubt the doctrine of multiplexity of reality (*anekāntavāda*). Indisputably it is also the most interesting Jaina contribution to Indian philosophy. The doctrine involved both a very particular realist ontology as well as a corresponding epistemology that was structured in such a way as to most aptly handle certain ontological presuppositions.

The Jaina ontology entailed by the doctrine of multiplexity of reality (*anekāntavāda*) viewed the world structure as consisting of four interrelated aspects: substance (*dravya*), quality (*guṇa*), mode (*paryāya*) and ineffable, transient occurrence (*vivarta, vartanā*, often overlooked in both Jaina expositions of the theory and in analyses carried out by modern researchers). However, the point to emphasise is that things, especially when conceived as substances, were believed to preserve their identity and in this aspect they were immutable and permanent. At the same time, however, when conceived as modes, they appeared to change and transform continuously. This seemed to have led to contradictions in ontology. Besides, in order to explain the process of change, Jaina ontology also distinguished three modes of existence, that actually co-existed:

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[1]The following Introduction consists of an edited and abbreviated version of Piotr Balcerowicz's article "Do attempts to formalize the *syād-vāda* make sense?", based on a paper presented at 11th Jaina Studies Workshop: Jaina Scriptures and Philosophy, SOAS, London 12-13.03.2009, and to be published in: Peter Flügel (ed.): *Jaina Scriptures and Philosophy. Willem B. Bollée Festschrift*. In editing the article some stylistic emendations have been exercised by the General Editor (Potter), and footnotes have been omitted to make the message of the text clearer.

origination (*utpāda, udaya*), continued existence (*sthiti, dhrauvya*) and cessation, or disintegration (*bhaṅga, vyaya, apavarga*). These four closely corresponded to the Buddhist Sarvāstivāda's and Abhidharma's four (or three) conditioned factors, known as 'markers' (*saṃskṛtalakṣaṇa*) – origination (*utpāda*), continuity (*sthiti*), deterioration (*jarā, vyaya*) and extinction (*bhaṅga, nirodha*) – or second-order elementary constituents of reality (*dharma*) that were believed to attach themselves to every other first-order elementary constituent of reality 'marked' (*lakṣya*) by them and thereby determined in its momentary existence (*kṣaṇika*).

The emphasis (which gradually became more pronounced after the second and third centuries CE) of Jaina ontology on both permanence and imperishability of substances, worked out against the Buddhist theories of momentariness (*kṣaṇikavāda*) and insubstantiality (*nairātmya, niḥsvabhāvatā*), as well as constant mutability and change of substances in form and occurrence, developed in contrast to the theory of the immutable substance of the Vaiśeṣika, seemed to lead to a contradiction: how to reconcile the idea of a permanent substance with its incessant mutability? Both the dual nature of things and a solution of the paradox was expressed by Umāsvāmin (c. 350–400) in *Tattvārthasūtra* 5.29-31:

> [29] The existent is furnished with origination, annihilation and permanence. [30] It is indestructible in its essentiality, i.e. permanent. [31] [The existent is both], because [it is] established as having emphasized [property] and not-emphasized [property].

The conviction that world substances, and their qualities, modes and transient occurrences cannot even be conceived to exist entirely independently as if separated from other elements, and that they all simultaneously originate, are endowed with continued existence and disintegrate in every moment again and again while at the same time preserving their integrity and self-identity, led further to a belief that the world is a complex network within which all the existents are related with all the remaining ones and that their essential character and nature is not only determined by what is in things themselves but also by all the relations in which they enter vis-à-vis all other existents.

Originally ontological or metaphysical considerations eventually led to the exuberant development of a corresponding

epistemology, which ultimately involved what came to be known as the theory of multiplexity of reality (*anekāntavāda*), that comprised three analytical methods: the method (historically the oldest) of the four standpoints (*nikṣepavāda, nyāsavāda*), the (usually) sevenfold method of conditionally valid predications, known as the doctrine of viewpoints (*naya-vāda*), and the method of the seven-fold modal description (*saptabhaṅgī, syādvāda*).

The most important component of this theory, most hotly criticized by other schools of thought, were the conjunctions of three basic figures (*bhaṅga*), or ways of analyzing an object within a consistent conceptual framework, usually—at an earlier stage—expressed *roughly* as follows:

(1) *syād asti* ('*x* is, in a certain sense, *P*'),
(2) *syāt nāsti* ('*x* is, in a certain sense, not-*P*'),
(3 or 4) *syād avaktavyam* ('*x* is, in a certain sense, inexpressible').

The remaining four figures were, as it is widely known, permutations of the three basic ones.

Description of the *Syādvāda*

Perhaps the most conspicuous feature of these seven *syādvāda* figures is that they *all are true*. All constructivist interpretations in terms of many-valued logic seem to tacitly assume that at least some *bhaṅgas* can be hierarchically ordered with respect to their truth value, ranging from false and indeterminate to true. The fact is, however, that for Jainism all seven statements are true:

1. *syād asti*	1
2. *syān nāsti*	1
3. *syād avaktavyam*	1
4. *syād asti nāsti*	1
5. *syād asty avaktavyam*	1
6. *syān nāsty avaktavyam*	1
7. *syād asti nāsty avaktavyam*	1

It is not the case that each member of this septuplet has a different truth value; what each of these figures actually expresses is a different property!

There is no single author, to my knowledge, who would claim, as R. N. Mukerji (in A. N. Upadhye et al, *Mahāvīra and His Teachings*, Bombay 1977, pp. 225-233) does, that the *syādvāda* is 'a game of chance' and that the sentences *syād asti, syān nāsti* etc. hit the truth with different probabilities, and therefore we can speak of different 'grades of truth'. No Jaina text ever says that at least one of the seven *syāt* sentences is false or is not really true, nor that it is not possible to say that a sentence is neither true nor false, i.e. the sentence cannot be assigned any truth value. All the Jaina sources are quite unequivocal that *all* these statements are true.

The term *syāt* is a sentential functor which means 'somehow', 'in a certain sense', a particle 'expressive of multiplexity of reality'. The seven sentences, as all textual sources show, are in fact incomplete sentences for which we seek a meaningful context, but they all concern one and the same object (*ekatra vastuni, ekavastu, ekatra jīvādau vastuni*):

> Difference and identity, which are the domain of cognitive criteria, are not empirical deceptions. For you, [Jina,] these two [coexist] without contradiction in one and the same [thing] consistent with the secondary or primary expressive intent [respectively]. (Samantabhadra, *Āptamīmāṃsā* 36)

These seven sentences predicate a particular property (*dharma*) of the object in logically possible ways.

Contradiction in the *Syādvāda*

Any model genuinely faithful to the original intentions of the Jainas should take into account their insistence on the lack of contradiction in any of the seven propositions, which has been explicitly articulated on numerous occasions, e.g. by Hemacandra Sūri in *Anyayogvyavacchedadvātriṃśikā* 24:

> Non-existence, existence and inexpressibility with regard to things are not contradictory [when taken as] conditioned by differentiation through conditioning factors. Only when they do not realise the above, idiots who fear contradiction, who are led to destruction by their simplistic interpretation (absolutism) of these [three], stumble.

Accordingly, the Jainas, it seems, consistently defined

contradiction as based on negation in its classical sense, viz.

x, y are contradictory iff $x = \sim y$.

In the same spirit, the question how the notions of universality and particularity (*sāmānyaviśeṣa*) are possible with respect to one and the same real thing (*vastu*) is discussed by Malliṣeṇa in his *Syādvādamañjarī* 23.158-162 as a case of *seeming* contradiction. He maintains:

> For, just as there is the [seven-fold modal description] of [its] existence and non-existence, similarly there is also a seven-fold, and only (*eva*), seven-fold, modal description of [the thing's] universal character and particular character. For it is as follows: in a certain sense, x is universal; in a certain sense, x is particular; in a certain sense, x is both; in a certain sense, x is inexpressible; in a certain sense, x is universal and inexpressible; in a certain sense, x is particular and inexpressible; in a certain sense, x is universal, particular and inexpressible. And one should not claim that in these [statements], there is no form of affirmation and negation, because the universal character has the form of affirmation, whereas the particular character consists in negation as having the form of exclusion.

Such a clearly defined idea of non-contradiction is especially important in propositions (3) 'inexpressible' or (4) 'both existence and non-existence', and all their derivative propositions (5)-(7). This certainly leaves no room for a non-classical or paraconsistent interpretation of contradiction.

Accordingly, the Jainas' understanding does not appear to be very much different from the classical definition of contradiction formulated by Aristotle in the *Metaphysics* 1005:

> It is impossible that the same thing at the same time both belongs and does not belong to the same object and in the same respect (and all other conditions which one can specify, let them be specified, so that dialectal objections be met).

Disambiguation of Complete Sentences

An important question is what the semantic background of the *syādvāda* actually is? In general, textual sources are quite

unanimous that the idea behind the doctrine of the seven-fold modal description' (*saptabhaṅgī*) is to disambiguate statements, which after a closer inspection are a sort of shorthand for more complex assertions, e.g. 'in a certain sense, it (some object) indeed exists' is a truncated statement, which should be read as 'in a certain sense, it (some object) indeed exists *as* ...', or 'in a certain sense, some object *x* indeed has a property P'. In a natural language, all statements stand in need of additional analysis which has to take into account the context. The idea that every sentence is incomplete and its intent should be delimited by or derived from a particular context to which it applies is occasionally expressed by the Jainas with a maxim (*nyāya*): 'Every sentence functions with a restriction.' This is, perhaps, the most crucial aspect when it comes to the proper understanding of the *syādvāda*.

The process of disambiguation not only allows one to determine a proper application of a proposition and its accurate meaning but it also proves indispensable in eliminating other possible meanings the proposition can in theory convey, as Vidyānanda Pātrakesarisvāmin (c. 850) explains:

> One should in the first place carry out the process of [semantic] determination of a proposition in order to eliminate [its] undesirable meanings. Otherwise, because the [meaning of the proposition] would be equivalent to anything unsaid, it [could be taken] in any possible meaning. (*Yuktyanuśāsanaṭīkā* I.6.53)

Thus, the primary task of a philosopher, as Jaina thinkers understood it, is to develop adequate tools that should make our language precise and unequivocal. They try to achieve this goal by formulating an appropriate semantic model that would provide reliable instruments to read any statement within its intended context. As Akalaṅka in *Laghiyastraya* 63 puts it, such a disambiguating strategy is indispensable in any successful communication:

> Even if it is not explicitly pronounced, the functor "in a certain sense" is understood from the context in all cases, both with respect to an affirmation and negation as well as with respect to any other case (sc. these two combined), if one should successfully convey [the intended meaning].

As the verse indicates, any successful and, therefore context-sensitive communication procedure should consistently read the functor *syāt* into any sentence, which by nature is incomplete and cannot convey its meaning while taken alone: the crucial semantic elements necessary for its proper understanding have to be supplied from the context. And that is what, as Akalaṅka claims, we regularly do in our daily life.

The *syāt* particle and the basic figures (*bhaṅga*)

One of the most conspicuous early components of the Jaina seven-fold modal description is the three basic figures (*bhaṅga*), or ways of analysing an object within a consistent conceptual framework:

(1) *syād asti* ('*x* is, in a certain sense, *P*'), i.e. σ (*x* is *P*).

(2) *syān nāsti* ('*x* is, in a certain sense, not-*Q*'), i.e. σ (*x* is $\sim Q$),

(3) or (4) *syād avaktavyam* ('*x* is, in a certain sense, inexpressible'), σ (*x* is (P & $\sim Q$).

where the symbol σ represents the sentential functor *syāt*. As we shall see the above formalisation, which is here treated only as an approximation, is not the most accurate one.

What were historically only three basic figures (*bhaṅga*) later came to be permutated so that the total of seven basic figures was reached, making up a complete version of the doctrine of the modal description (*syādvāda*):

1. 'In a certain sense, *x* [indeed] is P' – *syād asti* [*eva*].
2. 'In a certain sense, *x* [indeed] is not-Q' – *syān nāsti* [*eva*].
3. 'In a certain sense, *x* [indeed] is P and [indeed] is not-Q' – *syād asty* [*eva*] *nāsti* [*eva*].
4. 'In a certain sense, *x* [indeed] is inexpressible' – *syād avaktavyam* [*eva*].
5. 'In a certain sense, *x* [indeed] is P and [indeed] is inexpressible' – *syād asty* [*eva*] *avaktavyam* [*eva*].

6. 'In a certain sense, *x* [indeed] is not-Q and [indeed] is inexpressible' – *syān nāsty* [*eva*] *avaktavyam* [*eva*].

7. 'In a certain sense, *x* [indeed] is P, [indeed] is not-Q and [indeed] is inexpressible' – *syād asti* [*eva*] *nāsty* [*eva*] *avaktavyam* [*eva*].

A significant step was an introduction of the particle *eva*—altogether absent in all earlier formulations—by Samantabhadra (c. 580–640?), who was apparently influenced by Dharmakīrti's use of *eva* as a delimiting particle (*vyavaccheda*). The particle *eva* was a highly useful semantic tool to restrict the applicability of the property (*dharma*) predicated of the real thing (*vastu*), or a semantic method to restrict the range of the term that denotes the property.

The Parameters and Aspects

Most Jaina descriptions of the *syādvāda* make a clear mention of what is called by them variously as aspects (*deśa/deso*) or facets (*aṃśa*), and what I propose to call parameters. Most Jaina thinkers distinguish four such basic parameters that qualify the way we predicate of a thing: substance (*dravya*), place (*kṣetra*), time (*kāla*), condition (*bhāva*).

The four classical parameters have a longer history. They gradually developed during the so-called 'Canonical Period', that ranges from 4th/3rd century BCE till 450–480 CE and are reflected in the Jaina Canon eventually codified in the second half of the 5th century. They assumed their more or less classical form before the 4th/5th century within a complex strategy of 'dialectical ways of analysis' (*anuyoga-dvāra*). Initially these tools of analysis were crucial theoretical determinants known as the four standpoints (*nikṣepa, nyāsa*): substance (*dravya*), place (*kṣetra*), time (*kāla*) and actual condition (*bhāva*) of an entity analysed. Occasionally, other parameters were added in canonical literature, such as a particular quality (*guṇa*), a mode (*paryāya*), spatial extension (*pradeśa*), name (*nāma*), form (*rūpa*), material representation (*sthāpanā*), transformation (*pariṇāma*) etc. Also the post-canonical literature enumerated similar parameters that served the same purpose. Some authors distinguished more than the classical four. A good example is Siddhasena Divākara (c. 450–500 CE) in the *Sanmatitarka-prakaraṇa* 1.69, who regularly speaks of aspects (*deso*) from which the substance can be predicated of. He mentions eight such parameters which qualify our statements about a thing, although he is rather unique:

> The proper method of exposition of entities [in accordance with *syādvāda*] is based on substance (*dravya*), place (*kṣetra*), time (*kāla*), condition (*bhāva*) as well as mode (*paryāya*), aspect (or part, *deśa*) and relation (or combination of elements, *saṃyoga*), and also distinction (*bheda*).

Later on, with the development of the Nyāya school and emergence of the concept of *upādhi*, variously translated as 'subsidiary condition', 'extraneous condition', 'limiting adjunct', 'conditioning factor', i.e. additional factors which should be taken into account in inference (*anumāna*) and in establishing the relation of invariable concomitance (*vyāpti*), the idea of the parameters came to be identified with *upādhi*. Hemacandrasūri, in the *Anyayogavyavacchedadvātriṃśikā* 24, uses this new term and applies it in the sense of 'an additional semantic factor' one should take into account while analysing the meaning of a sentence. In his opinion, the meaning of every statement is 'conditioned by differentiation through conditioning factors', i.e. it should be disambiguated through additional semantic criteria. Commenting on Hemacandrasūri's phrase *upādhibhedopahita*, Malliṣeṇa (*Syādvādamañjarī* 24.17–20) develops the idea and establishes an explicit link between the 'conditioning factors' and an earlier idea of aspects or facets (*deso / deśa / aṃśa*).

> [Non-existence, existence and inexpressibility] are conditioned by, i.e. are emphasised by way of, differentiation, i.e. diversity, of conditioning factors, i.e. delimiters, which are the modes which express an aspect. This [differentiation] is a qualifier of non-existence. When conditioned by differentiation through conditioning factors, non-existence does not stand in contradiction with existent objects. One should correlate it to existence and inexpressibility having introduced such differentiation in utterances.

The relevance of the four basic parameters, and the same holds valid for more parameters than the classical four, is explained by Malliṣeṇa (*Syādvādamañjarī* 24.28-31):

For there would be contradiction only if both existence and non-existence had one and the same conditioning factor. But it is not the case [in the *syādvāda*], because the existence [of the object as *P*] is not [predicated of] with respect to the same fact with respect to which non-existence [as Q is predicated of]. Rather, existence [of the object as P] has a different conditioning factor and non-existence [of the object as Q] has a different conditioning factor. For existence is with respect to the own form [of a real thing], whereas non-existence is with respect to a different form [belonging to another thing].

Such an account clearly avoids an apparent contradiction that '*x* is both P and ~P'; what we have instead is a statement to the effect that '*x* is both P and ~Q'. It is never the case under the *syādvāda* scheme, that one and the same property is affirmed and denied from one and the same viewpoint or under one and the same set of circumstances.

But how should we read and apply this scheme in practice? Malliṣeṇa (*Syādvādamañjarī* 23.113-119) provides a lengthy example of how one should interpret modal sentences by applying the parameters for all the seven figures, and what semantic implications the figures carry:

> [1] As for these [modal sentences, the first figure is:] "in a certain sense", or "somehow", [i.e.] through its own substance, place, time and condition, everything, for instance a pot etc., indeed exists; [it does] not [exist] through another thing's substance, place, time and condition. For it is as follows: With respect to substance, a pot exists as being made of clay and does not exist as something made of water etc. With respect to place, a pot exists as related to [the city of] Pāṭaliputra, it does not exist as related to [the city of] Kanyakubja etc. With respect to time, it exists as related to autumn, not does not exist as related to spring etc. With respect to condition, it exists as something black, not as something red etc. Otherwise, an undesired consequence would follow that [the thing] would abandon its own form by assuming the other form. And in this method the process of [semantic] determination the aim of which is to exclude unintended meanings is employed, because otherwise it would absurdly follow that the same proposition would equally have the meaning which has not been expressed, because its own meaning would not be clearly defined in every case.

As it seems, every affirmative sentence predicates certain properties of a real thing with respect to its particular, individually specific substance, place, time and condition. At the same time it carries a hidden meaning which excludes a range of alternative properties predicable of the thing with regard to the same parameters: substance, place, time and condition. However, what can be, for all practical reasons, explicitly conveyed by an affirmative sentence is merely the former range of meanings.

Accordingly, ordinary sentences should always be interpreted through the parameters, and what the particle *syāt* actually expresses are various perspectives one can take while predicating a particular property of a particular object. Accordingly, if we wish to formally symbolise the *syādvāda*, we should first distinguish (positive and negative) sentences that consist of a subject and a range of predicates R {A, C, E, G, H} of the form: P*x*, and its hidden implied counterpart is: ~Q*x*, with a range of predicates ~Q {B, D, F, H, H}. For instance, the example given by Malliṣeṇa can be said to represent, at its face value, the following situation:

x is A	=	'*x* is made of clay',
x is ~B	=	'*x* is not made of water etc.',
x is C	=	'*x* is related to the city of Pāṭaliputra',
x is ~D	=	'*x* is not related to the city of Kanyakubja etc.',
x is E	=	'*x* is existing in autumn',
x is ~F	=	'*x* is not existing in spring etc.',
x is G	=	'*x* is something black',
x is ~H	=	'*x* is not something red etc.'

It should be noted that all negative predicates ~Q {~B, ~D, ~F, ~H, ...} are merely implied by the affirmative predicates R {A, C, E, G, ...}, but they are not expressly stated in sentences of the first figure: *syād asti*. It is only in the second sort of sentences, negative ones, that the exclusion comes to the fore:

[2] "In a certain sense", or "somehow", the pot etc. indeed does not exist; for in a certain sense there cannot be a thorough determination of the real thing, because its own form is not determined thoroughly when the real thing's non-existence [as Q] is not accepted also on the basis of a different substance etc. [belonging to other things], like [*mutatis mutandis* its existence as P is determined] on the basis of [the real thing's] own substance. And someone who maintains that [the pot] exists in an absolute sense cannot claim that the non-existence [as Q] with respect to the [pot] is not established, because it is somehow established to be congruous with the real thing, just as a proof [requires both positive and negative concomitance] (*Syādvādamañjarī* 23.112-140).

The idea of a description of the thing's essence in a negative manner is related to a considerably common conviction among Indian philosophers that any definition determines the nature of a thing by indicating 'a property which excludes all that is not the thing's nature'. Accordingly, the negative aspect of exclusion, so much emphasised by semantic theory of *anyāpoha* ('exclusion of the other') developed by the Buddhist tradition of Diṅnāga, plays an important role in the Jaina theory of the *syādvāda*.

When the Jainas speak of thing's non-existence (*vastuno 'sattva*) they mean precisely such an exclusion of the properties that do not constitute the thing's essence. Although logically equivalent to 'x is P', to say 'x is not non-P' reveals additional intensional, semantically relevant information.

In Malliṣena's laconic exposition, the combination of the first and second figures should not present any difficulty:

[3] The third one, [i.e. the combination of these two: *syād* and *nāsti*] is absolutely clear.

Since the first and the second figures are logically equivalent, although they do carry different semantic contents, their conjunction involves no contradiction. In addition, it is within our verbal means to express their conjunction. Similarly, the fourth figure which involves the conjunction of the positive and negative statements cannot yield any contradiction, although it is practically inexpressible in the sense that there are no verbal means to express the conjunction with one word.

The outcome of this kind of approach may seem rather trivial and disappointing because all that is meant by the statement *syād avaktavyam* is linguistic incapacity, or human incapability, to express an affirmation of certain properties and negation of some others in one breath, and not some kind of logical third value. It is simply not possible to expressly communicate two ideas simlultaneously, even though they can be logically closely related.

As transpires from the foregoing, the sentential functor *syāt* is itself a kind of variable the actual values of which are various parameters. We can distinguish two types of such parameters (for the second-order parameters see below), whose actual values happen to be, as in the above example: 'made of clay', 'made of water etc.', 'related to the city of Pāṭaliputra', 'related to the city of Kanyakubja etc.', 'existing in autumn', 'existing in spring etc.', 'something black', 'something red', etc. What I call first-order parameters are the traditionally accepted following four:

substance (*dravya*) = S,
place or occurrence (*kṣetra*) = O,
time (*kāla*) = T,
condition (*bhāva*) = C.

Their number can be extended and can include other parameters, such as mode, aspect, relation, distinction, material substratum, serviceability, verbal designation etc., depending on the requirements of the analysis.

In other words, if we want to be more accurate, the ranges of predicates R {A, C, E, G, ...} and ~Q { ~B, ~D, ~F, ~H, ...} turn out to be a predicate P indexed with the set of the four basic parameters {$P^S x$, $P^O x$, $P^T x$, $P^C x$, ...}, for instance as follows:

'With respect to substance, x is ...': $P^S x$,
"With respect to place, x is ...': $P^O x$,
'With respect to time, x is ...': $P^T x$,
'With respect to condition, x is ...': $P^C x$, etc.

However, a closer reading of textual sources shows that this is still a simplification, insofar as what we really have is a case of double indexicality or double parameterisation, i.e. the four basic, first-order parameters are also indexed in at least

twofold fashion as follows: $R^S{}_1x$, $\sim Q^S{}_2x$, $R^O{}_1x$, $\sim Q^O{}_2x$, $R^T{}_1x$, $\sim Q^T{}_2x$, $R^C{}_1x$, $\sim Q^C{}_2x$, ..., for instance:

'with respect to substance S_1, *x* is ...'	:	$R^S{}_1x$,
'with respect to substance S_2, *x* is not ...'	:	$\sim Q^S{}_2x$,
'with respect to place O_1, *x* is ...'	:	$R^O{}_1x$,
'with respect to place O_2, *x* is not ...'	:	$\sim Q^O{}_2x$,
'with respect to time T_1, *x* is ...'	:	$R^T{}_1x$,
'with respect to time T_2, *x* is not ...'	:	$\sim Q^T{}_2x$,
'with respect to condition C_1, *x* is ...'	:	$R^C{}_1x$, etc.
'with respect to condition C_2, *x* is not ...'	:	$\sim Q^C{}_2x$, etc.

We can restate the above set of propositions as a general rule as follows:

$$\forall x \,.\, \exists \sigma \, \sigma \;:\; P^{\pi}x\,,$$

'For every real thing (*vastu*) *x*, there is a particular perspective σ such that it can be interpreted as parameter π with respect to which *x* is P', where π = {*S*, *O*, *T*, *C*} is the set of the first-order parameters of substance = *S*, place (occurrence) = *O*, time = *T*, and condition = *C*.

Thus, every sentence should be taken as embedding a set of hidden parameters that delineate the context, and a predicate, say, P of any statement *x*: P*x* is in fact a compound predicate that should be analysed by way of additional parameters.

3.5 Emphasis

There is still one more important element to take account of, namely emphasis (*arpaṇa/arpaṇā*). The idea comes to the surface from relatively early works onwards, perhaps the earliest being Umāsvāmin's *Tattvārthasūtra*, where we find the expression '*arpitānarpita*' ('emphasised [property] and not-emphasised [property]').

What emphasis (*arpaṇa*) actually means is a verbal pronouncement of a property, whereas 'non-emphasis'

(*anarpaṇa*) means that a property is not explicitly mentioned in a sentence although it is logically implied or entailed. What is important, the emphasis applies only when we want to express two properties, but it is never mentioned when we express just one property.

A fairly early date of first occurrences of the idea of emphasis attests to its being a vital component of the theory of the *syādvāda* from its outset. The idea becomes a standard element in all expositions of the theory. It is usually used to explain the difference between the figures *syād asti nāsti* and *syād avaktavyam*. Referring to the idea of emphasis and its consecutive or simultaneous application in the *Tattvārtharāja-vārttika* 4.42, Akalaṅka clarifies the difference between the third and fourth statements precisely as a difference in a consecutive and simultaneous emphasis:

> The third alternative holds good, insofar as one wants to predicate two [distinct] qualities simultaneously of a numerically one undifferentiated [thing] without any differentiation [between the two]. In this case, when one thing as a whole is consecutively denoted by way of [accentuating] one property of a whole [composite] thing as such with [just] one speech element at one time for each of the first and the second alternatives (figures), [this is consecutiveness]. Similarly, when one wishes to ascribe two opposing qualities, each restricted (sc. expressible by separate words of different denotation), to numerically one thing as an indivisible whole with numerically one speech element at one time simultaneously, without any differentiation [between the two], then it is inexpressible (sc. inexpressible), because there is no such speech element [to convey] this [complex meaning]. In this case, simultaneity (sc. the fourth figure "inexpressible") operates with regard to implied properties without differentiation with respect to time and other [factors], and their differentiation in the case of [the inexpressible proposition] is not possible..

Clearly, for all practical reasons the third statement (*syād asti nāsti*) *consecutively* expresses two distinct properties, that are not contradictory, because they refer to two different contexts, or they have two different sets of parameters. On the other hand, in the fourth statement (*syād avaktavyam*), we have a case of, again, two distinct parameterised properties, which do not stand in contradiction, but there is no linguistic tools at our disposal to express them *simultaneously*. It seems that the 'inexpressible' figure is not a case of indeterminateness or undecidedness either understood as a third logical truth value or in the sense that we are unable to determine which of possible sets of parameters apply.

The idea of simultaneity can, as Akalaṅka points out in the same passage, easily be replaced with the idea of 'equal expressive force' applied to both properties one wishes to predicate of the thing:

> Alternatively, [the figure] is inexpressible because two properties of equal force, inasmuch as both function as primary, cannot be expressly predicated of a real thing as qualities both of which one intends to express, due to the fact that, when verbal designation of one impedes verbal designation of the other, that would entail either that [the object] would be contrary to what one accepts or it would have no qualities.

As he indicates, various other parameters, not necessarily the time factor alone, can be used as criteria of emphasis, the main idea of which is to facilitate a reference point that determines what particular feature can either be affirmed or denied of an object, viz. in what sense a particular thing 'is P' and in what sense it 'is not-Q'. Due to purely practical or verbal limitations, but certainly not logical constraints, the affirmation or denial cannot be asserted of one and the same object simultaneously.

What is called 'simultaneity' (*yaugapadya*) involves the application of one and the same parameter taken as the point of reference which one wishes to apply to various properties affirmed or denied of one and the same thing. In other words, 'simultaneous' predications are those which predicate two incompatible sets of properties of a numerically one object from exactly the same reference point.

We can therefore introduce a new symbol ε for 'emphasis' to a model sentence in our formalisation attempt as follows:

$$\forall x\,.\,\exists\sigma\,\sigma\ :\ \mathrm{P}^{\pi\varepsilon}x$$

> 'For every real thing (*vastu*) x, there is always a particular perspective σ such that it can be interpreted as parameter π with respect to which x is P and the property P is emphasised under condition ε'.

I will use the symbol ϵ_1 'property under emphasis', or 'emphasised property', and ϵ_0 for 'property under no emphasis', or 'property not emphasised'.

Let us see, at least provisionally, before a final attempt of formalisation, how the idea of emphasis can accordingly be applied formally. Closely following Malliṣeṇa's interpretation, Yaśovijaya (c. 1600) describes, in his *Jainatarkabhāṣā* 1.22, section 63, the first figure *syād asti eva ghaṭaḥ* under four parameters:

> [1] 'In a certain sense, i.e. with respect to substance *S*, a given pot x exists as being made of clay' ($A^{S}{}_{1}x$) and 'with respect to substance *S*, a given pot x does not exist as something made of water' ($\sim B^{S}{}_{2}x$) : $A^{S}{}_{1}\epsilon_{1}x$ & $\sim B^{S}{}_{2}\epsilon_{0}x$;
>
> [2] 'In a certain sense, i.e. with respect to place *O*, a given pot x exists in the city of Pāṭaliputra' ($C^{O}{}_{1}x$) and 'with respect to place *O*, a given pot x does not exist in the city of Kānyakubja' ($\sim D^{O}{}_{2}x$): $C^{O}{}_{1}\epsilon_{1}x$ & $\sim D^{O}{}_{1}\epsilon_{0}x$;
>
> [3] 'In a certain sense, i.e. with respect to time *T*, a given pot x exists in the autumn' ($E^{T}{}_{1}x$) and 'with respect to time *T*, a given pot x does not exist in the spring' ($\sim F^{T}{}_{2}x$): $E^{T}{}_{1}\epsilon_{1}x$ & $\sim F^{T}{}_{2}\epsilon_{0}x$;
>
> [4] 'In a certain sense, i.e. with respect to condition *C*, a given pot x exists as something black' ($G^{C}{}_{1}x$) and 'with respect to condition *C*, a given pot x does not exist as something red' ($\sim H^{C}{}_{2}x$): $G^{C}{}_{1}\epsilon_{1}x$ & $\sim H^{C}{}_{2}\epsilon_{0}x$.

3.6. Formalisation

I propose the following way to formalise the seven propositions of the *syādvāda*:

	bhaṅga	formalisation 1:
1.	*syād asti*	$P\pi_1\epsilon_1 x$
2.	*syān nāsti*	$\sim P\pi_2\epsilon_1 x$
3.	*syād avaktavyam*	$P\pi_1\epsilon_0 x$ & $\sim P\pi_2\epsilon_0 x$
4.	*syād asti nāsti*	$P\pi_1\epsilon_1 x$ & $\sim P\pi_2\epsilon_1 x$
5.	*syād asty avaktavyam*	$P\pi_1\epsilon_1 x$ & $P\pi_1\epsilon_0 x$ & $\sim P\pi_2\epsilon_0 x$
6.	*syān nāsti avaktavyam*	$\sim P\pi_2\epsilon_1 x$ & $P\pi_1\epsilon_0 x$ & $\sim P\pi_2\epsilon_0 x$
7.	*syād asti nāsti avaktavyam*	$P\pi_1\epsilon_1 x$ & $\sim P\pi_2\epsilon_1 x$ & $P\pi_1\epsilon_0 x$ & $\sim P\pi_2\epsilon_0 x$

where P is a predicate variable, and comprises a range of positive predicates R {A, C, E, G, ...} and a range of negative predicates Q {B, D, F, H, ...}; π is a set of the first-order parameters {*S*, *O*, *T*, *C*} of substance, place (occurrence), time and condition, which determine in what sense predicate P is to be understood; ϵ is emphasis, which indicates that a given property is either expressed (ϵ_1) or suppressed (ϵ_0).

How to read this? For instance, $P\pi_1\epsilon_1 x$ states that an assertion that an object *x* is P should be understood through a certain first-order parameter π (π_1), e.g. 'in view of its substance, a jar is made of clay', and it is verbally emphasised (ϵ_1), i.e. the predicate is expressly stated in language. The second figure $\sim P\pi_2\epsilon_1 x$ means a proposition stating that the same object *x* is not P should be understood through some other first-order parameter π (π_2), e.g. 'in view of its substance, a jar is not made of water', and likewise it is verbally emphasised (ϵ_1). The third figure $P\pi_1\epsilon_0 x$ & $\sim P\pi_2\epsilon_0 x$ expresses an idea that the object *x* is both $P\pi_1$ and is not $P\pi_2$, but no single term or expression can convey this complex meaning, hence the properties in question are verbally suppressed (ϵ_0).

On this reading, we can see that all the seven figures do not overlap and in each of them the component predicates are not repeated, for instance in figure 7 ($P\pi_1\epsilon_1 x$ & $\sim P\pi_2\epsilon_1 x$ & $P\pi_1\epsilon_0 x$ & $\sim P\pi_2\epsilon_0 x$) no element occurs twice. It is because the

'inexpressible' proposition holds only when both properties are not emphasised at the same time. This corresponds to Akalaṅka's reading of the figure 'inexpressible', in which both properties are not emphasised, or 'non-primary' (*vide supra*), viz. both are conveyed with equally suppressed 'expressive force'.

Final Remarks

There arises a very important question in the general context of the Jaina doctrine of multiplexity of reality (*anekāntavāda*), which is known to comprise three theories: *nikṣepavāda*, *nayavāda* and *syādvāda*, which complement each other. Especially the latter two make an impression that somehow their application overlaps and, indeed, most researchers seem to have treated them jointly, without making a conscious effort to distinguish them or to keep their respective applications distinct. What is then a practical difference of the doctrine of viewpoints (*nayavāda*) and the method of the sevenfold modal description (*saptabhaṅgī*, *syādvāda*)?

The former takes any potentially meaningful sentence as context-dependent and assigns to it a context within which the sentence is true. The *nayavāda* states that, as far as a real thing (*vastu*) is considered, only one aspect of it can be taken into account, albeit the whole range of possible applications and references of the sentence can be conceived of, but these would become meaningful only within a correspondingly delimited range of context. That is why the *nayavāda* is called an 'incomplete account' (*vikalādeśa*), because only one context, out of many, can be verbally expressed by a sentence and is applicable to a particular object under a particular viewpoint. In other words, the *nayavāda* takes a sentence as an object of its analysis and selects a particular context as its proper reference, out of many possible applications. According to this theory, all utterances are in fact incomplete sentences, and the task of the theory is to determine a proper context for a particular sentence by assigning to it its proper point of reference, which is a particular viewpoint. In other words, one sets off with a particular utterance, which is by nature ambiguous, and searches for such a viewpoint, or for an 'indexed level of description', under which the sentence is true and relevant. Thus, the primary object of the *naya-vāda* are statements and their application.

The idea of the 'incomplete account' (*vikalādeśa*), or partial description of an object, which is merely a 'side-effect' of the strategy to assign proper reference to a proposition, is crucial in the way viewpoints operate, whereas cognitive criteria are characterised by the 'complete account' (*sakalādeśa*). The idea is often repeated in Jaina philosophical works and finds its succinct form in an unidentified, often quoted passage:

> A complete account rests on cognitive criteria, [whereas an incomplete account rests on viewpoints.

In contradistinction to the *nayavāda*, the seven-fold modal description takes a real thing (*vastu*) as the object of its analysis and searches for all possible statements that can be made about it. That is why it is called a 'complete account' (*sakalādeśa*), insofar as all possible perspectives relevant in the verbal description of a thing are thereby taken into account. This idea was rather to accommodate all propositions that are conceivable with regard to one and the same object: each of the figures as a distinct locutionary act presents a new context or reveals its new aspect (*deśa*), but does not necessarily have its own distinct truth-value different from truth or falsity. Also, the theory of the seven-fold modal description acts on the presumption that all utterances are incomplete sentences, but the difference as compared to a similar assumption of the *nayavāda* concerns the fact that a sentence undergoes the process of disambiguation through the process of establishing a referential link with its object, which is merely one of innumerable aspects of a real thing. To put it more precisely, one tries to offer a complete account of a real thing and formulates a whole spectrum of assertions and denials about the thing, and the meaning of each and every particular sentence in the seven-fold scheme of such assertions and denials is thereby determined, as if incidentally: it is, so to say, a side effect of the description of a particular real thing in its various aspects. These aspects are proper denotata of a particular sentence, not the real thing as such.

Interestingly enough, in order to incorporate various theories or worldviews into a consistent whole, the Jainas in their textual expositions never apply the *syādvāda*; instead they use a different model, which is the sevenfold method of

'conditionally valid predications' (*nayavāda*). As a rule, we find their attempt to give a meaning to each of various philosophical schools and standpoints in a consistent holistic framework in the context of the *nayavāda*, contrary to what some researchers would expect. On the other hand, 'the doctrine of the seven-fold modal description' (*saptabhaṅgī*) is primarily discussed in three contexts: that of the triple nature of reality, which is believed to consist of 'origination, continuation and decay', that of the relation between the universal and the particular and that of the relationship between the substance and its properties/modes. In short, all these questions could be reduced to that of 'the identity problem': how is it possible that a complex entity, composite and extended in space and time, is one and preserves its identity despite its transformations and similarities to other entities? This finds corroboration in Hemacandra's *Anyayogavyavacchedadvātriṃśikā* 25:

> In a certain sense, any thing (lit. "this very [thing]") is [both] perishing and permanent. In a certain sense, any thing is [both] similar (sc. universal) and unique (particular). In a certain sense, any thing is communicable and incommunicable. In a certain sense, any thing is existent and non-existent. O Lord, this [seven-fold modal description] is the tradition the stream of which proceeds forth as nectar of truth enjoyed by the wise.

In this poetically rather awkward verse, Hemacandra aptly sketches the four main thematic groups to which usually the *syādvāda* is most commonly applied. And indeed, most examples of the application of 'the doctrine of the seven-fold modal description' we come across in various works essentially pertain to one and the same issue: how to preserve the integrity of a composite thing, a problem which is entailed by the question of the relation between permanence and change, also phrased in terms of the question of how to relate the whole and its parts. However, the *syādvāda* is never applied to doxographic analysis or as an instrument to construct typologies of various doctrines or to pigeonhole the opponents.

There is still one more remark to make and it concerns what I would call the 'tolerance myth' of Jainism, repeated in large circles of scholars and Jaina laity. In its popular form the

tolerance myth states that the doctrine of multiplexity of reality was developed by the Jainas, or even by Mahāvīra himself, both as an expression of their intellectual non-violence and tolerance as well as in order to accommodate all conflicting worldviews with the aim of achieving reconciliation or promoting tolerance.

In his well researched review of the dissemination and propagation of the myth in "Intellectual *ahiṃsā* revisited", Philosophy East and West 50, 2000, pp. 324-325, John Cort argues, and I could not agree more, that the modern understanding of Jaina tradition as intellectually pluralistic and tolerant

> is at odds with the one gained from investigating a wider range of sources than just the logic texts themselves. If one looks at other aspects of the Jain religious world-view, in particular the Jain position on the proper path to liberation (*mokṣamārga*), one finds that the Jains accept other points of view as being at best only partially correct and therefore, inevitably, for the most part incorrect. In return, the Jains assert that only the Jain perspective is based on correct perception (*samyag-darśana*) and correct knowledge (*samyakjñāna*), which are correct because they are rooted in the omniscience of the enlightened and liberated Jinas. Further, if one looks at narrative texts and other sources in which one finds expressions of Jain intellectual and social interaction with non-Jains, one finds that the Jains are frequently intolerant and disputatious in their interactions with non-Jains, and coexistence characterized as "intellectual *ahiṃsā*".

Not only stories and narratives, legendary accounts or historical records belie a belief that Jaina spirit of *ahiṃsā* pervades the *anekāntavāda*, a belief that has in the meantime assumed a status of a prevalent article of faith of most modern Jainas, but we find absolutely nothing in Jaina philosophical texts, in which Jaina philosophers reflect either on the nature of non-violence or on the multiplexity of reality but never establish any link between these two themes, until the twentieth century which could lend even symbolic degree of justification for such a belief. On the contrary, the *anekānta-vāda* could be more accurately viewed both as an effective

ideological weapon wielded against other religious traditions and philosophical schools, which are thereby demonstrated to be merely one-sided and true in a very limited sense, and as an expression of the conviction on the part of the Jainas that, since they have such a powerful tool that comprises all partially true worldviews, it is they who enjoy intellectual superiority over other traditions and the supremacy of their salvific doctrine is thereby well grounded.

Jaina doctrine of multiplexity of reality pretends to provide a meta-philosophical vantage point, or present a supra-doxastic scheme that enables one to evaluate the truth and falsity, always said to be partial, of all particular philosophical claims and beliefs in a wider model of truth, available only to the Jainas. However, this claim, instead of promulgating tolerance and equal respect for other convictions, introduces a doctrine of two truths, in a way similar to what we know from, e.g., Mādhyamika or Yogācāra schools. The difference is that the ultimate truth (*paramārthasatya*) is in Jaina hands. And it is in this sense that the *anekāntavāda* can be treated, contrary to modern claims, as a kind of concealed intellectual violence (*hiṃsā*). Of course, this aspect of Jaina theory is in no way different from similar cases of intellectual violence exercised by other religious and philosophical traditions in a context of debate and rivalry in the sense that the latter, too, would waste no opportunity to take advantage of the strength of their own merits and arguments to secure their own privileged position in philosophical or public discourse. This should not obscure, however, obvious philosophical merits of the *syādvāda*, and other components of the *anekāntavāda*, which can justifiably be reckoned among most important contributions of Indian philosophy and continue to be a source of inspiration for logicians and philosophers. And the progression from earlier position to modern stance that takes the *anekāntavāda* as an expression of *ahiṃsā* is socially noteworthy.

PART TWO

SUMMARIES OF WORKS (ARRANGED CHRONOLOGICALLY)

100 DHARMAGHOṢA (1300)

"A pupil of Devendra Sūri of Tapā Gaccha", says NCC 4, 37. NCC 7, p. 82 says "pupil and successor of Devendra." NCC 9, p. 243: "pupil of Devendra Sūri of Tapā Gaccha known as Dharmakīrti before initiation; died in 1301 A.D.; preceptor of Somaprabhasūri and grand-preceptor of Somatilaka Sūri; a *Saptaśatasthānaka* is ascribed to him and his grand-pupil. See Weber 1932. On his works see Winternitz, HIL II, p. 557; also JRK I. p. 126b." Wiles says (p. 208): "Dharmaghoṣa Sūri, his earlier name was Dharmakīrti, pupil and successor of Devendra.." See Peterson IV, p. lxiv for more information, references.

100.356 DHARMAGHOṢA, *Kālasaptatikā(vicāra)*

NCC 4, 37 says this Prakrit work is in 74 Āryā verses. It is published, with the author's Sanskrit commentary, in Atmananda Jainagranthamala 5, Bhavnagar, Bombay 1911-12. NCC 9, p. 243 says "Printed in the Appendix to Bhaktāmara Kāvya Saṃgraha Pt. I. *Āgamodaya Samiti*. Bombay 1926." Also consult JRK p. 86.

100.357 DHARMAGHOṢA, *Saṅgācāra(vṛtti)vidhi* on the *Caityavandanāsūtra*

Wiles, p. 208, says "it was composed before *saṃvat* 1327 (1270). Copy in Jesalmere dated 1329 (1272), probably the author's own copy (JRK 126)." Published, at least partially, from Bombay 1988 as BL1350.D480.

100.358 DHARMAGHOṢA, *Lokanālika-sūtra* or *-dvātriṃśikā*

Velankar, JRK p. 339, says it is published in the Jaina Atmananda Sabha Series 3, Bhavnagar 1911, as well as in *Prakaraṇaratnākara* Vol. II, pp. 720 ff. Manuscripts cited. It is also edited by Vijayajinendra Sūri in *Six Small Tracts of Jaina Doctrines*, published from Lakhabavata-Santipur, Saurastra in 1993.

101 BRAHMADEVA (1300?)

A.N. Upadhye, in his Introduction to the commentary on *Paramatmaprakāśa*, Agra 1973, 1990, pp. 79-81, discusses what we can guess about this author. On pp. 79-81 Upadhye reviews a large amount of information, so extensive that we refrain from trying to quote it here. However, he comes to the conclusion that this "Brahmadeva might be tentatively put in the 13th century A.D." This is mainly based on a manuscript of the commentary copied in *saṃvat* 1485, i.e. 1428 A.D., plus his references to Jayasena, whose dates we have seen must fall in the period 1150-1200. On the other hand, the University of Washington Library as well as other libraries places the author of that commentary in the 17th century, implying that there were at least two different Jain authors by this name.

Upadhye (ibid., p. 74) thinks "Brahmadeva in all probability belongs to the North."

101.359 BRAHMADEVA, *Vṛtti* on Nemicandra Siddhāntin's *Dravyasaṃgraha*

Edited by S.C. Ghoshal, Delhi 1989. It is also printed in the RJSM Series No. 10, Bombay 1919, 1966 and in Sacred Books of the Jainas 1, Arrah 1917; reprinted 1966. Edited by Raj Kishore Jaina, Bhavnagar 1976.

101.360 BRAHMADEVA, *Tattvadīpikā* on Umāsvāti's *Tattvārthasūtra*

NCC 8, p. 79 cites Jainagranthavali p. 89

101.361 BRAHMADEVA, Commentary on Kundakunda's *Pañcāstikāya*

NCC 11, p. 76 says this was "written at the request of Śivakumāra Mahārāja", and provides manuscript citations. A.N. Upadhye (in the Introduction to his edition of Kundakunda's *Pravacanasāra*, Agas 1967, p. 97, footnote 2): "According to Peterson's extracts (Peterson IV, p. 151) there is a commentary of Brahmadevajī on *Pañcāstikāya*, but comparing the extracts given by Peterson I find that it verbally agrees with that of Jayasena..."

101.362 BRAHMADEVA, Commentary on Yogīndudeva's *Paramātmaprakāśa*

Edited by Manoharalal Sastri. RJSM 1916; second edition re-edited by A.N. Upadhye, Agas 1973, 1990 (BL1378.8) A third edition is BL1378.8.Y6412 2000. Also edited and translated into Hindi by J.C. Jain, Agase 1960 BL1375.S43.

102 JINAPRABHĀ SŪRI (1308)

NCC 7 p. 259: "Pupil of Jinasiṃhasūri and Vidyāguru of Saṅghatilaka Sūri (author of Samyāktvasaptatikā); flourished during the close of 12th [sic!] century and beginning of the 13th [sic!]; collaborated with Malliṣeṇa in completing *Syādvādamañjarī* in 1292 A.D.; visited the court of Mahmudshah, successor of Allauddin." For a list of his works see BORI D. XVII. iv. pp. 11-14. Among the many works ascribed to him and mentioned in NCC we choose those that seem most likely to have philosophical content.

Peterson IV, p. xxxvii, provides copious amounts of information, including the following: "Author also of a commentary on the *Ajitaśaṇtistava* of Nandiṣeṇa, which he composed in the city of Dāśarathi (=Sāketapura = Ayodhyā) in *saṃvat* 1365...Ratnaśekhara Sūri, author of the *Nyāyakandalīpañjikā*, studied under him...Helped Malliṣeṇa Sūri with his commentary on the *Syādvādamañjarī* of Hemachandra, *śaka* 1214 (*saṃvat* 1349)....His known dates range from *saṃvat* 1349 to *saṃvat* 1369. His guru Jinasiṃha Sūri founded the Laghukharatara Gaccha in *saṃvat* 1331."

102.363 JINAPRABHĀ SŪRI, *Avacūri* on Bhadrabhu's *Āvaśyakaniryukti*

NCC II gives Jesalmere Skt. Intro. 58. There are other citations of works with this title on the following pages of NCC II. Manuscripts of the commentary on the *Pratyākhyāna* section cited at JRK p. 263.

102.364 JINAPRABHĀ SŪRI, *Jīvānuśāstisamādhi*

NCC 7, p. 298 says this is in Apabhraṃśa. D. Lal at Pattan I, pp. 268-269, provides the opening and closing verses.

102.365 JINAPRABHĀ SŪRI, *Paramasukhadvātriṃśikā* or *Ārādhanāsūtra*

NCC 11, p. 172; JRK p. 236.

102.366 JINAPRABHĀ SŪRI, *Vandanasthānavivaraṇa*

NCC 7, p. 160; JRK p. 341.

102.367 JINAPRABHĀ SŪRI, *Ṭīkā* on Dharmadāsa's (Buddhist) *Vidagdhamukhamaṇḍana*

NCC 7, p. 260 cites manuscripts.

102.368 JINAPRABHĀ SŪRI, *Anuyogacatuṣṭhayavyākhyā*

NCC I, Revised Edition p. 211.

102.369 JINAPRABHĀ SŪRI, *Caturviṃśatikā*

Cf. JRK p. 113 for manuscript. citations.

102.370 JINAPRABHĀ SŪRI, *Vicāraprabhā*

"In 24 stanzas in the Apabhraṃśa language", says JRK p. 350, with [a] manuscript. citation.

102.371 JINAPRABHĀ SÛRI, *Syādvādamañjarī*

Cf. JRK p. 457 for manuscript. citations.

103.372 ŚRĪTILAKA (1317), *Vṛtti* on the *Gautamapṛcchā*

Velankar 1930, #1600 reports on a manuscript of this work and calls this Tilaka "pupil of Devabhadra Sūri, pupil of Abhayadevasūri, the founder of the Rudrapallīya Gaccha. The commentary was composed during the spiritual reign of Candrasūri, successor of Prabhānandasūri, successor of the above-named Devabhadrasūri, who is said to have made a *pratisthā* in *saṃvat* on Mount Abu...Our author was made an

Upādhyāya by Candrasūri's pupil Guṇaśekhara." He was the teacher of Saṅghatilaka, who wrote a commentary on *Saṃyaktvasaptati* in *saṃvat* 1422; see Peterson, Reports, I p. 92."

104 BHUVANATUṄGA SŪRI (1324)

NCC 2, p. 43 says "pupil of Mahendra Sūri; c. 1324 A.D." JRK p. 117 says that Mahendra Sūri was a pupil of Dharmaghoṣa Sūri of the Añcala Gaccha, cites manuscripts.

104.373 BHUVANATUṆGA SŪRI, *Vivaraṇa* on the *Āturapratyākhyānaprakīrṇaka*

Consult NCC 2, 43.

105 JINAKUŚALA SŪRI (1280-1332)

A.K. Chatterjee (CHJ2, pp. 127-128, and also p. 133) tells us a lot about this person, who apparently was the head of the Kharatara Gaccha between 1318 and his death in 1331. "After spending the first two rainy seasons at Patan (Pattana), he decided to visit the two great *tīrthas* at Śatruñjaya and Urjayanta along with his followers...The relevant passages of the *Kharataragaccha Bṛhadgurvāvalī* give an eyewitness account of this pilgrimage undertaken by hundreds of influential Jaina monks and *śrāvakas* from all over India, under the inspiring leadership of that Kharatara Ācārya Jinakuśala. It is of some significance that in connection with the description of this journey, the author has not omitted to mention the extreme hardship inflicted on the hapless inhabitants of Saurāṣṭra by the marauding Muslim soldiers...But the Kharatara Ācārya continued ceaselessly to work for the promotion of Jainism by undertaking repeated journeys and by inducing his followers to build or repair temples...

"The *Kharataragaccha Bṛhadgurvāvalī* also gives a very vivid and detailed account of some of the Jaina *tīrthas* of Sind (Sindhudeśa) visited by Jinakuśala. We should remember that Sind was at that time fully under Muslim control and a majority of the inhabitants of that *janapada* were Muslims. This

courageous monk, it appears from the relevant passages of this extremely informative work, was not afraid of the Muslims, and moved about freely in the towns and villages of that province....It is quite significant that this great Śvetāmbara saint dies in *vīrasaṃvat* 1389 (1331 A.D.) at Devarājapura, a town of Sindhu-maṇḍala..."

Peterson IV, p. xxxiii says he was born in *saṃvat* 1337 (A.D.1280), received *dīkṣā* in *saṃvat* 1347 (A.D.1290) and died in *saṃvat* 1389 (A.D.1332). And on p. xlvii he adds "Taruṇaprabhā Sūri was one of Jinakuśala's pupils. He received *dīkṣā* and *ācāryapada* from Jinakuśala."

Wiley pp. 108-109: "Jinakuśālasūri, Ācārya (1280-1332). Śvetāmbara Mūrtipūjaka Kharatara Gaccha mendicant leader and the third Dādāguru. He was born in the Marwari village of Garh Sivana, Rajasthan, and was named Karman. He was acquainted with the ascetic life at an early age because his paternal uncle was the head of the Kharatara Gaccha. Around 1290, he took initiation and was given the name Kuśalakīrti. Note for his scholarship, he was appointed *ācārya* in 1320. He participated in two large pilgrimages sponsored by prominent businessmen to Mount Śatruñjaya and Mount Girnār during which he consecrated many images, including those of previous Kharatara Gaccha *ācāryas*. He was invited by Jains to come to Sindh to rectify problems within the community, and he brought about a revival of Jainism there. He brought two Hindu deities, White Bhairava and Black Bhairava, under his control He is often portrayed with these two deities, who are shown paying homage to him. He died at Devrajpur in Sindh. Since then, there have been numerous reports of his appearance to devotees. The most famous of these occurred in Sindh, were he is said to have prevented a boat from sinking."

105.374 JINAKUŚALA SŪRI, *Vṛtti* on Jinadatta Sūri's *Caityavandanakulaka*

NCC 7, p. 249: "composed at Barmer. See *Jainism in Rajasthan* p. 155. Published in Shri Jin Duttsuri Prachin Pustakoddhar Fund Series no. 11, N. S. Press, Bombay 1920. See IOPB. 1938, p. 577. Velankar, JRK p. 124 says it was composed in 1326, calls its author "Jinakuśala, pupil and successor of Jinaprabodha of the Kharatara Gaccha; cites manuscripts.

105.375 JINAKUŚALA SŪRI, *Jinacandracatussaptatikā*

See NCC 7, p. 249. Also consult JRK p. 135, which says it is in Apabhraṃśa.

106 RATNASIṂHA SŪRI (1330?)

Ratnasiṃha Sūri was the teacher of Cāritrasundara Gaṇi, who in turn taught Ratnaśekhara Sūri, whose date is fixed at 1391. He is discussed by Peterson IV, pp. ciii-civ, where he is termed "Guru of Vinayendu (Vinayacandra) Sūri, who, in *saṃvat* 1325, composed a short commentary on the *Kalpasūtra*. He was the pupil of Saiddhāntika Sri Munichandra."

106.376 RATNASIṂHA SŪRI, *Ātmānuśāsanakutūhala* or *Ātmānuśāstikulaka*

Consult NCC II, 63.

106.377 RATNASIṂHA SŪRI, *Vṛtti* on Abhayadeva Sūri's *Pudgalaṣaṭtriṃśikā*

NCC XII, 118 suggests that the *Pudgalaṣaṭtriṃśikā* is an "exposition of both the types of *pudgalas*, viz., *sapradeśa* and *apradeśa*, from four viewpoints; based upon *Bhagavatīsūtra* (verse 8) by a saint who flourished before Abhayadeva." But H. D. Velankar, JRK p. 252, cites both this commentary and the separate text of Ratnasiṃha's titled *Pudgalaṣaṭtriṃśikā* listed below (as 106.383). The text and its commentary by Ratnasiṃha Sūri has been published from the Jaina Atmananda Sabha in 1912. See also JRK p. 252.

106.378 RATNASIṂHA SŪRI, Commentary on Abhayadeva's *Nigoḍaṣaṭriṃśikā*

Printed in Jaina Atmananda Sabha, Bhavnagar 1912. See also JRK p. 212 for manuscript citations.

106.379 RATNASIMHA SŪRI, *Arthavāla* on
Abhayadeva Sūri's *Paramāṇukhaṇḍaṣaṭtriṃśikā*

NCC 11, p. 176 says that the work is "Prakrit 36 verses; exposition of *pudgalas*; based on *Bhagavatīsūtra* V. 7." It has been printed in Jaina Atmananda Sabha, Bhavnagar 1912.

106.380 RATNASIMHA SŪRI, *Ṭīkā* on Dharmaghoṣa's
Paramāṇuvicāraṣaṭtriṃśikā

NCC 11, 177.

106.381 RATNASIMHA SŪRI, Commentary on
Abhayadeva Sūri's *Bandhaṣaṭtriṃśikā*

Wiles, p. 75, reports it is published at Jaina Atmananda Sabha, Bhavnagar 1912.

106.382 RATNASIMHA SŪRI, *Ātmatattvavicāra*

It is in 24 stanzas.

106.383 RATNASIMHA SŪRI, *Pudgalaṣaṭtriṃśikā*

Velankar, JRK p. 252 lists this work separately from the *Vṛtti* on Abhayadeva Sūri's work of this title, says it is in 36 *gāthās*.

107 ŚRUTAMUNI (1341)

In Strasbourg, pp. 188-189, we find: "The author Śrutamuni is a pupil of Bālacandra...His...work *Paramāgamasāra* is dated *śaka* 1263 (*saṃvat* 1398).

107.384 ŚRUTAMUNI, *Bhāvatribhaṅgī*

Published in MDJG 20, 1921. J. Mukhtar (Purātana Jaina Vākya Sūci (Sarsawa 1950), Introduction pp. 111-112 says most of the verses are from the *Gomatasāra*.

107.385 ŚRUTAMUNI, *Paramāgamasāra*

Written in 1341; see above.

108 LABDHINIDHĀNA GAṆI (1346)

NCC 7, p. 81 says he was a "pupil of Jinakuśala". Jinakuśala, the author's teacher, was himself a pupil of Jinacandra Sūri of the Kharatara Gaccha, according to Velankar, JRK p. 124.

108.386 LABDHINIDHĀNA GAṆI, *Tippaṇa* on
Jinadattasūri's *Caityavandanakulaka*.

NCC 7, p. 81 says it has been published from the Shri Jin Duttsuri Prachin Pustakoddhar Fund Series 11, N. S. Press, Bombay 1920.

109 RĀJAŚEKHARA SŪRI (1350?)

Velankar 1930, #1634 says "pupil of Śrītilaka of Maladhāri Gaccha...made a *pratiṣṭhā* at Patan in *saṃvat* 1417"; gives spiritual genealogy." This is the same person as the author of the *Pañjikā* on Śrīdhara's *Nyāyakandalī*.

109.387 RĀJAŚEKHARA SŪRI, *Pañjikā* on
Ratnaprabhā Sūri's *Ratnākarāvatārikā*

See Jetly at PAIOC 22, 1965, 239-240. Edited by Hargovinda Das and Becara Das, YJG 1, 1905; 5, 1905 (Emeneau 2708c). Also edited by Dalsukh Bhai Malvania. LD Series 6, 16, 24 (3 volumes) 1965-69 (BC25.D48).

109.388 RĀJAŚEKHARA SŪRI, *Syādvādakalikā*

Edited by Hiralal Hamsaraj. Jamnagar. In 41 *ślokas*. Vadekar at JRK p. 457 says that according to Jainagranthāvalī p. 83 it was composed in *saṃvat*1214, in which case it is not by this Rājaśekhara.

109.389 RĀJAŚEKHARA SŪRI, *Ṣaḍdarśanasamuccaya*

According to Johrapurkar this is published in Yasovijaya Granthamala (Banaras 1909, 1912), as well as Agamodaya Samiti (Surat 1918). It is translated by Kenneth W. Folkert (op. cit.), pp. 361-382. The section (pp. 361-364) of Folkert's

translation, dealing with Jain views, is reproduced here. One should also consult Folkert, ibid., pp. 127-130.

5. "Therein, in the Jaina doctrine the mark
 is first of all the broom
And the mouth-shield; and the dress
 and is known as the loin-cloth, etc.
6. The details in the matter of dress, etc.
 are to be known from the mass of *niryuktis*;
Conduct is characterized by the five *samitis*
 and the three-fold *gupti*.
7. Wandering, careful speech, proper eating,
 sitting for meditation, careful evacuation:
So are known the five *samitis*; the three *guptis*
 involve avoiding contact with women.
8. The Tīrthaṅkaras are twenty-four,
 Vṛṣabha and the rest;
 They are the illuminating suns of complete knowledge,
 being freed from the eight *karmans*' afflictions.
9. The teacher is said to be the keeper
 of the great vow, constant,
Knower of the secrets of all the *āgamas*,
 conqueror of passion, self-esteem, etc., possession-less.
10. Two *pramāṇas* are held herein,
 pratyakṣa and *parokṣa*;
Thereunder, *prameya* is regulated by the *syādvāda*,
 and consists in six substances.
11. *Dharma, adharma*, ether, time,
 matter, and consciousness:
These are known as the six substances;
 their subdivisions are found in the *āgama*.
12. *Jīva, ajīva*, merit and demerit,
 inflow and stoppage,
Bondage, decay, and release: nine *tattvas*
 are held by the *arhats*.
13. *Jīva* is characterized by consciousness;

 ajīva is what is other than that.
Merit consists of agglomerates of good *karman*,
 demerit of agglomerates of bad.
14. Inflows are held to be passions, activity,
 eternal objects, and the like;
That which causes cessation of inflow
 is known as stoppage.
15. Bondage is regarded as the acquisition
 of pure and impure *karman*;
The removal of the mass of previously gotten *karman*
 is known as decay.
16. The fixation of the true nature of the *jīva*
 through destruction of *karman* is release (*śivam*).
It is obtained through faithful conduct
 in accord with these nine *tattvas*.
17. The venerated Śvetāmbaras
 use the '*dharma lābha*' greeting.[2]
They beg food, etc., from door to door,
 like bees going from flower to flower.
18. The well-known *Pramāṇamīmāṃsā*,
 a collection of *pramāṇa*-discussions;
The *Nayacakravāla tarka*,
 and the *Syādvādakalikā*;
19. That sun to the *prameya*-lotus, the *Tattvārtha*,
 the means to all things;
The *Dharmasaṃgrahaṇī*, etc.--this is the mass
 of logic-material in the Jaina teaching.
20. There are two wings to the Jaina doctrine
 Śvetāmbara and Digambara;
The Śvetāmbara were discussed above,
 and now the Digambaras are told.
21. There are four divisions among Digambaras,

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[1]This form of greeting, roughly "May you attain *dharma*", occurs in verse 23; verse 24 contains another, roughly "May your *dharma* increase". (Folkert)

all following the vow of nakedness:
The Kāṣṭhasaṅgha, Mūlasaṅgha,
and the Māthura and Gopyaka Saṅghas.
22. In the Kāṣṭhasaṅgha, the broom is ordained
to be made of the yak's tail.
In the Mūlasaṅgha, the brush is made
of peacock-feathers.
23. The broom has never been an issue
in the Māthura Saṅgha.
The Gopyas sweep with peacock-feathers;
their greeting is '*dharma lābha*'.
24. The rest greet with '*dharma vṛddhi*.'
The Gopyas declare release for women;
The three Saṅghas other than the Gopya
declare that women cannot attain it.
25. Neither the other three nor the Gopyas
hold that an omniscient takes food.
There is no release for one wearing monk's garb,
though he keep the vow well.
26. There are thirty-two obstacles
and fourteen impurities in mendicancy;
How to avoid them
is found in their *āgama*.
27. For the rest, they are like the Śvetāmbaras
in matters of conduct, deity, and teacher;
They accept the logic treatises
composed by the Śvetāmbaras.
28. Theirs are mostly of the same nature,
illuminated by knowledge of the *syādvāda*;
The *Paramāṣṭasahasrī*,
that moon to the *nyāya*-lotuses.
29. The *Siddhāntaśāstra* and other logic-books
are very difficult;
Each word of them is capable
of imparting victory.
30. These divisions in Jaina practice, etc.
will presently be obscured in the Kali-age;
And then these present things, taught here,

will have to be learned from the Jaina *āgama*.
31. One who takes pleasure in the eight-fold *yoga*,
having known correctly the Jaina doctrine,
Having made his *karman* small,
will obtain uninterrupted bliss.

109.390 RĀJAŚEKHARA SŪRI, *Ṭippana* on Siddhasena Mahāmati's *Nyāyāvatāra*

It is edited by Bhagavandeva from Patan 1917 as BL1316.S46.N43.

110.391 MALADHĀRIN BĀLACANDRA (1350?)
Commentary on Yogīndudeva's *Paramātmaprakāśa*

A.N. Upadhye (in the Introduction to the edition of Yogīndu's *Paramatmaprakāśa* and *Yogasāra* (Bombay 1937), pp. 72-74), attributed this Kannada commentary to a Bālacandra different from the one (or ones) cited earlier and later. He says this commentary is "mainly based on Brahmadeva's *Vṛtti*", and that the author "styles himself as Kukkutāsana Maladhāre perhaps to distinguish himself from earlier and contemporary Bālacandras. Bālacandra plainly tells us that he composed this gloss to enlighten the unenlightened by consulting Brahmadeva's commentary...Bālacandra's text contains six verses more [than Bahmadeva's]...It is very rarely that he gives some additional remarks following Brahmadeva".

Upadhye speculates that he may have lived "near about Sravana Belgola". His dating is mainly based on the presumed date of Brahmadeva, discussed above.

111 TARUṆAPRABHA (1354)

Wiles, p. 207 calls him "pupil of Jinacandra Sūri of the Kharatara Gaccha." Velankar, JRK p. 390, adds that Jinacandra Sūri was "successor of Jinaprabodhasūri of the Kharatara Gaccha." The line of successors is given in Peterson IV, p. xlvii, where we are told that Taruṇaprabha was of one of the pupils of Jinakuśala (see above), but his teachers were Yaśaḥkīrti and

Rājendracandra Sūri. "Taruṇaprabha gave *sūrimantra* to Jinapadma and Jinalabdhi the two successors in that order of Jinakuśala (Weber II, pp. 1047-1048) and *padasthāpana* to Jinodaya, who succeeded Jinalabdhi at Cathay in *saṃvat* 1415 (Weber II, p. 1049)."

111.392 TARUṆAPRABHĀ, *Ṭīkā* or *Vivaraṇa* on the *Ṣaḍāvaśyakasūtra* or *Śrāddhapratikramaṇasūtra*

Wiles, p. 207, says this is in Gujarati, composed in *saṃvat* 1411 (1354). Extracts from this are published by Jinavijaya in his *Prācīna Gujarāti-gadyasandarbha*, Ahmedabad 1931. The complete text is published by Prabodha Becaradasa Pandita, Bombay 1976 (Singhi Jaina Granthamala, granthanka 71) (BL1305.S5 no 71), also (BJ1290.T37); it has prefatory matter in English.

112.393 DAYĀSIṂHA GAṆI (1360), *Bālāvabodha* on Śrīcandra Sūri's *Saṃgrahaṇīratna*

Dayāsiṃha Gaṇi was a pupil of Ratnasiṃha Sūri of the Tapā Gaccha, says JRK p. 410, giving several manuscripts.

113 CĀRITRASUNDARA GAṆI (1361)

NCC 7, p. 24 says: "pupil of Ratnasiṃha Sūri and teacher of Ratnaśekhara Sūri (author of *Ācārapradīpa*).

113.394 CĀRITRASUNDARA GAṆI, *Ācāropadeśa*.

Velankar, JRK p. 25, says "it is in six chapters containing 264 *ślokas*. It is published in *Laghu-Prakaraṇasaṃgraha* by Bhimsing Manek, Bombay 1903, and also by Jaina Atmananda Sabha Series Bhavnagar, 1927, and by T.P. Doshi, Ahmedabad A.D.1895." Kapadia 18, p. 227, says: "the six *vargas* respectively containing 62, 65, 53, 28, 33 and 22 verses deal with *ācāra* or conduct-discipline."

114 SOMATILAKA SŪRI (1367)

NCC 5, p. 160 says "Pupil of Somaprabha", whom Velankar 1930 #s1594-95 identifies as "pupil of Dharmaghoṣa, pupil of Devendrasūri of the Tapā Gaccha". Wrote *Śīlataraṅginī* (114.397) in 1338 A.D. See Johrapurkar, p. 92, who says he was of the Rudrapallīya Gaccha and a pupil of Sanghatilaka. A. K. Chatterjee reports that his work *Kumārapālapratibodhacarita* was written in *vīrasaṃvat* 1424" (1367 A.D.). He apparently called himself also Vidyātilaka.

Peterson IV, p. cxxxiv, gives the relevant dates: "born *saṃvat* 1355; *dīkṣā*, *saṃvat* 1369; *sūripada*, *saṃvat* 1373; died *saṃvat* 1424.

114.395 SOMATILAKA SŪRI, *(Nava)* and *(Bṛhat)Kṣetrasamāsa*

Velankar 1930, #s1594-95: "In 387 *gāthās*". Velankar, JRK p. 99, also cites many manuscripts.

114.396 SOMATILAKA SŪRI, *Laghuvṛtti* on Haribhadra Sūri's *Ṣaḍdarśanasamuccaya*

Edited by Mahendra Kumar. JPMJG 36, 1970 (reprinted 1989). Johrapurkar, p. 92 says he wrote this work in 1336. See also JRK pp. 402-403. Also edited by Vijayajambu Suri, Dabhoi 1919, 1949 and from Ahmedabad 1952 (Yale); also edited at Poona in 2002 as Vijayamahodayasurigranthamālā 5.

114.397 SOMATILAKA SŪRI, *Taraṅginī* on Jayakīrti's *Śīlopadeśamālā*

Composed in 1337, says JRK p. 385, who adds that it was composed for the sake of one Chāju son of Lādasādhu. It has been published with Jayakīrti's text by Hiralal Hamsaraj, Jamnagar 1999.

115.398 SANGHATILAKA SURI (1368), *Tattvakaumudī* on Haribhadra Sūri's *Darśanasaptati*

Kapadia (GOS 105, p. xxiv) gives the date of this work's composition and says "it illustrates the main topics of the text by means of narrations. This commentary along with the text has been published in DLJP as No. 35 in 1916 A.D."

Peterson IV, pp. cxxiv-cxxv: "Of the Rudrapallīya Gaccha. Author, in *saṃvat* 1442, of a commentary on a

Saṃyaktvasaptatī (in Prakrit) of an anonymous author...Sanghatilakācārya...wrote the book at the request of his pupil Devendramuni, brother in the faith of another pupil Somatilakācārya."

116 DEVASUNDARA GAṆI (1370)

NCC 9, pp. 124-125, says "50th monk of Tapā Gaccha, pupil and successor of Somatilakasūri and teacher of Jñānasāgara (author of *Uttarādhyāyanasūtrāvacūṇī*)..and (teacher) of Kulamaṇḍana and Guṇaratna Sūri; preceptor, grand-preceptor and predecessor of Somasundaragaṇi (author of *Dīkṣākalyānakāstava*), etc.; preceptor of Sādhuratna Sūri...and also of Munisundara Sūri. For details *Ācārapradīpa*, BORI D. XVIII. i. 136 and *Gacchācāra* with *Vivṛti*, BORI D. XVII. i. 382, iii. 926."

117 JÑĀNACANDRA (1370)

NCC 7 says this author is "pupil of Guṇacandra of Sādhupūrṇimā Gaccha"

117.399 JÑĀNACANDRA, *Ṭīkā* on Guṇabhadra's *Ātmānuśāsana*

NCC 2, p. 63 says this has been printed, see Arrah I-A. p. 2.

117.400 JÑĀNACANDRA, *Ṭippaṇa* on Ratnaprabha Sūri's *Ratnākarāvatārikā*

See YJG 5, 1904, and LD Series 6, 16, 24, 1963-69 for editions. NCC 13, p. 35 and JRK p. 267 cites manuscripts. Velankar 1930, #1635, says "with the assistance of Rājaśekhara Sūri of the Maladhāri Gaccha."

118 GUṆĀKARA *or* GUṆASUNDARA (1370)

NCC 6, p. 58 identifies this author as "of Rudrapallīya Gaccha; pupil of Guṇacandra and successor of Śrītilaka."

118.401 GUṆĀKARA, Commentary on the (or a?) *Ṣaḍdarśanasamuccaya*

NCC 6, p. 58.

119 JAYAŚEKHARA SŪRI (1380)

NCC 7, p. 192 says: "Pupil of Mahendraprabhā Sūri of Añcala Gaccha, contemporary of Merutuṅga (author of *Nemidūtakāvya*, etc. (1346 A.D.). See Indian Antiquary 23, pp. 176-177; [he is] said to have composed twelve other works besides smaller compositions. For genealogy of [the] author see BP. Extrs. pp. 442-443." Kapadia 18, pp. 247-248, gives a list of eighteen different works of this author.

119.402 JAYAŚEKHARA SŪRI, *Ātma(ava)bodhakulaka*

Edited in *Kulasaṃgraha* (Ahmedabad 1915); Bombay 1917.

119.403 JAYAŚEKHARA SŪRI, *Navatattvakulaka*

See NCC 7, p. 192.

119.404 JAYAŚEKHARA SŪRI, *Sambodhasaptatikāprakaraṇa*

Published from Jaina Atmananda Sabha 53 (Bhavnagar 1927). Consult also JRK p. 422, who says that the publication just mentioned contains Guṇavijaya's commentary, and gives manuscript citations.

119.405 JAYAŚEKHARA SŪRI, *Vṛtti* on Maladharin Hemacandra's *Upadeśamālā*.

Cited in NCC II, p. 751 and 7, p. 192. NCC 12, p. 162 says "Añcalika Jayaśekhara composed" an *Avacūri* on the work in 1405 A.D., citing Jainagranthavali p. 184. We assume these are all the same work. It may or may not be the same as the *Avacūri* (also called *Paryāya*) cited in JRK p. 50. JRK p. 254 provides another manuscript citation.

119.406 JAYAŚEKHARA SŪRI, *Upadeśacintāmaṇi/Svopajña Ṭīkā*

NCC 2, p. 347 says this was composed in 1380 A.D. It has been published, with the commentary from Jamnagar 1919. It consists of 540 *gāthās*.

Kapadia 18, pp. 308-310: "A metrical composition in 385 verses in Prakrit, (it) deals with the following topics–(1) eulogy of *dharma*, (2) means of practicing *dharma*, (30 *deśavirati*, and (4) *sarvavirati*....Published with auto-commentary by Harold Hamsaraj, Jamnagar in four parts, *saṃvat* 1977-1980."

119.407 JAYAŚEKHARA SŪRI, *Giranāragiridvātriṃśikā*

Consult NCC 6, p. 19.

119.408 JAYAŚEKHARA SŪRI, *Tribhuvanadīpakaprabandha*

Published in the Jaina Dharmabhyudaya Granthamala, Bhavnagar, according to JRK p. 162.

119.409 JAYAŚEKHARA SŪRI, *Ārādhanāsāra*

See JRK p. 33 for manuscript. citations.

120 DHARMABHŪṢAṆA ĀCĀRYA (1385)

NCC 9, p. 258 says he was a pupil of Vardhamāna Bhaṭṭācārya; lived in the beginning of the 17th cent." But Itaru Wakiryo, in the Introductory material to his edition and translation of the work below, pp. 78, specifies Dharmabhūṣaṇa's dates as 1358-1418+, deriving this from the opinions expressed by Darbarilal Kothiya in the edition of the work published by the Viraseva Mandir from Delhi in 1945. Wakiryo explains: "He (Kothiya) postulates the period of Dharmabhūṣaṇa's accession (to head of the school of Balātkāra or Vallabhamaudya) in the Vijayanagara kingdom) as after 1373 A.D. by taking note of the fact that twelve years passes from the time of completion of (the) Vindhyagiri inscription (1373 A.D.) which does not raise the name of the fifth Dharmabhūṣaṇa till the completion of Vijayanagara inscription (1385 A.D.) which raises it. And, he postulates the period of Dharmabhūṣaṇa as '1355-1418+' on the assumption of the age of Dharmabhūṣaṇa as 20 years old (at the minimum) at the time of his accession."

120.410 DHARMABHŪṢAṆA ĀCĀRYA, *Nyāyadīpaka*

NCC 10, p. 249 says "in 3 *prakāśas*. Printed (1) Kolhapur 1899; (2) with Hindi C. by Nathuram Premi, Bombay 1913; (3) Sanatana Grantha Mala, Benares 1915; (4) Jaina Sahitya Prasaraka Sabha, Bombay 1926. To this must be added the edition by Kothiya noted in the previous paragraph. NCC 8, p. 88 lists a commentary on Umāsvati's *-sūtras* having this title and ascribes it to Dharmabhūṣaṇa, citing Jainagranthavali p. 88; this is presumably the same work.

The work has been edited and translated by Ikaru Wakiryo as Abhinavadharmabhūṣaṇa's *Nyāya-Dīpikā. Primary Text of Jaina Logic and Epistemology* (Delhi 2001. This is our E and T. Wakiryo has also summarized and analyzed a section of the work in an article entitled "Dharmabhūṣaṇa's treatment of *pramāṇa*", in *Jaina Logic and Epistemology* ed. V. N. Jha), Sri Garib Das Oriental Series No. 209, Delhi 1997, pp. 70-77, pp. 73-75.

What we provide below is in effect a translation. It is based on the translation by Wakiryo provided in ET, with emendations for grammatical and stylistic purposes made by the Editor (Potter).

CHAPTER ONE:

I.1-2 (ET105-106) Umāsvati's opening lines (of *Tattvārthasūtra*), viz., "Knowledge (of reality) arises from (understanding) the instruments of knowledge and the perspectives", are intended to describe the ways of understanding the categories, viz., self, etc., as the content of right vision, the means to liberation, the highest human purpose. By those instruments of knowledge and the perspectives those (categories) to be discussed, the self, etc., are rightly understood, since without those (instruments and perspectives) any other knowledge (of reality) is impossible. Furthermore, there are old works discussing those (topics), some of which are large, some difficult and deep, so that beginners cannot understand them. So the present work starts by mentioning this topic, so that beginners may easily understand those topics.

I.3 (ET106) Here the explanation of the instruments and standpoints is accomplished through mentioning, defining and examining them. But since no definition is given none can be defined or examined. It is likewise with respect to (things of) the world and of scripture (*śāstra*).

I.4 (ET107) Still, mentioning is merely giving the name of what is going to be discussed. Defining is the cause of differentiating things occurring together. And according to (Akalaṅka, the author of the (*Tattvārtha Rāja)Vārttika* (II.8), "a definition is that by which difference is known, even when there is similarity"

I.5 (ET107-108) There are two kinds of definitions, in respect of (a thing's essential) nature and not (in such a respect). A definition of a thing's essential nature indicates the nature of an actual entity, e.g., heat of fire. Heat is the essential nature of fire which distinguishes (heat) from what it is not. Different is a definition not in respect of a thing's essential nature, e.g., the stick (as defining) a man (having a stick), which distinguishes a man (from others) by indicating his associations.. This is indicated in the succeeding words of the (same) passage (from Akalaṅka).

I.6 (ET108) (Objection:) A definition indicates a unique (*asādhāraṇa*) property.

(Answer:) That is not correct, since that definition involves the unwanted outcome (*prasaṅga*) of the absence of collocation (*sāmānādhikaraṇya*) between the referent of the defining property and the referent of the property-possessor being defined, and because the stick, etc., would constitute the defining property (of the person), though they are not the (person's) definientia. Moreover, such a definition is too narrow. There are three kinds of fallacious definitions (*lakṣaṇābhāsa*): too narrow (*avyāpti*), too wide (*ativyāpti*), and impossible (*asambhava*). (These are explained with examples.) Therefore what we have indicated is correct.

I.7 (ET109) Examination (*parīkṣā*) is discussion (*vicāra*) of the weakness and strength of arguments that contradict one another, indicating the results of adopting each argument.

I.9 (ET110) An instrument of knowledge is a right

awareness. E.g., "possessing dewlap, etc." defines cow and "heat" defines fire. The word "right" (in "right awareness") excludes doubtful, erroneous and non-ascertaining awareness.

I.10.1 (ET110-111) Doubt is awareness that involves contradictory alternatives, e.g., whether this is a post or a man. Without any determining instrument (*sādhakapramāṇa*), any specific property, and because of the perception of a common property, this (doubtful) awareness embraces many (possible conflicting) alternatives.

I.10.2 (ET111) Error is the determination of one alternative where there is (actually) another one, e.g., awareness of silver where there is actually shell. As in the previous case (of doubt), the awareness is due to the similarity (of silver) to shell.

I.10.3 (ET111) Indecision (*anadhyavasāya*) is thinking "what is this?", e.g., while going along a road one touches something. It is not doubt, since it doesn't involve contradictory alternatives, and it is not error, since there is no determination of one thing where there is actually another one.

I.10.4 (ET112) These three (doubt, error, indefinite awareness) are untrue awarenesses since they do not generate a (correct) conclusion concerning their own content. So they [doubt, etc.] are not right awarenesses.

Even though there is correctness (*samyaktva*) in the knower (*pramātṛ*) and in the conclusion (*pramiti*), since they are without fault, they do not constitute (right) awarenesses.

I.11.1 (ET112) (Objection:) The knower, the concluder, has cognizerness (*jñātṛtva*), not awarenessness (*jñānatva*). But, though the word *jñāna* may exclude the knower, it doesn't exclude the conclusion, since that is in fact right awareness.

I.11.2 (ET112-113) That may be true, if the word "*jñāna*" were an existence-indicator (*bhāvasādhana*). But instead it functions as an instrument-indicator (*karaṇasādhana*), that by which something is known...

I.11.3 (ET113) For any of these words their use as an existence-indicator is different from their use as instrument-indicator. Otherwise one could not explain the co-referentiality of "*pramāṇa*" and "right awareness". Because of this, it is laid

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down (for example in the *Pramāṇanirṇaya*, says T, without identifying which work this may be), that an instrument of knowledge is the most effective (*sādhakatama*) instrument (*karaṇa*, the causal condition *par excellence*) for bringing about a (correct) conclusion.

I.12.1 (ET113-114) (Objection:) Then the definition overextends to the eye, or the *hetu* term, etc., since they too are instruments for knowledge.

I.12.2 (ET114) (Answer:) No, for the eye, etc. are not most effective instruments for cognitions.

(Objection:) Still, a conclusion is the result of an instrument of knowledge.

(Answer:) There is no divergence on that score. But to produce knowledge an awareness unvitiated by ignorance is required; so an instrument of knowledge must contradict ignorance. But the eye, etc. are not contradictory to ignorance, since they are insentient. It is only some sentient property that can contradict ignorance and be an instrument of knowledge. In common experience people use light to remove darkness that is contradictory to it, and not a pot, etc., since they are not contradictory to it.

I.13 (ET114-115) Moreover, the eye, etc. lack most-effective-ness for bring about a knowledge, since they are not capable of cognizing their own selves. For that which is incapable of cognizing itself cannot illuminate other things. A cognition is an illuminator of others as well as itself, e.g., a lamp. Therefore, since it is not the most effective instrument the eye, etc. are not (the most-effective) instruments in producing a valid conclusion.

I.14 (ET115) We commonly say "it is known through the eye", but this involves resort to metaphorical usage (*upacāra*) involving the notion of helpfulness (*sahakāritva*).

(Objection:) Obviously the proponent (*sādhaka*), the most effective instrument, is the helper, since any cause that is the most effective is the most effective instrument. (Cf. *Jainendravyākaraṇa*). So the definition is not too wide.

I.15 (ET115-116) (Objection:) Even then there is over-extension in the case of repeated cognition (*dhārāvāhikabuddhi*), because that is also right awareness.

(Answer:) "This is a pot", "this is a pot" constitute repeated cognition when repeated after knowledge of the pot is established. Repeated cognition of the same pot is not the most effective instrument for knowledge, since knowledge is already established in the first awareness. So how can the definition overextend, since repeated cognition merely generates the awareness of the already cognized?

I.16 (ET116) (Objection:) Well, then it could be argued that if, after seeing a pot and after some interruption, when the pot is seen again the subsequent awareness becomes invalid has to be deemed invalid like repeated awareness.

(Answer: No, since what was known is as good as unknown when there are fallacies; as (Māṇikyanandī, says T) "even an ascertained thing becomes unascertained due to fallacies."

I.1.17 (ET117) In the same way the fault of over-extension is removed in the case of construction-free awareness having the form of awareness of mere being, since that (construction-free) awareness, being uncertain (*avyavasāya*), has no most-effectiveness. For an awareness without a form (*nirākāra*) is not an awareness (at all)! (*Sarvārthasiddhi* II.9 quoted): "vision is without form; awareness has form." So the definition of an instrument of knowledge being right awareness does not over-extend. Nor is it under-extensive, either, since it always pervades both (kinds of) the definiendum, namely direct and indirect knowledge. And the definition is not inapplicable, since its occurrence in the defined is not sublated.

I.18.1 (ET117) What is the truth in a true awareness? It is the non-deviation (*avyabhicāritva*) from the content revealed by it.

I.18.2 (ET118) How is that shown? By itself, says the Mīmāṃsaka, meaning that the validity of a judgment is produced by the generally sufficient condition (*sāmagrī*) by which the awareness itself is produced.

I.18.3 (ET118) But (these Mīmāṃsakas) are not experts in cogitation, since a collection of causal conditions is there in the cases of doubt, etc. which are cases of (erroneous)

awareness. We (Jains), however, say that though the collection of causal factors is the same for both valid and invalid awarenesses, still the distinction between invalid (doubt, etc.) and valid (awareness) is not groundless.

I.18.4 (ET118-119) Therefore, just as (the Mīmāṃsakas say that) defects, etc. constitute an additional causal factors determining invalidity in the case of doubt, etc., similarly (we say) that in the case of knowledge (*pramāṇa*) determination of validity must be occasioned by some other cause (than knowledge itself). Otherwise, the distinction between true and false awarenesses cannot be maintained.

I.19 (ET119) So one should not say that invalidity is extrinsic and validity intrinsic, since that would then be true in the case of error as well. It would then be possible to say (the reverse, that) invalidity is intrinsic and validity extrinsic. Therefore both validity and invalidity must be extrinsic. It cannot be maintained that the collection of causes of cloth in general is the cause of a red cloth; similarly, the collection of causes of awareness in general cannot be the cause of valid knowledge. For it is clear that distinct effects are produced from distinct causes.

I.20 (ET119-120) How is that concluded? In the case of contents previously cognized, knowledge of them is intrinsic. But in the case of objects not (previously) cognized, it is extrinsic...

I.21.1 (ET120) In the case of familiar objects, when the awareness that, e.g., it is water arises, at that very time ascertainment of the knowledge of that is ascertained. Otherwise, in the moment following it there could not be undoubting activity, which of course there is.

I.21.1 (ET120-121) However, in the case of unfamiliar objects, after the judgment "I know water" arises, still the validity of that awareness has to be ascertained extrinsically. Otherwise, in the subsequent moment there could not be any doubt as to its validity. However, doubts do arise: "Is that water or a mirage?"

I.22 (ET121-122) The view of the twins (*yaugāḥ*) (i.e., the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas) is that like the production of an awareness itself, ascertainment of its validity is extrinsic only. However, since (as we have seen) the production of the validity of (judgments about) familiar objects is only intrinsic, it is not possible to maintain that it is also extrinsic. But as to ascertainment of validity, it is sometimes intrinsic and sometimes extrinsic. (The *Pramāṇaparīkṣā*) (?) is again quoted in support.)

I.23 (ET122) Even though the nature of an instrument of knowledge has thus been explained, still we should examine the wrong definitions proposed by others, e.g., the Buddhists, etc.

I.24 (ET122-123) "An instrument of knowledge is a non-deviating (*avisaṃvādi*) awareness" (*Pramāṇavārttika* II.1), say the Buddhists. That is not a proper definition since it is inapplicable. For the Buddhists accept two instruments of knowledge, viz., perception and inference. (Dharmakīrti, *Nyāyabindu* I.3 quoted.) Of these, perception is not non-deviating since what is construction-free (*nirvikalpaka*) cannot contradict the ascription of the ascertainment of its object. Inference also is not non-deviating, since according to that (Buddhist) view inference ranges over universals which are not actually real.

I.25 (ET123) The Bhāṭṭas say: "An instrument of knowledge is that which ascertains an object previously uncognized as what it actually is." (*Śāstradīpikā*) This also is non-pervasive. Even in the case of repeated knowledge there is no determination of an object not previously cognized, which is what is considered an instrument of knowledge by them.

(Objection:) There is determination of an object not previous cognized, since a distinct object is produced at a subsequent moment.

(Answer:) No, since it is impossible to distinguish moments, they are so small.

I.26 (ET124) The Prābhākaras say: "An instrument of knowledge is a direct awareness (*anubhava*)." That too misses the mark. If the word "direct" is an existence-indicator (*bhāvasādhana*) it is too narrow, making the definition under-extend as not applying to knowledge as an instrument-

indicator, but if it is an instrument-indicator it misses its aspect of an existence-indicator. For according to their view an instrument of knowledge to be valid must function as both (action- and instrument-indicator). As Śālikānātha says: "as an existence-indicator consciousness (*saṃvid*) itself is an instrument of knowledge, but as an instrument-indicator it is the contact of the self with the internal organ that is (the instrument of knowledge)." (*Prakaraṇapañjikā*)

I.27 (ET124-125) "An instrument of knowledge is the cause *par excellence* of veridical awareness (*pramākaraṇa*)." (Jayanta, *Nyāyamañjarī*, KSS 106, Varanasi 1934), say the Naiyāyikas. That definition too is defective. If God is accepted as an instrument of knowledge, then the definition will under-extend, since God is the locus and not the instrument of knowledge.

(Objection:) I did not propose this definition (that God is an instrument of knowledge).

(Answer:) But Udayanācārya, the foremost of the Yaugas, states "For us Śiva is the instrument of knowledge." (*Nyāyakusumāñjali* IV.6). Some amateur philosopher (*bāliśāḥ*), in order to avoid this (the fault of under-extension) says: "An instrument of knowledge is either the instrument or locus being the pervader of valid awareness"(*Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha* (GOS 1, 1924 ed.), p. 235.). This comes to saying that either one or the other of instrument or locus is at fault, and so there will be under-pervasion of the definition.

I.28 (ET125-126) There are many other definitions expounded by other systems which we have not considered; but they are not correct definitions. Our view is that it is knowledge alone that is capable of removing ignorance and cognizes what is uncognized and of a qualified nature, and it is capable of revealing the natures of both itself and others.

CHAPTER TWO

II.1 (ET127) Now we explain the nature of the specific instruments of knowledge. They are of two types: direct and indirect. Of these, direct knowledge is (defined as) clear illumination...

II.2 (ET127-128) What is this clearness? It is established by experience due to the destruction or removal of the veil of awareness (*jñānāvaraṇa*) that is not possible through language or inference. We see that an awareness, e.g., this is fire, produced by the sense-organs is different from the awareness this is fire from the statement of a reliable person or (from inference through a) reason, e.g., (because of) smoke, etc. Such a distinction is what is conveyed by the word "purity" (*nairmalya, vaiśadya, spaṣṭatva*). (Akalaṅka's *Nyāyaviniścaya* and Vidyānanda quoted.) All this has been well explained by experts, so no further explanation is required.

II.3 (ET128-129) The Buddhist's (specifically, Dharmakīrti's) definition (of perceptual knowledge) is: "perception is construction-free (*kalpanāpoḍha*) and non-erroneous (*abhrānta*)". By the word "construction-free" construction-filled awareness is excluded, but by the word ""non-erroneous" fallaciousness (*ābhāsa*) is excluded. Thus the meaning is: Perceptual knowledge is construction-free and not erroneous. This is a childish argument, because the non-erroneousness of construction-free awareness is difficult to establish. Being construction-free is not opposed (only) to being erroneous (but to being veridical as well). So how can it [construction-free awareness] be accepted as [valid] perception? For the validity of an awareness is established [partly] through its definiteness (*vyavasāyātmaka*) [and a construction-free awareness is not of anything definite].

II.4.1 (ET129) (Buddhist objection:) Well, construction-free awareness alone is a direct perception and an instrument of knowledge, because it (perception alone) produces the object (that is its content). That (object) alone is what is real (*paramārthasat*), produced by a pure particular (*svalakṣaṇajanya*). But that is not (the case with) construction-filled (awareness). For that (construction-filled) does not produce an object (of knowledge), since its content is a universal which is not a real entity.

II.4.2 (ET129-130) (Answer:) No. As in the case of a lamp, an object does not produce awareness of itself. E.g., (there is a rule that) the relation of cause and effect is

established through positive and negative concomitance only. Then the lamp is not the cause of its awareness, because even in the absence of the lamp awarenesses of cats, etc., which move in the night time arises, and because, even when light is present, awareness does not arise for an owl, e.g. Likewise, the object is not the cause of awareness, because even without an object erroneous awareness arises (examples indicated, such as mosquitoes in one's hair, etc.). So how can one account for the generation of awareness by an object? (Māṇikyanandin's *Parīkṣāmukha* quoted.) It is non-deviation (*avyabhicāra*) alone that is the condition for truth and not the productivity of the object, since the validity of self-awareness (*svasaṃvedana*) is accepted by them (the Buddhists), even though it is not produced by its object. Indeed, nothing is produced from its own self.

II.5 (ET130-132) (Objection:) How can an awareness be the illuminator of something not produced by that awareness?

(Answer: A lamp, though not produced by the pot, is the illuminator of that pot--let your good self be satisfied with this.

(Objection:) Then how can the rule of correspondence be satisfied, the rule that the content of the awareness of a pot is a pot, and not a cloth? The awareness has to be produced from the object that constitutes its content, but you apparently do not accept it.

(Answer:) Fitness (*yogyatā*) alone is the cause of this principle of correspondence.

(Question:) What is this fitness?

(Answer:) It is the destruction of what covers (*āvaraṇa*) the object (*Parīkṣāmukha* II.9 quoted).

II.6 (ET132) This also refutes the theory that the awareness that illuminates an object has the same form (*ākāra*) as that object, since we find that the lamp that illuminates a pot does not have the form of a pot. So there is no reason to suppose that what is produced has a similar form as its producer. Thus a universal, though the content of a construction-filled (*savikalpaka*) awareness, can nevertheless be ultimately real, since there is no contradiction in that. On the contrary, the Buddhist notion of a pure particular is refuted

thus. Thus (for us) a perception cannot be construction-free (*nirvikalpaka*).

II.7.1 (ET132) How then can it be accepted by the Yaugas (Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas) that awareness of relations (*sannikarṣa*) is a causal condition for knowledge, since relations are insentient? How can such (cognitions) be instruments of knowledge? and how can they constitute perception?

II.7.2 (ET133) Moreover, the eye is the producer of the knowledge of color even though it is not related to it, since it cannot cause that (color) to be grasped. So even in the absence of a relation a thing is directly known; perception does not necessarily involve relation.

(Objection:) (The generation of knowledge when) the eye fails to reach the object is never found.

(Answer:) Just such an experience is regularly found.

(Objection:) As in the case of an atom, that the eye reaches (*prāp-*) its object has to be established by inference. Since the atom cannot be established by perception, since it (the awareness) cannot be explained otherwise, in the same manner the reaching of its object by the eye is proved by an inference, viz., the eye illuminates the object it reaches, since it is an external organ, like the tactual organ. Since reaching is itself a relation, there is no failure to pervade a relation.

II.8 (ET134) (Answer:) Not so, for the inference is only apparent. It is like this: Which thesis is maintained in the case of the eye? Is the eye natural or supernatural? If the former (viz., the eye is natural) the reason (in your inference) commits the fault of being mistimed (*kālātyāpadiṣṭa*), since the human eye, being round, cannot literally reach an object. If the latter (viz., the eye is supernatural), the fallacy of unproved locus (*āśrayāsiddhi*) is committed, since a supernatural eye has not yet been shown to exist. So it is clear that the eye causes (awareness) without reaching an object, since it is impossible to explain (otherwise) our simultaneous awareness of moonlight and a branch of a tree, e.g. So even without any connection awareness of color arises through the eye, since relations are non-pervading, even without any connection awareness of color(/form) may be produced by the eye. It is

clear that there is no involvement of a thing's essential nature (*svarūpa*) in perception.

II.9 (ET134-135) This account of the object perceived is well-expressed in (Prabhācandra's) *Prameyakamalamārtaṇḍa* (I.1 and II.4). Since that work is a compilation (*saṃgraha*) it is not (further) explained here. Furthermore, there is no construction-free perception of the sort proposed by the Buddhists, nor any sense-object connection (*indriyārthasannikarṣa*) as accepted by the Yaugas (Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas). Thus it is proved that direct awareness (*pratyakṣa*) is just clear presentation (*viśadapratibhāsa*).

II.10.1 (ET135) There are two kinds of direct awareness, viz., empirical (*sāṃvyavahārika*) and real (*pāramārthika*). Of these, that which is clear in some part(s) is empirical direct awareness...

II.10.2 (ET135-138) It is of four sorts: indistinct (*avagraha*), directed (*īhā*), determinative (*avāya*) and focused concentration (*dhāraṇā*). Of these, indistinct is a particular (kind of) awareness that grasps an actual object qualified by a universal more specific than mere existence through the mediation of mere existence following the connection of a sense-organ and an object, as for example "this is a man" or "this is not doubt". Since it has as its content its own self, by precluding any other content, it has a different defining characteristic from doubt. (Akalaṅka, *Rājavārttika*, I.15.9-10 quoted.)

II.10.3 (ET136-137) Directed awareness is effort to remove doubts arising from an object grasped by indistinct awareness. For example, after one has determined "this object is a person" doubt arises, viz. "is he from the south or from the north"?" To remove this (doubt) the awareness arises "he must be from the south".

II.10.4 (ET137) Determinative awareness is understanding how it is through understanding the specific language, etc., (involved), e.g., "he is definitively from the south".

II.10.5 (ET137) Awareness of this becomes focused concentration through the capacity to avoid forgetting it at a later time, e.g., at a later time one remembers "that is the same person".

II.11.1 (ET137) (Objection:) Any of these may be invalid because they each grasp an object previously grasped, just as in (the case of) repeated (*dhārāvāhika*) awareness.

II.11.2 (ET137-138) No, since these (four) grasp what is not (yet) cognized, because the contents are different. That is, that which is the content of indistinct awareness is not the content of directed awareness, that which is the content of directed awareness is not the content of determinative awareness, etc.

II.11.3 (ET138-139) Each of these four when originated by a sense-organ are called sensory perception; when originated without involving a sense-organ they are called non-sensory perception. There are five sense-organs: touch, taste, smell, sight and hearing; the internal organ (of mind) is not a sense-organ. That (perception) which is caused by these two (sense- and internal-organ) is called "empirical perception" in ordinary usage. (*Parīkṣāmukha* II.5 quoted.) This is perception in a secondary sense (*amukhya*), since it is based on metaphor (*upacāra*); actually it is indirect (*parokṣa*) knowledge, since it is immediate awareness (*matijñāna*). Why is immediate awareness (called) indirect? The *Sūtras* say: "the first two are indirect", the first two being explained as immediate awareness and verbal awareness. Here again the meaning is clarified through appeal to secondary meaning.

II.12 (ET139-140) Real direct awareness is clear entirely. It is of two sorts: partial (*vikala*) and complete (*sakala*). The partial sort is that which grasps some (but not all) objects: it can be either clairvoyance or telepathy. Clairvoyance has material substance only (*rūpidravya*) as its content, and is assisted by the destruction-and-subsidence directed by the energy involved in depleting and destroying that *karman*. Telepathy is awareness of the thoughts in others' minds and is assisted (likewise) by the destruction-and-subsidence directed by the energy involved in depleting and destroying that *karman*. "Immediate awareness" subsumes both clairvoyance and telepathy.

II.13 (ET140) Complete real direct awareness has as its

contents all substance(s) and mode(s). That alone is omniscience (*kevalajñāna*) which is produced from the complete destruction of the obstacles (*ghāti*). (Citing Umāsvāti, *Tattvārthasūtra* I.29.)

II.14 (ET140-141) So these three--clairvoyance, telepathy and omniscience--are real direct awareness, completely clear, since dependent merely on the self.

II.15.1 (ET141) (Objection:) All right, omniscience may be real, but it is not proper to call the other two so, since they are (types of) partial (awareness).

II.15.2 (ET141) (Answer:) No. In this case partiality and totality relate to content. E.g., omniscience is total, because its contents cover all substances and all modes. However, clairvoyance and telepathy are partial, since their contents are only some (substances and modes). But that does not mean they are not real. Like omniscience, since their clarity is complete in regard to their specific contents, they count as real awareness.

II.16.1 (ET142) (Objection:) The word "*akṣa*" means the sense-organs such as the eye, etc., so "*praty-akṣa*" (direct awareness = perception) is what is based on those (sense-organs) and nothing more.

II.16.2 (ET142-143) Not so. In the case of clairvoyance, telepathy and omniscience there is no contradiction in (calling them) perception, even though they depend on the self alone and not on the sense-organs. So clarity is the instigator (*prayojaka*) of perceptivity, not generation by the sense-organs. So concerning (the five kinds of awareness it is (rightly) said (in Umāsvati's *Tattvārthasūtra* I.11-12) "the first two are indirect, the remaining are direct awareness".

II.17 (ET143) Why are they (all) called "*pratyakṣa*"? We say, by convention (*rūḍha*).

II.18.1 (ET143) Or, that which sees, pervades and cognizes is *akṣa*, and that is the self. And awareness which is produced in dependence on that (self) alone is direct awareness. So where is the problem?

II.18.2 (ET143) (Objection:) Then sensory perception should not be perception.

II.18.3 (ET143-144) Sorry, you are forgetting something (we said before). We have already said that sensory awareness is direct perception metaphorically. So sensory awareness may be treated (metaphorically) as not direct awareness--so what? But the claim that awarenesses not derived from the sense-organs are indirect (*parokṣa*) is wrong, since the definition of indirect awareness is absence of clarity.

II.19.1 (ET144) (Objection:) That may be true, it is too extreme to make clairvoyance perception, since it is impossible (in any case). Too postulate the existence of what is impossible would imply that a flower in the sky is real!

II.19.2 (ET144) (Answer:) No, since the existence of a flower in the sky is not proved. But non-sensory awareness is (proved) by instruments of knowledge. Similarly, omniscience is possible in a perfected being (*arhant*), though it is not possible in a person of limited awareness like Kapila, etc. And the Lord (*bhagavān*) is omniscient.

II.20.1 (ET145) (Objection:) Since omniscience itself is unproved, what is the (proof of) a perfected being's omniscience? For one cannot establish the existence in a particular object of something not known to exist.

II.20.2 (ET145) (Answer:) No, for there is the following inference: "subtle, (temporarily) distant and far away objects are perceived by somebody, since they are inferrable, like fire." (Samantabhadra, *Āptamīmāṃsā* 5 quoted.)

II.21 (ET145-146) Things such as atoms, etc. are of natural extreme subtlety. Rāma, etc. who are far away in time are called "distant", and Mt. Meru, etc. which are spatially distant are called "far away" objects. These sorts of things are (nevertheless) property-possessors (*dharmin*).

II.22 (ET146) In "perceived by somebody", the *sādhya* (in Samantabhadra's inference), "perceived" means being the content of a perceptual awareness, since a property of a thing cognized is also the content (of the cognition) by metaphorical extension. "Since they are inferable" is the reason, and "fire" the example. Just as "fire, etc. are perceptible" by someone is established by the inferability of fire, etc., so the perceptibility of atoms, etc. is established (by the inferability of atoms, etc.).

(Objection:) The inferability of atoms is unproved.

(Answer:) No, since all schools agree on their inferability.

II.23.1 (ET146-147) (Objection:) Perhaps someone who has direct awareness of all contents may have the perception of subtle things. But how does that prove that that awareness is super-sensible?

II.23.2 (ET147) (Answer:) It is like this. If that awareness (of subtle, etc. things) were sensory it can't have super-sensible contents, since a sense-organ can only produce the kind of awareness having the kind of content appropriate to it. But subtle, etc. objects are not fit to be cognized by such (sensory) awareness, so one must conclude that awareness of everything involves non-sensory awareness. All who assume omniscience agree on that. And even others (e.g., the Naiyāyikas, says T) hold that "*adṛṣṭa*, etc. are perceived by some, since they are objects (of awareness)."

II.24.1 (ET147-148) (Objection:) Let the definition of agency be the non-sensory perceptual awareness arising directly from any content. But why is it only an *arhant* that can have it? "Somebody" (in Samantabhadra's inference above) covers anybody regardless of their name.

II.24.2 (ET148) (Answer:) True, that inference proved that omniscience is possible in general. That the *arhant* is omniscient is proved by another (different) inference, e.g., the *arhant* alone can be omniscient, since he is free from faults. One who is not omniscient is not free from all faults, as for example the man on the street. This is a negative inference for omniscience.

II.25 (ET148-149) Obstructions, passions, etc. are defects. Ridding oneself of them is faultlessness, which is not achieved without being omniscient, since faultlessness is contradicted by faults such as obstructions, etc. in the cognizer who thus is not omniscient. Thus the presence of faultlessness in the *arhant* proves his omniscience. That faultlessness is also proved by his words, which do not contradict reason (*yukti*) or scripture (*śāstra*), since they accord with the instruments of knowledge and are thus well established.

II.26.1 (ET149) (Objection:) Even then, how is the *arhant* omniscient, since that (omniscience) is possible in Kapila, etc.?

II.26.2 (ET149-151 (Answer:) Kapila, etc. are not omniscient, for they are not free from faults, their contradicting reason and scripture. For their theories of liberation, etc., being one-sided, are contradictory to the instruments of knowledge. (Samantabhadra, *Āptamīmāṃsā* 6-7, 9 and 12 quoted).

II.28 (ET152-153) So it is clear that *arhants* alone have super-sensory omniscience. Because of the truth of this, the truth of super-sensory awarenesses like clairvoyance and telepathy are also proved. So super-sensory awareness is faultless. In this way, the two types of perception, viz., empirical and highest, are proved.

CHAPTER THREE

III.1 (ET152) Here begins an explanation of indirect instruments of knowledge. Indirect awareness is not clear...

III.2 (ET152-153) (Objection:) The contents of indirect instruments of knowledge are universals only.

(Answer:) That is not correct, since the definition commits the fault of impossibility (*asambhavatva*), because both indirect and direct instruments of knowledge have for their actual objects both universals and particulars. E.g., direct knowledge (can be) directed toward objects like pots, etc.; it is seen (there) to grasp the form of a universal property, viz., potness, etc., and simultaneously it grasps the form of distinctness (*vyāvṛtti*) that exists in the object. So involving universals only is not (the definition of) an indirect instrument of knowledge. But non-clarity is (that definition) alone. If either universality alone or particularity alone are taken as the content (of an awareness) it cannot be viewed as an instrument of knowledge, because all instruments of knowledge have actual objects having the forms of both universality and particularity. (*Prameyakamalamārtaṇḍa* IV.1 quoted).

III.3 (ET153-154) There are five (kinds of) indirect instruments of knowledge: memory, recognition, reasoning, inference and scripture. Each of these five arise dependent on

another awareness (than itself): memory depends on previous experience, recognition depends on memory and previous experience; reasoning depends on recognition, memory and previous experience; inference depends on perception of the *hetu*, and scriptural knowledge depends on hearing words and conventional understanding (*saṅketagrahaṇa*). But in the case of perception (*pratyakṣa*) that is not the case, since it arises independently. However, (this) dependence on another on the part of memory, etc. will be shown when they are discussed.

II.4 (ET154-155) What is memory? It is that which recalls the actual entity that was the content of a previous direct experience in the form of "that (thing)", etc., for example, Devadatta...(Previous) experience alone is the root of (that) involving retention (*dhāraṇārūpa*), since in the absence of retention, even when there is indistinct awareness, etc. (of that object) memory (of it) does not occur. For retention produces a trace in the self which helps produce an awareness of that (kind of) content in the future as well...

III.5 (ET155-156) (Objection:) Then memory is invalid through being a grasping of something already grasped.

(Answer:) No. Like directed awareness, etc. memory has a different content. In the case of directed awareness, etc. the validity with respect to a content that has already been grasped through indistinct awareness, etc. is (known) by reference to a particular content different from the content of the directed awareness. Likewise a memory is valid even though the object in retention was already cognized (before retention). The object of retention has this-ness (*idantā*); the object remembered has that-ness (*tattā*). So memory is valid because it delimits its content from faults which are not remembered.

III.6 (ET156) If memory were deemed not to be an instrument of knowledge on the ground that its content has already been cognized, then perception of fire after the same fire has been inferred would be invalid.

III.7 (ET156-157) Furthermore memory is an instrument of knowledge because it is non-deviant (*avisaṃvādi*) like direct knowledge, etc. After being remembered the judgment of an object occurring in a particular place is not a mistaken one.

Where there is wandering there is a fallacious remembrance, as in the case of fallacious perception. So memory is a distinct kind of knowledge.

III.8 (ET157) Recognition is an awareness combining experience and memory. Experience is an awareness involving this-ness. Memory involves that-ness. Awareness combining the two, the content of which is qualified by identity, similarity or dissimilarity to earlier or later (states) is what is called "recognition". For example, "this is that very Jinadatta", "a *gavaya* is like a cow", "a buffalo is different from a cow" (respectively).

III.9 (ET157-158) Those three cases are illustrated.

III.10 (ET158-159) (Objection:) There is no "recognition" apart from experience and memory.

(Answer:) That is not right. Experience has objects existing at the present time only; memory illuminates only things of the past. So how can they (experience and memory) grasp an object which is a combination of past and present as one, similar or dissimilar?

III.11.1 (ET159) (Objection:) Recognition of identity should be included under direct knowledge (perception). It is like this: Awareness which based on positive and negative concomitance with a sense-organ is perception, as is well-known. This recognition (of identity) is based on positive and negative concomitance with a sense-organ, and so is included under perception.

III.11.2 (ET159-160) (Answer:) That is not correct. A sense-organ considers (*parāmarśa*) only (objects) occurring in the present; because of that they are unable to cognize identity between a present content and a past one. If it were otherwise one should be able to have sensory cognition of things not their objects, e.g., the eye could cognize a taste.

III.12.1 (Objection:) Even so, a sense-organ may cognize the unity pervading two (times, present and past) as auxiliary cause of something proximate, as when the eye recognizes a formerly covered object cleared by application of an ointment. The eye does not have the power to cognize a covered object, the capacity to cognize it is gained due to the effects of the

ointment. Likewise, the sense-organs only when assisted by memory, etc. may be held to produce an idea of unity of the two states. So what is the need of constructing (*kalpanā*) an additional kind of instrument of knowledge?

III.12.2 (ET161) (Answer:) That too is not correct. Even though thousands of auxiliary factors are at work, the activity (of a sense-organ) does not occur towards things which are not (fit to be) their contents. Use of ointment in the eye as an auxiliary cause works in perceiving color, but not in experiencing taste, etc., since (the eye) is not the (relevant) content in that case. So a distinct instrument of knowledge should be assumed to cognize (the unity of past and present), because in all (the systems) different instruments of knowledge are based on distinctions between (the varieties of) their contents.

III.12.3 (ET161-162) Moreover, the awareness "it is the same" is not an immediate (*spaṣṭa*) one, and so recognition is not included under perception. And this too should certainly be recognized, that the eye does not have the capacity to produce an awareness of singleness. Otherwise the eye could produce awareness of a fire's having a mark (say, smoke) with the assistance of seeing the mark and remembering pervasion, so that inference will not constitute a distinct instrument of knowledge (from perception).

III.12.4 (ET162) Since the eye, e.g., operates only towards its corresponding object, it is not capable of generating awareness of the thing to be proved (*liṅgin*, here that smoky thing's being fire).

III.13.1 (ET162) (Objection:) Some say that recognition of similarity is a distinct kind of instrument of knowledge, namely comparison (*upamāna*).

III.13.2 (ET162-163) That is not right, for then awareness based on a combination of memory and previous experience would be a still different thing. Furthermore, the awareness of dissimilarity, e.g., "a buffalo is different from a cow" and the awareness "this is far from that" would (each) have to be regarded as still other distinct instruments of knowledge, having different counter-positives. So, like that

awareness of dissimilarity, recognition of similarity also is (just) recognition. This is the correct account.

III.14 (ET163-164) Then, what is reasoning (*tarka*)? It is awareness of pervasion. And invariable concomitance is non-deviation (*avinābhāva*), a particular relation that does not allow for wandering, and which is the instigator (*prayojaka*) of the understanding of the cognizer and what is cognized concerning the thing to be proved and its proof. Because of this capacity (of pervasion), fire and not a pot is inferred from smoke, because of the absence of pervasion between smoke and pot. The most effective cause of the awareness of pervasion involving this non-deviation of the things to be proved and its proof is the instrument of knowledge termed *tarka*. (Vidyānanda, *Tattvārthaślokavārttika* I.13.5 quoted.) Another name for reasoning is *ūha*.

III.15 (ET164-165) What is an example of reasoning? It is said: wherever there is smoke-possession there is fire-possession. Where smoke is present fire is regularly cognized, and in the absence of fire smoke is never cognized, (leading to the conclusion) "at all time and all places smoke does not occur without fire", after which arises knowledge of non-deviation. Reasoning is different from direct awareness. Because perception can only cognize the relationship between nearby cases of smoke and fire it cannot be the cognizer of pervasion. Pervasion applies to all cases (*sarvopasaṃhāra*).

III.16.1 (ET165-166) (Objection:) Even if mere perception cannot cognize pervasion, still a qualified perception can do so. It is like this: One first perceives smoke with fire in a kitchen; after that a series of (such) perceptions arises but they are incapable of generating awareness of pervasion. But a (certain sort of) qualified perception which is accompanied by recognition of a form involving a whole class along with the memory of smokes and fires experienced earlier, determines the pervasion that applies in all cases.

III.16.2 (ET166-167) And so what is the need to postulate reasoning as an added kind of instrument of knowledge.

(Answer:) These (who propose this objection) do not

understand the ways of logic. For even where thousands of auxiliary factors are present, one can nevertheless not perceive an object which is not present, as we have seen. So, awareness of pervasion produced by perception cannot occur. What can occur is this, the grasping of pervasion arising from memory, recognition and repeated experiencing of direct perceptions, and this it is that constitutes reasoning. Inference, etc. cannot lead to the grasping of pervasion.

III.17 (ET167) But Buddhists say that conceptual construction (*vikalpa*) arising after direct perception is what grasps pervasion. They should be asked: Is that (conceptual construction) an instrument of knowledge or not? If it is not, then how can the pervasion that it grasps be known as true? If it is an instrument of knowledge, is it direct perception or inference? It cannot be direct perception, because it does not appear [as such?]. But it can't be inference either, because it does not arise from awareness of a mark.

(Objection:) It is a still-different instrument of knowledge (other than perception or inference).

(Answer:) Then it should be recognized as (our so-called) "reasoning".

III.18 (ET167-169) Knowledge of the thing to be proved (*sādhya*) on the basis of a reason (*sādhana*) constitutes inference...Knowledge of the *sādhya*, viz., fire, as the property-possessor of smoke, is inference, because that (knowledge of the reason) alone removes the preceding obstacle, viz., ignorance about there being fire (present). Again, inference is not knowledge of the reason, because that (knowledge) is not capable of removing the ignorance about the *sādhya*, since it is exhausted in merely removing the obstacle in the *hetu* itself. So the Naiyāyika's definition of inference, viz., "inference is recollection together with the mark" (*Nyayāvārttika ad* I.1.5) is the statement of a badly-brought-up harlot (?-*avinītalāsita*?)! But we say that recollection of the mark assisted by memory and pervasion is the cause of an argument's having the nature of inferential knowledge, as experience is the cause of having the form of memory, etc. Experience involving retention is the cause of memory, immediate experiences and memories are the

cause of recognition, and the directly-experienced recognitions and the remembrances that are the content of the thesis and the reason constitute the cause of reasoning. Similarly, knowledge of the mark assisted by remembering pervasion is the essential cause for inference.

III.19.1 (ET169) (Objection:) You seem to be saying that the *hetu* (term) is the cause of inference and not knowledge of it, for you said (in the previous section) "knowledge of the thing to be proved on the basis of a reason".

III19.2 (ET170) (Answer:) No. "On the basis of a reason" is intended to mean "on the basis of the definite and certain ascertainment of smoke". (Citing *Tattvārthaślokavārttika* I.13.120.)...If an unknown *hetu* could produce awareness of the *sādhya*, then knowledge of fire could be derived from uncognized smoke--uncognized because one is asleep, say.

III.20 (ET170-171) (Question:) What is this reason which causes awareness of the *sādhya*? Is it inference?

(Answer:) The reason is not possible without there being a definite *sādhya* (involved)...(Bhaṭṭāraka Kumārānandin quoted.)

III.21 (ET171-172) (Question:) What is this thesis (*sādhya)* in the absence of which there can be no reason?

(Answer:) The thesis is (something) possible, that is intended (to be proved), and that is not yet established (as proved). "(Something) possible", i.e., that is not sublatable by an instrument of knowledge such as perception, etc. It must be intended as the view of the proponents, but not yet established, since it is involved in doubt, etc. If what is not possible to establish becomes a thesis, one could have "fire is cold" as a thesis. On the other hand, if what was not intended becomes the thesis there arises uselessness in subsequent inferences (about it). (Akalaṅka, *Nyāyaviniścaya* 172 quoted.)

III.22 (ET172-173) The thesis must be possible, what was intended, and not as yet established. Otherwise one has a fallacy of the thesis, contradictory, etc. A contradictory thesis is one that is sublated by perception, etc., where the "etc." covers cases where (the thesis is) unintended or already established. Why? Because these three do not correctly represent the

content(s) of the reason, since they cannot occur in the range of things covered by the reason. This is the gist of Akalaṅka's view, but it is (also) known to (Vādirāja, the author of) the *Syādvādavidyāpati*. (Vidyānanda's *Ślokavārttika* is quoted in support.)

III.23 (ET173) So, inference is shown to be awareness of a thesis which is possible, intended and as yet unproved on the basis of a reason satisfying the definition of invariable connection.

III.24 (ET173-174) Inference is of two kinds, for oneself and for others. Of these, inference for oneself is the awareness of a conclusion on the basis of a reason that has been ascertained by oneself. For example, awareness of fire on a mountain produced by the reason "because of smoke", when accompanied by the memory of pervasion produced by experience following previous reasoning and independent of communication from others is inference for oneself. For example, "this mountain possesses fire because of possessing smoke"--this is an inference for onself having the form of an awareness expressed in words, just as "this is a pot" is a perception based on words.

III.25 (ET174-175) An inference for oneself has three components--a property-possessor (*dharmin*), a thing to be proved (*sādhya*) and a reason (*sādhana*). Of these, the reason is a component through causing the awareness; the thing to be proved is a component through being the awareness caused; and the property-possessor is a component through being the locus of the thesis-property. For proving the thesis through its having its abode in some particular locus is the purpose of an inference, since the thesis alone is established just at the time of ascertaining the pervasion "wherever there is smokeness, there there is fireness".

III.26 (ET175-176) Otherwise, (one may say that) inference for oneself has two components, a thesis (*pakṣa*) and a reason (*hetu*), since the thesis is constituted by a property-possessor qualified by the property to be proved. Which one prefers (three or two components) depends on what one desires to emphasize.

III.27 (ET176) Sometimes proof of the property-possessor is through an instrument of knowledge, and sometimes through conceptual construction (*vikalpa*), and sometimes in both ways. Of these, the first, through an instrument of knowledge, means through any instrument, direct awareness (or perception, *pratyakṣa*), etc. The second, proof through conceptual construction, occurs when it is not certain whether the awareness (of the property-possessor) is valid or invalid. And the third involves both direct awareness and conceptual construction.

III.28 (ET177-178) A property-possessor established by an instrument of knowledge would be, e.g. "the mountain is in (the class of things pervaded by) fire-possession, because it has smoke.", and it is experienced perceptually. An example of (the second case, viz., proof of the property-possessor through conceptual construction) would be, e.g., "an omniscient person exists, because there is an instrument of knowledge which refutes any relevant impossibility". Here an omniscient person is the thing to be proved. Again, in "a hare's horn does not exist", the hare's horn is the thing whose nonexistence is to be proved. Omniscience is not proved by any instrument of knowledge such as perception, etc. prior to its establishment as existent; what is proved is merely the idea (*pratīti*) (of omniscience). So we say that this property-possessor is established through conceptual construction. Likewise, the hare's horn is established not to exist through the proof of its prior conceptual construction. An example of (the third case, viz., "in both ways") would be "sound is an evolute (*pariṇāmī*), because it is produced". Here sound is the property-possessor, and (only) present sound is cognized by perception, cognition of past and future sounds requires conceptual construction. But all these (three) sounds are (parts of) the property-possessor (viz., sound), so it is said to be proved "in both ways". Proof of a thesis established in both ways is as one pleases. But in the case of a property-possessor proved through conceptual construction there is proving only of existence or nonexistence--that is the rule....

III.29 (ET178) So inference for oneself is where a reason

not dependent on any other factor is seen to occur in a thing to be proved through its existence in a property-possessor...

III.30 (ET179) Inference for others is the awareness of a thing to be proved on the basis of a reason based on the experience of another. What is meant is that an inference for others involves the cognition of what is to be proved on the basis of a reason that becomes known to a listener on the basis of the other's statement of thesis, reason, etc...

III.31 (ET179-180) Some say that an inference for others is only the sentence (expressing the inference) conveyed to another. They should be asked whether (that expresses) the primary or the secondary sense (of the term)? Not the primary sense, since a sentence cannot constitute knowledge. If then they say it is so in a secondary sense, we agree, (it is so only metaphorically).

III.32 (ET180-181) The expression of the parts of an inference for others is the same as that for inference for oneself. The occasion for inference for others comprises two sentences, a thesis and a reason. The thesis is constituted by a statement involving a combination of a property and a property-possessor, e.g., "this mountain has fire". A reason expresses a reason concomitant with the thesis, e.g., "(because of) nonexistence of smoke-possession (without fire-possession)" or "(because) it (this mountain) possesses smoke." The alternative reasons are merely a matter of alternative usages....The two are not (really) different, since in both cases the pervasion and the reason are the same...

III.33 (ET182-184) The Nyāya account of the five components of an inference is explained.

III.34 (ET184) (Objection:) (All) these five components may be required in a discussion without desire (to win), but where there is a desire to win the thesis and the reason are sufficient: what is the point of the other (three) components?

III.35 (ET184-186) Discussion with desire to win is debate involving a proponent and an opponent, and each continues to try to establish his view up to the victory of one and defeat of the other. But discussion without desire to win, between teacher and student or among those free from attachment and aversion, continues up to ascertainment of reality. Such discussion has been called debate (*vāda*) by some, but discussion between student and teacher is not called "debate" normally; debate involves desire for victory. E.g., it is said that Samantabhadra defeated one-sided views everywhere. In debate only the two components--thesis and reason--are useful, not the examples, etc. It is like this: there must be a reason, an expression of the mark (*liṅga*), since without it there could not be inference at all. And there must be a thesis (*pratijñā*), an expression of that which is to be proved. Without it the listener would be in doubt about what is being proved, and no inferential result (*anumiti*) could arise...Here (even without the other three components) the debate continues...

III.36 (ET186-187) (Objection:) May be, but even in stating a thesis there is repetition, since the *pakṣa* is contextually understood (as part of the thesis). So only one component, viz., the reason, is required to be used.

(Answer:) Thus the animal (*paśu*) Buddhists show their unsophisticatedness. For merely by stating the reason an intelligent person cannot remove doubt about what is the thesis. So there must be a statement of a proposition so as to remove any doubt about what the thesis is. So both thesis and reason are required to be stated. (We are referred to the (lost?) *Patraparīkṣā*.)

III.37 (ET187-188) (Kumāranandin Bhaṭṭāraka, in his *Vādaratnākara*, has indicated that the number of members in inference can be anywhere from two to five depending on the needs of the hearer...

III.38 (ET188-190) Even though it is clear that the foregoing explains the reason in the only way that makes inference possible, nevertheless others thinking in the way of *arhants* (i.e., Buddhists) explain in a different way that which cannot be counted as reason. They say that an inference arises from the threefold mark--(the *hetu* term's) qualifying the *pakṣa* (*pakṣadharmatva*), etc. The three forms of a (satisfactory) reason are (the *hetu* term's qualifying the *pakṣa*, presence (of the *hetu* property) in the *sapakṣa*, and absence (of the *hetu* property) from (all of) the *vipakṣa*. A *pakṣa* is a property

possessor having the property being inferred (*sādhya*), for example, the mountain when smoke is what is inferred (there). The pervasive existence of (the *hetu* property) in that (*pakṣa*) is what is known as its having the property being inferred (*pakṣadharmatva*). The *sapakṣa* is a possessor of the property belonging to the thing being inferred, e.g., a kitchen (in the case of the inference from smoke to fire). The *hetu* property may occur in all or only a part of the *sapakṣa*. A *vipakṣa* is a property-possessor having a property contradictory to the property being inferred, for example, a lake (in the case of the inference from smoke to fire). The *hetu* property must fail to occur in any of the *vipakṣa*. Having all three of these features is the definition of a (satisfactory) reason; if any (of the three) are absent it is termed a fallacious reason (*hetvābhāsa*).

III.39 (ET190-191) But that (the Buddhists') definition is not correct..."The constellation *śakaṭa* will rise in one *muhūrta* (= 48 minutes), because the constellation *kṛttikā* is rising now" is a valid inference, but since the *hetu* term ("arising at present") does not exist in the *pakṣa* (the constellation *śakaṭa*). So the Buddhist definition is too narrow (*avyāpta*).

III.40 (ET191-194) But the Naiyāyikas define the (satisfactory) reason as involving five features, adding to the above threefold list two more: that the reason not be sublated (by an instrument of knowledge) (*abādhitaviṣayatva*) and that it not be counterbalanced (*asatpratipakṣatva*) (by an equally strong reason for the reason's absence from the *pakṣa*). Examples are given...

III.41 (ET194-196) There are five (kinds of) fallacious reasons deviating in one way or another from these features (say the Naiyāyikas). They are called "unproved (*asiddha*)", "contradictory (*viruddha*), "inconclusive (*anaikāntika*)", "mistimed (*kālātyayāpadiṣṭa*)" and "counterbalanced" (*prakaraṇasama*)". Examples of each are given.

III.42 (ET196-197) But this account given by the Naiyāyikas is not correct. The five features still do not cover the case of the two constellations (cf. III.39 above).

III.43 (ET197-198) Furthermore, (the Naiyāyikas) accept as valid the only-positive and only-negative reasons even though the five criteria are not satisfied. A reason that satisfies both positive and negative concomitance satisfies those five criteria...

III.44 (E198-199) But in an only-positive (*kevalānvayin*) inference like, e.g., "*adṛṣṭa* must be seen by someone, since it can be inferred; what is perceptible is also inferrable by someone, e.g., fire", though there is a positive example (viz., fire), there is no *vipakṣa* that can be given (if there were it would have to be something not inferrable by anyone, and there is no such thing). So this is an only-positive inference, (which is valid indeed, but fails to satisfy all five of the Naiyāyika's requirements for a reason's being valid.).

III.45 (E199-200) An only-negative inference is where the *hetu* term is excluded from any *vipakṣa* but there is no *sapakṣa*. An example is "a living body must have a self, since it breathes, etc.; whatever does not have a self cannot breathe, e.g., a stone.".. Here there can be no *sapakṣa* (something other than the *pakṣa* having the *hetu*-property), since everything that could constitute a similar instance, i.e., has a self, is a living body (which is the *pakṣa*).

III.46 (ET200) So in those two cases (of only-positive and only-negative inference) there is deviation from the Nyāya definition of a valid inference. But (our) definition involving the impossibility of the *hetu* in the absence of the *sādhya* (termed *anyathānupapatti*) is satisfactory, because it applies to all cases where there is pervasion of the *hetu* by the *sādhya*. For a *hetu* cannot produce the *sādhya* by itself.

III.47 (ET200-202) (Objection:) The specification of those five features is to remove the five kinds of faults like unproved, etc.

(Answer:) No, for the correction (of unproved, etc.) is accomplished through acceptance of our definition involving the impossibility of the *hetu* in the absence of the *sādhya*. (*Prameyakamalamārtaṇḍa* III.25 quoted).

(Question:) Since visual perceptibility, etc. which are normally needed to prove the non-eternality of sound, etc, is (in the case of the two constellations) absent, how can the impossibility of the *hetu* in the absence of the *sādhya* be

known?

(Answer:) Though that problem leads to fallaciousness in the case of the non-eternality of sound, it does not mean that the first mark (of the three marks of a valid inference, viz., *pakṣadharmatva*) is not satisfied (in the argument about the constellations) where the *hetu*'s particular place of arising is not known (by perception, etc.), for the rising of *kṛttikā* constitutes a proper mark (*hetu*) because it satisfies the definition of a *hetu* already stated above. That is clear from the case of the contradictory mark, etc. (explained previously)...

III.48 (ET202-203) Again, the argument "Maitrī's child (in the womb) is black(-complexioned), because it is the child of Maitrī, like Maitrī's (already born) child", which is obviously fallacious, satisfies both the threefold mark (of the Buddhists) and the five-fold mark (of the Naiyāyikas). Yet it is known to be fallacious, since it is possible he may be light(-complexioned). Here there is non-establishment of darkness in Maitrī's unborn child, since there is no necessity of sequence (for the skin color of a child to match that of the parent).

III.49-50 (ET203-204) That lack of necessity in that example further explained.

III.51 (ET207) So do not define a *hetu* as having those five marks. What then?

(Objection:) It is having the five marks qualified by impossibility otherwise (*anyathānupapatti*).

(Answer:) Then let it be impossibility otherwise alone, since without that, even if the other five are satisfied, it is not a (valid) *hetu*; witness our previous discussion of the argument about the two constellations, etc.

III.52 (ET207-208) The same needs to be said to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas (here called "the twins").

III.53.1 (ET208-209) There are two kinds of reason (*hetu*) (in inference: positive (*vidhi*) and negative (*pratiṣedha*). The positive kind is itself of two kinds, viz., that kind of positive reason which establishes something positive, and that kind of positive reason which establishes something negative. The first has many examples, e.g., as an effect, e.g., "this mountain possesses fire, since without its possessing fire its possessing smoke is impossible", or as a cause, e.g., "it will rain, because without a particular (kind of) cloud rain is impossible. (Here the) cause is a particular cloud which, being the cause of rain, generates the knowledge of rain as its effect.

III.53.2 (ET209-210) (Objection:) An effect may well generate inference of its cause, since an effect cannot occur without a cause. But a cause may occur without its effect, e.g., the existence of fire in the absence of smoke. So fire does not cause the awareness of smoke.

III.53.3 (ET210) (Answer:) That is not right, since there is nothing wrong in attributing causality with regard to an effect to something that is capable of generating awareness of the effect and is non-deviating from it (the effect).

III.54 (ET210-211) Another kind (of the positive kind of reason) is as specific (*viśeṣa*), e.g. "this is a tree, since without its possessing *śiṃśapā*-ness its being a tree is impossible." Here the *śiṃśapā* is (the specific thing), and that specific tree generates the awareness of treeness. For a thing cannot be a particular tree without there being tree(ness) in general. Still another kind (of positive reason) is as preceding (*pūrvacara*), e.g., "the constellation *śakaṭa* will rise, because without the *kṛttikā* constellation rising the rising of *śakaṭa* is impossible"...Again, another kind of case is as subsequent (*uttaracara*), e.g., "*bharaṇi* (a star) rises before *udga* (another star), since *kṛttikā* rises (after *bharaṇi*)." Still another case is that of simultaneity, e.g., "the *mātuliṅga* fruit must possess color, because without its possessing color its possessing taste is impossible", since the possession of taste and color is simultaneous.

III.55 (ET211-212) In all these cases the *hetus* are all positive reasons that establish something positive.

III.56 (ET212-213) The second kind (of positive reason) is that which establishes something negative. For example, "this self has no falseness, because without its being religious (*āstikya*) its not having falseness is not possible." Religiosity is the property of having faith in the teacher's being omniscient coupled with lack of desire. Or, e.g., "real things are not always one-sided (*sarvathaikānta*), because, without things not being

one way (*anekānta*) or another, one-sidedness is not possible." This demolishes the position of the Buddhists (*saugata*), etc.

III.57 (ET213) (Objection:) What is this "not being one way or another " (*anekāntātmakatva*)? Is it the complete absence of one-sidedness in every actual entity?

(Answer:) Objects like selves, etc. are not completely (one-sided); there are presences and absences, many-sided and one-sided, eternal and non-eternal, etc; this is (what we consider) "not being one way or another". Thus is explained the positive reason.

III.58 (ET213-214) A negative reason also has two varieties, that which establishes something positive and that which establishes something negative. Of these, an example of the first is "here there is right inclination in the self, because of the absence of perverse devotion (*abhiniveśa*)." Here the absence of perverse devotion proves the existence of right inclination, so a negative reason proves a positive conclusion.

III.59 (ET214) Here is an example of second variety (of negative reason), "Here there is no smoke because there is no fire". In this case the absence of fire is has a negative form, and establishes the absence of smoke, which also has a negative form; so a negative reason proves a negative conclusion. Further subdivisions of these can be found in (Māṇikyanandin's) *Parīkṣāmukha*. Not otherwise, though, for that constitutes a fallacious reason.

III.60 (ET214-216) What are fallacious reasons? A fallacious reason is one that resembles a valid reason but lacks its marks. Fallacious reasons are of four sorts: unproved (*asiddha*), contradictory (*viruddha*), inconclusive (*anaikāntika*) and incapable (*akiñcitkāra*). (An) unproved (reason) is one for which no determining example is found, because of certainty about the absence of its essential nature or the doubtfulness concerning its nature...An example of the first kind (absence of essential nature) is "a word changes because it is perceptible by the eye". A word is not perceptible by the eye, because it is audible (not visible). So it's being perceptible by the eye is a fallacious reason. An example of the second kind (doubtfulness concerning its nature) is "this place has fire because it has

smoke" when it is unclear whether it is smoke or fog that is present.

III.61 (ET216) A reason that contradicts what is being proved (*sādhya*) is the contradictory sort of fallacious reason, e.g., "language is unchanging because it is produced." Productivity is pervaded by changing-ness, which is contradictory to unchanging-ness.

III.62 (ET216-219) An inconclusive reason is one which exists in the *pakṣa*, the *sapakṣa*, and the *vipakṣa*. It has two varieties: one where the *vipakṣa* is certain, and the other where the *vipakṣa* is doubtful. An example of the first is: "this place possesses smoke because it possesses fire", because fire-possession is known to be found in a *sapakṣa* (a kitchen) but it also is known to be occur in charcoal (*aṅgāra*), which is known to be fiery but lacks smoke. Here the existence of the *hetu*-term in the *vipakṣa* is certain. An example of the second type (of inconclusive reason is "the son in Maitrī's womb is black, since he is a son of Maitrī". (The example was discussed previously.) Here it is not certain (thus, doubtful) whether the son in Maitrī's womb is black. Another example would be "an *arhant* is non-omniscient, because he speaks, like an ordinary man". Here it is not a contradiction for an omniscient person to speak.

III.63 (ET219-221). An incapable reason is one which is not capable of proving (the conclusion). There are two sorts: one in which the reason proves something already accepted, and the other where the existence of the subject of the reason is sublated. An example of the first is: "sound is heard, because it is heard by an *arhant*". This is pointless, since the thing to be proved, a sound's being heard, is already accepted. An example of the second (viz., sublated) is "fire is cold because it is a substance". This is an example of sublation of the content of a direct awareness. An example of sublation where the content is sublated by inference is "this sound does not change, because it is produced", which is sublated by the inference "a sound changes, since it is a content of knowledge". An example of sublation by verbal testimony is "merit brings suffering in the next world, because it is dependent on a human being, like demerit", since from scripture we know that merit brings

pleasure in the next world. An example of being sublation because of being (self-)contradictory is "my mother is barren, since she is not pregnant even after sexual union". Still other varieties of the incapable reason could be given...

III.64 (ET221-222) (Objection:) Even though for a learned person it is sufficient to specify the thesis and the reason, teachers give examples to help beginners. So what is an example?

(Answer:) An example is a case where the pervasion is present. Pervasion has the form of invariable co-existence (*niyatasahācarya*) of the *sādhya*(-property) by the *hetu*(-property), e.g., wherever there is smoke there is fire, and wherever there is no fire there is no smoke. This (invariable co-existence) is also called non-deviation (*avinābhāva*), since the *hetu*-property does not occur without the *sādhya*-property. When it occurs there is the undisputed acceptance (of it) by both the proponent and the opponent on the basis of examples, viz.., a kitchen and a lake...

III.66 (ET223-224) A fallacious example is one which lacks the features of a (proper) example but which appears to be like it. This may be for one of two reasons, one due to not properly describing what is an example, the other due to describing something as an example which is not one. An example of the first is: "wherever there is fire there is smoke, as in a kitchen", of the second "wherever there is no smoke there is no fire, as in a lake". In these the pervader and the pervaded are mentioned in the (wrong, i.e.) reverse order.

III.67 (ET224-225) "Pervader" and "pervaded" are explained.

III.68-70 (ET225-229) Further detailed discussion of the arguments "wherever there is fire with wet fuel there is smoke", which is valid, and "the son in Maitrī's womb is black, since he is the son of Maitrī who eats spinach". These do not constitute counter-examples to what has been shown previously.

III.71 (ET229) The (Nyāya) definition of an imposed property (*upādhi*) as "that which pervades the *sādhya* without pervading the *sādhana* (or *hetu*) is an imposed property" is rejected as involving mutual dependency (*anyonyāśraya*). We

are referred to a work whose title is given as *Kāruṇyakalikā* for explanation.

III.71-72 (ET229-230) The fourth and fifth members of a Nyāya inference, viz., the application and conclusion, are defined.

III.73.1 (ET230-231) We next explain scripture (i.e., verbal testimony) as knowledge of a thing on the basis of a sentence of a qualified person (*āpta*). We are shown some improper definitions which overextend or under-extend in various ways.

III.73.2 (ET231-232) (A word's) meaning should be understood as conventional (*rūḍha*) on the basis of its speaker's intention; that is what learned persons say. So the definition (just given in III.73.1) of scripture is without fault...

III.74.1 (ET232-233) A qualified person is explained as follows. A person is qualified concerning the highest (*parama*) (truth) is one who has right perceptual knowledge of all things. Again some improper definitions are explained and refuted.

III.74.2 (ET233-234) The "highest" is liberation (*niḥśreyasa*), and teaching of it mainly arises from the *arhant*, though it could secondarily occur on the basis of questions...The Naiyāyika's definition of a qualified person is refuted by specifying that he have the right perceptual knowledge of all things, since (for the Naiyāyika) omniscience (is not required).

III.75 (ET234-235) (Objection:) Why is the Naiyāyika's knowledge of a qualified person not omniscience?

(Answer:) Because on their account their knowledge is not omniscience, since it is not aware of itself. The reverend teacher (Akalaṅka) has explained this in his *Āptamīmāṃsā-vivaraṇa*, so we terminate our discussion of it here.

III.76 (ET235-236) What is an object (*artha*)? It is defined as that which has many definitions, i.e., many properties--e.g., universals, particulars, modes, qualities. A universal (property) is explained and exemplified. It is a single, eternal thing occurring in things and not completely different from others (e.g., individuals, etc.). Otherwise there would be a stream of difficulties, (noted by Dignāga, says T, but it is

Dharmakīrti's *Pramāṇavārttika* I. 153 that is quoted) viz., because a universal does not move, is not produced, has no parts, does not leave its earlier location, etc.

A particular is defined as the essential nature of a pot, etc. which forms the supporting object of the notion of exclusion (of a thing from other things), e.g., "this pot is large", "that pot is small", etc.

III.77 (ET236-237) Modes are of two kinds: objective and linguistic (*vyañjanā*). An objective mode is the essential nature of an actual entity limited by the present time understood as free from connection to the past or the future. It is understood by the wise as the content of the view which is confined to the present (*ṛjusūtranaya*). It is what is taken by Buddhists to be a momentary object. A linguistic object is a particular entity that is related to an individual's inclinations and disinclinations, and is the cause of action(s) such as bringing water, etc. For example, a pot has as its modes a mass of earth, pot-shaped earth, pot, pot-half, etc.

III.78 (ET237-239) Qualities such as actuality, visual, gustatory, olfactory and tactual, etc. occur in all the modes of positive substances. These, actuality, etc., when related to the substance clay, comprise a mass of earth, but a different mode from, say, clay spread out flat. Therein lies the difference of modes from qualities. Even though a mode can be either universal or particular they (the two varieties) are discussed separately in scripture, since grasping their meaning depends on them and because they are the contents of the common usages. The locus of both qualities and modes is a substance. (Quotes Umāsvati, *Tattvārthasūtra* V. 38) and cites Akalaṅka.)

III.79 (ET239-240) Substances are of two kinds, living and nonliving. Both are fit for production, destruction and maintenance (citing *Tattvārthasūtra* V. 30). It is also said that when the arising of virtue in a living substance leads him to heaven, his humanity is destroyed and godliness arises but his self-awareness remains. If a living substance were supposed to as having only one state (or mode) the accumulation of merit would be useless. If one living substance were to have indefinitely many modes accumulation of merit would be

useless, since the one who gains merits would be one and the one who enjoys them another. But a person acts for the well-being of others for its own benefit. Therefore, as substances selves are identical, but as modes they are different. So the previous discussion has validity...

III.80 (ET240-241) Likewise for nonliving substances like earth. When there is the destruction of a mass of earth pot-shaped, etc. arise, but the substance remains the same, just as it is in the case of living substances. (Vāmana, a follower of Samantabhadra, quoted.) Thus an actual entity having a manifold nature is the content of statements constituting instruments of knowledge indicating their objects. Thus it is proved: everything is by nature manifold, because they exist; that which is not (by nature manifold), like a sky-lotus, is not.

III.81.1 (ET241-242) (Objection:) Even though a lotus does not exist in the sky, it exists in a pond; so a sky-lotus does not fail to exist.

III.81.2 (ET242-243) (Answer:) If so, that proves many-sidedness. Other citations to that effect (origin unspecified).

III.82.1-2 (ET243-244) A viewpoint is a particular desire on the part of a cognizer which produces the partial awareness of an object grasped by an instrument of knowledge. Viewpoints are of two sorts: those having substance(s) and those having mode(s) as their contents. The substantial viewpoint explained. An example is when one hears "bring gold" and consequently brings a gold bracelet, ear-ornament or anklet, etc., since they are each gold.

III.82.3 (ET244-246) The modal viewpoint: when one says "bring an ear-ornament" one does not bring a bracelet, etc. Thus though from the substantial viewpoint gold is one, from the modal viewpoint it may be many. And it may even be one and many sequentially, or when taken together, inexpressible (*avaktavya*) (as either one or the other alone).

(Objection:) It is perfectly possible to attribute different properties to one thing at a single time, e.g., color-possession and taste-possession.

(Answer:) This kind of "inexpressibleness" is referred to in (the last three "may bes") "may be one and is inexpressible",

"may be many and inexpressible", and may be one and many and be inexpressible." This is the sevenfold predication (*saptabhaṅgī*), which is to be understood as the collective expression of the seven divisions.

III.83 (ET246) (Objection:) How can those seven properties be attributed to one and the same object?

(Answer:) Just as one can attribute to one and the same pot color-possession, taste-possession, smell-possession, etc.

III.84 (ET246-247) Likewise (Vedāntins) attribute different properties to Brahman which is said to be one without a second. If they were really different they could not exist there.

III.85 (ET247-248) The temporally immediate (*ṛjusūtra*) viewpoint has as its content an object of the highest mode. It grasps the nature of a real entity limited by the present time without any reference to past and future. From this viewpoint the Buddhist's momentariness thesis can be established, as other viewpoints are taken by other systems. (Samantabhadra, *Svayambhūstotra* 103 quoted.)

Instruments of knowledge refer to actual objects having many and changing properties. And viewpoints have for their contents actual objects having a necessarily fixed, single property. If, losing track of this, there is supposed to be one single aspect, e.g., Brahman is one without a second, there is nothing making more than one", since plurality is not possible, this will constitute a fallacy of the object (*arthābhāsa*). A statement expressing it will be a scriptural fallacy (*āgamābhāsa*), since it is sublated by direct perception as well as by scripture, which says "truths are many, realities are many." The same is the case about supposed absolute difference, since there could be no efficient activity (*arthakriyā*).

III.86.1 (ET249) (Objection:) A collection of coexisting properties like being one and being many, since they are clearly different in the scope of their essential natures, being erroneous in the absence of mutual coexistence, must be itself erroneous.

III.86.2 (ET249-250) (Answer:) We welcome such an objection. As Samantabhadra says in his *Āptamīmāṃsā*: "if the collection of false judgments is false, then that is not non-

absolutism. It is the absolute viewpoint which is erroneous, but that viewpoint which is dependent on the actual object is what leads to successful activity."

III.87 (ET250-251) So the final conclusion is established, that the proof of an actual entity comes through instruments of knowledge and viewpoints.

121.411 TRIŚAMBHUDĀSA (1388), *Bālāvabodha* on Padmanandin's *Pañcaviṃśatikā*

JRK p. 228 gives manuscript. citation(s).

122 JÑĀNASĀGARA (1390)

NCC 7, p. 341 says he was pupil of Devasundara of Tapā Gaccha. Wiles adds that he was a pupil of Cakreśvara of the Candra Gaccha. Peterson 1894 (Extra Number), pp. xlvi-xlvii says "born *saṃvat* 1405, died *saṃvat* 1460."

122.412 JÑĀNASĀGARA, *Avacūri on* (Bhadrabāhu's) *Āvaśyakasūtra(niryukti)*

NCC 7, p. 341. says this was composed in *saṃvat* 1440 (1384 A.D.), but makes it a direct commentary on the *Āvaśyakasūtras*. NCC 2, p. 189, on the other hand, says it is a commentary on the *Niryukti* "based on Haribhadra's Commentary".

Wiles, p. 202: "7,885 *granthas*", indicates it has been published from Surat in 1965 as #108 in the series titled Devchand Lalbhai Jaina-Pustakoddhara.

122.413 JÑĀNASĀGARA, *Avacūri* on a *Kṣetrasamāsa*

NCC 7, p. 340.

122.414 JÑĀNASĀGARA, *Avacūri* on Jayaśekhara's *Upadeśacintāmaṇi*

Manuscript citations in NCC 7, p. 340 and NCC 2, p. 347.

122.415 JÑĀNASĀGARA, *Avacūri* on *Uttarādhyāyanasūtra* and Bhadrabāhu's *Niryukti*

NCC 2, p. 312 says this was composed in *saṃvat* 1441 (1385 A.D.) (though JRK, p. 44, says *saṃvāt* 1414 = 1357.). Part of this is printed in volume 2 of the edition by Kancanavijaya Suryapriya, Surat 1960-67, two volumes (BL1313.9.U776347 1960).

122.416 JÑĀNASĀGARA, *Avacūrṇī* on the *Caityavandanāsūtra*

NCC 7, p. 32.

122.417 JÑĀNASĀGARA, *Avacūri* on the Sthavirāvali portion of the *Nandīsūtras*

Wiles refers us to Schubring 1944, p. 41.

123 RATNAŚEKHARA GAṆI (1391)

NCC 6, p. 56 says "pupil of Vajrasenasūri of Nāgapurīya Tapā Gaccha". NCC 5, p. 159 says: "pupil of Hematilaka and Vajrasena Sūri" and calls him "(Kṛtadeva)Ratnaśekhara.". NCC 6, p. 66: "pupil of Vajrasena Sūri and Hematilaka Sūri of Nāgapurīya Tapā Gaccha".

123.418 RATNAŚEKHARA GAṆI, *Guṇasthānakramāroha(ṇaprakaraṇa)/Avacūrṇi*

NCC 6, pp. 56-57 describes this work as "on the gradation of 14 Jain virtues". It has been published at least twice (apparently without the commentary), with a Hindi translation, in Atmatilakagrantha Society 8 (Ahmedabad 1918). It was published in DLJP Series No. 38, Bombay 1916 (fPK5013.R35.G88 1916), and another edition is cited, by Hiralal Hamsaraj, Jamnagar 1910, with plenty of manuscript citations.

123.419 RATNAŚEKHARA GAṆI, *Arthadīpikā* on Bhadrabāhu's *Āvaśyakasūtraniryukti*

NCC 2, p. 190.

123.420 RATNAŚEKHARA GAṆI, *Kṣetrasamāsa*

NCC 5, pp. 159-160: "In 264 *gāthās*...Printed (1) in *Prakaraṇaratnākara*, Bombay 1876-78, Vol. IV. (2) in *Laghuprakaraṇasaṃgraha*, Bombay 1876. (3) with C. (Jaina) Atmananda Jainagranthavali 46, Bhavnagar 1915." Cf. JRK p. 99. It is a Prakrit work on the mythological geography of the Jains. The work is called *Laghukṣetrasamāsa* in Strasbourg Ser. #135 (pp. 193-194).

123.421 RATNAŚEKHARA GAṆI, *Vṛtti* on (a part of?) the *Āvaśyakasūtras*

NCC 12, p. 253.

123.422 RATNAŚEKHARA GAṆI, *Sambodhasaptatikā*

Published with Amarakīrti's commentary by Hiralal Hamsaraj, Jamnagar (date not given). JRK p. 472 cites this, also manuscripts.

124 KULAMAṆḌANA SŪRI or GAṆI (1394)

NCC 4, p. 238: "One of the five pupils of Devasundara Sūri; successor of Jñānasāgara Sūri of Tapā Gaccha; born in 1353 A.D.; became Sūri in 1386 A.D. and died in 1499 (!-1399?) A.D.

124.423 KULAMAṆḌANA SŪRI, *Avacūri* on Bhadrabāhu's *Āvaśyakanirukti*

NCC 2, p. 189.

124.424 KULAMAṆḌANA SŪRI, *Vṛtti* on a *Navatattva(prakaraṇa)*

NCC 4, p. 238 and NCC 9, p. 393.

124.425 KULAMAṆḌANA SŪRI, *Ālapaka* or *Vicārasaṃgraha* or *Vicārāmṛtasaṃgraha* or *Siddhāntakālāpakoddhāra*

NCC 4, p. 238 says this was composed in 1387 A.D., and cites manuscript locations.

124.426 KULAMAṆḌANA GAṆI, *Avacūrṇī* on Abhayadevasūri's *Prajñāpanāsūtratṛtīyapañcagrahaṇī*

Wiles, p. 115 writes: ""Composed 1444 *vīra saṃvat*) = *Prajñāpannāsūtravivaraṇa-viṣamapadaparyāya*" (published Benares 1884), adding "Punyavijaya, Malvania and Bhoja think that the *avacūrṇī* printed with Abhayadeva's *Saṃgrahaṇī* (in that Benares edition), although more extensive than Kulamaṇḍana Gaṇi's, seems to be merely an elaboration of it." Velankar, JRK p. 258, gives the title as *Tṛtīyapadasaṃgrahaṇī-Ṭīkā*, cites manuscripts.

125 MERUTUṄGA SŪRI (1395)

Nagin Shah identifies this author as Merutuṅga of Añcala Gaccha, a pupil of Mahendraprabha Sūri. NCC 3, p. 312, says one of his works was written in 1388. This is confirmed by Johrapurkar, who gives the titles of a number of further works of this author, works concerning which we have been unable to find any information, e.g.. a *Śatakabhāṣya, Bhāvakarmaprakrīyā* and some which are on grammar and other matters. *Rasādhyayaḥ* is a work on the medical use of mercury.

However, Peterson IV, p. xcviii says that a Merutuṅga is "mentioned as pupil of Mahendraprabha and *guru* of Jayakīrti in the Añcala Gaccha....In the *Añcālāgacchapaṭāvali* the dates of this teacher are given as follows:–Birth, *saṃvat* 1403; *dīkṣā*, *saṃvat* 1418; *ācāryapada*, *saṃvat* 1426; *gacchanāyaka*, *saṃvat* 1446; death, *saṃvat* 1471...Guru of Māṇikyacandra Sūri."

Peterson IV, p. xcviii knows of (another?) Merutuṅga, "author of the *Mahāpuruṣacaritra*, otherwise called *Upadeśaṣaṣata*....He refers to his *guru* Candraprabha, as he does also in the beginning of his *Prabandhacintāmaṇi*...Merutuṅga

composed also a *Tharāvalī*, which Bhau Daji gives there [at JBBRAS 9, 1867, p. 147], a *Ṣaḍdarśanavicāra*, and the *Prabodhacintāmāṇi*. This last book composed in *saṃvat* 1367, according to Buhler, see Hemacandra, rather *saṃvat* 1362, at Vardhamānapura or Vadvana in Kattiwar." Presuming that this *Ṣaḍdarśanavicāra* is the same work as our #425 we can assume that this latter Merutuṅga is its author.

Given all this, it is tempting to suppose that these two Merutuṅgas are one and the same. We list the philosophical works ascribed to both here under one author, but with the appropriate warning!

125.427 MERUTUṄGA SŪRI, *Ṣaḍdarśananirṇaya*

This is a small work in 11 pages. It has been edited by Nagin J. Shah, in LD Series 41, 1973, pp. 1-11, who summarizes the work on pp. 1-2 of his Introduction. We provide the gist of this summary here. The work has been translated by Kendall W. Folkert, op. cit., pp. 383-395. See also Folkert, ibid., pp. 140-143.

Summary by Nagin J. Shah

"In the beginning of this small tract the author points out as to what constitutes real Brāhmaṇahood and Yatihood. According to him, truth (*satya*), penance (*tapas*), control of sense-organs (*indriyadama*), etc. constitute *brāhmaṇa*-hood. Mere birth in the Brāhmaṇa family and wearing of sacred thread do not make one a Brāhmaṇa. There is a possibility of Brāhmaṇas in the Cāṇḍāla caste and of Caṇḍālas in the Brāhmaṇa caste. Similarly, equanimity which is the result of the conquest of narrow love and hatred is the true mark of a Yati. Staying in woods, wearing bark garments, living upon fruits, leaves or flowers, abandonment of purifying agents of the body, observation of fasts, etc. are merely the accidents and not the essentials of a Yati."

"After this general discussion the author explains six systems of Indian Philosophy, viz., Bauddha, Mīmāṃsā (along with Vedānta), Sāṃkhya, Naiyāyika, Vaiśeṣika, and Jaina. While dealing with a particular system of Indian philosophy he

elucidates the nature of God, spiritual teacher and religion as accepted by its theoreticians. In short, he explains and examines its main philosophical theories."

"But what he wants to emphasize is that in spite of metaphysical differences all the systems of Indian philosophy agree with regard to values of life and spiritual discipline. He substantiates his finding by the quotations from the work of different systems."

125.428 MERUTUṄGA SŪRI, *Vṛtti* on Jayaśekhara Sūri's *Upadeśacintāmaṇi*

NCC 2, p. 347; JRK p. 48.

125.429 MERUTUṄGA SŪRI, *(Dharma)Upadeśaśataka* and *Vivaraṇa* thereon

NCC 2, p. 354.

125.430 MERUTUṄGA SŪRI, *Bhāṣya-Ṭīkā* on Candramaharṣi's *Saptatikāsūtra*

Cf. JRK p. 414, which says it was composed in *saṃvat* 1449, i.e., 1392 A.D.

126 SOMASUNDARA (SŪRI) (1398)

"In the fifteenth century, the dominant Jaina monk was Somasundara, and his activities are largely known from the poem *Somasundarakāvya* composed by his pupil Pratiṣṭhāsoma of the Tapā Gaccha in *vīrasaṃvat* 1524" (1467 A.D.)...(which) "shows that Somasundara was busy repairing and building Jina temples in Gujarat but also in the extensive state of Rajasthan", despite the fact that "all the standing Hindu and Jaina shrines of Gujarat of that time were destroyed by (Ahmad Shah's) general Tāj-ul-Mulk, who was appointed by that Sultan for the sole purpose of demolishing all the temples belonging to the 'hated *kāfirs*'..."A(n) inscription...dated *vīra saṃvat* 1501" (A.D.1444) "on a metal icon of Sambhavanātha, which was consecrated by him, was...found from Ahmedabad. This is probably the last known date of this remarkable Jaina saint, who not only was a great Jaina *sādhu* of his days, but also the *guru* of several important Jaina scholars..."[251]

"For the time of the great Somasundara (of the Tapā Gaccha) we get several dates on manuscripts", writes Chatterjee in CHJ, specifying "the earliest" as 1413 A.D., on which date two separate manuscripts were copied.

He was a pupil of Devasundara Sūri of the Tapā Gaccha, as shown above. Kapadia 18, p. 401, says he was "born *vikrama saṃvat* 1430 and died *saṃvat* 1499". The names of fourteen of his works are given on p. 402.

Peterson IV, p. cxxxvi gives his dates: "born *saṃvat* 1430; *vrata*, *saṃvat* 1437; *vācakapada*, *saṃvat* 1450; *sūripada*, *saṃvat* 1457; died *saṃvat* 1499."

126.431 SOMASUNDARA, *Avacūrṇī* on Bhadrabāhu's *Avaśyakasūtra(niryukti)*

NCC 2, p. 190; NCC 7, p. 82. See also NCC 12, p. 285 for references on the 6th section. See also JRK p. 262 (Pratyākhyāna).

126.432 SOMASUNDARA SŪRI, *Avacūri* on the *Catuśśaraṇa*

NCC 6, p. 335; JRK p. 117.

126.433 SOMASUNDARA SŪRI, *Laghuvṛtti* on the *Bhagavatīsūtras*

Wiles, p. 65, cites JRK 290.

126.434 SOMASUNDARA SŪRI, *Ṭīkā* on the *Āturapratyākhyānaprakīrṇaka*

Velankar, JRK p. 26, says this is based on Bhuvanatuṅga's *Avacūri*, cites a manuscript.

126.435 SOMASUNDARA SŪRI, *Bālāvabodha* on Dharmadāsa's *Upadeśamālā*

JRK p. 50 says this was written in *saṃvat* 1485 (1428 A.D.); lists manuscript citations. It is edited in Prakrit and Gujarati in (BL1376.S58 2001), volume 2.

126.436 SOMASUNDARA SŪRI, *Bhāṣya-Ṭīkā* on the *Caityavandanāsūtra*

See JRK p. 126, who says the author was a pupil of Devasundara Sūri of the Tapā Gaccha, cites manuscripts. It was composed in *saṃvat* 1508 (1451 A.D.) according to JRK p. 297, so its author may not be the same person as composed the previously-cited works on dates ranging from 1413 to 1428.

126.437 SOMASUNDARA SŪRI, *Bālāvabodha* on Hemacandra's *Yogaśāstra*

Again, by the Somasundara who was a pupil of Devasundara Sūri. It is edited by Prasamarativijaya as Sri Vijayamahodayasurigranthamālā 12 from Poona in 2003 (BL1375.Y63.S66 2003). It is printed in old Gujarati.

126.438 SOMASUNDARA SŪRI, *Cūrṇī* on Candrarṣi Mahattara's *Saptatikāsūtra*

JRK p. 415.

126.439 SOMASUNDARA SŪRI, *Bālāvabodha* on Devagupta Sūri's *Navatattvaprakaraṇa*

BL1350.D48 1993 may be the same as this work. Cf. JRK p. 207 for manuscript citations.

127 DEVĀNANDA ĀCĀRYA *or* SŪRI (1396)

NCC 7, p. 130 says "pupil of Padmaprabha of Pūrṇimā Gaccha."

127.440 DEVĀNANDA ĀCĀRYA, *Kṣetrasamāsa/Vṛtti*

NCC 7, p. 130 says this was composed in 1396 A.D.

127.441 DEVĀNANDA ĀCĀRYA, *Samayasāraprakaraṇa/Ṭīkā*

NCC 7, p. 130 and JRK p. 417 say that both text and commentary have been published in the Jaina Atmananda Sabha Series No. 39, Bhavnagar 1914. Cites manuscripts.

128 DEVENDRA SŪRI (1397)

NCC 9, p. 397 says "pupil of Saṃghatilaka Sūri", who was of the Rudrapallīya Gaccha, according to JRK p. 209..

128.442 DEVENDRA SŪRI, *Abhinava Vṛtti* on Devagupta Sūri's *Navapadaprakaraṇa*

NCC 9, p. 397; JRK p. 2090.

129.443. SĀDHURATNA SŪRI (1400), *Avacūri* on a *Navatattvaprakaraṇa*

A pupil of Devasundara Sūri--cf. NCC 9, p. 125.2. Consult NCC 9, p. 393; JRK p. 207 for manuscript citations. Velankar 1930, #1622, contains manuscripts. of three works, the first of which is this text: he gives beginning and ending verses.

130 KṢEMĀṄKARA GAṆI (1400)

NCC 5, p. 152 says "pupil of Devasundara Sūri of the Tapā Gaccha", i.e., our Devesundara Gaṇi of 1370.

130.444 KṢEMĀṄKARA GAṆI, *Ṣaṭpuruṣavicāra*

NCC 5, p. 152 says it has been printed in the Seth Devchand Lalbhai Jain Pustakoddhar Fund Series 24, 1915. JRK p. 401 adds that a Gujarati translation is published by the JDPS, Bhavnagar 1905, and that "the six kinds of *puruṣas* are Adhamādhama, Adhama, Vimadhyama, Madhyama, Uttama and Uttamottama." Manuscripts cited.

131 GUṆARATNA SŪRI (1412)

This author also wrote at least one Nyāya work, a commentary on Śaśadhara's *Nyāyasiddhāntadīpa*. See the discussion, based on an article by Bimal Krishna Matilal, in this Encyclopedia, Volume Six, pp. 394-395. A Śvetāmbara, pupil of Devasundara. NCC 6, p. 51: "of Tapā Gaccha; elder brother of Somasundara Gaṇi; third among the five pupils of Devasundara

and teacher of Bhuvanasundara." See also Matilal at (B132.N38.S225 1971).

131.445 GUṆARATNA SŪRI, *Tarkarahasyadpikā* on Haribhadra Sūri's *Ṣaḍdarśanasamuccaya*

Edited any times. Cf. under Bib, 3d ed. 419,16. Consult JRK p. 402 for manuscript citations. Edited by Mahendra Kumar in JPMJG 36, 1970 (B131.K37 or B131.H290).

131.446 GUṆARATNA SŪRI, *Avacūrṇī* on Somatilaka's *Kṣetrasamāsa*

NCC 5, p. 160 tells us this was composed in 1409 A.D., and that it was "composed for Jñānasāgara Sūri, eldest pupil of Devasundara. [It is] sometimes ascribed to Jñāna Sāgara." There seem to be two versions, one longer than the other. NCC 6, p. 51 says he commented on both the *Bṛhat* and the *Laghu* parts of the *Kṣetrasamāsa*. See also JRK p. 99 for more manuscript. citations.

131.447 GUṆARATNA SŪRI, *Pramāṇanayatattvarahasya*

Published in the *Śrutajñānamīdhara*, Bombay 1936, p. 25. Velankar, JRK p. 267, says it is based on *Syādvādaratnākara* and *Prameyaratnamālā*.

131.448 GUṆARATNA SŪRI, *Avacūrī* or *Vivaraṇa* on the *Āturapratyayākhyānaprakīrṇaka*

Consult NCC 2, p. 43.

131.449 GUṆARATNA SŪRI, *Avacūri* on the *Catuśśaraṇa* or *Kuśalānubandhadhyayaṇa*

NCC 6, p. 334-335 says the *Catuśśaraṇa* is a "Prakrit. *Prakīrṇaka* in 63 verses on 'fourfold refuge': austerity, merit, conduct and mental abstraction; recited during *padikkamana* by Jain monks; attributed to. manuscript locations cited. Vīrabhadra".

131.450 GUṆARATNA SŪRI, *Avacūri* on Devendra Sūri's *Karmagrantha*

See JRK p. 70 for manuscript citations. It was composed in *saṃvat* 1459 (1402 A.D.). This work by Guṇaratna Sūri, along with a couple of other such commentaries, are commentaries on all five (or six)of the works comprised in the collection called *Karmagrantha*..

131.451 GUṆARATNA SŪRI, *Avacūrṇi* on Candrarṣi Mahattara's *Saptatikāsūtra*

The author says he based his commentary on that of Devendra Sūri of the Tapā Gaccha, a text which seems to be lost. It was composed in 1402. Cf. JRK p. 415. This may be a part of the previously cited text.

132 NAYAKUÑJARA UPĀDHYĀYA (1420)

NCC 9, p. 345 says he was a "pupil of Jinarāja Sūri of Kharatara Gaccha."

132.452 NAYAKUÑJARA UPĀDHYĀYA, *Pravacanavicārasāra*

NCC 9, p. 345.

133 SOMACANDRA (1421)

NCC 5, p. 237 says: "disciple of Ratnaśekharasūri", thus we date him at 1421.

133.453 SOMACANDRA, *Gaṇadharadūḍhaśataka*

NCC 5, p. 237.

133.454 SOMACANDRA, *Guruguṇasattari* (or *-saptati*)

NCC 6, p. 66.

134 MUNĪŚVARA (1422)

Nagin Shah (in LD Series 41, 1973, p. 10) writes: "From the colophon (of 256) we gather that the author belonged to Vṛddha Gaccha and that he earned the title Vādīndracakracūḍāmaṇi. Our author seems to be identical with one Munīśvara Sūri mentioned in an inscription on an idol. In the inscription we are told that in *vīra saṃvat* 1479 Munīśvara Sūri of Bṛhad Gaccha got the idol installed. Again, in another inscription dated *vīra saṃvat* 1501 on an idol it is written that for the spiritual good (*puṇyārtha*) of Vādīndracakracūḍāmaṇi Munīśvara Sūri, who flourished in the line of Devācārya of Bṛhad Gaccha after Jinaratna Sūri, Tilaka Sūri and Bhadreśvara Sūri, the idol has been gotten installed. The title occurring in this inscription exactly tallies with the one found in the colophon. So, we conclude that the author of the tract *Pramāṇasāra* flourished in the latter half of the 15th century V.S."

134.455 MUNĪŚVARA, *Pramāṇasāra*

The summary is found on pp. 11-12 of LD Series 41, 1973. "E" is the same volume, pp. 107-126.

Summary by Nagin J. Shah

"The first part (*pariccheda*, section) is mainly devoted to the treatment of the nature of *pramāṇa*. The author first (E108) gives definitions of *saṃśaya* (doubt), *anadhyavasāya* (non-ascertainment) and *viparyaya* (error); and then excludes *pramāṇa* from them. He shows that *pramāṇa-pravṛtti* is impossible in the case of Brahmādvaita, Jñānādvaita and Śūnyavāda. He refutes the Cārvāka position that *pratyakṣa* is the only *pramāṇa*. He is of the opinion that *tarka* is a *pramāṇa*. According to him the definition of *pramāṇa* is *sva-paravyavasāyi jñānaṃ pramāṇam*. He maintains that *prāmāṇya* (validity) as well as *aprāmāṇya* (invalidity) "of a piece of cognition is intrinsic (*svataḥ*) in the case of repeated acquaintance (*abhyādadaśā*) and extrinsic (*parataḥ*) in the case of first acquaintance."

(E110) According to him the content of a *pramāṇa* is of the nature of both *sāmānya* (generic characteristics) and *viśeṣa* (specific characteristics). At this juncture he refutes the view that the thing is of the nature of *sāmānya* alone as also the view that the thing is of the nature of *viśeṣa* alone. He explains the Jaina theory of transformation (*pariṇāmavāda*).

(E115) He demolishes the Buddhist theory of universal flux (or momentariness) coupled with the doctrine of destruction without residue (*niranvayavināśavāda*).

(E116) He suggests that the theory of *syādvāda* (non-absolutism) is a logical corollary of the ontological theory of infinite-properties-of-a-thing. He has elucidated the Jaina doctrine of sevenfold judgment."

(E116) The second section is devoted to the classification of *pramāṇas* (knowledges).

(E117) It mentions twofold classification of *pramāṇas* into *pratyakṣa* (perceptual knowledge) and *parokṣa* (non-perceptual knowledge). *Pratyakṣa* is divided into *sāṃvyavahārika* (empirical) and *pāramārthika* (transcendental). *Sāṃvyavahārika pratyakṣa* is divided into *sakala* (perfect) and *vikala* (imperfect).

(E118) In the class of *vikala pāramārthika pratyakṣa* fall *avadhijñāna* and *manaḥparyāyajñāna*, whereas the class of *sakala pāramārthika pratyakṣa* has one member only, viz. *kevalajñāna*. The cause of *kevalajñāna* is the absence of *rāga-dveṣa*. Food-taking does not obstruct *kevalajñāna*. *Kevalī* does take food. It is so because hunger is the result of *vedanīyakarman*; it is not the result of *mohanīyakarman*. Moreover, even a woman can attain *kevalī*-hood. Womanhood is not a bar to the attainment of *kevalī*-hood. Again, *kevalī* may wear garments. Wearing of garments does not come in the way of his attainment of *kevalajñāna* or *mokṣa*.

(E119) "The *pramāṇas* that are included in the class of *parokṣa pramāṇa* are: (1) *smaraṇa* (memory), (2) *pratyabhijñā* (recognition), (3) *tarka* (knowledge of invariable concomitance), (4) *anumāna* (inference), and (5) *āgama* (verbal testimony). Let us remember that formerly at one place

in the first *pariccheda* the author has said that *tarka* is *pramāṇāṅga*.

"What distinguishes *pratyakṣa* from *parokṣa* is *spaṣṭatva* (vividness). By *spaṣṭatva* the author means cognition of more *viśeṣas*.

(E121-126) "The third *pariccheda* gives the essentials of six systems of philosophy, viz., Jaina Naiyāyika, Bauddha, Sāṃkhya, Vaiśeṣika and Jaiminīya."

135 HARṢABHŪṢAṆA GAṆI (1423)

NCC I, Revised Edition p. 89 says he was a pupil of Somasundara Sūri of Tapā Gaccha. Kapadia 18, p. 126 adds that he was a "devotee of Munisundara Sūri, pupil of Somasundara Sūri of the Tapā Gaccha."

135.4566 HARṢABHŪṢAṆA GAṆI, *Añcalamataprakaraṇa*

NCC I, Revised Edition, p. 89 says "composed in 1423 A.D., Velankar, JRK, p. 4 says it is "a refutation of the peculiar religious doctrines of the Añcala Gaccha", and cites further manuscripts.

Kapadia 18, pp. 127, remarks that it is a "refutation of some of the tenets of the Añcala Gaccha pertaining to *mukhavastikā, sthāpanācārya, sādhanāśuddhi* and *daśadṛṣṭāntasiddhi*"

135.457 HARṢABHŪṢAṆA GAṆI, *Śrāddhavidhiviniścaya*

JRK p. 391 says it was composed in 1423 by Harṣabhūṣaṇa Gaṇi, pupil of Harṣasena Gaṇi of the Tapā Gaccha. Manuscripts cited.

136 MĀṆIKYAŚEKHARA SŪRI (1425)

Wiles, p. 164 says he was a "pupil of Merutuṅga Sūri of the Añcala Gaccha, reports "But *(J)ina (R)atna (K)ośa* says, composed *saṃvat* 1771 (1714). In this commentarty the author also mentions his commentaries, all called *Dīpikās*, on *Ācārāṅga, Uttarādhyāyana, Oghanirukti, Daśavaikālika,*

Navatattva and *Piṇḍanirukti*. (BORI Cat. 17:3, 456-457; JRK 37)." It is printed in three volumes published as *Ācāryaśrīmadvijayadānasūrīśvaraji-Jainagranthamālā* 16, 29, 42, Surat 1939-49.

136.458 MĀṆIKYAŚEKHARA SŪRI, *Dīpikā* on Bhadrabāhu's *Āvaśyakanirukti*

NCat I, p. 345. Wiles, p. 202, says it numbers 11,750 *granthas*.

136.459 MĀṆIKYAŚEKHARA, *Dīpikā* on the *Uttarādhyāyanasūtra*

Wiles, p. 164 says "no manuscript extant but it is mentioned by the author in his *praśasti* in" work #456 (the previously-cited work). Ditto JRK p. 44.

137 DHARMANANDANA GAṆI (1425)

A pupil of Merutuṅga Sūri, says JRK on p. 410.

137.460 DHARMANANDANA GAṆI, *Avacūri* on (Śrī)Candrasūri's *Saṃgrahaṇīratna*

JRK p. 410 gives manuscript citation.

137.461 DHARMANANDANA GAṆI, *Avacūri* on Dharmadāsa Gaṇi's *Upadeśamālā*

See JRK p. 50 for manuscript citations.

137.462 DHARMANANDANA GAṆI, *Avacūri* on Dharmaghoṣa's *Lokanālikā*

JRK p. 339 gives manuscript citations.

137.463 DHARMANANDANA GAṆI, *Avacūri* on Mahendrasiṃha Sūri's *Prakaraṇapuṣpāmṛta-Vicārasaptatikā*

Cf. JRK p. 353 for citations.

138.462 JINABHADRA SŪRI (1425), *Siddhāntakośa* or *Samastasiddhāntaviṣamapadaparyāya*

The author was another pupil of Jinarāja Sūri of the Kharatara Gaccha; he helped Jayasāgara Upādhyāya correct that author's work as said. below under Jayasāgara (1438). JRK p. 421 gives information.

139 KALYĀṆAKĪRTI (1427)

NCC 3, p. 251: "pupil of Lalitakīrti, of Karkal Mutt, contemporary of Pāṇḍya king (a. of *Bhavyānanda Śāstra*)."

139.465 KALYĀṆAKĪRTI, *Jinayajñaphalodaya*

NCC 3, p. 251: "in 2750 *ślokas*; written at the instance of his preceptor."

139.466 KALYĀṆAKĪRTI, *Dvādaśānuprekṣā*

A manusript is cited at JRK p. 185.

140.467 BHOJA KAVI or BHOJA SĀGARA (1427), *Vijñaptitriveṇī*

Cf. JRK p. 355, which says it is published in *Kāntivijayagranthamālā* I, Baroda 1916.

141 BHUVANASUNDARA SŪRI (1428)

This is the same author as is cited in Volume VII of this Encyclopedia, pp. 471-472, as the author of three works on *mahāvidyā* inference. His date was estimated there as between 1390 and 1450. Nagin Shah, however, informs us in his Introduction to LD Series 41, p. 5, that this author was a pupil of Somasundara Sūri of Tapā Gaccha. This teacher is the author of a Jain work above) whom we have dated at 1398, so consistent with that we may estimate his pupil Bhuvanasundara Sūri's date as 1428.

Cf. Volume VI of this Encyclopedia for more information about this author and his works.

141.468 BHUVANASUNDARA SŪRI, *Parabrahmotthāpanasthala*

Printed in pp. 49-58 of Nagin Shah's collection found in LD Series 41 and cited previously. The summary found on pp. 6-8 of the same volume.

Summary by Nagin J. Shah

(E49-50) "First the author demolishes the inference of the Vedāntins, viz., 'The world is illusory as it is perceived (*dṛṣyatvāt*); those that are perceived are illusory, as for example shell-in-silver.' The author retorts that on (the) Vedāntin's showing fine atoms and distant mountains, which are not perceived, should be regarded as real. The Vedāntins answer that they are also perceived by some one at least. The author asks them as to whether the one who perceives them is doing so by sensory perception or extrasensory perception. If the former, then they should be perceived by ordinary persons too. If the latter, then there arise two alternatives, viz. the possessor of extrasensory perception should be either non-omniscient or omniscient. If he is non-omniscient then the things that are not perceived by him should be regarded as real. If he is omniscient, then the Vedāntins' (Mīmāṃsakas') thesis that there is no omniscient being stands contradicted. If it be said by the Vedāntins that the atoms etc. are not recognized by them, then the reason '*dṛśyatvāt*' will have no *pakṣa* to reside in with the result that there will arise the fallacy of *āśrayāsiddha*."

(E50-51) "The Vedāntins' view that though the world is unreal it is perceived by the force of ignorance (*avidyā*) is attacked by the author in the following manner. They are asked if their ignorance is real, unreal or indescribable. If it is real, then the doctrine of *advaita* is contradicted. If it is unreal, then it cannot enable us to perceive the world because both are unreal. If it is indescribable then there arises a question as to whether it is indescribably totally or partly. If the former, then we cannot even name it as '*avidyā*'. If the latter, the all things of the world will have to be regarded as indescribable. If it be said

that by indescribable is meant 'different from real as well as (from) unreal', then it is to be pointed out that such a thing does not exist. If it be said that from the standpoint of *vyavahāra* it does exist, then the question arises as to whether *vyavahāra* itself is real or unreal. Both these alternatives involve difficulties already pointed out."

"The author asks the Vedāntins as to whether the perception that perceives the world is real or unreal. If unreal, then it cannot function like a son-of-a-barren-woman. If real, then the doctrine of *advaita* stands contradicted. Moreover, he asks them as to whether the function of perception is to assert or to negate. Acceptance of the first alternative is not conducive to the negation of the world. The second alternative is not acceptable to the Vedāntins because that goes against their scriptural dictum, viz. *āhur vidhātṛ pratyakṣaṃ na niṣedhṛ vipaścitaḥ.*"

The author asks the Vedāntins as to what is the meaning of *mithyātva*. If it means *paramārthasatyatvavaidhurya* then it implies the *sadrūpatā* of the world. So, the controversy boils down to the question whether the world is *paramārthasatya* or not. The term *paramārthasatyatva* means either *parabrahmasvarūpatva* or *pramāṇapratiṣṭhārtha-viṣayatva*. And in both these senses the world is *paramārthasatya*."

(E51) "The Vedāntins maintain that the *vyavahāra* becomes possible on account of the combination of *satya* and *anṛta*. The author points out that this combination of *satya* and *anṛta* is impossible. None has ever seen the combination of (an) unreal hare's horn with (a) real pot. If such a combination is considered to be a possibility then that of a son-of-a-barren-woman with Brahma would be effected. But this is absurd."

"The Vedāntins accept the world as real for the sake of *vyavahāra* only. They accept three grades of reality: illusory (*prātibhāsika*), empirical (*vyāvahārika*) and absolute (*pāramārthika*). Silver cognized in shell has illusory existence. The pot, etc. which ordinary beings perceive every moment has empirical existence. Things having illusory existence as also (those) having empirical existence are sublated by succeeding knowledge and hence are regarded as mental figment(s).

Existence or reality belonging to Brahman is ultimate because it is never sublated."

"The author shows how this gradation of reality does not stand to reason. If *pratīti* is *asat* then on its strength nothing can be established as real. If it is *sat*, then its object cannot be *asat* (unreal). This same logic applies to *vyavahāra*. If *vyavahāra* is *asat* then on its strength nothing can be established as *sat*. And if it is *sat* then its object cannot be *asat*."

(E51-58) "To the Vedāntins the author puts a question, viz. 'what is the nature of *avidyā*?' If it is held to be not-describable-either-as-*sat*-or-as-*asat*, then it should be *paramārtha sat*, because like *Parabrahma* it is neither *sat* nor *asat*. If it be said that *Parabrahma* is not *avācya* (inexpressible) then it should be *vācya* (expressible) or *lakṣya* (indicable) or *vyaṅgya* (suggestible) or *tātparyāgamya* (implied). If it be held *vācya* then it is on (a) par with the world which is certainly *vācya*. If it be held *lakṣya* then it should have some connection with *vācya*. There is no *lakṣyārtha* which is not connected with *vācyārtha*. Moreover, whatever is *lakṣyārtha* should also be *vācyārtha* at the same time. *Taṭa* (the bank of a river) is *lakṣya* when the sentence '*gaṅgāyāṃ ghoṣaḥ*' (is entertained). Thus when all the things that are *lakṣya* are proved *vācya* also the view that Brahman is *lakṣya* has no speciality. If it be held that Brahman is *vyaṅgya*, then *vyaṅgya* being of various types the author asks as to which type of *vyaṅgya* Brahman belongs to. Moreover, he points out that whatever is *vyaṅgya* must also be *vācya* at some time. Hence to declare that Brahman is *vyaṅgya* serves no purpose. If it be said that like *rasa* (sentiment) it is *vyaṅgya* only then there arises a question as to whether it is *abhivyaktasvabhāva* or *anabhivyaktasvabhāva*. Both the alternatives are fraught with many difficulties. Nor can it be held *tātparyagamya* because the thing that is not *vācya* at any time can never be *tātparyagamya*."

"The logical reason '*dṛśyatvāt*' (because it is perceptible) adduced by the Vedāntins to prove *mithyātva* (unreality) of the world, says the author, proves quite the opposite, viz. *satyatva* (reality) of the world. *Asat* is never *dṛśya*. If it be said that even

though the *jalacandra* (moon-in-water) is *asat*, it is *dṛśya* then the author, as a representative of Jaina philosophy, declares that *jalacandra* is *sat* because it works as a *hetu*. Further, he says that if an absolutely *asat* thing were *dṛśya* then a square circle should be *dṛśya*, but no one has ever seen it."

"Against the Vedāntin's inference, viz. 'the world is *mithyā* (unreal) because it does not illumine its own self', the author produces the counter-inference viz., Brahman is *mithyā* (unreal) because it does not illumine things other than its own self. The author further points out that if Brahman is held *paraprakāśaka* then *satyatva* of the world will naturally follow from it."

141.469 BHUVANASUNDARA SŪRI, *Dīpikāvṛtti* or *Ṭippaṇa* on Kulārka's *Mahāvidyāviḍambana*

Kulārka's non-Jain work "is a short metrical piece consisting of ten stanzas containing sixteen arguments to prove the eternity of *śabda*", says Velankar, JRK pp. 305-306. This is a Jain commentary on it. Edited by Mangesh Ramakrishna Telang in GOS 12, Baroda 1920 (PK2971.G3x, v. 12).

141.470 BHUVANASUNDARA SŪRI, *Laghumahāvidyāviḍambana*

Mentioned by Velankar, JRK p. 306, with manuscripts cited.

141.471 BHUVANASUNDARA SŪRI, *Vṛtti* on the *Catuśśaraṇa*

NCC 6, p. 335. JRK p. 117 cites manuscripts.

142.472 SĀDHURATNA GAṆI (1428), *Ṭīkā* on Haribhadra Sūri's *Yogadṛṣṭisamuccaya*

Sādhuratna Gaṇi was a pupil of Somasundara Gaṇi of the Tapā Gaccha. Manuscripts of this work are cited at JRK p. 322.

143 MUNISUNDARA SŪRI (1435)

NCC 8, p. 281 he belonged to Tapā Gaccha. He was a pupil of Somasundara, says NCC 2, p. 353. His dates are given in NCC 1, Revised Edition, p. 145. He was a Śvetāmbara. Also, he was a pupil of Devasundara Gaṇi (see above, placed at 1370).

A. K. Chatterjee: "A well-known disciple of Somasundara was Munisundara, who was not only a great author, but also an active promoter of the religion of the Jinas. He was even honored by the Muslim Naik of Cambay."[252]

Kapadia 18, p. 428, says he lived *saṃvat* 1436-1503. Strasbourg Ser. #180 (pp. 236-237) says this author is also called Bhānucandra Gaṇi, was "a contemporary of King Akbar".

Peterson IV, p. xcvii gives the relevant dates: "Munisundara, *birudha* Kalīsarasvatī, born, *saṃvat* 1436; *vrata*, 1443; *vācakapada*, 1466; *sūripada*, 1478; died 1563."

143.473 MUNISUNDARA SŪRI, *Traividyāgoṣṭhī* or *Pañcadarśanasvarūpa*

Edited Bombay 1921. This work was composed in 1398, according to NCC 8, p. 281. Velankar at JRK pp. 165-166 says it "is a discourse on Deva, Guru and Dharma". It is published by Shah Devakarana Mulaji, Bombay, 1902 (B162.5.M87).

143.474 MUNISUNDARA SŪRI, *Upadeśaratnākara/Vṛtti*

NCC 2, p. 353 cites two printed versions: (1) Lalan Niketan Jain Granthamala, Bhatade, Sihor, Kathiawar; (2) Seth Devchand Lalbhai Jain Pustakoddhar Fund Series 21, with C. Bombay 1922. Velankar, JRK pp. 51-52, says it is "in three chapters, called Taṭas, which are further divided into Aṃśas and Taraṅgas, composed by Munisundara Sūri, pupil of Somasundara Sūri of the Tapā Gaccha. In this Prākṛta work, *Adhyātmakalpadruma*, *Śaivamukhavajrasūcī* and *Sandehasamuccaya* are quoted." He cites another publication by the Jaina Dharmavidyāprasāraka Varga, Palitana, *saṃvat* 1964 (1907 A.D.). He cites a great many manuscripts. Edited in DLJP 86 (Bombay 1940) (BJ1290.M8618 1988).

143.475 MUNISUNDARA SŪRI, *Adhyātmakalpadruma*

Edited by Moticandra Giradharalal Kapadiya, 1972 (B162.5.M86 1972); (BJ1290.M8618 1988). Also with commentaries by Dhanavijaya Gaṇi and Ratnacandra Gaṇi by Nirnaya Sagara Press, Bombay 1906, 1940 (B162.5.M86); *Prameyaratnākara* II, Bombay 1876-78, with Ratnacandra's Gujarati commentary (contents summarized in French by Guerinot, AMG 22, 1906); Jaina Dharma Prasāraka Sabhā, Bhavnagar. Velankar in JRK, p. 5 says it has 16 chapters. Also edited with Dhanavijaya's commentary by Sivarama Tanha Dube Deshmukh. Bombay 1906. It is also published with Dhanavijaya's commentary by Mansubhai Bhagubhai and Jamanabhai Bhagubhai, Ahmedabad *saṃvat* 1971, along with others; cf. Kapadia 18, p. 135

143.476 MUNISUNDARA SŪRI, *Avacūri* on some *Pañcasūtras*

JRK p. 230.

144.477 JAYASĀGARA UPĀDHYĀYA (1438), *Vidhiratnakaraṇḍikā* on Jinadatta Sūri's *Sandehavolāvalī*

Jayasāgara Upādhyāya was a pupil of Jinarāja Sūri of the Kharatara Gaccha. JRK p. 413 provides this identification and the date, and says "It is based on (Jinatilaka Upādhyāya's *Ṭīkā*) and was corrected by Taporatna Vācaka and Jinabhadra Sūri." It is published by Hiralal Hamsaraj, Jamnagar, says JRK p. 412.

145 SAKALAKĪRTI (1386-1442)

This is apparently a different Sakalakīrti from the Sakalakīrti Bhaṭṭāraka who lived in 1125. His date is listed in libraries as between 1386-1442.

145.478 SAKALAKĪRTI, *Siddhāntasāradīpikā* or *Trilokasāradīpikā*

JRK p. 440 says it contains about 4516 stanzas divided into 16 cantos; cites manuscripts. According to Satya Ranjan Banerjee, op. cit., p. 489 "it is an important descriptive work of Sakalakīrti on topics prevalent amongst the Jainas, about heaven, hell, renunciation, final liberation etc." It is edited and translated into Hindi by Aryika Visuddhimati, (BL1375.C6.S24 1981).

145.479 SAKALAKĪRTI, *Samādhimaraṇotsahadīpikā*

Edited and translated into Hindi, with Hiralal Jain's Hindi commentary, by Darbarilal Kothiya. Varanasi 1984 (BL1378.85.S25155 1984).

145.480 SAKALAKĪRTI, *Tattvārthasāra*

Peterson V.1892-95 (Bombay 1896), says this is summarized in R. G. Bhandarkar's Report...Bombay Presidency 1883-84 (Bombay 1887), pp. 106-116. There is a copy of this in the Indian Library in Oxford, but it is too stiff to copy.

146 DHANADARĀJA (KAVI SANGAPATI) (1440)

NCC 9, p. 219 identifies Dhanadarāja as a "pupil of Jinabhadra Sūri of Kharatara Gaccha", and gives a date of 1434 when he wrote the work below. JRK (p. 370) calls him "son of Dehaḍa".

146.481 DHANADARĀJA, *Śatakatraya*

NCC 9, p. 219 says this work was composed in 1434 A.D. in imitation of Bhartṛhari, and is printed at K.M. Gucch. XIII pp. 33-80. JRK, p. 370 says it was composed in *saṃvat* 1490" (1423 A.D.) "at Maṇḍapadurga." The work has three sections--on *nīti*, *vairāgya* and *śṛṅgāra*--and is published in *Kāvyamālā*, Gaccha 13, Bombay (no date given).

147 JINAMAṆḌANA (1442)

He was a disciple of Somasundara Sūri, and is known to have written the work cited below between 1492-1498 *vīra saṃvat* (1434-1442 A. D.).

147.482 JINAMAṆḌANA, *Hetuviḍambanasthala*

This work is edited by Nagin Shah on pp. 59-75 of LDSeries 41, 1973. Prof. Shah offers the following short summary in the same volume, Introduction pp. 8-9.

"In this tract the Jaina author, in the spirit of a Cārvāka, demonstrates that an inference can never be an instrument of knowledge. First he proves the impossibility of a *sādhya* and then of a *hetu*. Again, he forcefully shows the impossibility of arriving at the necessary universal relation (*vyāpti*)."

148.483 DHĪRASUNDARA (1443), *Avacūrṇi* on Bhadrabāhu's *Āvaśyakaniryukti*

Velankar, JRK p. 37 says this author was "pupil of Amarasundara Gaṇi, pupil of Somasundara Sūri of the Tapā Gaccha. The *Vṛtti* is based on those of Haribhadra, Hemacandra and Jñānasāra." Gives manuscript citation.

149 JAYACANDRA SŪRI or MUNI (1443)

Pupil of Somasundara Sūri of Tapā Gaccha; preceptor of Jinaharṣasādhu..."Jayacandra of the well-known Tapā Gaccha is mentioned in inscriptions ranging from *vīra saṃvat* 1502" (1443 A.D.) "to *vīra saṃvat* 1506" (1447 A.D.). Peterson IV, p. xxx: "One of the five pupils of Somasundara, who was the pupil of Devasundara. Devasundara and Somasundara are Nos. 49 and 50 in the *Tapāgacchapaṭṭāvalī*."

149.484 JAYACANDRA SŪRI, *Pratikramaṇakramavidhi* or *Hetugarbha(krama)vidhi*).

NCC 7, p. 171. Composed in 1449, according to Peterson IV, p. xxx and JRK p. 258-259, who provides manuscript citations. The date of 1449 is probably *saṃvat* 1449 (1382 A.D.), given the confirmed dates for his pupil and grand-pupil below.

149.485 JAYACANDRA SŪRI, *Pratyākhyānasthānavivaraṇa*

Manuscripts cited at p. 263 of JRK.

150 SOMADHARMA GAṆI (1447)

Pupil of Cāritraratna (of the Tapā Gaccha), says NCC 2, p. 355., and JRK p. 47. JRK pp. 52-53 says that Cāritraratna Gaṇi was himself pupil of Somasundarasūri of the Tapā Gaccha.

150.486 SOMADHARMA GAṆI, *Upadeśasaptatikā*/Commentary

This has been published, with the commentary, as Jaina Atmanand Dharmaprasarka Sabha 33, Bhavnagar, Bombay 1915, 1917. Velankar, JRK p. p. 52-53, comments "(it) is a work in five chapters, containing 75 stories illustrative of moral precepts...Another name of the work is *Gṛhasthadharmopadeśa*. It is edited from Bombay, 1988 in (BL1376.S57).

150.487 SOMADHARMA GAṆI, *Vṛtti* on Dharmadāsa's *Upadeśamālā*

JRK p. 50 cites two manuscripts Is this the same work as the previously-listed one?

151.488 CĀRITRAVARDHANA (1448), *Ṭīkā* on Somaprabhā's *Sindūraprakara*

JRK p. 442 says that this author was a pupil of Kalyāṇarāja, pupil of Jinahita Sūri of the Kharatara Gaccha, gives the date of composition as 1448, and cites manuscripts.

152.489 (RĀJA) DEVARĀJA (1450), *Ātmatattvaparīkṣā*

NCC 2, p. 48 says "15th cent." Consult NCC 2, p. 48.

153 SARVĀNANDA SŪRI (1450)

NCC 2, p. 351 says this author was a pupil of Guṇaratna Sūri.

153.490. SARVĀNANDA SŪRI
(1450), *Vṛtti* on Dharmadāsa Gaṇi's *Upadeśamālāprakaraṇa*

According to NCC 2, p. 351, this author was a pupil of Guṇaratna Sūri. The same source also says this commentary is "based on Siddharṣi's". Siddharṣi's commentary, in turn, is listed on the same page of NCC 2 as "C. *Vivaraṇa*. *Heyopādeya* by Siddharṣi, pupil of Durgasvāmin and Gargarṣi or Siddharṣi. In some manuscripts. It is specified as *Bṛhadvṛtti* and in some as *Laghuvṛtti*, i.e. it has a longer and a shorter recension." See also JRK p. 50.

154.491 SĀDHUSOMA GAṆI (1455), *Vṛtti* on Maladhārin Hemacandra's *Upadeṣamālā*

This author is identified in JRK p. 254 as "pupil of Siddhāntasuci, pupil of Jinabhadra Sūri of the Kharatara Gaccha", giving the date when it was written, and citing several manuscripts.

155.492 SAṂVEGA DEVAGAṆI (1457), *Bālāvabodha* on an *Āvaśyakapoṭhikā*

JRK p. 35 says this author was a pupil of Somasundara Sūri of the Tapā Gaccha, and lists several manuscript citations. The work was written in 1457.

156 RATNAŚEKHARA SŪRI (1459)

Velankar, JRK, p. 22, dates him as having composed his *Ācārapradīpa* in 1459, calls him "pupil of Munisundara Sūri of the Tapā Gaccha". Ratnaśekhara died in *saṃvat* 1517. This Ratnaśekhara is to be distinguished from (i) Bṛhadgacchīya Ratnaśekhara, author of *Guṇasthānakramāroha,* a pupil of Hematilaka Sūri, and from (ii) "Pippalagacchīya Ratnaśekhara. For another (nonphilosophical?) work named *Śrāddhavidhiprakaraṇa* and *Vidhikaumudī* thereon, cf. Strasbourg Ser #58, pp. 117-118; it consists of seventeen Prakrit verses and has six *dvāras*; it was finished in *saṃvat* 1506, i.e. 1447 A.D. See Peterson IV, pp. cii-ciii.

156.493 RATNAŚEKHARA SŪRI, *Uttarādhyayana Gītā*

Wiles, p. 166 says a manuscript dated 1618 exists, citing the *prastavana* p. 6, item 41 to (BL1313.9.U776332).

156.494 RATNAŚEKHARA SŪRI, *Ācārapradīpa*

See H. R. Kapadia, "A note on four problems given by Śrī Ratnaśekhara Sūri in his work Ācārapradīpa", ABORI 18, 1936-37, 399-401. Velankar, JRK p. 22, says it contains five chapters, and has been printed several times: (1) by Ramacandra Dinanath, Bombay 1901; (2) Somchand Panachand for the Jainodaya Sabha, Kheda; (3) in Devchand Lalbhai Pustakoddhara Series 71, Bombay 1927 (Emeneau 4139) (Ch.).

This Ratnaśekhara Sūri is "pupil of Caritrasundara Suri, according to Kapadia. 18, pp. 220-223. "This work deals with the five *ācāras* of a Jaina Ācārya such as *jñānācxāra*, etc.; there is a separate chapter (*prakāśa*) on each of them."

156.495 RATNAŚEKHARA SŪRI, *Arthadīpikā* on the *Śrāddhapratikramaṇa-* or *Vandittu-sūtras*

Published in the DLJP Series 48, Bombay 1919 (Emeneau 4020). Also edited by Padmavijaya, (BL1313.9.A8342.S3315). According to Peterson IV, p. cii, it was written in *saṃvat* 1496, i.e., 1439 A.D.

156.496 RATNAŚEKHARA SŪRI, *Vandanapratikramaṇāvacūri*

This appears to be a commentary on Jinabhadra Kṣamāśramaṇa's *Viśeṣyanavatī* on the *Āvaśyakaśutras*. It is edited from Bombay in 1967.

157.497 AMARACANDRA SŪRI (1461), *Avacūri* on Dharmadāsa Gaṇi's *Upadeśamālā*

NCC 2, p. 351. Velankar, JRK p. 51 lists this work as authored by Amaracandra Gaṇi and composed in *saṃvat* 1518 (1461 A.D.) but says "this is a mistake"! (It's not clear what is a mistake.) However, he cites several manuscripts.

Peterson V.1892-95 (Bombay 1896), p. v. "Transcribed in *saṃvat* 1518....He was a pupil of Vivekasamudra Gaṇi who was a pupil of Somasundara the head at the time of the Tapā Gaccha."

158 VARDHAMĀNA SŪRI (1463)

NCC 2, p. 24 says "pupil of Abhayadeva and Jayānanda", whom Velankar (JRK p. 22) identifies as Jayānanda Sūri of the Candra Gaccha.

158.498 VARDHAMĀNA SŪRI, *Ācārādinakara*

NCC 2, p. 24 says this was "composed in A.D. 1463" and is published in *Kharataragacchagranthamālā* No. 2, 2 pts., Bombay 1922.

159.499 SAṄGRĀMASIṂHA (1463), *Buddhisāgara*

NCC 14, p. 31. JRK p. 283 confirms the date, says that the author was the Bhāṇḍāgārika of Mohamed Khilji of Malwa, cites manuscripts.

160. ŚUBHAŚĪLA (1433-1483)

According to Velankar, JRK p. 227, Śubhaśīla was a pupil of Munisundara Sūri of the Tapā Gaccha

160.500 ŚUBHAŚĪLA, *Pañcavargasagrahanāmamālā*

See there for manuscript listings. Also (BL1316.S894 P36); (BL1376.S83).

160.501 ŚUBHAŚĪLA, *Pañcaśatiprabodhasambandha*

Edited by Mrgendra Muniraji from Surat in 1968 (BL1316.S894 P360 1968).

161.502 HEMAHAṂSA GAṆI (1465), *Bālāvabodha* on the *Āvaśyakasūtras*

This Hemahaṃsa Gaṇi was a pupil of Jayacandra, Munisundara, etc. of the Tapā. See JRK p. 39. The work is in old Gujarati.

162.503 JÑĀNARĀJA (1470), *Praśnottarapañcāśikā*

JRK p. 276 provides the date and cites manuscripts.

163 VIDYĀNANDIN (1470)

A teacher of Śrutasāgara, whose date is 1500.

163.504 VIDYĀNANDIN (1400), Commentary on Śubhacandra's *Jñānārṇava*

NCC 7, p. 346 says the commentary is "on prose passages".

164.505 ŚIVAMAṆḌANA GAṆI (1470), *Ṭīkā* on Haribhadra Sūri's *Darśanasaptatikā*

See JRK p. 167.

165 MAHĪSĀGARA (1471)

JRK p. 39 says the author was "pupil of Jayakesari Sūri (*saṃvat* 1498) of the Añcala Gaccha."

165.506 MAHĪSĀGARA, *Bālāvabodhasaṅkṣepārtha* on the *Āvaśyakasūtras*

Cf. JRK p. 402 for a manuscript citation.

165.507 MAHĪSĀGARA, *Ṣaḍāvaśyakavidhi*

JRK p. 402 says it was composed in *saṃvat* 1498 (1444 A.D.).

166 MERUSUNDARA GAṆI or UPĀDHYĀYA (1470)

He was a pupil of Ratnamūrti of the Kharatara Gaccha, says Velankar, JRK p. 391.

166.508 MERUSUNDARA GAṆI (1471), *Bālāvabodha* on Hemacandra's *Yogaśāstra*

JRK p. 324 gives the date of composition as 1471.

166.509 MERUSUNDARA GAṆI, *Bālāvabodha* on the *Śrāddhapratikramaṇasūtra*

Cf. JRK p. 391.

166.510 MERUSUNDARA GAṆI, *Bālāvabodha* on Jayaśekhara Sūri's *Sambodhasaptatikā*

Consult JRK p. 422, which says it was written in 1471 A.D.

166.511 MERUSUNDARA GAṆI, *Bālāvabodha* on the *Āvaśyakasūtras*

Merusundara was a "pupil of Ratnamūrta Gaṇi. He composed this work at the command of Jinacandra Sūri of the Kharatara Gaccha. It is based on Taruṇaprabha's *Ṭīkā*." (JRK p. 39). The work is in old Gujarati. On p. 50 of JRK the title of this commentary is given as *Vārtārūpāntara*.

166.512 MERUSUNDARA GAṆI, *Bālāvabodha* on Maladhārin Hemacandra's *Upadeśamālā*

See JRK p. 254.

166.513 MERUSUNDARA GAṆI, *Bālāvabodha* on Jayakīrti's *Śīlopadeśamālā*

Edited by R.M. Saha, Ahmedabad 1980 as LD Series 77 (BL1356.M47).

166.514 MERUSUNDARA GAṆI, *Sandehapadapraśnottaraśata*

See JRK p. 413 for manuscript citations.

166.515 MERUSUNDARA GAṆI, Commentary on the *Ajitaśāntistava*

Edited, with a Prakrit commentary by Nandiṣena, in old Gujarati from Ahmedabad 1990.

167.516 RĀJAVALLABHA (1473), *Vṛtti* on the *Ṣaḍāvaśyakasūtra*

JRK p. 402 gives the date and cites locations of manuscripts.

168 JINAMAṆĪKYA GAṆI (1482)

According to a genealogy provided in a *praśasti* by Vijaya Muni, Jinamaṇīkya's pupil, this author was a pupil of Cāritraratna, who was a pupil of Jayacandra Suṛi, who in turn was a pupil of Somasundara. This *praśasti* was written in 1539 *vīra saṃvat* (1483 A.D.)–or perhaps this is the date the work mentioned below was written. (See LD Series 12, Ahmedabad 1967, containing Bechardas J. Doshi's edition of work #516, cited below, p. vi).

168.517. JINAMAṆĪKYA GAṆI, *Ślokaśatārtha* on Ratnaprabhā's *Ratnākarāvatārika* and autocommentary

This work has been edited, with the autocommentary, by Becaradas Jivaraj Dosi. Ahmedabad 1967 (PK3798.R292.R334). In this work, p. vi, Prof. Dosi provides the following explanation of the nature of the work: "The *Śatārthī* is a commentary on the benedictory stanza of the *Ratnākarāvatārikā* written by Ratnaprabhā Sūri (a pupil of Vādi Deva Sūrī). The stanza contains a prayer to Lord Mahāvīra: May the lamps in the form of the nails of the Lord destroy the moths in the form of the obstructions lying in the way of composing the great work, the *Ratnākarāvatārikā*. A literary work containing a hundred stanzas or so is called *śataka*. Here in the present work the author has brought out more than a hundred meanings of one single verse. At one place the author

has even shown that the verse describes the *Siddhahemacandra-vyākaraṇa*. Regarding this grammar he remarks that but for its study it would have been impossible for him to discover the numerous meanings hidden in one single verse."

169.518 ŚUBHA VARDHANA GAṆI (1483), *Avacūri* on Bhadrabāhu's *Āvaśyakaniryukti*

JRK p. 37 gives the date and a manuscript location

170 ŚIVATILAKA (1486?)

Strasbourg pp. 206-207: "The name of the commentator's guru Lakṣmī Sāgara and that of Jñāna Sāgara are registered in some scribal remarks dated between *saṃvat* 1511 and 1543 (see A. M. Shah, *Praśastisaṃgraha* (Ahmedabad 1937), II. Nos. 63, 99, 113, 116, 132, 141, 169, 173, 239 and Nos. 145, 176, 185). Hence, Śivatilaka can be placed in the same period."

170.519 ŚIVATILAKA, Commentary on a *Pañcasūtra*

Cf. Strasbourg Series #147, pp. 206-207.

171 UDAYASĀGARA (1489)

Wiles p. 165 says "of the Añcala Gaccha."

171.520 UDAYASĀGARA, *Ṭīkā* on the *Uttarādhyāyanasūtra*

"Composed *saṃvat* 1546 (1489 A.D.)", says Wiles. See JRK, p. 44.

172 HARṢA VARDHANA GAṆI (1490?)

Writing in LD Series 34 (Ahmedabad 1972) the editor, Nagin Shah, speculates about the identity and in particular the date of the author of a work titled *Adhyātmabindu* which, with its auto-commentary, a manuscript of which, written in *vīra*

saṃvat 1778 (1722 A.D.), has been discovered in the L. D. Institute's collection in Ahmedabad. Shah uncovers four authors going by the name Harṣa Vardhana, but deems three of them unlikely to be the author of the work in question–one is not known to have written anything, another lived too late to be the author of a work copied in a truncated manuscript of the work also in the same collection, and still another wrote on Nyāya. Shah comes to the conclusion that the author of that work must be the present Harṣa Vardhana, who is the known author of several works and about whom we have a good deal of knowledge. This Harṣa Vardhana was a pupil of Ratnaśekhara of Tapā Gaccha, who in turn was a pupil of Somasundara Sūri, both of whom are to be found in our list of Jain authors prior to the end of the 15th century.. The dates of Ratnaśekhara's life span from 1396 to 1461 A. D. Without a lot of confidence, Shah guesses it is this Harṣa Vardhana who wrote the *Adhyātmabindu* and its commentary. Having no better hypothesis to offer, and wishing to include the work in our purview–as we shall see, it has a great deal of philosophical content–we shall enter this author and his work here.

172.521.HARṢAVARDHANA, *Adhyātmabindu* and auto-commentary thereon

The work is based on four *Dvātriṃśikās*. The auto-commentary is only available on the first of these four. Prof. Shah's summary of the first with its commentary is taken from the volume of the L. D. Institute Series mentioned above, constituting pp. 4-28. "E" references are to the edition contained in that volume; "S" refers to the pages of Shah's summary. As usual, we have substituted our renditions of technical terms for his where necessary, and made a few grammatical revisions to suit linguistic custom.

Summary by Nagin J. Shah

DVĀTRIṂŚIKĀ I

I.1 (E1; S4-5) [After a benedictory verse, a section indicating the purpose of the commentary–] The author

explains the term "*adhyatman*" in the title of the work. Primarily it means a work the subject-matter of which is the self. Secondarily, it means thought-activity that refutes the position that a self is doer and enjoyer. It means discriminative knowledge (*vivekakhyāti*).

Discriminative Knowledge: This knowledge enables us to distinguish clearly and rightly self from non-self. The task of distinguishing self from non-self is very difficult because a self has become one with the karmic particles since beginningless time. Only through the power of discriminative knowledge can we distinguish it from foreign elements, first having determined its special conduct and nature. Once one convincingly realizes the relieving fact that [a] self is essentially different from karmic matter he necessarily destroys the fourfold *karmans*, viz. *mohanīya* (deluding one from right conduct and right faith), *jñānāvaraṇīya* (awareness-obstructing), *darśanāvaraṇīya* (perception-obscuring) and *antarāya* (hindrance-inducing). It is these *karmans* that obscure the nature of the self. On the destruction of these four types of *karman* one become omniscient.

Mundane Selves: The cycle of births and deaths has no beginning. Mundane selves take birth and die. Like a wheel they go round and round in the world, taking birth in the class of living beings in which they had taken birth infinite times. They are blinded by delusion (*moha*). They long for the enjoyment of worldly objects that are as ephemeral as the ones seen in a dream. They are born in various classes of living beings and they suffer pains. Their eyes are turned away from their own self. But they are always fixed on what is not the self. For such mundane selves birth in the class of human beings provides a rare opportunity for spiritual uplift. Even after attaining the status of human beings it is very difficult to acquire spiritual discriminative knowledge. If one were to acquire it, then on its acquisition one would become free from the cycle of births and deaths. The attainment of this discriminative knowledge on the part of some meritorious persons is *ayatanasādhya* (requires no effort).

I.2 (E2-3; S5) Conditions of right vision [*samyakdrṣṭi*]:

Birth in a noble (*ārya*) family and a noble country is generally a condition for the attainment of right faith. Of course, there are exceptions to this general rule. Again, some attain right faith without depending on external conditions whereas others attain it depending on them. Association with spiritual teachers and listening to the scriptures are counted among the external conditions. Mere listening to the scriptures is of no avail if one is not convinced of the principles enunciated in them. It is to be born in mind that even a person of such conviction is sometimes led astray by delusion. This proves the formidable power of delusion.

I.3 (E3-4; S5-6) Activity or External Movement of Mundane Self: Mundane selves are bound by karmic matter. This bondage can become possible if it is proved that mundane selves are active, i.e., doers, agents. If they were inactive, then there would be no possibility of their bondage.

An ocean by itself is motionless. But when a storm of wind rises it is disturbed and numberless waves rise and vanish. Similarly, self, by its very nature, is inactive but its association with karmic matter has made it active. This activity becomes possible in the mundane self because self, by its very nature, is changing. If it were changeless by its very nature, then various classes of mundane selves, viz., mobile (*trasa*), static (*sthāvara*), would become impossible and consequently the world itself would become a non-entity. To hold it to be changeless would mean to make it unreal like a sky-flower. "A thing is real and yet it does not undergo change"–none can prove this. Again, it is contradicted by our perception of milk turning into curds. If the self were held to be changeless then the activity on the part of mundane selves would become impossible with the result that the theory of moral causation would become redundant. If the opponent were to argue that a self undergoes changes on account of its association with *karman*, then he should be asked as to whether a self, according to him, is changing or changeless by nature. If changeless, then nothing can make it variable or changing. If changing, then it would not require any other thing to cause changes in it. The nature of a thing does not depend upon

external conditions. So, the self should be regarded as changing by its very nature. Thus a pure self which is free from karmic matter undergoes pure changes worthy of liberated selves but the self which is in association with karmic matter undergoes impure changes and becomes actor, agent or doer.

I.4 (E4-5; S6) *Karman* as auxiliary cause necessary for impure changes: A lump of clay, when not in association with other things like water, a potter, etc., undergoes pure or similar changes. But as soon as it comes in contact with them it undergoes impure or dissimilar changes and consequently assumes different forms, viz., of a cup or a pot, etc. Similarly a self not associated with karmic matter undergoes pure changes, but it in association with karmic matter undergoes impure changes and assumes different states of mundane existence, viz., sub-human, human, infernal and celestial. Thus though a self, like other substances, is changing by its very nature it cannot change into impure changes in the absence of its contact with karmic matter, the auxiliary causal condition necessary for the impure change. The mundane self undergoes impure changes, that is, it remains caught up in the cycle of births and deaths on account of its association with karmic matter from beginningless time.

I.1.5 (E5-6; S6-7) Higher (*niścaya*) and practical (*vyavahāra*) standpoints: The higher standpoint describes things as they are. It concentrates on the natural properties or states of a substance. For it, contingent or adventitious properties of a substance do not really belong to it. They are quite foreign to it. Hence this standpoint never predicates of self the properties dependent on karmic matter. On the other hand, the practical standpoint describes things as they are not. It superimposes contingent and foreign properties on a substance. This is the reason why it regards states or modes that are due to karmic matter as belonging to the self. Psychical states like attachment, aversion, etc., which are dependent on karmic matter, are considered to be states of the self. Not only that but the physical qualities of the body, viz., color etc., are also predicated of a self. This finally leads to the identification of the body with the self and consequently whatever body does is

attributed to the self. All activities of body, mind and speech depend on karmic matter. And this practical standpoint superimposes them on the self. Natural properties of a self, viz., knowledge, etc. are technically called *svabhāvas* of a self. And they form the subject-matter of the higher standpoint. Psychical states and physical properties, which invariably depend on karmic matter, are respectively called *vibhāvas* and *parabhāvas* of the self. And they form the subject-matter of the practical standpoint. The higher standpoint penetrates into the transcendental or ultimate nature of a self whereas the practical standpoint studies the empirical nature of a self, which is the result of its association with karmic matter. The former discriminates the pure and natural properties of a self from its contingent and dependent properties, whereas the latter does not do so. In other words, the former is based on the spiritual discriminative knowledge whereas the latter lacks it. Again, the definitive standpoint is inclined to view a substance and its properties to be identical whereas the practical standpoint is inclined to view them as different.

I.6-8 (E6-12; S7-9) Utility of the practical standpoint: As we have already seen, the practical standpoint does not present the self as it is. It does not help us in knowing a self in its pure and pristine state. So, someone might here urge that this standpoint is absolutely useless and hence one should reject it altogether at all stages. He may further add that as it presents the thing as it is not it should be regarded as an error. Thus the practical standpoint is a case of wrong view (*mithyātva*).

The author firmly answers that those who strive for liberation should not reject it altogether. It is this standpoint that makes possible the *arthapravṛtti* (religious activities to be performed by the fourfold order). It is true that this standpoint presents the self as it is not. It is an error. But there are two types of error–one leading to successful purposive activity (*saṃvaḍi bhrama*) and another frustrating our purposive activity (*visaṃvādi bhrama*). The case under consideration is of the type of *saṃvādi bhrama*. Though it is an error it leads us to our destination. The author explains the point by an illustration of two persons, one mistaking the light of a lamp for a diamond

and another mistaking the luster of a diamond for a diamond. The activities of the former to attain the diamond will be frustrated whereas those of the latter to attain it will be successful. The practical standpoint mistakes what is the result of the combination of self and matter for the self itself. It gives rise to the cognition "this is self" even in the case of the one-sensed, the two-sensed [creatures], etc. No doubt this is an error. But it helps us in achieving our spiritual goal. From the practical standpoint we consider the one-sensed, etc. to be selves and through compassion we refrain from killing them or causing pain to them. And through this type of behavior selves in bondage can cross the ocean of worldly life. And on this line the practical standpoint makes possible and meaningful the *tīrthapravṛtti.* On the contrary, *niścayanāya* considers the self to be totally different from the body and hence absolutely incorporeal; so, there is no possibility of violence at all; thus even if one tortures the mobile and immobile living beings he will not incur bondage of *karman*. Again, from the standpoint of *niścayanaya* there is no possibility of spiritual evolution. It is possible from the standpoint of *vyavahāranaya*.

The practical standpoint is indispensable for educating the people For instance, those who are spiritually unadvanced do not understand what the term "self" (*ātman*) stands for; so, the learned take recourse to the practical standpoint and explain the term "*ātman*" as meaning that which struggles (*atati*) for the attainment of *darśana, jñāna* and *cāritra* or that which attains different modes, viz. *sthāvaratva, trasatva*, etc. In the first case though the self in fact is not different from *darśana, jñāna, cāritra* it is described in such a manner as if it were different from them. In the second case, though the self does not really transform into those modes, yet it is so described. The learned has to adopt this mode of expression to educate the people. This comes very near to the Buddhist doctrine of *upāyakauśalya*.

Danger in our sole reliance on either of them: Those who rely solely on either of the two are ignorant of the doctrine of non-absolutism (*syādvāda*).

Those who rely solely on the practical standpoint have

no faith in the pure self presented by the higher standpoint. They are so much attached to religious practices that they could not make spiritual progress. They can attain the auspicious condition as a result of religious practices. But they can never attain the pure spiritual condition which follows the renunciation of all religious practices and virtues. They mistake means for the end.

Similarly, those who rely solely on the higher standpoint step into the mire of hypocrisy and self-deception. They consider themselves to be free from all impurities. They deceive themselves by believing that they do not enjoy sense-pleasure even when they enjoy all sorts of sense-pleasure. They degenerate into hypocrites *par excellence*. They despise all religious activities and virtues. They forget that one has to pass through the auspicious condition of religious activities and virtues in order to reach the final destination. Though it has to be left behind by one who wants to proceed further, yet it is a necessary station in the spiritual journey. We cannot renounce what we have not acquired. Similarly, we cannot renounce virtues or auspicious condition if we have not attained them. Though the minds of those who rely solely on the higher standpoint reject the duality of end and means yet they have not attained the state where their difference melts away. Hence they are deprived of the fruits of both the conditions. They do not perform good deeds lest they come to accumulate auspicious *karman*. Thus these persons are at a stage which is even lower than the one at which those who solely rely on the practical standpoint are. They are steeped into the condition of spiritual lethargy and yet think that they have attained the highest spiritual light. They accumulate inauspicious *karman* and yet think that they are in the purest state, accumulate no *karman*, and think that whatever activities and enjoyments they are seen performing are simply the result of previous *karman* and are untouched by those activities and enjoyment. Thus these persons mistake the lowest stage for the highest. This mistake is due to the fact that many a time the two extremes are alike. "A child comes into the world crawling and without teeth, and the old man goes out without teeth and crawling.

The extremes are alike, but the one has no experience of the life before him, while the other has gone through it all...There are idiots who have no desires in this world because their brains are imperfect. At the same time, the highest state is reached when we have no desire."

We should put equal emphasis on both the *nayas*, The higher standpoint clearly lays down the goal in order that we may not mistake a stage that falls in the spiritual evolution for the highest goal. The practical standpoint shows us the way to the goal. Thus the subject-matter of the former is the highest goal whereas that of the latter is the way to that goal. This makes crystal-clear as to how both the standpoints are equally important. The practical standpoint without the higher standpoint is like a man who has forgotten the place for which he has started. The higher standpoint without the practical standpoint is like a man who does not know the way to his destination though the verbal picture of the destination is so vivid to his mind. The philosophy propounded by a *tīrthaṅkara* gives equal importance to both the standpoints. By the force of non-absolutistic logic the seeming opposition between the two is resolved and they are made friendly co-operators in the task of helping living beings who are engaged in freeing themselves from worldly bondage.

I.9-10 (E12-13; S9-10) Discriminative awareness (*bhedajñāna*) and its effects: The author employs the Sāṃkhya terminology and says that knowledge of difference between *puruṣa* (self) and *prakṛti* (matter) has the power to cut off the bondage. For such knowledge he has used the well-known Sāṃkhya term *vivekakhyāti*. In the absence of this discriminative knowledge, a living being knows not what is to be set free and from what it is to be set free. Consequently he cannot attain spiritual freedom. Having pondered over the true nature of the self and having discriminated it from non-self as also from the states contingent upon its association with matter one can untie the Gordian know of ignorance. This knot has been formed from beginningless time. As soon as it is untied the impure internal states of attachment and aversion never arise and consequently no new karmic traces are acquired. And the already acquired traces are completely dissociated or destroyed by means of penance, internal as well as external. *Śukladhyāna* (pure concentration) is the highest form of penance. It destroys those karmic traces that obstruct and obscure the fourfold nature of the self. And the activities that still remain, at this stage, without the slightest tinge of attachment and aversion get altogether stopped and the person attains the final stage of spiritual evolution called *śaileṣī*. Thus discriminative knowledge is the seed of liberation.

I.11-12 (E13-15; S10-11) Non-discriminative awareness (*abhedajñana*): On the other hand, the seed of worldly existence or bondage is non-discriminative awareness. This non-discriminative awareness is ignorance of the distinction between self and not-self. It is ignorance. It is falsity (*mithyātva*). Due to this ignorance one is unable to discriminate the self, the nature of which is cognition, from passions that arise depending on karmic matter. As a result of it one identifies oneself with passions and consequently superimposes doership on the self. Thus he comes to believe that the self is an agent, actor or doer. From beginningless time the self is associated with what is not-self, i.e., karmic matter; so, its power of discrimination has been veiled. A person stricken with ignorance is fascinated by worldly objects, hankers after them, thinks that there obtains a relation of owner and owned between the self and these worldly object, gets his self transformed into the ideas of them, is possessed by the ideas so much that he completely forgets his own true self. He is a man of likes and dislikes. When he comes in contact with desired and undesired objects he entertains the feelings of attachment and aversion with regard to them respectively. Accordingly, he ideally constructs them, becomes one with them, ponders over them; consequently his consciousness assumes their forms. Thus he remains caught up in the cycle of activity (of attaining or abandoning them) and its fruits.

Removal of Ignorance. Ignorance of the true nature of the self is the cause of the notions "I" and "mine" in the case of what is essentially different from the self. How can one remove this ignorance? It is demonstrated as follows: The self is of the

nature of awareness (*jñāna;* Shah says "determinate cognition") and vision (*darśana*; Shah says "indeterminate cognition"). This is established by experience itself. As soon as the veil of ignorance [falsity] (*mithyātva*) is removed it is found engrossed in its infinite awareness and bliss. Ignorance is removed either spontaneously or by listening to the preaching of a spiritual teacher. One who has not attained *samyaktva* (opposite of *mithyātva*, redeeming knowledge, right faith) previously at any time attains it spontaneously. This *samyāktva* of his is invariably of the *aupaśamika* type. One who had attained *samyaktva* previously but who is now deprived of it will regain it with the help of the gospels of a spiritual teacher. This *samyaktva* of his is of the *kṣāyika* or *kṣāyopaśāmika* type. Thus one who has acquired *samyaktva* spontaneously or with the help of a spiritual teacher knows that worldly objects are not his, nor is he theirs, and as a result of it he does not form binding association with matter.

I.13 (E15-16; S11-12) *Pramāṇa, Nikṣepa, Naya* and their status: *Pramāṇa* is that by which we measure, i.e. know, objects. It is twofold–immediate and mediate That which bears vivid reflection is immediate. But vividness is meant here the special internal purity effected by the removal of karmic impurities. The immediate *pramāṇa* also is twofold–secondary (*sāṃvyavahārika*) and primary (*mukhya*). The former is again of two types, viz., sensory and quasi-sensory. The cognition of an external object, had through the sense organs, is known as sensory cognition. Regarding this sensory cognition Jainas maintain that a particular sense-organ cognizes a particular object because it is endowed with a power to cognize that object only. According to Jainas mind is an *anindriya* (quasi-sense organ). And the cognition had through it is regarded as quasi-sensory cognition. The primary immediate *pramāṇa* is of two types, viz., partial and entire. The former class consists of two members, viz. *avadhi* (extra-sensory determinate cognition of spatially and temporally distant material objects) and [telepathy or] *manahparyāya* (knowledge of the modes of mind). The latter one is a one-membered class. Its member is omniscience (*kevalajñāna*). This *kevalajñāna* is purely self-

dependent and immediately knows all objects with all their modes.

The cognition that bears vague reflection is called mediate (*parokṣa*) *pramāṇa*. It is of five types, viz., memory, recognition, cogitation, inference and verbal testimony.

The ways of positing things are called *nikṣepas*. They are four–*naṃa, sthāpanā, dravya* and *bhāva*. To posit a thing only in name is called *nāma*. When we give a particular name to an object which does not possess the property denoted by that name, it is a case of *naṃa-nikṣepa*. To posit a thing by way of configuration is called *sthāpanānikṣepa*. In other words, here we take merely a figuration or symbol for the thing itself. To posit a thing by way of its past or future state is called *dravyanikṣepa*. Here we know a thing by its past or future state. To posit a thing by way of its present state is called *bhāvanikṣepa*. This *nikṣepa* concentrates on the present state of a thing.

Naya grasps an aspect of a thing cognized by a *pramāṇa*. Thus *nayas* are the expressions of partial truths. *Nayas* are classified into two main divisions, viz. *dravyāstika* and *paryāyāstika.* According to the Jainas both the *dravya* (substance) and the *paryāya* (modes) constitute the nature of a thing whereas *paryāyāstika* concentrated primarily on the mode-aspect of it. *Śuddhaniścayanaya* and *aśuddhaniścayanaya* are the cases [causes?] of *dravyāṣṭikanaya*. The *dravyāstikanaya* is threefold, viz. *naigamanaya, saṅgrahanaya* and *vyavahāra-naya*, whereas *paryayārthikanaya* is fourfold, viz., *ṛjusūtranaya, śabdanaya, samabhiruḍhanaya* and *evambhuṭanaya. Pramāṇa, nikṣepa* and *naya*–all the three operate in the lower sphere. It is so because they are conceptual in nature and hence they cannot grasp the pure thing, the thing-in-itself. They simply help us who belong to this lower sphere of conceptualization and thought, to discriminate between self and non-self. But they are useless for those who have attained the higher sphere of pure experience or trance which is eternal and blissful. The higher sphere or state is that where all impurities are completely wiped off, where one becomes unruffled, placid and peaceful and where shine the blissful nature of the self. Again,

this sphere is beyond the path. The *yogins* who belong to this sphere have no use of *pramāṇa*, *nikṣepa* and *naya*. The instruments are sought in order to achieve the goal. So, when the goal is attained, the instruments become useless. The scaffolding is necessary for building a house. But when it is already built, the scaffolding must be removed from the house...

I.14 (E16-17; S12) States of karmic accumulations: There are many states of karmic accumulations or traces. But out of them the main states are as follows: *bandha, udaya, udīraṇā* and *sattā*. *Bandha* is a state in which new karmic traces are accumulated by the self due to the rise of passions. *Udaya* is a state in which the traces operate and as a result the self experiences their proper fruits. *Udīraṇā* is a state in which the traces operate before their destined time. *Sattā* is a state in which the traces simply exist in the units of a self without any operation on their part. Bondage (*bandha*) is of four kinds, viz., *prakṛtibandha* (bondage which determines the nature of traces), *sthitibandha* (bondage which determines the duration of traces), *anubhagābandha* (bondage which determines the intensity of the fruits yielded by traces) and *pradeśabandha* (bondage which determines the quantity of traces). Though the traces assuming these different states cause impure modifications like attachment, aversion, etc. in a self, they are quite different in nature from a self.

I.15 (E17-18; S13) Attachment, aversion, pleasure, pain etc. not natural to a self: Even the impure modifications like attachment, aversion, pleasure, pain etc. caused by traces do not constitute the nature of the self. Their presence depends on the presence of traces. Similarly, their absence depends on the absence of traces. This proves that these impure modifications are not natural to a self. And hence they should not be regarded as identical with a self.

I.16 (E18; S13) *Cetanā*. the defining characteristic of a self. It is *cetanā* (consciousness) that constitutes the nature of a self. It is on the basis of this characteristic that self is differentiated from all other substances. It is found in two forms, viz., *jñāna* (awareness; Shah says "determinate cognition") and *darśana* (vision; Shah says "indeterminate

cognition"). *Darśana* cognizes universals whereas *jñāna* cognizes particulars. Though a self is the substratum of many properties, *cetanā* is selected as its defining characteristic because it is found in each and every self but it is never found in a member not belonging to the class of selves. It is again threefold, viz., *karma cetanā, karmaphala cetana* and *jñānacetanā*. *Karma cetanā* means consciousness or awareness of action. *Karmaphala cetanā* means consciousness or awareness of pleasure-pain which are the fruits of actions. These two forms of *cetanā* do not constitute the nature of the self because they depend on and are caused by its association with actions. *Jñāna cetanā* is of the nature of pure consciousness (*niruparāgayoga*) devoid of all adventitious impurities. It does not depend on actions. It is the nature of a self. It cognizes both its own self and an object. One can distinguish, with its help, one's own self from the five *ajīva* substances as also from other selves. As soon as one realizes that it constitutes the nature of one's self one will consider the impure modifications like attachment, aversion, etc. to be foreign to one's self, This will ultimately lead to the cessation of all impure modifications and consequently that of bondage itself.

I.17 (E19-20; S13-14) Superimposition of bodily qualities on the self: Though the physical qualities, viz. color, etc., are found associated with the self due to its relation with a material body, they do not constitute the nature of the self. On account of the operation of [stored-up] (*pudgalavipakī*) *karman* the self comes in close contact with a body. This contact is such that the units of one are permeated with those of another. Hence ordinary people are unable to differentiate one from the other. In spite of this the defining characteristic of the self is *upayoga* (cognitive awareness) which is invariably concomitant with it. The physical qualities being not invariably concomitant with it do not constitute the nature of self. This is the reason why it is said that color, etc. are not there in the self. In spite of this people who live on the plane of *vyavahāranaya* are unable to differentiate the nature of self from that of body, and consequently wrongly identify self with body and

superimpose physical qualities like color etc. of body on the self. The cause of the superimposition or mistake lies in the close intermingling of the one with the other from the beginningless time. The qualities of the body are superimposed on the self because the former is closely bound up with the latter. But they are not there in the self by nature because the self by nature is an incorporeal non-physical conscious substance.

Two types of devotional songs (*stuti*): Those who have not risen beyond the stage of *vyavahāra* urge as follows: "If the self were absolutely different from the body then our activity of paying homage to *tīrthaṅkaras* and *ācāryas* would become meaningless and fruitless (*mithyā*). Hence it is better to accept the identity of body and self."

The author in reply points out that even the devotional songs fall into two broad divisions, viz., *vyavahārastutis* and *niścayastutis*. *Vyavahārastutis* contain the praise of different parts of the body of a *tīrthaṅkara* whereas *niścayastutis* glorify his spiritual qualities.

I.18 (E20-21; S14) Attachment, aversion, etc. are material: Attachment, aversion, wrong religious faith, etc. are the different forms of *mohanīyakarman*, which is material. Wrong religious faith, passions, not refraining from violence, etc. are considered to be of two types each, viz. those characterizing the self and those characterizing what is not self. When viewed from the standpoint of karmic matter which gives to them they are regarded as characterizing non-self. But when they are viewed as states–of course, impure and contingent–of a self, they are regarded as characterizing self. On account of the close association of self with the material *mohanīyakarman* of various kinds, the self assumes various impure states. But it never abandons its true nature. It is so because even a thousand causes and conditions cannot deprive the thing of its own nature. The internal impure states of self, viz., attachment, etc., are proved *acetana* on the application of *asadbhūtavyavahāra* which takes into account the fact that they are produced by material *mohanīyakarman* and which utilizes the principle that "like produces like".

I.19 (E21; S14-15) Ignorance causes *Karman*: Due to ignorance the self identifies itself with impure states dependent on material *karman*. As a result of it the self gives rise to both the types of *karman*, viz., *bhāva* (mental) and *dravya* (material). And by assuming transformations–auspicious and inauspicious–the self acts as an instrumental cause in the production of a karmic state in the material particles that enter into the self through bodily, mental and vocal activities.

I.20 (E21-22; S15) The Self is an Agent (*kartā*) of Impure States: The state of being an agent of impure states or transformations is superimposed on the self as a result of wrong identification of self with non-self. A man possessed of a ghost identifies himself with the ghost and behaves in an unhumanly manner. Similarly, a self deprived of its power of discrimination identifies itself with impure states and considers itself to be the agent of those states. As soon as the self undergoes impure transformations of attachment, etc., it identifies itself with them, pervades them and thus becomes their agent. And the transformation, too, getting identified with and pervaded by the self, thus becomes the object of the self's doings. When the thing undergoing transformations is regarded as a doer then the natural corollary to it is that the transformations undergone by the thing are to be regarded as an object of the doer. It is so because in the final analysis a doer and its object are identical. The self is the doer of the states of pure consciousness or knowledge. And self is identical with those states. But these pure states are natural to the self whereas the impure states are not.. Hence the identity of the self with the pure states is natural, and hence the self's agency in connection with them is real. But its identity with impure states being superimposed, its agency in connection with them is secondary.

I.21 (E23-24; S15-16) A Substance is not the Producer or Agent of *Parabhāvas*: The view that a substance is a producer or agent of another substance is fraught with many difficulties. A self is the agent or producer of his own states which are either pure or impure. As there obtains a relation of pervader and pervaded between a self and its state, the self can produce its own states. These states are pervaded by self

because they are found in self only; the self is the pervaded because it assumes them in succession. Again, there obtains between self and its states the relation of enjoyer and enjoyed. Hence when a self produces states of attachment, etc. it enjoys or experiences them. Thus the states which the self produces are the contents of its experience. So, the self thinks that he is attached, he is angry and so on and so forth. When the self comes in contact with a desirable object he produces the state of happiness, enjoys that state and thinks that he is happy. Here like pure and natural states, even the impure and contingent states are regarded as his *svabhāva* (own states). But it is to be borne in mind that impure states should really be called *vibhāvas*. Only secondarily are they regarded as *svabhāva* because there obtains between these impure states and the self the relation of the pervaded and the pervader. Thus both self and non-self are the substrata of the two-fold *paryāyas* (states), viz., *svabhāvaparyāya* and *vibhāvaparyayā.*

Parabhāva means a state of a foreign substance. No substance undergoes or produces *parabhāva*. If it were held that a substance can undergo *parabhāva* then one substance would become identical with another substance with the result that the division of self and non-self would exist no more. This, in turn, would mean that one substance possesses many different natures. Nor have we ever observed one substance undergoing the transformations of another substance. If one substance were to undergo the transformations of another substance then all other substances would become redundant and the contingency of all being all would arise. Hence the relation of the producer and the produced obtains between a substance and its own states only.

Six States of the Process of Transformation: The term "*bhāva*" connotes *pariṇāma*, i.e. transformations, modes or states. The transformation and that which undergoes transformations are identical because they together constitute the nature of a thing. A thing exists through its various transformations. Substance is like a fluid in an egg of a pea-hen. In it all the states and sub-states, divisions and sub-divisions are there in an undifferentiated form. When such a

substance, having obtained the proper causal aggregate, manifests different states, we say that it originates (*jāyate*), it exists (*asti*), it undergoes change (*vipariṇamate*), it grows (*vardhate*), it decays and dwindles (*apakṣīyate*), it perishes (*vināśyati*). For instance, when a clay substance shuns the state of a lump and assumes another state we say that it originates (*jāyate*). This state of origination is characterized by activity. By "*asti*" is meant the state of mere existence of the thing. This state of existence is not characterized by an activity. The state which is indifferent to "becoming" is called by the term "*asti*". By the term "*vipariṇamate*" is pointed out the state in which a substance assumes another transformation which was latent till then. The transformation of milk into curds is an instance in point. Here the state or becoming is manifested through the assumption of another state. The development or growth of the mode is known by the term "*vardhate*". "*Apakṣīyate*" denotes the state of decay of the already assumed and developed transformation or mode. This is another state of becoming, characterized by the *apacaya*. By "*vināśyati*" is meant the involution of the manifested state. For instance, the statement that a pot has perished means that the state characterized by a particular form h as undergone involution, has become latent. It does not mean that that state has completely been destroyed. These are the six stages of the process of transformation.

Arthaparyāya and *Vyañjanaparyāya*: *Paryāyas* (modes, states, transformations) are again twofold, viz. *arthaparyaya* and *vyañjanaparyaya*. *Arthaparyāya* is that feature of a thing which is characterized by the pure present bereft of past and future. Thus it is an object of *ṛjusūtranaya*. *Vyañjanaparyāya* is partly permanent and partly transient, is an object of speech and hence is gross. On the other hand, *arthaparyāya* is instantaneous and subtle. The etymological meaning of "*vyañjana*" is manifestation. The mode on which our purposive activity depends is *vyañjanaparyāya*. This *vyañjanaparyāya* is twofold, viz. *svabhāvavyañjanaparyāya* and *vibhāva-vyañjānaparyāya*. Each of the two again is of two kinds, viz., *svabhāvavyañjanaparyaya* and *vibhāvaguṇavyañjanaparyāya*;

vibhāvadravyavyañjanaparyāya and *vibhāvaguṇa-vyañjanaparyāya.*

I.22 (E24-25; S17) A Thing is the Material Cause of its own States: A thing is the material cause (*upādānakāraṇa*) of its own states. It is so because between them only does there obtain a relation of the pervader and the pervaded. A potter is not the material cause of a pot. The material cause of pot is clay. The potter is simply the auxiliary cause (*nimittakāraṇa*) of the pot. But he is the material cause of his own states, viz. knowledge of pot, the will to produce it, etc. Similarly, a self is the material cause of its own states, pure and impure. But it is never the material cause of the material karmic traces. So, the accumulated material karmic traces become the auxiliary cause of the impure states of the self, viz. attachment, aversion, etc. And these impure states of a self, in turn, become auxiliary causes of the inflow of fresh material karmic particles.

I.23 (E25-26; S17) Divisions of Consciousness: Consciousness (*upayoga*) is twofold, viz., pure and impure. Pure consciousness means that consciousness which is free from attachment, aversion, delusion, etc. And impure consciousness means that consciousness which is affected with attachment, etc. It is this impure consciousness that is the cause of a self's bondage by material traces. This impure consciousness is considered to be threefold according as it is tinged with attachment (*rāga*), aversion (*dveṣa*) and delusion (*moha*). Aversion and delusion are always of the nature of inauspicious consciousness only, whereas attachment is of the nature of either auspicious or inauspicious consciousness. Attachment of the form of devotion toward an *arhat*, etc., is of the nature of auspicious consciousness. On the other hand, attachment towards worldly objects is of the nature of inauspicious consciousness. These impure states–auspicious or inauspicious–destroy the purity of consciousness, color it with their own nature and ultimately lead to the self's bondage to material traces. Thus the internal impure states (*bhāvāsrava*) act as an auxiliary cause to bring about the inflow of karmic matter (*dravyakarmāsrava*). Hence by stopping the rise of these impure states, viz., attachment, aversion etc., one can stop the

inflow of karmic matter.

I.24 (E26-27; S18) All Things Confined to their Own Natures: All things are firmly established in their own natures. They do not mix themselves with others, otherwise there would arise the contingency of one thing becoming another, that is, of x being non-x, which is a glaring contradiction. Knowledge is confined to its own nature. It does not share the nature of anger etc. Anger is confined to its own nature. It does not characterize a self, which is pure consciousness. Consciousness does not characterize material karmic traces. Consciousness and material traces possess diametrically opposite natures. From the highest standpoint material traces have no power whatever to obscure pure consciousness.

I.25 (E27-28; S18)Two Interacting Series could be Ended: The impure internal states act as auxiliary causes in the production of material karmic traces. And those material traces, in their turn, act as auxiliary causes in the production of the impure internal states. These two interacting series are beginningless. But they can be ended by discriminative knowledge. By discriminative knowledge one realizes the distinction between the self and *āsravas* [karmic inflow], e.g. passions, etc. Discriminative knowledge is necessarily and invariably associated with the absence of *āsravas*. This is the reason why it is said that discriminative knowledge alone can put an end to the two series. It is, therefore, a wrong view that religious acts alone can stop the two series. Religious acts performed without discriminative knowledge can never lead one to *mokṣa*.

I.26 (E28-29; S18) The Relation of the Knower and the Known: One who has attained the discriminative knowledge knows the difference between self and external objects. He realizes that there obtains between them the relation of the knower and the known alone. No other relation is possible in their case. That is, there does not obtain between them even the relation of the possessor and the possessed. Hence his attachment to all external objects including his own body ceases. He remains engrossed in his own pure consciousness. Thus he does not produce or bind *karman*–mental or material.

I.27 (E28-29; S18-19) Matter is Identical with Color, Etc.: Matter in all its states is pervaded by color, etc. and in the absence of the latter there is the absence of the former. In other words, matter is identical with color etc. This means that color etc. together constitute the nature of matter. The Vaiśeṣika philosophers might urge that in the absence of odor there exists water, in the absence of odor and flavor there exists fire, in the absence of odor, flavor and color there exists air; hence matter cannot be said to have necessary universal relation with them, that is, color etc. together cannot constitute the nature of matter. The Jains reply that qualities are sometimes latent and sometimes patent in their substratum due to the variety of changes that the substratum undergoes. Qualities that are latent do not lost their nature. They do not become non-existent. They are there in the substratum. The moon-stone, a log of *araṇi* tree and *yava* grains possess patent qualities of smell, flavor and color respectively. They are seen to act as material causes of water, fire and air-in-the-body. This proves that water, fire and air possess small, flavor and color respectively in their unmanifest form. Moreover, the Vaiśeṣika philosophers have recognized that fire is characterized by any one of the following four alternatives:

(1) manifest color + manifest touch
(2) unmanifest color + unmanifest touch
(3) manifest color + unmanifest touch
(4) unmanifest color + manifest touch

All this proves that matter is identical with color, etc. Moreover, the variety of change that that matter undergoes being infinite, one should not wonder if color, etc. are found manifest at one time and unmnifest at another.

Six Modes of Matter: Depending on the necessary causal aggregate matter assumes a gross or subtle mode. These two modes are expanded into the following six:

(1) Gross-gross, or very gross (solid) matter, e.g., a log of wood, a stone, a pillar etc. Matter having this mode cannot get united without the use of a third thing.

(2) Gross (liquid) matter, e.g., milk, oil, water etc. On division matter having this mode unites without the intervention of a third thing.

(3) Gross-fine matter, e.g. shade, sunshine etc. Matter having this mode is perceived but it cannot be cut into pieces, it cannot be grasped, so on and so forth.

(4) Fine-gross matter, e.g. fragrance, sweetness, sound etc. Matter having this mode is amenable to sense-perception, even though it is fine.

(5) Fine matter, viz. matter capable of becoming karmic aggregates. Matter having this mode is not amenable to sense-perception.

(6) Fine-fine, viz. all the classes of matter that fall in between karmic aggregates and dyads.

I.28 (E30-31; S19-20) Self is Identical with Consciousness (*cetanā*). In all the states self exists where consciousness exists and it does not exist where consciousness is absent. This means that consciousness is invariably concomitant with self. This proves its identity with self. In the states of *nigoda* etc. a self does not have movement, etc. That is, in these states it has no overt sign of consciousness. Yet even in these states it is not completely devoid of consciousness or awareness. An infinitesimal part of awareness is manifest even in a self at the lowest stage of development, viz. *nigoda*. A self in the state of *nigoda* is devoid of overt behavior or movements. But that does not mean that it is devoid of consciousness. A self in the state of an egg is devoid of movements, yet we consider an egg to have life or consciousness.

Self is not identical with color, taste, etc. Though in a transmigratory state it has necessary universal relation with them, in the state of liberation it is found in their absence. This proves that they are not invariably related to a self. That is, self is not identical with them. Moreover, they constitute the nature of matter. If we relate them to self, then the contingency of the identity of self and matter would arise. This, in turn, would result in the effacement of self substance altogether. Thus it is established that color, etc. are the defining characteristics of matter only and never of self.

I.28-29 (E30-32; S20) As soon as one realizes the nature of self the beginningless Gordian knot of *moha* is cut asunder.

All the awareness of a person who is infected with *moha* or ignorance has no redeeming value whatsoever. This proves that self is the highest content of awareness. That is why it is said that one who has known [his] self has known everything. Good and bad thoughts cause karmic bondage, auspicious and inauspicious respectively. Doership and knowership are contradictory. When one performs good and bad acts, it is not possible for him to realize the true nature of self. For this spiritual realization one should raise one's self beyond the stage of good and bad acts. Performance of good and bad acts makes impossible the stoppage of karmic inflow. On the other hand, if one realizes and remains engrossed in one's own spiritual nature which is pure consciousness, then for him there are no transmigratory existence and karmic bondage.

I.30 (E32-33; S20-21) From the practical standpoint *darśana, jñāna* and *caritra* jointly constitute the means to the attainment of liberation. *Darśana* means vision of the (seven or nine) categories recognized by Jainas. *Jñāna* means knowledge of these categories. And *caritra* (good conduct) means refraining from attachment and aversion.

On the other hand, from the higher standpoint the self itself, which is of the nature of *darśana, jñāna* and *caritra*, is the means fo the attainment of *mokṣa*. Belief in the self, knowledge of the self and absorption in the self are respectively *darśana, jñāna* and *caritra*. There obtains between the three and self the relation of part and whole. When *darśana* etc. are tinged with the activities due to non-self, they act as a cause of bondage too. But when they are devoid of all such activities they directly lead to liberation. Those who rely solely on the practical standpoint are engaged in such activities and hence they never attain the moments of inward spiritual contemplation. Such persons cannot attain liberation even if they practice severe penances.

Bliss and knowledge are found in the self alone. A self that has realized its true nature never gets perturbed. This is the supreme bliss.

I.31 (E33-35; S21) From the highest standpoint a self does not possess fourfold sense-organs. It is shorn of eight types

of *karman*. It is devoid of the twofold mind. It has no body out of the five recognized in Jaina philosophy. It is not tarnished by ignorance, etc. It is tranquil, inactive, independent, eternal, detached from foreign substance, shining in its own infinite light of knowledge. This description tallies with the description of perfected beings given in the *Āgamas*. This means that from the higher standpoint there are no classes of living beings except the class of perfected beings.

DVĀTRIṂŚIKĀ II

(E37-39; S21-23) II.1 Poison causes swoon, a particular type of stone makes ineffective the power of fire, a fire-brand causes illusion, and a magnet attracts iron filaments. Really, varied are the powers of matter.

II.2 Material particles are so powerful that they can veil even the qualities of self, knowledge etc. They overpower the nature of self and make it suffer impure changes.

II.3 Liquor dulls intellect whereas *brāhmī ghī* sharpens it. Similarly, actions, though material, (adversely) affect the natural powers of a self and make it suffer impure changes.

II.4 It is the presence of ignorance (*avidyā*) that causes a self to assume impure modes or states. When it is not present the self does not suffer impure changes.

II.5 *Avidyā* is the cause of the bondage of the self with matter. And consequently material actions cause impure changes in the self. Scriptures declare that facilitation and clouding of the powers of a self are due to material actions.

II.6 Logicians might urge that the bondage of a self with matter should be endless as it is beginningless.

II.7 But Jaina theoreticians maintain that even the beginningless state of bondage can come to an end if proper causes operate. We know that the union of gold and dirt, found in gold ore, though beginningless, comes to an end when the ore is heated and chemically treated.

II.8 A self is the doer or producer of its own pure natural states. It is never a producer or doer of foreign states. The scriptural statement that the self is the doer primarily means that it generates its own pure natural state.

II.9 From the standpoint of *aśuddhaniścaya* the self is the doer or producer of mental states (*bhāva karman*), whereas from the standpoint of *vyavahāranaya* it is regarded as the producer of material actions (*dravya karman*) also.

II.10 The relation of invariable concomitance obtains between the generator (i.e. material cause) and the generated (i.e. effect). But such a relation does not obtain between a self and material *karman*. So, how can the self be regarded as the generator (i.e. material cause) of material *karman*?

II.11 Again, the relation of invarariable concomitance is possible in the case of those two things which are identical and not in the case of those that are not identical. Self and material *karman* are not identical in nature. Hence there could not obtain the relation of invariable concomitance between them. So, how can the self be held as the generator (i.e. material case) of material *karman*?

II.12 As a matter of fact, the self is the auxiliary cause of material *karman*.

II.13 As soon as a self acts as an auxiliary cause of material *karman*, it is deprived of its true nature and it enters into pithy darkness.

II.14 On account of our mistaking body for self we become blind to our own nature. And under the spell of this delusion we attribute to the self the activities performed by the body.

II.15 Awareness attached to external or internal objects gets transferred into those objects. When such is the case of with awareness, then what shall we say of auspicious and inauspicious (material) actions?

II.16 Self is not body.

II.17 Body is nothing but an aggregate of material atoms which are non-living by nature. On the other hand, self is of the nature of consciousness.

II.18 Body is amenable to sense-perception whereas a self is not amenable to it. Hence one should shun one's wrong belief in the identity of self with body.

II.19 Body is made up of impure disgusting material substances like flesh, blood, bones, etc. One who is

overpowered by ignorance considers it to be self.

II.20 The notion of "I" and "mine" in connection with the body, etc. is the main cause of transmigratory existence.

II.21 One whose attention is directed towards his own nature has no desire for even the lordship of gods. On the other hand, one whose attention is not directed toward his own nature has strong desire for even a trifling position.

II.22 Those who are fallen from their true nature get satisfied with external worldly objects, just as boars get satisfied with mud or moss.

II.23 But those who are engrossed in relishing spiritual bliss consider worldly objects to be disgusting.

II.24 Having dived deep into the well of nectar in the form of knowledge of pure Brahman and having removed all adventitious impurities of the form of *karman*, saints achieve the highest bliss.

II.25 Liberation is attained if we depend or concentrate solely upon our own nature and not otherwise because that would involve over-absurdity. One should worship one's own self. This worship is the seed of liberation.

II.26 Just as petals of a lotus are not touched by water, even so the nature a self is not touched by material *karman*.

II.27 Worldly pleasures are mixed with miseries.

II.28 The unquenching desire for the enjoyment of worldly objects is not good. Like a she-serpent it leads one to a terrible unconscious state of the self.

II.29 The fall from the high state is the *anubhāva* caused by *vibhāva* (impure psychic changes). And remaining constantly attached to this *anubhāva* one does not feel sorry or regretful.

II.30 The shackle in the form of the I-notion binds the self from time immemorial. Let us break it by realization of the self.

II.31 "I am not the body, nor is the body mine. I am knowledge. I am distinct and different from non-soul (*prakṛti*)." Since time immemorial we have not been realizing this.

II.32 Self is devoid of the qualities of *prakṛti* (nature). It is simply and purely a seer. It is not an enjoyer. One who is attached to *prakṛti* (nature) enjoys fruits, viz. pain or pleasure.

One who shines with discriminative knowledge triumphs over the karmic forces. So, may we attend a self which is untouched by the changes of *prakṛti*.

DVĀTRIMŚIKĀ III

(E49-42; S23-25) III.1 When the mind is disturbed by worldly thoughts, the self which is of the nature of pure consciousness is not reflected clearly in it just as the moon is not reflected clearly in water disturbed by waves.

III.2 One should constantly think of the self. What is the use of constantly thinking of not-self? If one were to do so, the mind becomes unruffled and placid and one becomes free from all types of miseries and attains liberation.

III.3 When the self directs its cognitive activities towards non-self it identifies itself with non-self. When it directs its cognitive activities towards its own self, it in no time realizes its own true nature.

III.4 If one were to have the I-notion in the self just as he has it in non-self, then he will surely have no bondage at all.

III.5 "I am not non-self, nor is the non-self mine, nor am I the owner of the non-self"–thus discarding all the "I" and "mine" notions with regard to non-self, if one were to remain engrossed in one's own self, then how can he be bound by the non-self?

III.6 Iron, though by nature static and motionless, moves in the presence of a magnet. Similarly, self, though by nature inactive, becomes active in the presence of karmic traces.

III.7 One who is pure, inactive, free from karmic impurities, in whom knowledge, consciousness and bliss are fully revealed and who is *avyaya* (beyond the changes of degrees in his essential qualities) is the highest self (*paramātman*), the conqueror (*jina*). The other who is bound by karmic traces is the transmigratory living being (*jīva*).

III.8 One should constantly thinks that the self, which is of the nature of pure consciousness, is quite distinct and different from actions and their effects. It is the self alone that can lerad us to the abode of eternal bliss.

III.9 "I am alone, I am pure, nothing is mine, I am of the nature of construction-filled and construction-free cognition; having dived deep into my own nature I shall immediately destroy attachment, aversion"–thus one should constantly think.

III.10 Yellow, cohesion, weight are not different from gold. Similarly, from the highest standpoint faith and conduct are not different from a self.

III.11 From the empirical standpoint they are different from a self. Though they are really identical with the self, they appear to be different from it at the plane of *vyavahāra*.

III.12 The wise should constantly ponder over the difference of self from not-self. This will destroy his *karman* and make him pure.

III.13 Knowledge of the self as the self leads one to liberation whereas delusion of self in body prolongs cycles of births and deaths. Hence having withdrawn the I-notion from the body one should direct it to the self.

III.14 Having risen above merit and demerit one should concentrate on the self by the self (i.e. with the help of the self itself). In the absence of seeds (merit and demerit) the sprout of rebirth can never flourish.

III.15 Bondage which has no beginning causes attachment, aversion, etc. And a self wrongly identifying itself with them considers itself to be an agent or generator (i.e. material cause) of them.

III.16-17 A silk-worm binds itself by its own threads. Similarly, a self binds itself by impure psychic changes, i.e. passions. The spider binds itself by its own threads. Similarly, a self binds itself by good and bad thoughts.

III.18 God is not the creator because He is without body. Hence how can a living being act impelled by Him?

III.19 The self itself becomes the agent (*kartā*) of the threefold acts through the energy which it, under the power of ignorance, directs towards them unknowingly. This is just like the transformation of eaten food into flesh, blood, fluid etc., which takes place without one's knowledge.

III.20 The opponent might urge that in considering each and every self to be an agent, the contingency of *gaurava* (cumbersomeness) would arise. But the proponent points out

that the *gaurava* which is established by logic is not regarded even by the opponent as a fallacy (*doṣa*).

III.21 Under the pressure of the forces of previous deeds a living being by itself goes to the lower birthplaces. The living being acts like a madman who under the influence of strong intoxicants rushes to the well filled with filthy things.

III.22 By the method of agreement and difference it is established that the cause of one's liberation is nothing else than one's own knowledge. In the absence of this redeeming knowledge whatever penances one may perform can lead to neither prosperity nor beatitude.

III.23-25 The self is the knower of all objects and the self itself is the highest object of knowledge. It has no beginning and no end. It transcends all pairs of opposites. It itself is the supreme bliss. It is the final achievement. It is beyond the reach of all thoughts. It is untouched even by karmic atoms. It is the supreme light. It is the highest reality. And a living being is that only. That self is smaller than the small and greater than the great.

III.26 A physician well versed in anti-toxic science is not adversely affected even if he takes poison. Similarly, an enlightened person is not bound by new karmic particles even though he enjoys the fruits of past deeds on the rise of karmic traces.

III.27 Fire cannot burn when its efficacy to burn is held up by spells. Similarly, actions cannot bind the self with new karmic traces when its efficacy is made defunct by the power of knowledge.

III.28 A *samyagdṛṣṭi* (one who possesses right attitude) is not deprived of his internal purity by new karmic traces even if he enjoys external material things. A man having no desire for wine is not intoxicated even if he takes it (as medicine).

III.29 All things are established in their own nature. That is, a thing never shares its nature with another thing. Then there arises a question as to why a self should unnecessarily affect its identification with foreign things–an identification which gives rise to the relation of action and doer and this relation, in turn, causes misery.

III.30 All things are defined by and confined to their own nature. But a self under the spell of ignorance gets attached and identifies itself with foreign things.

III.31 The *muni* who remains engrossed in his true spiritual nature entertains neither likes nor dislikes toward foreign things, has no attachment to or aversion from them.

III.32 Thus realizing clearly the difference between self and not-self one should shun all the not-self things. Then only can one become unruffled and placid. Then only one's consciousness can become calm and pacific. This means that then there does not arise in it the waves of impure modes, thoughts or passions. Then the self becomes devoid of the veil of *karman* and shines in its supreme inner light.

DVATRIMŚIKĀ IV

(E43-47; S25-28) IV.1 The inner light, having come out of the strong whirls of passions and having destroyed the darkening karmic is of eight types, fully shines in its own light.

IV.2 As soon as the weight of impure modes gets removed it assumes its original pure placid state. Again, as soon as bondage of four types is cut off it gets permeated through and through with highest bliss. And it then being free from any limiting or obscuring investment becomes pure, pacific, infinite and unobstructed, and reflects in itself all the objects of knowledge from all sides.

IV.3 All the modes of all substances are reflected in only a part of that limitless ocean of knowledge.

IV.4 *Darśana* (right attitude), *jñāna* (right awareness) and *cāritra* (good conduct)–the three together constitute one path to liberation. If a person clearly and firmly aiming at liberation travels on the path, remains completely unattached to what is not his nature, keeps his vision fixed on the path, behaves fully in accordance with it, then whatever he does is simply the result of the rise of traces and hence leads to *nirjarā* (expulsion or dissociation of karmic traces) alone.

IV.5 It is really due to ignorance that one thinks 'I am causal agent", "I am enjoyer".

IV.6 Due to ignorance of one's own nature, the self

becomes causal agent (*kartā*). As soon as he realizes his own nature, its natural *akartṛtva* becomes manifest. Attachment and aversion are the results of the rise of traces. Once the self rises beyond attachment and aversion it cannot produce material traces or passions.

IV.7 It is ignorance that makes us believe that attachment, aversion, etc. constitute our nature. By pondering over the distinction between self and passions one can fully and clearly realize that the self, in its perfection, is free from all modes contingent upon matter and is eternal.

IV.8 Ignorance causes spiritual lethargy and sleep. As soon as ignorance is removed spiritual realization dawns upon us and we feel powerful, energetic and fearless.

IV.9 The unfathomable mystic light, when it becomes free from the whirls of modes contingent upon matter, attains purity, shines brightly and its riches of supreme bliss gets fully manifest. For the relish of that supreme bliss even those great persons who have so many objects of worldly enjoyment renounce the world and exert themselves for the state of liberation which itself is supreme bliss.

IV.10 Severe penance, stern practice of vows, forbearance of strong *pariṣahas*–all these are futile and vain in the absence of knowledge of the highest reality, the pure self.

IV.11 Hence one should exert for the attainment of that highest reality. It is so because the shining rays of that luminous reality destroys the pithy darkness of strong ignorance. Once we relish the bliss that supreme reality yields, the pleasures which the positions of Indra, Cakrī yield appear to us like salty water.

IV.12 One cannot attain liberation by merely studying the *śāstras* and by pulverizing the pride of opponents by one's scholarship. For its attainment one should be free from the illusion of self within a body. Mere study of *śāstras* cannot help us in the attainment of liberation.

IV.13 By the force of ignorance the true nature of self gets obscured. As soon as ignorance is removed, the self shines in its own light–pure, infinite and independent. And it is the words of a *jina* that can remove ignorance.

IV.14 By churning the self with the self the supreme light

emerges. We all know that fire is generated in a tree when it rubs itself with itself. Hence the persons of pure vision, who have fixed their constant attention on absolute Brahman–i.e. pure soul–will surely attain the highest good. There is no other way to it.

IV.15 Ignorance gives rise to the illusion of a serpent in a rope–the illusion which causes fear etc. even in the wise. Similarly, ignorance, viz. the notion of the I in the body, keeps even the great caught in the transmigratory state.

IV.16 For long they have slept in the bed of misery, having closed their eyes of *viveka* with the eyelids heavy under the pressure of the sleep of ignorance. And in dream they identify their self with what is not-self. As a result, they are born in low classes of living beings.

IV.17 As soon as one knows the supreme spiritual reality which takes in its fold all the three worlds by its infinite cognitive faculty, there remains for him nothing to know. And in the ignorance of it, the debates conducted with sharp scholarship is simply for exertion and misery and thus resembles an act of pounding chaff.

IV.18 As soon as *bhavābandha* enters the field of experience the knot of ignorance is cut off. This is like the removal of darkness on the entry of the sun in the sky.

IV.19 Were the self to remain engrossed and established in its own nature, then it will not undergo even in the presence of objects of knowledge impure changes contingent upon non-self. It is so because attachment and aversion, not finding their objects, come to an end just as fire not getting fuel gets extinguished.

IV.20 There is no other state more blissful than the one which one is afraid of. And there is no other state more dreadful than the one which one relies on. So, one should long for and attain the spiritual state which is permeated with supreme bliss and infinite knowledge.

IV.21 A living being itself causes and gets involved in the transmigratory cycle on account of its ignorance of the difference between self and not-self. And it is this ignorance that gives rise in a living being to the notion that the self is the

cause or doer (of actions). Even in the state of liberation self is the cause of its own pure states alone. Hence it is self that is the ruler of self and nothing else.

IV.22 If a living being, having abandoned the world, the objects of enjoyment and the means of enjoyment (body, etc.) experiences its own nature than the creeper of transmigratory existence, not finding nourishment, dries up.

IV.23 Just as a patient recovered from a dreadful disease abandons, for the maintenance of health, the various delicious dishes, even so a person freed of the fever of perverted attitude shuns all worldly enjoyment for the maintenance of spiritual health.

IV.24 The world shines and gets animated in the presence of this great spiritual power which too, though dwelling in it, never assumes its changes. But under the influence of ignorance it dreams many dreams and hence its affluence gets obscured.

IV.25 Objects of illusion exist so long as illusion exists but they melt away as soon as illusion is removed. Similarly, worldly objects cease to exist, so to say, for the one who has destroyed ignorance and consequently attachment to them. Such a person has truly realized his own spiritual self. And in his presence we feel his calming influence.

IV.26 When the spiritual and highly mystical light shines fully having destroyed the cloud of strong delusion, it makes the whole world shine with its own light, pervades it by its upshooting spiritual rays, and transcends all activity.

IV.27 A living being who is free from attachment and aversion, who knows all substances, who experiences pure spiritual states alone and who has realized the eternal spiritual nature, does not bind new traces even if he performs this or that activity.

IV.28 The state in which we, having become mad or infatuated, sleep is not ours. Let us abandon it and strive for the attainment of the highest spiritual state wherein the pure spiritual nature attains its eternal stability by itself. There is no fall from this state once we have attained it. So, let us free ourselves from karmic bondage as early as possible. having realized our own true spiritual nature.

IV.29 The realization of spiritual nature is the only means to cut off the roots of the trees of births. So, for realization one should concentrate on the self.

IV.30 Realization is not possible through *karmakāṇḍa* (external religious practices). It can be attained through the force or power of pure knowledge. One should not vainly take recourse to the *karmakāṇḍa* which mainly asks us to torment the body.

IV.31 If I have said, through ignorance, anything that goes against Jaina *āgamas* then I request the learned to correct me. Intellect of a non-omniscient being is bound to err somewhere.

IV.32 I, Harsā Vardhana, have written these four *dvātriṃśikās* which expound *vivekakhyāti*.

173 JINAHARṢA GAṆI (1490)

"For Jinaharṣa, we have inscriptions ranging from *vīra saṃvat* 1519"(1462 A.D.) "to 1552" (1495). He was a prominent monk of the great Kharatara Gaccha", says A. K. Chatterjee (CHJ2, p. 130). He was a pupil of Jayacandra Sūri of the Tapā Gaccha.

173.522 JINAHARṢA GAṆI, *Samyaktvakaumudī*

NCC 7, p. 277 says this work was composed in 1487, and directs us to JRK p. 494a. The date is given in JRK p. 424, where the author is called "pupil of Jayacandra Sūri of the Tapā Gaccha". It is published in Jaina Atmananda Sabha Series 23, Bhavnagar 1913.

173.523 JINAHARṢA GAṆI, *Viṃśatisthānakavicārāmṛtasaṅgraha*

NCC 7, p. 277. It was composed in *saṃvat* 1502 (1445 A.D.), according to JRK p. 349, which says it is published in the DLJP Series 60, Bombay 1922 The University of Chicago Library dates the author of this work as 1648-1707, which may indicate that the author of this work is not the same Jinaharṣa

Gaṇi as the author of the other works, or that perhaps several of them have a different author.

173.524 JINAHARṢA GAṆI, (Commentary on a?) *Gautamapṛcchā*

NCC 6, p. 228 says "Prakrit in 64 *gāthās*; a dialogue between Gautama and Mahāvīra on the effects of virtues and vices." It is printed by Hiralal Hamsraj from Jamnagar 1920. Velankar, JRK p. 111, lists many manuscript citations, but does not ascribe this work to any author, so it is possible it is an older work. (A work by this title, published in 1920, is ascribed to Mukti Sāgara, but without telling us whether this Mukti Sāgara was ancient or modern. Note that Śrītilaka (our #103) is credited with a commentary (103.372) on a *Gautamapṛcchā*, so Jinaharṣa, at a later date, can hardly be the author of the work thus commented on. Presumably it is an older work, perhaps by an ancient "Mukti Sāgara", on which Śrītilaka and Jinaharṣa both commented, but without access to more information it is hard to tell.)

173.525 JINAHARṢA GAṆI, *Vṛtti* on (a part of the?) *Āvaśyakasūtra*

NCC 12, p. 253 says "composed in 1468 A.D".

173.526 JINAHARṢA GAṆI (1467), *Pratikramaṇavidhi*

Velankar, JRK p. 259 says it was "composed in *saṃvat* 1525" (1467 A.D.) "by Jinaharṣa, pupil of Jayacandra of the Tapā Gaccha." Cites one manuscript.

174.527. KṢEMARĀJA (1490), *Upadeśasaptatikā/Ṭīkā*

Velankar, JRK, p. 53 says Kṣemarāja was of the Kharatara Gaccha. The work was published in Jaina Dharma Prasaraka Sabha Series 37, Bhavnagar 1917. There is also a Gujarati translation published from the same series in 1919. Velankar, JRK p. 53, says the commentary was composed in *saṃvat* 1547 (1490 A.D.). It is edited by Vijayajinendra from Santipur in 1991 (BL1237.32.K78).

175 JÑĀNAKULAŚA (1491)

NCC 7, p. 320: "Pupil of Dharmaghoṣa, successor of Amaracandra Sūri, descendant of Vādideva Sūri of Bṛhad Gaccha." JRK p. 413 says that Jñānakulaśa was a descendant of the famous Vādi Deva Sūri of the Bṛhad Gaccha, provides manuscript citations.

176.528 INDRAHAṂSA GAṆI (1492), *Upadeśakalpāvalī*

Concerning the author see NCC 2, p. 236. The work has been printed by Hiralal Hamsaraj, Jamnagar in 1918, and also in the Jaina Dharma Prasaraka Sabha Series, Bhavnagar, 1921. Also edited by Vijayajinendra Suri from Santipur 1991 (BL1356.I53).

176.529 INDRAHAṂSA GAṆI, *Bhuvanabhānukevalīcariya*

Edited by Ramanikavijaya in LD Series 54, Ahmedabad 1976 (BL1356.I530 1991).

177.530 TAPORATNA VĀCAKA (1493), *Laghuvṛtti* on the *Uttarādhyāyanasūtra*

The date is given in Wiles p. 164 following JRK p. 44 (which can be consulted for manuscripts): "Composed...during the reign of Jinasamudra Sūri of the Kharatara Gaccha. It was corrected by Tejorāja."

178 SĀDHUVIJAYA YATI (1494)

Nagin Shah, op. cit., p. 9 of the Introduction identifies the writer as "a pupil of Jinaharṣa; Jinaharṣa was a pupil of Sumatisādhu; Sumatisādhu was a pupil of Lakṣmī Sāgara who flourished in the line of Somasundara of Tapā Gaccha. The date assigned to Sādhuvijaya Yati by scholars is 1550 *vīra saṃvat*", which equals 1494 A.D.

178.531 SĀDHUVIJAYA YATI, *Hetukhaṇḍanapāṇḍitya* or *Vādavijayaprakaraṇa*

The summary below is found in Nagin Shah's collection in LD Series 41, op. cit., pp. 9-10. The work itself appears on pp. 76-106 of the same volume.

Summarized by Nagin J. Shah

"The first section deals with the flaws that vitiate a *hetu* (logical reason) and make it invalid (*hetvābhāsa*). Again, it demonstrates the flaws of *aprayojakahetu, mahāvidyāhetu,* and *vakracchāyānumānahetu*. The second section discusses the nature of *upādhi*. Some thinkers hold that a *hetu* is vitiated by the defect *aprayojaka* on account of *upādhi* (vitiating condition). Hence the author raises a question as to what *upādhi* is. He explains with illustrations a definition of *upādhi,* viz. *sādhyanānāpakatve sati sādhyasamavyāptir upādhiḥ*. The third section explains another definition of *upādhi* viz. *sādhyāvinābhāve satpakṣāsādhāraṇadharmavān upādhiḥ*. Moreover, in this section the author points out that the defects of *asiddha, viruddha, anaikāntika, satpratipakṣa,* etc. are present when an *upādhi* is present. The fourth section is devoted to the exposition of *pratyupādhi* which is defined as *upādhyāhatānumānānugrāhaka*. In the fifth section having presented out various shortcomings of the definition of *upādhi* the author declares that *upādhi* is nothing over and above *hetvābhāsa*. He further states that Jaina theoreticians do not recognize in an *upādhi* any defect other than *vyabhicāra*. What follows the fifth section is a sort of an appendix which pertains to problems and benefits of argumentation."

179 KĪRTIVALLABHA GAṆI (1495)

Wiles, p. 164 identifies this writer as a "pupil of Siddhānta Sāgara Sūri, when the latter was the head of the Añcala Gaccha." Likewise JRK, p. 44.

179.532 KĪRTIVALLABHA GAṆI, *Ṭīkā* on the *Uttarādhyāyanasūtra*

Wiles says this was "composed *saṃvat* 1552 (1495)", and cites JRK, p. 44. He indicates it was printed in 1909, (*Jaina sāhitya kā bṛhad itihāsa* 2, 144 item 1). Wiles also indicates another edition from 1960-67 which we have not been able to further identify through his mammoth list. It has been published from Jamnagar by Hiralala Haṃsaraja, 1909.

180 KAMALA SAṂYAMA (1492)

Wiles, p. 164 says he is a "pupil of Jinabhadra Sūri of the Kharatara Gaccha". He is cited in NCC 3, 159 as having written in 1488 or 1490.

180.533 KAMALA SAṂYAMA, *Vṛtti* on the *Uttarādhyānasūtra*

NCC 2, p. 312 says this is printed in Jaina Yasovijaya Granth, Bhavanagar 1927. According to Emeneau 3954, p. 399, this commentary's actual title is "*Sarvārthasiddhi*", and it is edited by Jayanta Vijaya in four volumes published by the Laksmicandra Jaina Library, Agra in 1923--copies can be found at the U. of Pennsylvania Library and at the Cleveland Public Library". Wiles, p. 164 calls this commentary *Ṭīkā* and cites the following publications: (1) edited by Muni Sri Jayantavijaya in four volumes, Agra 1923-33; (2) in YJG 46, Bhavnagar 1923, 1927. Strasbourg Ser. #15, pp. 80-82 says "Composed it in 1554 at Jesalmer".

180.534 KAMALA SAṂYAMA, *Vivaraṇa* on a *Karmastava*

Velankar, JRK p. 70, says "it is doubtful whether it is on this" (i.e., Devendra Sūri's) "or on the older *Karmastava*".

180.535 KAMALA SAṂYAMA GAṆI, *Siddhāntasāroddhāra*

This author is identified in JRK p. 440 as "pupil of Jinaharṣa of the Kharatara Gaccha". We are guessing it is the same Kamala Saṃyama.

181.536 LĀVAṆYA SAMAYA (1500), *Gautamapṛcchācatuṣpadī*

Lāvaṇyasamaya was a pupil of Samayarāja of the Tapā Gaccha, says JRK p. 112, which provides manuscript citations.

182 ŚRUTA SĀGARA SŪRI (1500)

"Śruta Sāgara..lived between A. D. 1400 and 1540." In his works, he has bestowed on himself the following epithets: *kalikāsarvajña, kalikālagautama, ubhayabhāṣākavicakravartī, vyākaraṇa-kamalamārtaṇḍa, tārkikaśiromaṇi, paramāgama-pravīṇa, navanavatimahāmahāvudivijetā*, etc. These at least testify that he was an extremely learned man and was a thorn in the flesh of his religious rivals." (!) Velankar, JRK p. 150, calls him "an old Digambara writer", and that one of his works was "composed by Śrutasāgara, pupil of Vidyānandin, successor of Devendrakīrti, at the request of Siṃhanandin, his Gurubandhu.". JRK p. 401 adds "Mallibhūṣaṇa" as a name of another of his teachers.

Peterson IV, pp. cxxiii-cxxiv: "His date can be deduced from a statement of Nemidatta, who wrote in *saṃvat* 1585...Nemidatta describes himself as 'devoted to the service of Śruta Sāgara and other *yatis*'. So that Śruta Sāgara's literary activity must be referred to about the year 1550 *saṃvat* or 1494 A.D."

182.537 ŚRUTA SĀGARA SŪRI, Commentary on Kundakunda's *Saṭprābhṛta*

Edited by Pannalala in MDJG 17, 1920 with Hindi *avagraha*, Sonagira 1989 (BL1380.D53.K8512).

182.538 ŚRUTA SĀGARA SŪRI, *Tattvatrayaprakāśinī* on the prose passage in Śubhacandra's *Jñānārṇava*

NCC 7; JRK, p. 150.

182.539 ŚRUTA SĀGARA SŪRI, *Vṛtti* on Umāsvāti's *Tattvārthasūtra*

Edited by Mahendra Kumar in JPMJG 4, 1949 (PK5013.S8 T3). Cf. JRK p. 156 for manuscript citations.

183 BHĀVA SĀGARA (1500?)

Wiles, p. 65, says "before *saṃvat* 1571 (1514). We assume he is referring to the Bhāva Sāgara listed in Peterson IV, p. lxxxvi, whose dates are given there as "Birth, *saṃvat* 1510; *dīkṣā* in Cambay from Jayakeśari Sūri, *saṃvat* 1520 *ācāryapada, saṃvat* 1560; death *saṃvat* 1583."

183.540 BHĀVASĀGARA, *Ṭīkā* on the *Bhagavatīsūtra*

Cf. JRK 290.

184 JÑĀNA BHŪṢAṆA (1506?)

His teacher was Bhuvanakīrti (cf. NCC 8, p. 42). NCC 7, p. 331 says "Digambara of Mūlasaṅgha Sarasvatī Gaccha; pupil of Bhuvanakīrti and preceptor of Sumatikīrti (author of *Karmakāṇḍa*). NCC 7, p. 331 lists several more works as "attributed to him". JRK p. 152 makes Bhuvanakīrti a successor of Sakalakīrti (not Sumatikīrti) of the Mūlasaṅgha; cites manuscripts.

184.541 JÑĀNA BHŪṢAṆA, *Ātmasambodhana*

NCC 2, p. 58; NCC 7, p. 331.

184.542 JÑĀNA BHŪṢAṆA, *(Tattva)Jñānataraṅgiṇī/Pañcikā*

NCC 7, p. 323 (also NCC 8, p. 43) says this was "composed in *saṃvat* 1560", i.e. 1517, but NCC 8, p. 42 says "composed in 1503 A.D." Edited with Gujarati introduction Bombay 1987. It is a brief work in eighteen short chapters.

184.543 JÑĀNA BHŪṢAṆA, *Paramārthopadeśa*

NCC 7, p. 331; NCC 11, p. 187.

184.544 JÑĀNA BHŪṢAṆA, *Bhāṣya* on Jinacandra's *(?) Siddhāntasāra*

NCC 7, p. 331 lists this work under Jñāna Bhūṣaṇa, but the entry reads "Siddhāntasārabhāṣya of Sumatikīrti. See N. Premi, *Jaina Sāhitya aur Itihās* (1956), p. 378 ff. It is published (Emeneau 4032).

185 INDRANANDIN (1514)

NCC 2, p. 253 says he composed the *Darśanaratnākara* in A.D. 1514. Velankar, JRK p. 166 says that Indranandin was "pupil of Somavijaya, pupil of Jayacandra Sūri of the Tapā Gaccha". Also known as "Indrabhūti".

185.545 INDRANANDIN, *Darśanaratnākara*

NCC 8, p. 328. Velankar, JRK p. 166, ascribes this work to his pupil ("Siddhāntasāra") (?), and cites manuscripts.

185.546 INDRANANDIN, *Samayabhūṣaṇa* or *Nirgranthasamayabhūṣaṇa*

Cf. JRK p. 417 for manuscript citations.

186 TĀRAṆA (TĀRAṆA) SVĀMIN (1515)

NCC 2, p. 355 says he "lived at Rahupawadi near Delhi, 1448-1515. See Jaina Siddhanta Bhaskara XIV. ii. p. 35; Jaina Antiquary XII. ii. pp. 59-61." The University of Chicago Library gives his name as Swami Tāraṇa Tāraṇa, and his dates as 1448-1515.

186.547 TĀRAṆA SVĀMIN, *Adhyātmakamalaṭīkā*

Edited by Jnanananda from Pipariya, Hosangibad 1999 (BL1378.6.T3715; 1999).

186.548 TĀRAṆASVĀMIN, *Jñānasamuccayasāra*

Edited by Brahmacari Sitalaprasada from Sagara, M.P. (BL1377.T37 1996).

186.549 TĀRAṆASVĀMIN, *Tribhaṅgīsāra*

Edited by Sitala Prasada from Sagara in 1993 (BL1356.T3716 1993). More recently this work has been edited and translated, with an extensive summary, by Dasharath Jain from New Delhi in 2010.

187 VINAYAHAṂSA SŪRI (1516)

NCC 2 knows him as "Vijayahaṃsa". Wiles says his teacher was "Mahimaratna, during the spiritual reign of Bhāva Sāgara Sūri of the Añcala Gaccha *saṃvat* 1567-81 (1510-24)".

187.550 VINAYAHAṂSA SŪRI, *Vṛtti* or *Dīpikā* on the *Uttarādhyāyanasūtra*

Consult NCC 2, p. 313:

187.551 VINAYAHAṂSA SŪRI (1516), *Vicārasāra*

Cf. JRK p. 353.

188.552 MAHEŚVARA SŪRI (1516), *Vicārarasāyana*

JRK p. 351 says the work is in 87 Prakrit *gāthās* and that Maheśvara Sūri was "of the Śrīpalla Gaccha"; cites manuscripts.

189.553 SOMADEVA SŪRI (1516), *Saṃyaktvakaumudī*

JRK p. 424 gives the date, says Somadeva Sūri was a pupil of Siṃhadatta Sūri of the Āgama Gaccha; cites manuscripts.

189.554 SOMADEVA SŪRI, *Sūktimuktāvalī*

JRK p. 449 gives manuscript citations.

190.555 JAYACANDRA GAṆI (1520), *Vṛtti* on Jinaharṣa Gaṇi's *Saṃyaktvakaumudī*

Jayacandra was a pupil of Jinaharṣa Gaṇi, and composed this work in 1440, says JRK p. 424.

191 GAJASĀRA (1522)

NCC 5, p. 230 says he was a "pupil of Dhavalacandra of Kharatara Gaccha and protege of Jinahaṃsa (1467-1525 A.D.)"

191.556 GAJASĀRA, *Cauvīsadaṇḍaka* or *Daṇḍakacaturviṃśati* or *Vicāraṣaṭtriṃśikā* or *Ṣaṭtriṃśikāvicāra/Ṭīkā*

NCC 5, p. 230 says "composed in 1522 A.D....Printed Jaina Dharma Prasaraka Sabha series, 1915." See also NCC 8, pp. 305-306. JRK p. 352 says it is composed of 40 *gāthās*, and mentions several publications: (1) with Rūpacandra's commentary, edited by Venichand Surchand, Mhesana 1916, 1928 (Emeneau 3982); (2) with the same commentary from Jaina Atmananda Sabha, Bhavnagar 1916; (3) without commentary it is published by Bhimsi Manek, Bombay 1903 in *Laghuprakaraṇasaṃgraha*; (4) with Gajasāra's own commentary it is published in the Jaina Dharma Prasaraka Sabha Bhavnagar, 1907. JRK lists the locations of many manuscripts. One more publication: Edited with Samayasundara Gaṇi's *Vṛtti* in *Prakaraṇatrayī* (Bombay 1928)(B162.5.P74 1989).

Seven of these editions are held at the India Office Library. R.L. Mitra, vol. 10, p. 19 says it is "on the classification of created objects and the redemption of living beings".

192 JINAHAṂSA SŪRI (1468-1526)

NCC 7, p. 276 says "pupil and successor of Jinasamudra Sūri of Kharatara Gaccha; preceptor of Puṇyasāgara Gaṇi (author of *Añjanasundarikathānaka*) and Jinaprabha (author of a commentary on *Bhayaharastotra* (?), and patron of Dhavalacandra (author of *Vicāraṣaṭtriṃśikā*)".

192.557 JINAHAṂSA SŪRI, *Dīpikā*) on the *Ācārāṅgasūtra*

NCC 7, p. 276 says "composed in 1526 A. D. NCC 2, p. 31 says it is based on Śīlāṅka's commentary". Edited by Rai Dhanapati Singh, 1880 A.D.

193 HARṢAKULA (1526)

NCC 5, p. 228: "a teacher of Vijayavimala". Royce Wiles says he was a "pupil of Hemavimala Sūri of the Tapā Gaccha" and composed the *Dīpikā* on the *Sūtrakṛdaṅga* in 1526. On the other hand, JRK p. 281 makes him a pupil of Lakṣmī Sāgara Sūri of the Tapā Gaccha.

193.558 HARṢAKULA, *Avacūri* on the *Gacchācāra Prakīrṇaka*

NCC 5, p. 228. H. D. Velankar, JRK p. 102, suggests "this is probably the same as No. (1)", "No. (1)" in this case being the *Vṛtti* of Vijayavimala Gaṇi. "Harṣakula was a Guru of Vijayavimala".

193.559 HARṢAKULA, *Bandhahetūdayatribhangī*

NCC 13, p. 231 says this is printed with Vijayavimala's commentary in Jaina Atmananda Series 66, Bombay 1917. So does JRK p. 281, citing many manuscripts.

The India Office Catalogue of Sanskrit Books, Section 2 (A-G) (London 1938) gives a brief synopsis, in Sanskrit, of the contents of this work.

193.560 HARṢAKULA, *Dīpikā* on the *Sūkṛdaṅgasūtra*

Edited by P.L. Vaidya in Arhatamataprabhakara 5, 1928. Emeneau 3919 indicates Yale has a copy. Royce Wiles says it consists of 6,600 *granthas*. It was earlier printed in 1880 as Raya Dhanapati Simha Bahadura ka Jainagamasangraha 2; also AgSS 2, Bombay 1879.

193.561 HARṢAKULA, *Dīpikā* on the *Uttarādhyāyanasūtra*

Cf. JRK p. 44 for a manuscript location.

193.562 HARṢAKULA, *Avacūri* on Dharmaghoṣa Sūri's *Lokanālikā*

Manuscript cited at JRK p. 339

193.563 HARṢAKULA, *Bījaka* on the *Bhagavatīsūtra*

JRK p. 291 lists locations.

194.564 LAKṢMĪKALOLLA GAṆI (1528), *Tattvāgama* on the *Ācārāṅgasūtra*

NCC 2, p. 31: "composed during the pontificate of Saubhāgyaharṣa of Tapā Gaccha (*saṃvat* 1584, 1590). Velankar 1930), #1397 says: "A brief commentary on the Ācārāṅga, composed during the spiritual reign of Saubhāgyaharṣa, successor of Hemavimala of the Tapā Gaccha, by Lakṣmīkallola Gaṇi, pupil of Harṣakallola, pupil of Āgamamaṇḍana Gaṇi of the same Gaccha. The date of the composition is given as 'Guhamukhakuj-kiraṇamite'. Saubhāgyaharṣa Sūri of the Tapā Gaccha is known to have consecrated idols in *saṃvat* 1584 and 1590...This pontiff of the Tapā Gaccha is not usually mentioned in the *Paṭṭāvalis*. He stands between Hemavimala and Ānandavimala."

194.565 LAKṢMĪKALOLLA GAṆI, *Muktāvabodha* on the *Jñātādharmakathāsūtra*

Cf. JRK p. 147. The ending is provided by Velankar 1930, #1473, who adds that "it was composed in the reign of Somavimala, successor of Saubhāgyaharṣa Sūri of the Tapā Gaccha."

194.566 LAKṢMĪKALOLLA GAṆI, *Sūktasaṃgraha*

JRK p. 448 locates a manuscript.

195 DĀNAŚEKHARA GAṆI (1530?)

Wiles, p. 65, dates him "before *saṃvat* 1597", which means before 1540. Otherwise our date here is a guess.

195.567 DĀNAŚEKHARA GAṆI, *Laghuvṛtti* on the *Bhagavatīsūtra*

Royce Wiles (p. 65) says it is printed from Ratlam in 1935.

196 BHAṬṬĀRAKA NEMICANDRA (1530)

NCC 6, p. 174 and 10, p. 219 says "pupil of Jñāna Bhūṣaṇa, Municandra and Prabhācandra of Mūlasaṅgha". A.N. Upadhye (at Indian Culture 7, 1940-41, p. 28) gives the following information about this author: "Nemicandra of the Mūla Saṅgha, Śāradā Gaccha, Balātkāra Gaṇa, Kundakunda Anvaya and Nandi Āmnāya. He was a *śiṣya*" (i.e., a pupil) "of Jñāna Bhūṣaṇa Bhaṭṭāraka. He was made a...*sūri* or was given *ācāryapade* by Prabhācandra Bhaṭṭāraka who was a successful disputant-logician. It is through the efforts of the Jaina king Malli Bhūpāla of Karnataka that he studied Siddhānta from Municandra who is styled Traividyavidyā-Parameśvara. Being pressed by Lālā Varṇi he came from Gaurjara country and stayed at Citrakūṭa in the temple of Pārśvanātha built by Jinadāsa Sāha."

Upadhye (on pp. 32-33 of the same paper) gives an extended argument concerning the date of Nemicandra, concluding that Nemicandra refers to a king Malli Bhūpāla who he thinks must be Sāluva Malli Rāya who was a king of Karnataka during the first part of the sixteenth century, and thus places Nemicandra in the same time frame.

196.568 BHAṬṬĀRAKA NEMICANDRA, *Jīvatattvapradīpikā* on Nemicandra Siddhānta Cakravartin's *Gomatasāra*

Published with English Introduction by Jyoti Prasad Jain in (B162.5.N44515). Two volumes. Mr. Jain says (p. 12) that the commentary was "written by Bhaṭṭaraka Nemicandra in Chittor (Rajasthan) in 1515 A.D." NCC 6, p. 174 says this work is "based on the earlier Kannada commentary of Keśavavarṇin, with the assistance of Viśālakīrti and the commentary by Abhayacandra; 16th century beginning."

A. N. Upadhye writes (footnote 16, p. 826 of Indian Historical Quarterly 16, 1940): "The Sanskrit commentary, *Jīva-tattva-pradīpikā*, on *Gommatasāra* is attributed by many scholars to Keśavavarṇi, but for this there is no evidence at all. My understanding of the available facts leads me to the conclusion that the author of the Sanskrit *Jīvatattva-pradīpikā* is one Nemicandrācārya; his commentary is based on Keśava-varṇi's Kannada commentary of the same name, and this Nemicandra's commentary is perhaps later than

Mandaprabodhikā. I have just stated my conclusion here,and the topic may be taken up later for an exhaustive study."

Indeed, Upadhye did take it up later (in his Hindi Introduction to his edition of Manikyanandin's *Gomatasāra*, pp. 7-11), providing us with more information, from which we quote: "At present *J(īvatattva)-P(radīpikā)* is the only complete and exhaustive Sanskrit commentary available on *G(omata)-S(āra)*. In fact, the credit of making the study of GS sufficiently popular goes to JP. JP follows (the) *M(anda)P(rabodhikā)* (of Abhayacandra) in many details: most of the technical details given by MP are bodily adopted by JP, at times even by mentioning the name of Abhayacandra; the opening Sanskrit verses in JP, at the beginning of each section, are modeled on those found in MP; and in the commentary on *gāthā* 383 of the *Jīvakāṇḍa* JP plainly says that it would hereafter follow only the *Karṇāta-Vṛtti* because the commentary written by Abhayacandra comes to a stop...JP quotes nearly one hundred verses..." It has been ascribed to Keśavavarṇin by mistake: Keśavavarṇin wrote a Hindî commentary on the *Gomatasāra* called *Saṃyagjñānacandrikā*, which various authors (according to Upadhye) have erroneously identified with Nemicandra's commentary.

Upadhye continues: "For the benefit of Dharmacandra, Abhayacandra and other pious people, and being requested by Sāha Sāṅga and Sāha Sahesa of the Khaṇḍelavāla family, he wrote his commentary...following the Karṇāṭaka *Vṛtti* through the help of Traividya Viśālakīrti. We are told that the first copy was prepared by Abhayacandra who is called Nirgranthācārya and Traividyā-cakravartin."

The Kannaḍa commentary of Keśavavarṇin was written in 1359. Upadhye reports: "Comparing the Sanskrit JP of Nemicandra with the Kannaḍa (commentary) of Keśavavarṇin, I find that the former is entirely based on the latter. Nemicandra has left out portions here and there: the Sanskrit portions are retained as they are; and whatever is in Kannaḍa is literally rendered in Sanskrit."[255]

196.569 BHAṬṬĀRAKA NEMICANDRA, *Pravacanaparīkṣā*

NCC 13, p. 79 cites Sravanabelgola 139.

196.570 BHAṬṬĀRAKA NEMICANDRA, *Arhatpratiṣṭhāsārasaṃgraha* or *Nemicandrasaṃhitā* or *Pratiṣṭhātilaka*

Velankar, JRK p. 16, says this Nemicandra is "different from the author of the *Gomatasāra*. Our Nemicandra was a layman, and probably lived in the 16th century of the Vikrama era...It is published with a Marathi gloss at Sholapur. It is in Sanskrit and contains 12 chapters." Velankar cites several manuscripts.

197.571 ŚRĪCANDRA (1530), *Vairāgyamaṇimālā*

JRK p. 366 calls Śrīcandra "pupil of Śruta Sāgara, pupil of Vidyānandin". The work is published in the *Tattvānuśāsanādisaṃgraha*, MDJG Series No. 13, Bombay 1918.

198 PĀRŚVACANDRA (1540)

NCC 6, p. 335 says he composed the first work below in *saṃvat* 1597 (1540 A.D.). He was a pupil of Sādhurāma Sūri and the founder of the Pārśvacandra *gaccha* in *saṃvat* 1572 (1515 A.D.). JRK p. 117 says "pupil of Sādhuratna".

198.572 PĀRŚVACANDRA, *Vārttika* on the *Catuśśaraṇaprakīrṇaka* of Vīrabhadra Sādhu

NCC 6, p. 335. The *Catuśśaraṇa* or *Kuśalānubandhiyajjhayaṇa* is, according to NCC 6, p. 334, a "Prakīrṇaka in 63 verses on austerity, merit, conduct and mental abstraction; recited during *pāḍikkamaṇ* by Jain monks". Composed in 1540 according to JRK p. 117, which cites manuscripts.

198.573 PĀRŚVACANDRA, *Bālāvabodha* on Abhayadeva Sūri's *Praśnavyākaraṇasūtra(vṛtti)*

NCC 13, p. 106; JRK p. 275.

198.574 PĀRŚVACANDRA, *Bālāvabodha* on the *Ācārāṅgasūtra*

Printed in *Ācārāṅga-sūtra: Gaṇadhara-Sudharmmā-svāmi tadupati Śrī-Haṃsasūrikṛta-Dīpikā-ṭīkā Śrī-Śīlaṅgācārya-kṛta-Ācārāṅga-ṭīkā evaṃ Śrī-Bhagavān-Pāyacandajī-kṛta-(Gujarātī)-bhāṣā*, i.e., AgSS 1, Calcutta 1878-9 (BL1312.3.A932 G8 1878.

198.575 PĀRŚVACANDRA, *Bālāvabodha* on the *Sūkṛdaṅgasūtra*

Printed in an edition by Bhimsiṃha Māneka constituting Raya Dhanapati Simha Bahadura ka Jainagamasangraha 2, Bombay 1880. Cf. also JRK p. 451, 455.

198.576 PĀRŚVACANDRA, *Vṛtti* on the *Sthānāṇgasūtra*

Wiles cites JRK 455.

198.577 PĀRŚVACANDRA, *Stabaka* on the *Vipākaśrutasūtra*

Wiles cites JRK p. 357.

198.578 PĀRŚVACANDRA, *Bālāvabodha* on the *Nandīsūtras*

JRK p. 201 cites a manuscript.

198.579 PĀRŚVACANDRA, *Stabaka* on the *Aupapattikasūtra*

JRK p. 64 cites manuscripts.

199.580 BRAHMARṢI (1542), *Svādhyāya* on the *Uttarādhyāyanasūtras*

Composed in old Gujarati in 1542, says JRK p. 45; gives manuscript citations.

200.581 SĀDHURANGA UPĀDHYĀYA (1542), *Dīpikā* on the *Sukṛdāṅgasūtra*

Cf. JRK p. 450 for the location of manuscripts.

201 MEGHANANDANA GAṆI (1544)

NCC 7, 295 says the author was a "pupil of Candravadhana Gaṇi of Kharatara Gaccha.

201.582 MEGHANANDANA GAṆI, *Vṛtti* on Śānti Sūri's *Jīvavicāraprakaraṇa*

NCC 7, 295 says it was composed in *saṃvat* 1610, which equals 1553 A.D. JRK p. 142 says the author was a "pupil of Candravardhana Gaṇi of the Kharatara Gaccha", that the work "was composed during the reign of Jinamāṇikya Sūri", and cites manuscripts.

202.583 KUŚALABHUVANA GAṆI (1544), *Bālāvabodha* on Candrarṣi Mahattara's *Saptatisūtra*

JRK p. 415 says he is probably of the Tapā Gaccha, provides the date and cites one manuscript.

203.584 UDAYADHARMA GAṆI (1548), *Śatārthavṛtti* on Dharmadāsa's *Upadeśamālā*

H.D. Velankar, JRK p. 51, says "This is a commentary on the *gāthās* of Dharmadāsa's *Upadeśamālā* (Be: - *dāsassa mūlajālaṃ*); interpreting it in one hundred ways, composed in *saṃvat* 1605 by Udayadharma, pupil of Lāvaṇyadharma." Manuscripts are identified.

204 PADMASUNDARA GAṆI or MUNI (1550)

Nagin Shah in his Introduction to LD Series 41, 1973, Introduction, p. 12: Padmasundara, a pupil of Padmameru who again is a pupil of Ānandasumeru of Tapā Gaccha, has composed *Pramāṇasundara*. Harṣakīrti who flourished in the same line after Padmasundara informs us that Padmasundara was honored by Emperor Akbar just as Ānandasaya (Ānanandasumeru) had been honored by Emperors Babar and Humayun. In his *Dhātutaraṅgiṇī* Harṣakīrti further tells us that

Padmasundara was honored by Māladeva of Jodhpur and that he defeated a Pandit at the court of Emperor Akbar."

He wrote several works on a variety of subject besides philosophy--poetics, astrology, a lexicon, etc.

NCC 11, p. 151 says "pupil of Padmameru of Nāgapurī Tapā Gaccha; patronized by Akbar", and counsels "See *Viśvatattvaprakāśa* Intro. pp. 97-98".

204.585 PADMASUNDARA MUNI, *Jñānacandrodayanāṭaka*

This has been edited by Nagin J. Shah in LD Series 81, Ahmedabad 1981.

204.586 PADMASUNDARA MUNI, *Pramāṇasundara*

NCC 13, p. 47 says "composed in 1576 A.D." The work is edited by Nagin Shah in LD Series 41, 1973, pp. 127-160, and summarized by Shah on pp. 13-14 of his Introduction. We reproduce the summary here.

Summarized by Nagin J. Shah

"The tract...is divided into four sections. The first section is devoted to the definition of *pramāṇa*. The definition given and discussed here is as follows: *saṃyaktvapara-vyavasāyātmakaṃ jñānaṃ pramāṇam.*"

"The second section treats of the classification of *pramāṇas*. All the *pramāṇas* are classified into *pratyakṣa* and *parokṣa*. Then *pratyakṣa* is classified into *sāṃvyavahārika* and *mukhya*; the former again is classified into *avagraha* (indistinct awareness), *ihā* (cogitation), *avāya* (determinative awareness) and *dhāraṇā* (retention) and the latter into *vikala* and *sakala*, the *vikala* being *avadhi* and *manaḥparyāya* and *sakala* being *kevalajñāna*."

"The third section is devoted to the treatment of *anumāna*, a type of *parokṣa pramāṇa*. The *parokṣa-pramāṇa* is defined as - *arthāntaraṅgakārmaṇakalaṅka-viśleṣaviśeṣodaya-nibandhanaḥ kaścid aspaṣṭatvāparanāmā svānubhavasaṃvedyaḥ pratibhāsaviśeṣaḥ parokṣam.* Under the head of *gauṇa anumāna* are brought *smaraṇa, pratyabhijñā* and *tarka*. This aspect of classification is somewhat novel in Jaina tradition as it views *smaraṇa, pratyabhijñā* and *tarka* to be the cases of *anumāna*. By *mukhya anumāna* the author means what is generally considered to be *anumāna*. According to him *arthāpatti* (implication) and *abhāva* (non-cognition) are simply the different forms of *mukhya anumāna*. He refutes the threefold or fivefold nature of a valid *hetu* and establishes *avinābhāvaniyama* to be the nature of a valid *hetu*. Again, he refutes the Buddhist view that there are only three types of *hetu*, viz., *svabhāvahetu, kāryahetu* and *anupalabdhihetu*. He criticizes the Sāṅkhya view that there are three types of *hetu*--*sānvayī, vyatirekī* and *tadubhayī*. He criticizes the Vaiśeṣika view that there are four types of *hetu*, viz., *saṃyogī, samavāyī, ekārthasamavāī* and *tadvirodhī*. The well known twofold division of *anumāna* into *svārtha* and *parārtha* is also explained by him. He classifies *sādhana* into *vidhisādhana* and *pratiṣedhasādhana*, and further explains their divisions and sub-divisions with illustrations. He discusses various types of *hetvābhāsas* (*pseudo-hetus*) and *dṛṣṭāntābhāss* (*pseudo-dṛṣṭāntas*). Moreover, he treats of *pratyakābhāsa* (pseudo-pratyakṣa), *smaraṇābhāsa* (pseudo-memory) and *pratyabhijñābhāsa* (pseudo-recognition)."

"The fourth section is devoted to the treatment of *āgama*. The cognition generated in the hearer through the words of an *āpta* (authority) is *āgama pramāṇa*. Thus, only secondarily *āgamapramāṇa* is verbal. At this juncture the author refutes (the) Mīmāṃsā theory of authorless Vedas. *Āpta* is of two types, viz., *avikalajñānī* and *vikalajñānī*; the former is again of two types, *pratyakṣa-avikalajñāna-vat* and *parokṣa-avikalajñāna-vat*. Tīrthaṅkara and *kevala* are *pratyakṣa-avikalajñāna-vat* (i.e., having cognition of all things with all their modes directly) while Gaṇadhara, etc. are *parokṣa-avikalajñā-vat* (i.e., having cognition of all things with all their modes indirectly through the words of (a) *tīrthaṅkara* or *kevalin*. Hence *tīrthaṅkara's* words are characterized by non-discrepancy with other *pramāṇas*. In other words, whatever is said in the *āgama* (words of (a) *tīrthaṅkara*) is contradicted neither by perception

nor by inference etc. Again, one part of the *āgama* being proved valid we can naturally infer the validity of (the) entire *āgama*. The *āgama* treats of *anekānta* (non-absolute nature of things), *pariṇāma* (change that characterizes all things), *mārga* (path to liberation) and the subject-matter of the *mārga*, viz., the nine *tattvas*. The author explains succinctly all this as also the doctrines of sevenfold judgment and *naya*."

204.587 PADMASUNDARA GAṆI, *Stabaka* on the *Bhagavatīsūtra*

See JRK p. 291.

204.588 PADMASUNDARA GAṆI, *Avacūri* on the *Prajñāpanāsūtras*

Wiles, p. 114 says "based on Malayagiri". See Dalsukh Malvania, Bombay 1969-71 (PK5003.A53.P3), vol. 2, p. 432.

205.589 SĀDHUKĪRTI (1552), *Ṭīkā* on Jinavallabha Sūri's *Saṃghapaṭṭakaprakaraṇa*

This author was a pupil of Dayākalaśa Gaṇi of the Kharatara Gaccha, says JRK p. 411, which provides the date and manuscript citations.

206.590 SĀDHURATNA or RATNAVĀCAKA or RATNA SŪRI (1555), *Ṭīkā* on Śānti Sūri's *Jīvavicāra*

JRK p. 142 gives the name(s) and dates, cites manuscripts.

207.591 NĀGARṢI GAṆI (1556), *Vicāramañjarī*

JRK p. 351 gives the date and some references. It says Nagarṣi was of the Tapā Gaccha. NCC 9, p. 321 says he was "pupil of Kuśalavardhana of Tapā Gaccha".

207.592 NĀGARṢI GAṆI, *Stabaka* on the *Uttarādhyāyanasūtras*

JRK p. 45 locates manuscripts.

207.593 NĀGARṢI GAṆI, *Dīpikā* on the *Sthānāṅgasūtra*

NCC 9, p. 321 says "Composed in 1600 A.D." NCC 10, p. 9 adds BORI 866 of 1895-1902. Cf. also JRK p. 455.

208 ŚUBHACANDRA (1557)

Velankar, JRK p. 213 calls him "successor of Vijayakīrti of the Mūla Saṅgha". He reports that in the *praśasti* to his *Pāṇḍavapurāṇa* (composed in 1551) he mentions 25 of his own works, the titles of which Velankar lists.

208.594 ŚUBHACANDRA, *Aṅgaprajñapti* (*Aṅgapaññatti*)

H.D. Velankar, JRK, p. 2 say this Śubhacandra was the "pupil of Vijayakīrti of the Mūla Saṅgha", and says "the work is mentioned by the author in his own *Pāṇḍavapurāṇa* composed in *saṃvat* 1608", which would place him in 1557. He is not the same as the author of the *Jñārṇava*; see Velankar, ibid., p. 150.

Summary by Ratna Lahiri based on a Hindi translation

The title may be rendered into English as "The Exposition of the Limbs (of Knowledge)". It is edited and translated into Hindi by Aryika Suparsvamati Mataji as Vimala Sāgarji Series 65, 1990 (UWL). It was also edited in *Siddhāntasārādisaṃgraha* (MDJG 21, Bombay 1923) (Emeneau 4032).

CHAPTER ONE

1-6 (E1-11) The terms *paryāya, śrutajñāna, pada, akṣara* are explained.

7-15 (E11-15) The continued cognition (*pratipatti*) type of knowledge describes all four states of existence, which after a number of progressions leads to the exposition (*anuyoga*) type of scriptural knowledge. These progressively increasing amount

of knowledge are related to the fourteen types of evolving search states (*mārga*). Four expositions lead to one sub-chapter (*prābhṛtaprābhṛta*) of knowledge (i.e., this occurs when syllable by syllable four expositions are completed), and twenty-four of those make one Chapter (*adhikāra*).

The number of subsections in the *pūrva* scriptures is stated to be 93, 600. The number of verses in the twelve limbs (*dvādaśāṅga*) of scriptural knowledge, the number of miscellaneous verses, and the number of unrepeated syllables in all scriptural knowledge are said to total similarly vast numbers.

16-21 (E18-24) Now each of the twelve limbs is discussed.

1.The first, *Ācārāṅga* or the limb of conduct, is described. It has 18,000 verses, and indicates how the aspirants who desire liberation must behave, e.g., how to sit and eat, the five great vows, five unavoidable actions (walking, speaking, eating, putting away and excreting), the compulsory actions for monks, etc.

22-23 (E24-26) 2.*Sūtrāṅga* or the limb of aphorisms. This section describes the actions to be undertaken for repentance, the actions of the Jina way and of the non-Jina ways. They are described in 36,000 *padas*.

24-28 (E27-29) 3.*Sthānāṅga* or the limb of places. The self, etc. have one or progressively increasing occupancy of space-type.

From the higher standpoint (*saṃgrahanaya*) the self is only of one type, while from the practical viewpoint (*vyavahāranaya*) it is of two types, worldly and liberated. With respect to origination, dissipation and permanence it is of three types. Due to rising *karman* a being can roam in four types of birth (*gati*). With respect to the five conditions (*bhāva*) of the self it can be conditioned by rising (*audārika*) *karman*, by those karmic particles being annihilated (*kṣayika*), by those being suppressed (*upaśamika*), caused partly by annihilation, partly by suppression (*kṣayopaśamika*), and those resulting from changing (*pariṇāmika*) *karman*.

Or it has seven types corresponding to the seven perspectives (*saptabhaṅgī*).

31-33 (E30-31) 4.*Samavayāṅga* or the limb of inseparable concomitances. From the higher standpoint these 164,000 phrases describe the geographical occupancy in islands, etc. of these substances, time, state, etc. as being similar to or in accordance with the stages of evolution.

The relation of substance, area, time and state with that of the area they occupy is known as inseparable concomitance (*samavāya*). Co-inherence of substance means that relative to substance the existent corporeal (*dharmādharmāstikāya*) and the upper, middle and lower regions occupy the same space points. There are innumerable space-points.

Concomitance of area means similarity in the area of occupancy. The Indraka hole in the seventh infernal region of clairvoyance, the *jambudvīpa*, the self-fulfilment (*vimāna*), the lake of Nandīśvara, and the city of Indras of the infernal regions (*vyantara*)--these five are of the measure of one lakh *yojanas*.

33-35 (E32-33) Concomitance of time relates to the similarity in time length. One *avali* is equal to that of a blink. Inhabitants of the first infernal regions have the same lifetime as those of the *vyantara* regions, that of 10,000 years. Inhabitants of the seventh infernal region live to be the same age as those of the fulfilled beings of the heavenly regions (33 *sāgaras*). Those of hyposerpentine (*avasarpiṇī*) and hyperserpentine (*utsarpiṇī*) time live to be a million-squared years.

36 (E33) Relative to concomitance of stages, the synonymity of space-points of knowledge and belief belonging to the realized ones (*kevalin*) are also similar.

5.*Vyākhyāprajñapti* or the limb of explanation. This explains whether the self exists or not, whether it exists or not, whether it is one or many, explicable or inexplicable. Is it totally the same as of different from its qualities and modes? Replies to the 60,000 questions put by *gaṇadhara devas* are given in this limb to establish by inference and scriptural proof the existence of the self.

37-38 From the substantial point of view the self is eternal, since the substance of the self is never destroyed. If it were destroyed, then the good or bad results of actions

committed by the self would have also been destroyed.

Relative to the modal sense, the self may be considered to be ephemeral, since all the time the modes are changing. Had the centrality of a substance been eternal, then the phases like achieving heave or perceptible states like childhood, etc., would have also disappear. From the substantial perspective the self is on, since inherent qualities such as consciousness, etc. are the same in all beings. However, since the happiness-sadness of each self is different, the self is also many.

This limb has 228,000 phrases.

39-40 (E37-38) 6.*Jñātṛkathāṅga* or limb of known biographies. It contains 556,000 phrases that tell the stories of the great leaders.

45-46 (E40-44) 7.*Upāsakādhyayanāṅga* or the limb detailing the study methods of aspirants. The vows of a truly renounced *deśavirata* are known as *pratimā*. There are eleven of them.

1.Vision (*darśana*) involves giving up eight fruits of trees as well as meat, alcohol and honey. It means renouncing the seven habits like gambling, drinking, meat-eating, hunting, going to prostitutes, entertaining other women, and stealing. It also enumerates types of food that cannot be eaten, drinking filtered water, adhering to the methods of behavior, aversion from the five types of sense-organ-related faults, and engaging in devotion to the five higher beings.

2.Other vows include five subsidiary (*anuvrata*) vows, three quality (*guṇa*) vows, and four educational (*śikṣā*) vows. The first vows have to be perfectly adhered to, but the seven others may have omissions (which can be redeemed by penance).

3.The three time-bound rules involve the meditation on Jina icons in the temple or at home by facing the eastern or northerly direction after purifying the mind, body and word. This included four circumambulations, three head-bows and two *namaskāras*. It also avoid the *ārta* and *raudra* types of meditations.

4.Fasting on the eight and fourteenth days of the lunar calendar, or eating tasty food only once; performing the *ekāsana* yogic posture on the seventh and thirteenth days, etc.

5.Avoiding eating certain vegetable-life forms, or certain types of vegetable or water that might have life.

6.Not eating at night. Includes renouncing daytime sex and giving up food from 48 minutes before sunset up to 48 minutes after sunrise.

7.Celibacy, and not even desiring women.

8.Avoiding engaging in agriculture, business, etc.

9.Avoiding accumulation of worldly things.

10.Avoiding giving permission to engage in agriculture, accumulations, marriage, etc.

11.Renouncing house and food cooked for oneself, which involves joining ascetics in the forest, keeping only the loincloth and one garment, and living being alms.

In order to be able to follow the above eleven *pratimās* the aspirant has to follow twelve control (subsidiary) vows (*anuvrata*): non-violence to moving life forms, avoiding crude lies, avoiding anything without asking the owner, stealing--even though it may have fallen or is forgotten--remaining celibate oneself and not even giving permission to another for entertaining women, and limiting the amount of wealth (ten types enumerated).

Three types of quality vows enhance the above twelve:

1.Controlling the number of trips to various destinations in order to fulfil desires.

2.Stopping unnecessary involvement of the mind, words and body.

3.Controlling mental desires by limiting the amount of indulgence in favorite food, clothes, etc.

Educational vows teach how to worship and revere regularly the five teachers and the *caitya* representing the Jinas, which comprises the offering of body, three long and two short bows, circumambulation, etc.

Those who arrive suddenly without previous announcement are guests. One must worship them with nine types of devotion, food with seven qualities.

51 (E48-49) 8.*Antakṛtadaśāṅga* or the limb of knowledge of realized beings. This knowledge involves the

realized being and contains ten *kevalīs* residing with the Lord. Each realized being had ten semi-realized beings (*muni*) under him in his time that ultimately reached the thirteenth stage of evolution with great austerities, and finally the fourteenth was achieved. Their hagiographic description and the difficulties they bore at those final states are the subject of this limb of knowledge.

52-54 (E50-51) 9.*Anuttaropapādikāṅga* or the limb of those having reached the volition-station (*upapāda*) from which they can transcend at will. Due to being born in the five highest positions (*vimāna*), in the five highest states of birth (*vijaya, vijayanta, jayanta, aprājita* and *svārthasiddhi*), after having gone through abject and extreme miseries, they are known as *anuttaropapādhika yogiṇs*. For example, during Vardhamāna's time Sunakṣatra, Abhaya, Dhanyakumara, Śreṣṭavāriṣena, Nandana, Nanda, Chilātaputra and Kārttikeya.

53-60 (E52-56) 10.*Prajñāvyākaraṅāga* or the limb of the explanation of queries. The subjects here include the divination of the future. Also, the signs of four types of religious tales are described here.

(E56-60) Here also is described the bondage arising of demeritorious deed, resulting in disease and birth in lower worlds or inauspicious failings, and how the self thus wanders in the world full of disease, poverty and problems.

68-69 (E60-61) 11.*Vipākasūtrāṅga* or the limb of resulting *karman*.

71-73 (E62-64) 12.*Dṛṣṭivādāṅga* or the limb of cognition backed by scriptural knowledge. The phrases of this limb are 10,886,856,005.

In this limb 363 fallacious beliefs are disproved. They are classified into *kriyāvāda, kālavāda, īśvaravāda, ātmavāda, niyatāvāda,* and *svabhāvavāda*.

There are also 84 types of non-actionists (*akriyāvādin*), who do not believe in effort, and 67 types of *ajñānavādins* who do not believe in a self and other substances. *Vinayavādins* are of 32 types.

CHAPTER TWO

The title of this Chapter is "Knowledge of the Former (Fourteen) Canonical Texts (*caturdaśapūrvāṅgaprajñapti*). The *dṛṣṭivāda* limb (12 above) has four sections: *parikrama, sūtra, prathamānuyoga* and *pūrvagata*.

1-14 (E72-81) The mathematical formulas of all areas in accordance with *karman* is described in the first, *parikrama* section. It has further divisions pertaining to the knowledge of the moon, the sun, *jambudvīpa*, etc. knowledges.

19-22 (E83-84) The Time-ists (*kālavāda*) hold that time alone creates and dissolves all. It remains awake in sleeping beings, so no one can cheat Time.

The self is without knowledge, cannot do anything by itself, and all its movements, is pain and pleasure, heaven and hell, etc. is controlled by the Lord. This is the *īśvaravāda*.

There is only one great self in creation. He is the Lord and is all-pervading, is hidden and cannot be known by all, is conscious, without qualities and supreme. This is *ātmavāda*.

Whatever happens as a rule at a time is due to happen just then and just as it is ruled. This is *niyatavāda*.

23 (E84-86) The difference of things is due to their nature. Without any other reason, only the nature of the substance predominates. This is *svabhāvavāda*.

24-25 (E86-87) Section on the non-actionists, mainly concerned to generate the prescribed 84 types.

26-27 (E89-90) Section on *ajñānavāda*, with similar concerns.

28-29 (E90-91) Those who accept that freedom can be reached merely by humility and manners (*vinaya*) without any regard to qualities or faults are the fallacious *vinayavādins* of 32 types.

30 (E92) *Puruṣārthavādins* say that everything depends on human effort. Indolent and inactive people can get no fruits whatsoever. One great person (*puruṣa*) pervades all and creates and destroys.

31 (E92) *Daivavāda* holds that fate alone is everything, effort means nothing. It cites the example of the brave Karṇa who dies in war.

32 (E92-93) Chance is the cause of successful effort, think some. A chariot cannot move on one wheel, so if both blind and lame help each other, they can move into the city. This belief in coincidence is the next fallacy.

33 (E93-95) A false notion, once prevailing, cannot be eradicated, just as when it becomes known that Draupadī was the wife of five brothers--who can now deny it even if it is untrue (according to Jaina tradition)? She had wedded Ārjuna, not the others, only the garland broke and its flowers fell on all the five brothers. Even Parśvanātha and Mahāvīra couldn't eradicate this false notion. Such folk-accepted beliefs are also fallacies which the *lokavāda* acepts.

The commentary elaborates still other fallacies, such as those preached by Makkhali Gośāla and the Ājīvikas, as well as *vijñānādvaita, brahmavāda pradhānavāda* (i.e., Sāṃkhya), *nityavāda*.

35-37 (E96-97) The third variety of *dṛṣṭivāda* is the first text (*prathamānuyoga*). This section has biographies of Vṛṣabhadeva and the twenty-four realized beings, the five great emperors like Bharata, the nine great gods like Rāmacandra, nine *nārāyaṇas* like *Kṛṣṇa* and the anti-*nāyaṇas* like Jarasandha.

38 (E97-98) The fourth variety of *dṛṣṭivāda* describes the fourteen former texts (*pūrva*), now lost. The first is the *Utpādapūrva*. It contains 10,000,000 phrases and talks of the nine natures of substances visible and invisible during their birth, existence and passing away.

39 (E99-100) The knowledge of the primary substances is known as *Agrāṇīya*, which explains 700 good or bad perspectives, the five extensive substances (*pañcāstikāya*), the six substances and seven fundamental categories of substances.

41-43 (E100-104) Of a total of fourteen substances, some are briefly described. The *aparānta* section relates the perspectives. The *dhruva* and *adhruva* sections describe permanent and impermanent substances respectively. The *cayanalabdhi* section describes the continuing destruction and creation or bondage of karmic particles and how they occur. The varieties of illusion (*māyā*) are related in detail in the

adhruva praṇidhi section. Since *praṇidhi* also signifies results, it describes the good results also. The *artha* section details meaning to which all heard knowledge is related. Logic decides the meaning. The *bhauma* section refers to *vyantara* type gods or those of this earth and the *vratadiś* section describes the five great vows, etc. undertaken by ascetics and aspirants. All purposes and relevance are described in the *artha* section and *kalpa* narrates the age as well as decides the actions worthy of undertaking. The *atītasiddhabaddha* section narrates how living perfected beings have been bound in the past, while the *anāgatasiddhabbaddha* relates how beings can gain perfection in the future and which are the actions that will lead to bondage of which kind, etc.

48 (E118-119) Thus ends this *Agrāyaṇīyapūrvasūtra* having 9,600,000 phrases and 280 chapters about the fourteen substances. The other chapters about the remaining substances and their exposition details, with their names and content, have disappeared with the passage of time and are not available now.

49-51 (E119-121) The section that details the potency (*vīrya*) of life-forms, etc. is known as the *vīryānuvāda*. It describes the potency of the self, of time, of state, of penance, of substance, of quality, of modes, of education, etc. in 7,000,000 part-verses. The commentary further describes the two types of potencies that each substance may have (*kṣāyika, kṣāyopaśamika*). Each substance retains its peculiarity which is its intrinsic nature differentiating it from others. This is called "power" (*śakti*). Substances do not release their intrinsic qualities, nor do these transfer.

52-57 (E122-125) The *astināstipraveśapūrva* is that body of knowledge which describes with equal emphasis both the possibilities of somewhat existent and somewhat nonexistent. A substance may exist or not, or it may do both partially but may not be describable. In relation to substance, area, time and state from one's own perspective, a substance is somewhat existent, and from another's viewpoint it is somewhat nonexistent. When both these views are alternately contemplated it is the "somewhat" form. Since both cannot be

articulated by words simultaneously, they are each separately as well as together somewhat ineffable. Since the negation of either is not possible without an assertion of it, even that assertion may be ineffable. Thus a substance may be existent, or nonexistent or ineffable or a combination of some or all of these, in a sevenfold way.

58 (E125-126) Likewise each quality of a substance should also be looked at in these sevenfold ways.

59-60 (E126-127) The *jñānapraveśapūrva* is now described. It includes perceptual knowledge, scriptural or heard knowledge, extrasensory knowledge, wrong perception, fallacious scriptural, telepathic knowledge and omniscience.

Matijñāna is awareness through sense-organs and mind. Each of the five sense-organs has specific objects. From the substantial viewpoint, though sensory perception may be one, from the modal viewpoint they are many and have four types: *avagraha, ūha, avāya* and *dhāraṇā*.

61-62 (E126-127) The coming together of subject (a self) and object is known as the conjunction type of perception (*saṃnipātasaṃyogapratyakṣa*). The first contact is *avagraha*. The specific contact is perceived after that and is determinate. After the first stage of generalized awareness, the desire to know it specifically is known as *ūha*. When it has become specific it reaches the third definite (*avāya*) stage, and when remembered subsequently as having been perceived definitively earlier it is known as recognition of *dhāraṇā*. This in turn has three subsidiary stages: remembered exactly for a duration (*avicyuti*), remembered unconsciously but latent (*saṃskāra* or *vāsanā*), and remembered again (*smṛti*).

63 (E129) The first type of sense-object contact devoid of particularity has two subtypes, *arthāvagraha* and *vyañjanāvagraha*. The latter is not cognized by the eyes and the mind, while the first type is the awareness by the other sense-organs. The *vyañjanā* type is unrevealed word and does not have the subsequent stages (of *ūha*, etc.), but it is generalized awareness only. The revealed object perceived meaningfully has all four stages. Thus, initially the mind and eyes do not perceive--they are involved in the determinate complete

cognition, in the subsequent state. The first becomes the second.

64 (E130-132) The number of different types of perceptual knowledge is computed, resulting in 336 types of sense-awareness.

65 (E132) The awareness arising on the basis of this pervious knowledge of substances arising out of immediate awareness (*matijñāna*) is known as scriptural knowledge (*śrutajñāna*). It is of two types, called *dravya* and *bhāva* (or *śabdaliṅgaja* and *arthaliṅgaja*). That arising out of hearing the spoken or (reading the) written word, on the pacification of the *karman* that veils knowledge, is the scriptural awareness of the first type. That which assumes the cause on seeing the result or meaning is the second type of scriptural awareness, also known as inference (*anumāna*).

The first type can be either worldly or other-worldly. A word emanating from normal worldly beings is the former. The words rising from the totally renounced omniscient Lord and composed by the *gaṇadhara* celestials is the divine word-originated verbal awareness. It is of two types. The first type (*dravyaśruta*) includes the twelve limbs of knowledge (*Ācārāṅga*, etc.), the fourteen pre-existing (*pūrva*) texts and fourteen miscellaneous (*samāyika*) scriptures. The second, the awareness arising out of listening to these (*bhāvaśruta*) is the meaning-related awareness of scriptural knowledge.

66 (E133-138) Twenty subtypes of word-originated awareness are distinguished: modes, modal combinations, syllables, syllable combinations, phrases, phrase combinations, conjunctions, conjunctional combinations, understanding, ascertainment combinations, expositional, exposition combinations, chapter, chapter combinations, sub-chapters, sub-chapter combinations, actual entities, actual entity combinations, pre-existing texts, their combinations. All are detailed in the commentary, enumerating how one leads to another and increases progressively leading to final omniscience. The first, third, fifth, etc. are of one type but the second, fourth, sixth etc. are of infinite types.

67-68 (E138-139) Karmic potencies that veil scriptural

knowledge are of twenty kinds, giving rise to twenty further modes of scriptural (veiled) awareness. Each of these in turn are of twenty types, and so on.

69-70 (E139-141) Clairvoyance is that awareness which, relative to substance, area, time and state, is limited (not omniscient) and knows its subject as if perceived directly. It is limited to lower things or limited phenomena, hence it is known as time-bound (*avadhi*) awareness. It has two types, *bhāvapratyaya* and *guṇapratyaya*.

The commentary elaborates the modalities by which each arises, and the reduction or unveiling of which *karmans* or fasts undertaken, etc. may cause it to happen. It is different in celestial or infernal beings in accordance with their karmic unveiling. The *bhāvapratyaya* type of clairvoyance is limited to space while the *guṇapratyaya* kind has three subtypes: *deśāvadhi, paramāvadhi* and *sarvāvadhi*. This type of awareness occurs only to humans and animals. "*Deśa*" here refers to right belief, not the performance of non-injury, etc. vows. The other two types (*sarva, parama*) are related to omniscience.

71-72 (E141-142) The *deśāvadhi* type again has three sub-types: good, medium and bad. The last occur in humans and animals, the goods to sages and self-controlled aspirants. Other subdivisions are detailed.

Paramāvadhi is without differences and can happen only to the highest realized and self-controlled beings. It has six subtypes.

The *sarvāvadhi* type of clairvoyance never diminishes, remains forever, goes from space point to space point, does not follow in the next life because the being gets liberated.

74 (E144-146) Telepathic awareness is of two types: simple and complicated. One who knows them in detail with subtypes of the karmic traces that gradually disappear to reveal this type of awareness knows the simple type. The complicated type knows the unveiling of the knowledge-related karmic particles and all their sub-types and causes, and knows all the worries, articulated or partly thought of along with the related happiness, gain, loss, unhappiness, etc.

Both these telepathic types of awareness can occur only

to the self-controlled beings. But while the first, simple type can be left behind, the other type remains with liberation.

75 (E146-147) The highest knowledge, omniscience (*kevalajñāna*) is without any veilings, continuous and bereft of any sequence of sensing. It enlightens this world and those beyond. Unlike the previous four it is without veils.

The first two (of the five) know the six substances and some of their modes. The third knows all matter and matter-related beings of this world. Telepathic awareness knows all that is known by clairvoyance and beyond. But omniscience knows all substances in all time with all its modes, in their entirety in all world. The first four may die out, but the last remains forever.

76 (E147-148) Ignorance is of three types: false intellect (*kumati*), false hearing (*kuśruti*), and false telepathic awareness (*kvavadhi*). All three are due to false beliefs and accumulation of infinite karmic particles leading to bondage. They are bereft of truth, the causes of worldliness, and without any rightness.

Awarenesses gleaned from other scriptures like the *Rāmāyana*, *Mahābhārata*, etc. are termed false scriptural awarenesses, and telepathy related to other gods not prescribed in the Jina scriptures--false gods--is false telepathic awareness.

77 (E149) Thus ends the section on knowledge.

78-79 (E150-152) The sixth (category) is *satyapravāda*. It contains control of speech, causes of good speech, customs of good speaking, twelve languages, many types of lies, types of speakers, and ten types of truth.

Control of speech (*vacanagupti*) means never to speak untruth, and to keep the vow of silence.

"Twelve types of language" refers to the following: language causing violence, causing conflict, causing jealousy or denigrating others, unrelated to the four duties, causing involvement in sense-pleasures, leading away from sense-pleasures, encouraging spirituality, without humility toward higher quality humans, causing theft, causing right belief and action, and causing false action and belief.

82-83 (E154-156) "Ten types of truth" include colloquial (*janapada*), conventional (*sammati*), ascribed or symbolic

(*sthāpanā*), practical (*vyavahāra*), formal, (*rūpa*), possible (*sambhāvanā*), inherent feeling (*bhāva*), relative (*pratīta*, *upekṣā*), practical (*vyavahārika*) and similarity (*upamā*) truths.

84 (E157) *Anubhavātmaka* language means where sentences spoken and unspoken are both known.

85-87 (E158-163) The *Ātmapravāda* section deals with the nature of the self, how the self is by turns the living entity (*jīva*), the doer (*kartṛ*), the speaker (*vaktṛ*), the enjoyer (*bhoktṛ*), material (*pudgala*), the knower (*vettṛ*), the deity (*viṣṇu*), self-created (*svayambhū*), embodied (*śarīrin*), human (*mānava*), capable (*śakta*), animal (*jantu*), egoistic (*mānin*), deluded (*māyin*), controlled (*yogin*), contracted (*saṅkucita*), not contracted, cognizer of the field (*kṣetrajña*), the inner self (*antarātmā*).

The commentary elaborates here how each is possible from different perspectives.

88-89 (E163-165) Next is the *Karmapravāda* section. By differences of the veils there are eight types of karmic options (*jñānāvaraṇiya, darśanāvaraṇiya, mohanīya, vedanīya, āyū, nāma, gotra, and antarāya*). These are known as basic nature (*mūlaprakṛti*).

90-91 (E164-186) The secondary nature (*uttaraprakṛti*) of these eight are 148, and the possibilities of resulting *karman* due to differing outcomes of living entities are innumerable.

The commentary explains how, through actions related to passions (*kaṣāya*) and conjoining (*yoga*), the coming together in the same space-point of matter accrues with the self, and that is known as bondage.

Actions do not immediately take effect upon bondage, just as alcohol takes effect after a certain time. The results accruing from a past action is known as its rise (*udaya*). If it gives future results it is known as *phalodaya*; if it dissolves without giving the expected result it is known as *pradeśodaya*.

To have a result bear before the time determined at the time of bondage is known as *udīra*. Between the time of bondage and the fruition of an action, the *karman* remains together with the self and at that point is known as *sātā*.

There are four types of bondage: *prakṛti*, *sthiti*, *anubhāga* and *pradeśa*. The second, *sthiti*, is of a further two types: lowly (*jaghanya*) and exalted (*utkṛṣṭa*).

92-93 (E186-187) Karmic natures (*karmaprakṛti*) are of two type, auspicious and inauspicious. Their ability to give positive or negative results is known as their *anubhāga* bondage. The further typology of these results are enumerated.

94 (E187-191) The commentary further explains the possibility of change during the time of the *anubhāga* bondage. There are three states while this attachment of material *karman* remains in the same space-points of the self: *saṅkramaṇa*, *utkarṣaṇa* and *apakarṣaṇa*. The coexistence of karmic particles with the self within the same space-points is *pradeśa* bondage. Eight such matter-adhesions divide into the eight veiling *karman* types. The rise, premature rise, co-existence, transformation, increase and decrease of these are described in the 400 chapters (18,000,000 verses) in this section of the canon.

95-97 (E191-195) The ninth *pūrva* called the refusal or negation (*pratyākhyāna*) canon has 8,400,000 *padas*. In it many sinful actions are reviewed carefully in accordance with the circumstances and physical capacity of the agent. Sins are negated and fasts are enumerated and their methods explained.

98-100 (E196-198) The Lord Jina has enumerated ten types of fasting. One should follow these fasts in a pure way as prescribed.

99-100 The *Vidyānuvāda pūrva* has fifteen topics in three hundred chapters: 700 lesser skills (like that of invoking the deity in the thumb), 500 great skills, and eight great omen texts are treated. The last includes the sciences of stars, their rising and setting times effecting auspicious and inauspicious results, divining earth-related matters like mines, water, etc. predicting in accordance with breath or sound, predicting results related to shape of body parts, prediction according to body signs like spots, marks, fingerprint formations, etc., predictions related to dreams, omens related to tearing of clothes, and signs on the body.

104-106 (E201-213) The *Kalyāṇavāda pūrva* has 26

million verses. It describes the five auspicious happenings in the lives of the realized ones, such as their conception, birth, austerities, enlightenment and emancipation. The entourage of other higher beings are also detailed.

108-109 (E220-224) *Pratyavāya pūrva* deals with medical literatures, poisons and their cure, spirit possessions and their cure, the varieties of earth, the main energy channels, the ten life forces and substances favorable or harmful to their health. Pediatry, surgery, injectible dressings, gerontology, breathing techniques, veterinary applications and nutrition are all detailed.

110-112 (E224-250) The *Kriyāviśāla pūrva* has to do with music, literature, rhyme and meter, seventy-two arts for men and sixty-four for women, eighty-four crafts.

113 (E250) Any action done for a particular purpose is called *naimittika*. The present section describes these and other ritual actions undertaken by the higher beings like *munis* and aspirants, happening regularly in the higher regions.

114-116 (E253-265) In the *Lokabindusāra pūrva* section eight kinds of arithmetic, the four seeds of learning (numbers, measures, area and time) leading to emancipation, and auspicious actions.

Development of the Jain way with mathematics.

Area measures starting from the indivisible atom to infinite atoms (*avasannāsana*) are given and include fine distinctions like the dust arising from the hooves of animals, from the wheels of chariots and the ends of hair-follicles of living beings of various worlds.

CHAPTER THREE

This Chapter consists of appendices. We confine reference to the mere listing of the subjects.

1-3 (E266-267) Mt. Meru and other mountain families, subterranean regions, fast travel, incantations and techniques.

4-9 (E267-269) Penetration of the earth. Magic and the austerities required to master them.

How to assume the form of a lion, etc. Crafts, e.g., drawing, painting, mining.

Sky-travel.

11-13 (E270-275) Meditation techniques.

14-15 (E276-282) The twenty-four realized beings described and classified, and adulation of them indicated.

16 (E282-283) Worship of the Jina.

17-19 (E283-289) Atonement.

20-21 (E290-295) Humility.

22-23 (E295-310) Prescribed activities (*kṛtikarman*).

24 (E311-328) How and when ascetics should study. Purity of food. Types of faults.

25-26 (E329-335) How to bear four types of symptoms and twenty-four afflictions.

27-28 (E335-336) The conduct of the aspirant.

29-30 (E337-341) Varieties of worshipers. Colorings (*leśya*).

31-33 (E341-351) Ritual giving, worshiping. Right and wrong faith.

34-35 (E352-354) How to eliminate errors of omission or indolence occurring by mistake. Atonement.

36-38 (E355, 358) Ten kinds of faults of self-criticism done before the guru.

The remainder of the book is mainly devoted to reviewing the contributions of the *gaṇadharas* and other notables.

208.595 ŚUBHACANDRA, *Vṛtti* on Āśādhara's *Jinayajñakalpa* or *Pratiṣṭhānasāroddhāra*

See JRK p. 136.

208.596 ŚUBHACANDRA, *Saṃśayavadanavidāraṇa/Vṛtti*

This Śubhacandra is the author of the well-known *Pāṇḍavapurāṇa*. H.D. Velankar writes at JRK p. 407: "The author discusses in the [present] work the points of controversy between the Śvetāmbaras and the Digambaras, such as liberation of women etc. The work is mentioned in the author's Pāṇḍavapurāṇa". Manuscripts are cited.

209.597 VINAYAKUŚALA (1558), *Vṛtti* on Mahendrasiṃha Sūri's *Vicārasaptatikā*

Published with the text in Jaina Atmananda Sabha Series18, Bhavnagar 1912. The author's date is given in JRK p. 353, which provides manuscript citations as well.

210 SUMATIKĪRTI (1564)

Velankar, JBBRAS 1930, #1575, says he was a "pupil of Jñāna Bhūṣaṇa of Mūlasaṅgha."

210.598 SUMATIKĪRTI, *Ṭīkā* on Nemicandra's *Gomatasāra*

Velankar, ibid., says "composed in *saṃvat* 1620 (1564 A.D.)", and provides manuscript citations: Allahabad 185 (3); BBRAS. 1575 (on verses 1-95 of *Karmakāṇḍa*); CPB 7173. Also JRK p. 110. See S. C. Ghoshal, *Dravyasaṃgraha*, Introduction, p. 40ff.; Rai Bahadur Hiralal, Introduction to CPB, p. 38.

210.599 SUMATIKĪRTI, *Pañcasaṃgraha*

Edited in Jnanapith Murtidevi Jain Granth, Prakrit. Text No. 10, Benares 1947. Composed in 1564 A.D. For a study "see Intro. to Pancasaṃgraha edition. pp. 14 ff." (says NCC 11, p. 59).

210.600 SUMATIKĪRTI, *Siddhāntasārabhāṣya*

Completion of Jñāna Bhūṣaṇa's #278. NCC 7, p. 331 says "See N. Premi, Jaina Sāṃhitya aur Itihāsa, p. 378 ff." JRK p. 440 says it was revised [!] by Jñānabhūṣaṇa, a pupil of Vīracandra, cites manuscripts.

210.601 SUMATIKĪRTI, *Ṭīkā* on Kundakunda's *Pravacanasāra*

NCC 13, p. 80 calls the author of this work "Sumatikīrti Bhaṭṭāraka". We make the identification without evidence. See *Paṭṭāvalī* p. 43 bi, 36.

210.602 SUMATIKĪRTI, *Karmaprakṛti*

NCC 3, p. 202 cites Pannalal Bombay III, p. 35. JRK p. 72 has another manuscript citation.

211 SAKALA BHŪṢAṆA (1571)

NCC 2, p. 352 says "pupil of Śubhacandra." Velankar, JRK p. 51, specifies that the Śubhacandra in question was himself pupil of Vijayakīrti of the Sarasvatī Gaccha.

211.603 SAKALA BHŪṢAṆA, *Upadeśaratnamālā*

NCC 2, p. 352 says this work is in Prakrit in 18 *paricchedas*; mostly in verse, by Sakala Bhūṣaṇa, pupil of Śubhacandra. Written in 1571 A.D.", cites many manuscripts. H.D. Velankar, JRK p. 51, says "It is in Sanskrit and its Granthāgram is 3100. It contains moral advice for laymen and hence is also called *Ṣaṭkarmopadeśaratnamālā*." He cites more manuscripts.

212 DHARMA SĀGARA (1572)

NCC 9, p. 271: "Born at Ladol; pupil of Hīravijaya of Tapāgacha, Jīvarṣi and Vinayadāna Sūri." The same location specifies that he wrote several works between 1558 and 1572-73. On the other hand, NCC 2, p. 263 and NCC 6, p. 68 gives Ānandavimala Sūri as his teacher.

Strasbourg Ser. #162 (p. 221): "His *Tapāgaccha-paṭṭāvalisūtra* (Prakrit with Sanskrit auto-commentary) is dated *saṃvat* 1648. For a list of his works see H. R. Kapadia at BORI Manuscripts pp. 289-290 (where also some details about Dharmasāgara's life are given)."

212.604 DHARMA SĀGARA, *Īryāpathikā(vicāra)ṣaṭtriṃśikā/Vivaraṇa* or *Svopajñavṛtti*

NCC 2, p. 263 says it is in Prakrit (gives Prakrit title) and has been published in the AgSS 49. It cites several manuscripts.

212.605 DHARMA SĀGARA, *Kupakṣakauśikāditya* or *Pravacanaparīkṣā* or *Sahasrakiraṇa/Svopajña Ṭīkā*

NCC 4, p. 196 says "Śvetambara Jain Prakrit, a polemic treatise against Digambara and other Jain sects, in 11 chapters. Composed in 1572-73 A.D. during the reign of Akbar by Dharma Sāgara Gaṇi, pupil of Hīravijaya of Tapā Gaccha...For analysis of its contents, see BP, 144-156; A Weber, *Sitzungsberichte der Preussischen Akademie der Wissenschaften in Berlin*, 1882, pp. 793-914". Velankar, JRK p. 270, says "it is an examination of the tenets of the ten sects of the Jainas, which according to the author are heterodox"; cites many manuscripts.

212.606 DHARMA SĀGARA, *Tattvataraṅgiṇī* in Prakrit and *Svopajña Ṭīkā* in Sanskrit

NCC 9, p. 271: "Composed in *samvat* 1615 (1558 A.D.)." NCC 8, p. 43 gives manuscript citations. JRK p. 152 says it contains 62 *gāthās*, lists manuscript citations.

212.607 DHARMA SĀGARA, *Ṣoḍaśakī* or *Gurutattvapradīpadīpikā*

NCC 9, p. 271; NCC 6, p. 68.

212.608. DHARMA SĀGARA, *Sarvajñaśataka/Ṭīkā*

This work has been edited by Mithabhai Kalyana Kapadvanj, 1905. Cf. JRK p. 428 for manuscript citations. Also edited, with Amṛtasagara Gaṇi's *Bālāvabodha*, by Ganilabha Sagara in AgSS 36, Kapadvanj 1967/8 (BL1351.2.D46 1967) Cf. Strasbourg Ser. #162 (p. 221).

212.609 DHARMA SĀGARA, *Nayacakra*

NCC in two places ascribes such a work to a Dharma Sāgara, although at NCC 9, p. 271 the author of this work is distinguished from the author of the previously cited works, but without explanation. In any case, manuscript citations are found at Jainagranthavali, p. 91; NP VII. 74.

213 GUṆABHADRA BHAṬṬĀRAKA (1575)

NCC 6, p. 49 says he is "of Māthurasaṅgha, pupil of Malayakīrti; was consecrated at Gopācala as Pontiff in the first half of 16th cent. A. D.", and ascribes a work entitled *Anantavratakathā* to him.

213.610 GUṆABHADRA BHAṬṬĀRAKA, *Tribhaṅgīsāra*

NCC 8, p. 256 ascribes such a work to "Guṇabhadrācārya", and cites Delhi III. 17 (2 manuscripts.)

213.611 GUṆABHADRA BHAṬṬĀRAKA, *Trivarṇācāra*

NCC 8, p. 263 lists Jhalrapatan, p. 13.

214 VIJAYAVIMALA or VĀNARARṢI GAṆI (1577)

NCC 5, p. 227: "pupil of Ānanda Vimala Sūri of Tapā Gaccha." Velankar, JRK p;. 101, says he is also known as "Vānararṣi".

214.612 VIJAYAVIMALA GAṆI, *Ṭīkā* on the *Gacchācāraprakīrṇaka*

NCC 5, p. 227-228: "composed in 1577 A.D." Cf. also JRK pp. 101-102 for more manuscript citations.

214.613 VIJAYAVIMALA GAṆI, *Avacūri* on Abhayadeva Sūri's *Bandhaṣaṭtriṃśikā*

NCC 13, 231 says this is published in Jaina Atmananda Sabha Ser. 12, Bhavnagar 1912. Velankar, JRK p 162, says it was composed and copied in *saṃvat* 1590 (1647 A.D.). Cf. also JRK p. 281.

214.614 VIJAYAVIMALA GAṆI, Commentary on Harṣakula's *Bandhahetūdayatribhaṅgī*

NCC 13, 231 says this is is printed in Jaina Atmananda Sabha 66, Bombay 1917. Confirmed by JRK p. 281, who adds that it was composed in 1645 (meaning, presumably, *saṃvat* 1645 or 1587 A.D.).

214.615 VIJAYAVIMALA GAṆI, *Bhāvaprakaraṇasūtra/Vyākhyā*

Published as Jaina Atmananda Series 9, Bhavnagar 1911. Cf. JRK p. 295.

214.616 VIJAYAVIMALA GAṆI, *Vicārapañcāśikhā/Ṭīkā*

Published with the commentary in *Prakaraṇapuṣpamālā*, Volume I of which is No. 24 of the Anandji Purusottama Granthamala; also published as the Jainadharma Prasaraka Series No. 11, Bhavnagar 1912. Cf. JRK p. 350.

214.617 VIJAYAVIMALA GAṆI, *Antargaṇadīpikā*

Cf. JRK p. 12 for manuscript citation.

214.618 VIJAYAVIMALA GAṆI, *Ṭīkā* on Hemacandra's *Anyayogyavacchedadvātriṃśikā*

JRK p. 10 gives location of manuscripts.

215.619 HARṢAKĪRTI (1577), *Vivaraṇa* on an *Anindrakārikā*

JRK, p. 7 gives this date, citing *Jainagranthāvalī*, Bombay 1909, p. 306.

216 PUṆYASĀGARA GAṆI (1583)

NCC 12, p. 112: "of Kharatara Gaccha; second half of 16th Century: Pupil of Jinahaṃsa Sūri and preceptor of Padmarāja (author of a commentary on a *Rūcikadaṇḍastuti*). NCC 13, p. 106 says he composed the work below in 1583.

216.620 PUṆYASĀGARA GAṆI, *Kalpalatikā* on Jinavallabha Sūri's *Praśnaśataka*

NCC 13, p. 106; JRK p. 275.

217 RĀJAMALLA or RĀJANALLA KAVI (1585)

NCC 1, Revised Edition, p. 145. A Digambara.

Johrapurkar, p. 98, says he was of the Kāsthāsaṃgha-Māthura Gaccha, and dates him in the range of 1575-1585.

217.621 RĀJAMALLA, *Adhyātmakamalamārtaṇḍa*

Edited as Vira Seva Mandir No. 3, Sarasava, Saharanpur District, 1944. "It is in four chapters containing about 200 *ślokas* in all. Published in MDJG 35, Bombay, 1930, 1936, pp. 241-362 (PK3799.R286).

217.622 RĀJAMALLA, *Pañcādhyāyī*

Vadekar, JRK p. 230, says "containing two parts having 768 and 1145 Sanskrit *kārikās* and probably composed by Rājamalla Kavi, the author of the Lāṭī Saṃhitā." Published by Natha Ranga Gandhi, Kolhapur 1906 and also by Lalram Jain, Indore *vīra saṃvat* 2444.

217.623 RĀJAMALLA, *Vācanikā* on Amṛtacandra's *Samayasārātmakhyāti*

Edited by B. Sitala Prasada, Surat 1931.

218.624 VIJAYASENA SŪRI (1590), *Sūktiratnāvalī*

JRK p. 448 gives the date of composition as 1590, says it is published in the Jaina Atmananda Sabha Series No. 23, Bhavnagar 1912.

218.625 VIJAYASENA SŪRI, *Cūrṇī* on Vīrabhadra's *Catuśśaraṇa(-Prakīrṇaka*

See JRK p. 117 for manuscript locations.

219.626 VIJAYASUNDARA GAṆI (1592), *Ṭīkā* on Somasūri's *Paryantārādhanā*

Cf. Velankar, JRK p. 32.

220 HĪRAVIJAYA SŪRI (1593)

M.D. Desai, in the Introduction to his edition of

Vinayavijaya's *Nayakarnikā* (contained in A.N. Upadhye (ed.), *Siddhasena's Nyāyāvatāra and Other Works* (Bombay 1971), pp. 214-216) provides copious details about the life and times of this Jain teacher, the teacher of Kīrtivijaya and others. "Hīravijaya Sūri was the 58th Pontiff of Tapā Gaccha from Śrī Mahāvīra. He was born on the 9th of Mārgaśāṣa Śukla, S.Y. 1583" (1526 A.D.) "at Prahlādanapura (modern Pālanpur), and was initiated on Kārtika Kṛṣṇa 2nd of S.Y. 1596" (=1540 A.D.) "at Patan. He got the title of Upādhyāya on Māgha Śukla 5th at Nāradapuri, and that of Ācārya in S.Y. 1610" (1554 A.D.) "at Shiorhi. He died at Unā on 11th Bhādrapada Śukla, S.Y. 1652" (1595 A.D.).

Desai offers further comments of historical interest. "Hīravijaya, whose memory is preserved in the Mahākāvya, entitled the *Hīrasaubhāgya*, was of the Śvetāmbara sect, and is especially known for the great service he did to the cause of Jainism, by obtaining several *fermāns* from the Great Emperor Akbar in favor of the Jains. One of these *fermāns* (Royal Warrants) recognized the right of Jainas to their Tīrthas (holy places) which the Emperor made over to certain Jainas, and another prohibited the slaughter of animals during the *paryūsaṇa* and on the dates held sacred by the Jaina community."

A. K. Chatterjee (CHJ 2, pp. 1131-132) also provides copious information on this monk.

221.627 VINAYAKUŚALA (1593), *Vicāraleśa* or *Maṇḍalaprakaraṇa/Ṭīkā*

JRK p. 351 says it "contains 99 Prākṛta *gāthās* and was composed in *saṃvat* 1652 by Vinayakuśala, pupil of Vijayasena Sūri of the Tapā Gaccha. It is based on the *Jīvājīvābhigamasūtra* and is published by the Jain Atmananda Sabha, Bhavnagar, 1922 (Series No. 73)." The *Ṭīkā* was corrected by Lābhavijayagaṇi.

222 DHANAVIJAYA GAṆI (1600)

NCC 3, p. 259 that Dhanavijaya Gaṇi was a student of

Kalyāṇavijaya Gaṇi who helped Hīravijaya Sūri (1527-96), a contemporary of Akbar."

222.628 DHANAVIJAYA GAṆI, *Viṣamapadādhirohiṇī* on Munisundara Sūri's *Adhyātmakalpadruma*

NCC 1, Revised Edition, p. 145. Emeneau #4125 lists this work, edited by Sivarama Tanba Dobe Deshmukh, Bombay, Nirnayasagara Press 1906. JRK p. 5 cites more manuscripts. Also edited in DLJP 89 (B162.5.M86 1940). See Kapadia 18, pp. 137-141.

222.629 DHANAVIJAYA GAṆI, *Stabaka* on Candrarṣi Mahattara's *Saptatikāsūtra*

JRK p. 415 says this author was a pupil of Kalyāṇavijaya of the Tapā Gaccha, provides the date and locates a manuscript.

223 JAYASOMA UPĀDHYĀYA (1600)

NCC 7, p. 197: "of Kharatara Gaccha; pupil of Jinacandra Sūri and Pramodamāṇikya and preceptor of Guṇavijaya (author of a commentary on *Vairāgyaśataka*)..." Composed a poem titled *Karmacandramantrivaṃśāvalī* at Lahore in 1593 A.D., says NCC 6, p. 197.

223.630 JAYASOMA UPĀDHYĀYA, *Īryāpathikāṣaṭtriṃśikā* and Commentary thereon

NCC 7, p. 197. Velankar, JRK p. 40, says it was composed in 1583 (or perhaps 1587), and that "it was probably a reply to Dharma Sāgara's work" of a few years earlier. Gives manuscript citations.

223.631 JAYASOMA UPĀDHYĀYA, *Vicāraratnasaṃgraha*

NCC 7, p. 197: "composed with the assistance of his co-student Dayāraṅga and copied in *saṃvat* 1657 (1600 A.D.) by his pupil Guṇavijaya." JRK p. 351 gives the same information, cites manuscripts.

Peterson III, pp. 13-14: "Written in *saṃvat* 1657 (1600 A.D.)...(contains) "a large number of interesting and important

quotations from older books (1) from Nemisādhu's *Ṣaḍāvaśyaka* (proper date 1069), (2) from Śrīcandra Sūri's *Ṣaḍāvaśyaka*, "written in *saṃvat* 1232".

223.632 JAYASOMA UPĀDHYĀYA, *Praśnottara*

Cf. JRK p. 275.

223.633 JAYASOMA UPĀDHYĀYA, *Bālāvabodha* on Devendra Sūri's *Karmagrantha*

Cf. JRK p. 70.

224 PADMASĀGARA (1600)

NCC 11, p. 150: "Pupil of Dharma Sāgara and Vimala Sāgara of Tapā Gaccha; belonged to 16th-17th centuries. See *Viśvatattvaprakāśa* Intro. pp. 99-100." Wiles, p. 112, following JRK p. 144, says "pupil of Dayasāgara (Añcala Gaccha)."

224.634 PADMASĀGARA, *Nayaprakāśa(stavavṛtti)* or *Jainamaṇḍana*

This work has been edited by Virchand Prabhudas, Ahmedabad 1918, and by Hiralal Hamsaraj from Jamnagar along with Rājaśekhara's *Syādvādakulaka*.

224.635 PADMA SĀGARA, *Pramāṇaprakāśa/Svopajñavṛtti*

NCC 11, p. 150 gives JBhP I. 1782. Cf. also JRK. Kapadia 18, p. 76: "Discussion about the *prāmāṇya*...side by side it is a devotional poem eulogizing Lord Santinatha, the 16th Tirthaṅkara".

224.636 PADMA SĀGARA, *Upadeśamālā*

NCC 2, p. 349 says "in *gāthās*", and cites *Jainagranthavalī* p. 172.

224.637 PADMA SĀGARA, *Ṭīkā* on the *Jīvājīvābhigamasūtra*

Wiles says this works was composed *saṃvat* 1700, which would mean in 1643. It is not clear whether the author of this work is the same as the author of the previous four. JRK p. 144 locates a manuscript.

224.638 PADMA SĀGARA, *Uttarādhyayanasūtrakathā*

Wiles, p. 166, says it was composed in *saṃvat* 1657. Cites BL1313.9.U776332, Prastavana p. 6, n. 38: "written in Pīpāra".

225 VĀDICANDRA (1600)

A. K. Chatterjee (CHJ 2, p. 216): "Vādicandra, the disciple of Prabhācandra of the Balātkāra *gaṇa* (Surat branch), was the author of several works. His earliest poem, *Pārśvapurāṇa*, was completed in *vīra śaiva* 1640" (1583 A.D.) "at the town of Vālmīkinagara."

225.639 VĀDICANDRA, *Pārśvapurāṇa*

Chatterjee, ibid., continues: "Here he describes his *guru* Prabhācandra as the successful rival of several religious opponents including those of the Buddhist and Brahmanical sects. The work has 1500 verses."

225.640 VĀDICANDRA, *Jainasūryodaya*

Chatterjee, ibid., continues: "His second work... is a play in which he has sought not only to ridicule the Brāhmaṇas and their philosophical systems, including the Upaniṣads, but also the Śvetapaṭa (Śvetāmbara) Jainas. This amply shows that as late as the end of the sixteenth century A.D. there is no love lost between the philosophers of these two principal Jaina sects. The play is a parody of Kṛṣṇa Miśra's *Prabodhacandrodaya* in which the Digambaras, along with the Buddhists, have been severely ridiculed and criticized. Here Vādicandra attempted to turn the tables on his Brahmanical opponents. This drama was written at Mādhūkanagara (Malwa, Gujarat) in *vīra saṃvat* 1648" (1591 A.D.).

226.641 MEGHARĀJA VĀCAKA (1602), *Dīpikā* on the *Sthānāṅgasūtra*

JRK p. 455 says: "Composed in *saṃvat* 1659 by Megharāja of the Pārśvacandra Gaccha. This is probably in Gujarati and is the same as the one which is published in the Benares edition", i.e. in *Āgamasaṃgraha* Vol. III, Benares 1880.

226.642 MEGHARĀJA VĀCAKA, *Stabaka* on the *Uttarādhyāyanasūtra*

Cf. JRK p. 45 for locations of manuscripts.

226.643 MEGHARĀJA VĀCAKA, *Bhaṣā* on Abhayadeva Sūri's *Bhagavatīsūtravyākhyā*

This is printed in the edition of the *Bhagavatīsūtra* published in 1882 with the commentaries of Rāmacandra Gaṇi, Sudharmasvāmi and Abhayadeva Sūri as AgSS 5 (Sriyuta Raya Dharnapatisiha Bahadura ka Agamasamgraha 5, Benaras 1882 (PK5003.A5285).

227.644 KAMALAMANDIRA GAṆI (1603), *Ṭīkā* on Jinavallabha Sūri's *Praśnaśataka*

Cf. JRK p. 275.

228.645 ĪŚVARĀCĀRYA (1607), *Ṭīkā* on Gajasāra's *Vicāraṣaṭtriṃśikā*

Cf. JRK p. 352.

228.646 ĪŚVARĀCĀRYA, *Akṣarārthadīpikā* on Śānti Sūri's *Jīvavicāra*

Cf. JRK p. 142 for manuscript citations.

229.647 BHĀNUCANDRA GAṆI (1607), *Vṛtti* on Jinadatta Sūri's *Vivekavilāsa*

See. JRK pp. 359, who says it was corrected by Jayavijaya.

230 ĀNANDAVIJAYA (1610)

NCC 2, pp. 114-115 makes Ānandavijaya the grand-pupil of Ānandavimala Sūri, the 58th of Tapā Gaccha; born 1547 *saṃvat* died 1596 in Ahmedabad; and contemporary of Sultan Mahmud II of Malwa, A.D. 1512-34."

230.648 ĀNANDAVIJAYA, *Ajñātoñchakulaka(prakaraṇa)vṛtti*

NCC 2, p. 115 says this is printed in Atmananda Granthamala 17, Bhavnagar 1912.

231 GUṆAKĪRTI SŪRI (1611)

NCC 6, pp. 45-46 says: "Successor of Guṇanidhāna Sūri of Maladhāri Gaccha."

231.649 GUṆAKĪRTI SŪRI, *Sukhabodhikā* on Dharmadāsa's *Upadeśamālā*

NCC 2, p. 351. Cf. also JRK p. 50, citing a manuscript dated *saṃvat* 1663 (1606 A.D.). Kapadia 18, p. 401, says it has been published but doesn't indicate where.

231.650 GUṆAKĪRTI SŪRI, *Vallabhī* on Somaprabha's *Sindūraprakara*

Cf. JRK p. 442, who says it was composed in 1611, cites manuscripts.

232 SOMASENA (1612)

NCC 8, p. 263 says he was a Digambara, pupil of Guṇabhadra, and composed the work below in *saṃvat* 1669 (1612 A.D.)

232.651 SOMASENA, *Trivarṇ(ik)ācāra*

Manuscripts cited at NCC 8, p. 281, which indicates the work is printed. Velankar, JRK p. 163 says it contains 13 chapters; gives manuscript citations.

232.652 SOMASENA, *Sūktimuktāvalī*
JRK p. 449 locates a manuscript.

233 RATNACANDRA GAṆI (1617)

Velankar, JRK, p. 5 says he was a pupil of Śānticandra Vācaka of the Tapā Gaccha, and reports that he himself states that he has written thirteen works, of which we cite two likely to be on philosophy.

233.653 RATNACANDRA GAṆI, *Adhyātmakalpalatā* on Munisundara Sūri's *Adhyātmakalpadruma*

This was written in 1617, reports Velankar, JRK p. 5. It is edited in DLJP 89, Bombay 1940. Kapadia 18 adds that it was composed in *saṃvat* 1674 in Surat.

233.654 RATNACANDRA GAṆI, *Ratnaprakāśa* on a *Saṃyaktvasaptati*

Cf. JRK pp. 5-6.

234.655 MAHIMA SIṂHA (1618), *Gītāni* on the *Uttarādhyāyanasūtra*

Wiles, p. 165 provides the date and cites JRK p. 45.

235.656 RŪPACANDRA (1618), *Ṭīkā* on Gajasāra's *Vicāraṣaṭtriṃśikā*

Rūpacandra was a pupil of Bhānucandra of the Tapā Gaccha. This information, the date of composition and manuscript citations provided at JRK p. 352.

236 GUṆAVIJAYA (1620)

NCC 6, p. 53 calls him "pupil of Sumativijaya" and says he composed the *Jātivivṛti* when Hīravijaya Sūri was the head of Tapā Gaccha. NCC 6, p. 54: "of Kharatara Gaccha; pupil of Jayasoma Upādhyāya and Jinacandra Sūri".

236.657 GUṆAVIJAYA, *(Mitabhāṣinī)Jātivivṛti*
NCC 6, p. 53; JRK p. 309.

236.658 GUṆAVIJAYA, *Vivaraṇa* on Jayaśekhara's *Sambodhasaptatikā*

NCC 6, p. 54 says "composed in 1596 A.D." JRK p. 422 says it was composed in *sambodha* 1651, i.e., 1594.

235.659 GUṆAVIJAYA, *Ṭīkā* on a *(Bhava)Vairāgyaśataka*/Commentary

According to Velankar, JRK p. 366, the *Vairāgyaśataka*, in Prakrit, is edited and translated by L.P. Tessitori in the Journal of the Italian Asiatic Society 22, p. 179 and 24, p. 405; it is also published with a Gujarati translation by Kacarabhai Gopaldas, Ahmedabad 1895. And it is published with Gunavijaya's commentary by Hiralal Hamsaraja, Jamnagar 1914.

237.660 UPĀDHYĀYA SŪRACANDRA (1622), *Jainatattvasāra*/Commentary

NCC7, p. 302 says it was "composed in 1622 A.D. by Upādhyāya Sūracandra with his own commentary at Amarasar near Bikaner". It is published with a Gujarati translation by the Jaina Atmananda Sabha, Bhavnagar (date not given). Manuscripts are cited at JRK pp. 144-145.

238.661 ŚIVANIDĀNA GAṆI (1623), *Bālāvabodha* on Śrīcandra Sūri's *Saṃgrahaṇīratna*

JRK p. 410 gives the date and locates a manuscript.

239.662 ŚRUTA SĀGARA (1627), *Caturdaśīyatipāśikanirṇaya*

JRK, p. 113 says he was a pupil of Dharma Sāgara Upādhyāya (presumably our 214. Dharma Sāgara Gaṇi) of the Tapā Gaccha, cites manuscripts.

240.663 BĀLACANDRA (1627), *Vicāraṣaṭpañcāśikā*
Cf. JRK p. 352.

241 ŚUBHAVIJAYA GAṆI (1630)

NCC 13, p. 115 says he was a "pupil of Hīravijaya Sūri and patronized by Vijayasena Sūri."

241.664 ŚUBHAVIJAYA GAṆI, *Praśnottararatnākara* or *Senapraśna*

Printed in DLJP Fund Series 51, Bombay 1919. BL1351.2.S45 is an edition (in *poṭhi* form) from Bombay in 1988.

241.665 ŚUBHAVIJAYA GAṆI, *Syādvādabhāṣā* or *Nayatattvaprakāśikā* on Vādideva's *Pramāṇanayatattvāloka*

Kasliwal 1967, p. 163 says this was written in 1610. Cf. JRK p. 457.

N. M. Kansara, in *Nirgrantha*, Volume 2 (Ahmedabad 1996), pp. 43-57, gives much information and an exhaustive summary of the work, from which we here quote excerpts.

Kansara notes that the work was first published in the Pothi form by N.G. Jhaveri in the DLJP Series No. 3, Bombay 1911, and again by Sri Jina Sasana Aradhana Trust, Bombay in 1990. Because of difficulties in distinguishing passages of the *Vṛtti* from those of the work itself, it was again published in the journal Sambodhi, Volume 18, Ahmedabad 1992, pp. 103-122 by Mr. Kansara.

The work consists of 282 *sūtras* in nine *paricchedas*, the *sūtras* being mostly drawn from Vādideva Sūri's and Māṇikyanandin's major works.

CHAPTER ONE

"(H)e enumerates nine basic concepts (*padārthas*)... by the knowledge and activity of which one attains liberation (*niḥśreyasa*). With I.2 onwards up to the end of this *pariccheda* are treated the definition of valid knowledge (*pramāṇa*) as that about the self and the non-self, capable of making us accept the agreeable things and discarding the disagreeable ones. This is essentially valid as it is opposed to superimposition (*samāropa*)...of three kinds, namely illusion (*viparyaya*), doubt (*saṃśaya*), and non-ascertainment (*anadhyavasāya*)...In the auto-commentary, the author has refuted the Mīmāṃsaka view that it is the knowledge itself which is responsible for its validity (*sataḥ-prāmāṇya*). And in his elaboration of...valid knowledge...he has criticized Māṇikyanandin's definition."

"In the second *pariccheda*, valid knowledge is classified into two kinds, namely direct and indirect. The direct is clear, in revealing the details to a greater degree than that done by inference, etc. It is of two kinds, namely the practical (*saṃvyāvahārika*) and transcendental (*pāramārthika*). The first of these is of two kinds, namely the sensual and unsensual, i.e., mental. Each of these two has four modes, namely grasp, attention, determination, and retention. Inquisitiveness (*īhā*) is to be distinguished from doubt (*saṃśaya*) which precedes it. Though these are in some respects one and the same, yet they are to be distinguished owing to the peculiarity in modifications. Their order is such, because they are perceived in such an order and because their origination is due to gradual destruction and abatement of one's own *karman*. Otherwise, the object of knowledge would remain unknown...Transcendental perception, on the other hand, is dependent on the soul alone for its genesis. It is either partial or complete. The partial is of two kinds, namely clairvoyance (*avadhi*) and telepathy (*manahparyāya*). Clairvoyance is knowledge which arises when its enveloping hindrance subsides in a particular way, which is connate with some and in others acquired by means of righteousness, and which has for its objects things that have a form. Telepathy, which has for its object the mental substance and its modes, arises from the subsidence of its peculiar cover, the subsidence being due to self-control and purity. The complete knowledge is the pure one consisting in the direct cognition of all substances and their modes, which arises when owing to a peculiar group of conditions, all the covering hindrances are annihilated. An *arhant* is possessed of that, as he has no faults. He is devoid of faults, because his words are unopposed to the valid knowledge...."

"The third *pariccheda* starts with the consideration of indirect knowledge; it is not clear. It is of five kinds–recognition, conception, induction, deduction and authoritative. Recognition is the recollection of an object cognized before, in the form, "it is that", and is due to the waking up of an impression...Conception is due to apprehension and recollection and consists in a synthetic knowledge of a thing under observation with regard to characteristics common to the whole species or to essences underlying a number of modes or with regard to other characteristics...Induction (*tarka* or *ūha*) is the knowledge of the forms "this being, this is...", etc. arising from a critical examination of the facts observed and non-observed and consisting in the establishment of relationship, which subsists in all the three times, such as that between the proven and the mark..."

Deduction is explained at length...

The fourth *pariccheda* starts with the definition of *āgama*. It is the knowledge arising from authoritative sayings. It is so called by transference of epithet. For instance, "there is a treasure here; there are things like Meru". An authority (*āpta*) is he who knows a thing under consideration as it is and describes it in accordance with his knowledge. He is either of the two, human or superhuman. Here, the father, etc., are the human, while the Tīrthaṅkara, etc., are superhuman authorities. A word signifies an object by means of both its natural force and applied meaning. Letter-sounds, e.g., A, etc. are atomic."

"The fifth *pariccheda* begins with the consideration of the object of *pramāṇa*. It is defined as a thing having a nature which has many aspects, namely, the general, the particular, and so on; because it is perceived to have a nature corresponding to, and different from, that of something (of the same class); and because it is capable of producing effects by the modification characterized by the modification of its nature which consists in its persistence through the giving up its old form and the assuming of a new form. Generality is of two kinds, distinguished by species and substantiality etc. Therein, the specific-idea (*tiryak-sāmānya*) consists in similar features found in each of the individuals of a class...Persistent substance (*ūrdhvatā-sāmānya*) is the substratum which remains in all its modification, antecedent and subsequent...The particular also is of two sorts, namely the mode and the distinction. Modes are gradually arising evolutes in the same thing; as the feelings of pleasure, pain, etc., in the soul. Distinction is the dissimilar modification, as cow, buffalo, etc."

"The sixth *pariccheda* starts with the consideration of the fruit or the result that is effected by the *pramāṇa*; such as, removal of ignorance and discarding, acceptance and disregard. It is of two sorts, namely the direct and the indirect. As regards the direct, fruit, that of all the *pramāṇas* is the annihilation of ignorance. As regards the indirect fruits, they are a spirit of avoidance, that of appropriation, and that of indifference..."

"The fallacies regarding the nature of the *pramāṇa* are: the view that is essentially unconscious; that it does not reveal the Self; that it reveals the Self only; the theory of the undetermined perception; and the fallacy of superimposition (*samāropa*)..."

"The unproved (*asiddha*), the opposed (*viruddha*), and the equivocal (*anaikāntika*) are (the three classes of) the mark-fallacy...

Nine kinds of fallacious positive examples and another nine kinds of negative examples are identified.

"The seventh *pariccheda*...opens with the definition of *naya*...The *naya*-fallacy (*nayābhāsa*) consists in denying the aspects other than the one with which one is concerned for the time being. It is of two kinds, diffuse (*vyāsa*) and compounded (*samāsa*). In its diffuse form it is of many sorts. In its compounded form it is of two kinds, namely the *dravyārthika*, i.e. the *naya* which considers the substantial aspects, and the *pratyāyārthika*, e.g. the one which considers a thing in its modifications. The first is of three kinds, namely the *naigama*, i.e., non-distinguished, the *saṃgraha*, i.e. generic, and the *vyavahāra*, i.e. practical." These are explained.

"The *paryāyārthika* is of four kinds: the straight-

expressed (*ṛjusūtra*), the verbal (*śabda*), the subtle (*samabhirūḍha*), and the such-like (*evaṃbhūta*)." These are in turn explained.

"The eighth *pariccheda*...has the statement about the nature of the basic concepts, called *padārtha*, which are associated with origin, destruction, persistence...In the auto-commentary on the *sūtra 3*, Śubhavijaya Gaṇi has elaborately discussed the various aspects of the nature of the *jīva* as propounded in the works on Jaina philosophy. This discussion covers about one-fifth of the extent of this entire work..."

"The ninth *pariccheda* explains the concept of *vāda*...A debate (*vāda*) consists in the system of argumantative statements, *pro-et-contra*, for establishing the subject-matter of one proposition, which is maintained by a party, by refuting the subject-matter of the other, the two subject-matters being opposed to each other." An analysis of the stages in a debate follows.

242 SAMAYASUNDARA UPĀDHYĀYA (1630)

NCC 9, p. 393: "Samayasundara Upādhyāya, pupil of Sakalacandra of Kharatara Gaccha." NCC 1, Revised Edition p. 454 lists an *Artharatnāvalī* by a Somasundara that was written in 1590 A.D. in honor of Akbar. We assume (guess!) this is the same as the author of the works below. His *Gāthāsahasrī* was written in 1630 A.D., acc. to NCC 5, p. 345, as well as Velankar at JRK p. 104--however, Velankar at JRK p. 104 says a *Gāthālakṣaṇa* was composed by him in *saṃvat* 1633, which is 1576 A.D. Since we have a wide spread of dates, we'll estimate his date as 1630 (!).

See also Peterson IV, p. cxxvi.

242.666 SAMAYASUNDARA UPĀDHYĀYA, *Aṣṭalakṣārthī*

Edited by Hiralal Rasikdas Kapadia in *Anekārtharatnamañjuṣā* (DLJP 81, Bombay 1933).

242.667 SAMAYASUNDARA UPĀDHYĀYA, *Vṛtti* on a *Navatattvaprakaraṇa*

NCC 9, p. 393. Written in *saṃvat* 1698 (1641 A.D.), acccording to JRK p. 207, which cites manuscripts. Edited by Mahabudhivijaya in *Prakaraṇatrayī* (Bombay 1989) (B162.5.P74).

242.668 SAMAYASUNDARA UPĀDHYĀYA, *Śrāvakārādhanā*

Composed in *saṃvat* 1667 (1610 A.D.). See Velankar, JRK p. 395 for manuscript citations.

242.669 SAMAYASUNDARA UPĀDHYĀYA, *Vicāraśataka*

JRK p. 351 says it was composed in *saṃvat* 1674 (1617 A.D.), cites manuscripts.

242.670 SAMAYASUNDARA UPĀDHYĀYA, *Vicārasaptatikā*

Cf. JRK p. 353.

242.671 SAMAYASUNDARA UPĀDHYĀYA, *Viśeṣaśataka*

Velankar, JRK p. 360 says it "consists of answers to a hundred disputed points connected with Jain religion and belief, composed in *saṃvat* 1672" (1617). "It is published for the Jinadattasuri Pustakoddhara Fund Bombay 1817" (?). Velankar says a manuscript dated *saṃvat* 1667 (1610 A.D.) was copied by the author himself. For a list of the authorities quoted consult Banerjee 1987, pp. 466-467.

242.672 SAMAYASUNDARA UPĀDHYĀYA, *Viśeṣasaṃgraha*

Velankar says "composed in 1685"--we suppose he means *saṃvat* 1685, which would = 1627. Velankar cites manuscripts.

Peterson III, p. 7, says this gives a commentary on "sixteen *gāthās* from the *Āvaśyacūrṇi*...The *gāthās* badly need a commentary being as they are mnemonic verses written in a cramped ungrammatical style which defies translation..." He directs us to Weber, *Indische Studien* xvii, pp. 65-67, 91-130. Peterson gives a translation of "Leumann's account of the first two heresies", pp. 7-10.

242.673 SAMAYASUNDARA UPĀDHYĀYA, *(Vi)Saṃvādaśataka*

Cf. JRK p. 406 for date and manuscript citations. Peterson III, p. 10 says "In the *Visaṃvādaśataka*, p. 290, a book written a year earlier" (than work #673, i.e., in 1629) 'the author has strung together a century of verses, in which are exhibited the discrepancies to be found in the sacred writings. He has not attempted a harmony".

243 BHĀVAVIJAYA GAṆI (1633)

NCC 2, p. 31-3: "of Tapā Gaccha), pupil of Munivimala, pupil of Vimalaharṣa." Wiles, p. 164, quoting BL1313.9.U776332, Prastāvanā p. 7: "(Bhāvavijaya was a) pupil of Upadhyāya Munivimala, pupil of Vimalaharṣa pupil of Vijayadāna Sūri of the Tapā Gaccha. He wrote *Ṣaṭtriṃśajjalpavicāra* (*saṃvat* 1679 (1622 A.D.)), and *Çampakamālākathā*, written in Bijapur, *saṃvat* 1708 (1651 A.D.). He began writing at 30 years of age, he also corrected the works of some other authors: Jayavijaya's *Kalpasūtra Dīpikā*, written *saṃvat* 1677 (1620 A.D.); Vinayavijaya's *Subodhikā ṭīkā*, *saṃvat* 1696 (1639 A.D.) and the same author's large work *Lokaprakāśa saṃvat* 1708 (1651 A.D.)."

243.674 BHĀVAVIJAYA GAṆI, *Vṛtti* on the *Uttarādhyāyanasūtra*

NCC 2, p. 313 says it was composed in *saṃvat* 1689, and cites (Jaina) Atmananda Grantharatnamala 32, Bhavnagar for published edition. It also says the work is "edited in Roman with an Introduction in French" in Jarl Charpentier, "Le commentaire de Bhāvavijaya sur le neuvieme chapitre de l'Uttaradhyayana Sutra", Journal Asiatique Series 10, Vol. XVIII (July-Dec. 1911), 201-255. According to this article, the work is a Sanskrit version of Devasena's *Sukhabodha*.

According to Wiles it has been edited several times: (1) Bhavnagar: Jaina Atmananda Sabha 1915-18. 2 volumes; (2) by Harsavijaya Muni (BL1313.9.U776332 1959); also (BL1313.9.U77, Bombay 1982) (sic); (BL1313.9.U776.B5, 1970) and (BL1313.9.U776, 197)

Velankar 1930, #s 1414-1415 adds: "Our Bhāvavijaya assisted Jayavijaya in *saṃvat* 1677 and Vinayavijaya in *saṃvat* 1686."

243.675. BHĀVAVIJAYA GAṆI, *Saṃyaktvanirṇaya*

JRK p. 425 says it was published at Calcutta in 1875.

244 KĪRTIVIJAYA GAṆI (1634)

NCC 4, p. 170 says he was a "pupil of Hiravijaya of Tapā Gaccha and teacher of Vinayavijaya gaṇi, who addressed his *Ānandalekha* to him (NCC 2, p. 113a) and wrote also a commentary titled Subodhikā on [the] *Kalpasūtra* (NCC 3, p. 245b). Mentioned also at the end of *Lokaprakāśa* by Vinayavijaya gaṇi (S.C. Vidyabhushana in HIL, p. 216).

244.676 KĪRTIVIJAYA GAṆI, *Praśnottarasamuccaya* or *Hīrapraśna* with *Arthaprakāśikā* thereon

NCC 4, p. 130. "Questions addressed to guru Hīravijaya by several pupils and put together and commented upon." Published Sri Hamsavijaya Jaina Free Library Granthamala 18, Ahmedabad 1923. Also consult NCC 13, p. 115-116; also JRK p. 277. There are 306 questions in all which arise regarding some doubtful points in Jain scriptures, says Velankar 1930 on #1646-1647.

244.677 KĪRTIVIJAYA GAṆI, *Vicāraratnākara/Ṭīkā*

Edited by Vijayadana Suri, DLJP 72, 1927. JRK p. 351 gives the date of its composition as *saṃvat* 1690 (1633 A.D.).

245.678 KAMALĀBHA (1640), *Bālāvabodha* on the *Uttarādhyāyanasūtra*

Wiles, p. 166, cites the *prastavana*, p. 6, item 33 of BL1313.9.U776332.

246.679 HITARUCI (1640), *Vyākhyā* on the *Āvaśyakasūtras*

JRK says that Hitaruci was a "pupil of Udayaruci, pupil of Vijayasiṃha Sūri of the Tapā Gaccha", and cites manuscripts.

247.680 JAGANNĀTHA (1646), *Sitāmbaraparājaya* or *Muktivāda*

JRK p. 436 calls the author "Jagannātha, son of Kṣemarāja", gives the date of composition, says "it is an attack against the Śvetāmbaras."

248.681 DHARMA SĀGARA GAṆI (1648), *Guruparipāṭi* or *Guruparibāḍī*

NCC 6, p. 74: "See BORI D. XVIII. i. 183"

249.682 SUMATIKALLOLA and HARṢANANDANA (1648), *Vivaraṇa* on the *Sthānāṅgasūtra*

The two authors were "pupils of Samayasundara of the Kharatara Gaccha. This is a commentary on the *gāthās* contained in Abhayadeva's *Vṛtti* on the *Sūtra*", says Velankar at JRK p. 455, who cites some manuscripts. See below under 253.HARṢANANDANA (1660) for another work of his.

250 NARENDRASENA ĀCĀRYA (1650)

NCC 9, p. 371 makes him a "disciple of Dharmasena; assigned to 17th Century".

250.683 NARENDRASENA ĀCĀRYA, *Pramāṇaprameyakālika/Svopajñavṛtti*

Edited by Darbarilala Kothiya. MDJG 47, 1961, 1963. See Visvatattvaprakasa, Intro. p. 103.

250.684 NARENDRASENA ĀCĀRYA, *Sarvajñavādasthala*

NCC 9, p. 371 cites BORI 291(b) of A1882-83.

250.685 NARENDRASENA ĀCĀRYA, *Siddhāntasārasaṃgraha*

Edited by Jinadas Parsvanatha Phadkule, Sholapur 1957, 1972 (BL1316.N37 S54).

251.686 VIMALADĀSA (1650), *Saptabhaṅgītaraṅgī*

Edited twice: by P.B. Anantacarya, SMS 8, 1891, and by Thakur Prasada Sarma, RJSM 4, Bombay 1905, 1916, 1977 (B162.5.V48 1977). Johrapurkar, p. 103, indicates it is in 800 *ślokas*, and adds that it is published in *Śāstramuktāvalī*, Conjeeveram 1909.

251.687 VIMALADĀSA, *Syādvādamañjarī*

See JRK p. 457.

252 HEMARĀJĀ PANDE (1653)

Information about this writer and the two works listed below is drawn from Padmanabh S. Jaini, "Hemarāj Pānde's Caurāsī Bol", in *Jambu-jyoti (Munivara Jambuvijaya Festschrift)*, ed. M.A. Dhaky and J.B. Shah, Ahmedabad 2004, pp. 374-398. Prof. Jaini tells us "We learn from a biography of Hemaraj, written by Dr. Kasturchand Kasliwall, that he was...the author of some" 16 "works, several in verse, including the *Caurāsī Bol*, which was completed in the same year as the Bālāvabodha.", referring us to Kasturchand Kasliwal, *Kavivar Bulakhichand Bulakidas, evaṃ Hemaraj*, Śrī Mahāvīra Grantha Akādamī, Jaipur 1983, pp. 205-228.

252.688 HEMARĀJ PĀṆḌE, *Bālāvabodha* on Kundakunda's *Pravacanasāra*

This is published in A.N. Upadhye's edition of the *Pravacanasāra* from Agas, 1964

252.689 HEMARĀJ PĀṆḌE, *Caurāsī Bol*

From Jaini's article noted above we draw the following information and the summary that follows.

"In 1956, Professor Hiralal R. Kapadiya published an article called 'Dikpaṭa Caurāsī Bol [Pratyukti]: (84 Bol Vicāra) Rekhādarśana", describing the contents of an important metrical Hindi work by Upādhyāya Yaśovijayajī. At the end of this text we learn that it is a refutation of the *[Sitapaṭa] Caurāsī Bol*, i.e. Eighty-Four Points of Controversy between the Digambaras and the Śvetāmbaras, a composition by Hemarāj Pāṇḍe."

"This work was completed in Agra in *saṃvat* 1709 (A.D.1653) when Shah Jahan was on the throne of Delhi...Hemarāj Pāṇḍe's work contains eighty-four (*caurāsī*) points (*bol*) presented in a composition of ninety-one verses in varieties of Hindi meters. The number eighty-four seems to have been deliberately chosen by him to match with the eighty-four hundred thousand varieties of *yonis* into which a *jīva* may repeatedly be reborn in the course of *saṃsāra* (see verse no. 88). He is suggesting thereby that those who hold these views may not escape *saṃsāra*. In the absence of any prior Digambara work on this topic, we might assume that he himself drew up this list and composed his verses accordingly."

"A brief outline of the eighty-four disputed views (*vāda*) attributed to the Śvetāmbaras by the Digambara *śrāvaka* Hemarāj Pande [numbers refer to the verses]:[3]

Introductory verses with a brief account of the beginning of the Śvetāmbaras by the Digambara *śrāvaka* Hemarāj Pāṇḍe [numbers refer to the verses]:

Introductory verses with a brief account of the beginning of the Śvetāmbara sect during the time of *ācārya* Bhadrabāhu. (1-18)

Summarized by Padmanabh S. Jaini

[1]Although many of these points have little to do with Jain philosophy, we provide a complete rendition since some of those points call forth replies later which do have philosophical implications.

1. The *kevalin* partakes of food by morsel (*kavala-āhāra*). (19-24)

2. The *kevalin* needs to answer the calls of nature (*nihāra*). (25-27)

3. The *kevalin* is subject to the suffering of disease (*roga*). (28)

4. The *kevalin* may suffer attacks (*upasarga*), such as that which happened to Mahāvīra at the hands of Gośala. [29]

5. The Jina (like Vardhamāna) attends school although he possesses *avadhijñāna* at the time of his birth. (30-31)

6. The Jina, prior to abandoning the household, distributes gifts for an entire year. (32)

7. The Jina gives up clothes at the time of his renunciation but Indra, the King of Gods, places a length of cloth over his shoulder (*devaduṣya*). (33)

8. In the absence of the *gaṇadharas*–the only human beings who can interpret the *divya-dhvani*–the Jina (Mahāvīra) preached his first sermon to the gods only.[1] (35-35)

9. Mahāvīra's mother (Triśalā) was not his natural mother because he was conceived in the womb of the Brahmin Devānandā. (36a)

10. The first Tīrthaṅkara, Ādinātha, was born with a twin sister (*yugaliyā*), and they became husband and wife. (36b)

11. In addition to his twin-wife, Ādinātha married Sunandā, a second wife, who had become a widow (i.e., *vidhavā-vivāha*). (37-38)

12. Mahāvīra was first conceived in the despicable family of a Brahmin. (39)

13. By the orders of Indra, Harinegameśī transferred that foetus into the womb of Triśāla and this is called (by the

[1]Jaini adds: "The Digambara point seems to be that if this were the case, then it would be wasted as the gods could not take any *vratas*. They believe that the Jina maintained silence for sixty-six days until Gautama, the first *gaṇādhara*-to-be, appeared in the *samavasaraṇa*.

Śvetāmbaras) a miracle (*acherā*, i.e., *āścarya*). (40-45)

14. The belief that only two Jinas, namely, Malli and Nemi, were unmarried, while in fact there were five. (According to the Digambaras, Vāsupūjya, Pārśva, and Mahāvīra were also *kumāras*, i.e., unmarried). (45)

15. The belief that a *kevalin* (for example, Bāhubali) would respectfully greet another *kevalin*, like Ṛṣabha. (46-47)

16. A *kevalin* like Mahāvīra unknowingly suddenly sneezed (which suggests that the *kevalin's* body has impurities). (48)

17. Gaṇadhara Gautama paid respects to a non-Jaina mendicant [named Khandaka]. (49-50)

18. A woman may attain *mokṣa* in that very life (*strī-mukta*). (51-53)

19. Tīrthaṅkara Malli was [not a man, but] a woman. (54-58)

20. A *yugala* (male and female twins) born in [the continent of] Harivarṣa was snatched by a heavenly being (*deva*) and brought to the continent of Bharata where he made their bodies small (to suit the Bharata region, i.e, against the rule that a *bhogabhumi* person cannot come to the *karmabhumis*). (59)

21. They were anointed as king and queen in Mathurā, where they ate meat and were reborn in hell (i.e., when in fact a person born in the *bhogabhumi* is reborn only in heaven). For this reason, the Śvetāmbaras consider this a miracle (*acherā*). They maintain that the lineage of the Haris (Harivamśa) derives from this family. (In the view of Digambaras, this story violates the rules pertaining to the twins born in a *bhogabhumi*). (60-64)

22. A *muni* does not break the *aparigraha-mahāvrata* even when he keeps 14 requisites (*upakaraṇas*), such as *pātras* for collecting food and water, clothes, blanket, and so forth). (65-67

23. *Kāla* is not a separate *dravya*. (68-69)

24. The *gaṇadhara* of Tīrthaṅkara Munisuvrata was a horse. (70)

25. A *muni* may partake of meat under some special

conditions. (70)

26. A *muni* should beg food from different houses and eat that food at his place of residence. (70)

27. It is not a sin if one beats up a person who reviles your doctrine. (70)

28. Bharata was Brāhmī's brother, and yet he wanted to make her his wife. (71)

29. Bharata became a *kevalin* while still living in the household. (71)

30. Draupadī was a virtuous wife but yet she had five husbands. (71)

31. A mendicant disciple attained *kevalajñāna* while carrying his teacher [called Caṇḍarudrācārya] on his shoulders. (72)

32. Mahāvīra was married. (72)

33. Mahāvīra's son-in-law, called Jamāli, disputed with him. (72)

34. Kapila was a *kevalin* and yet he danced. (72)

35. Vasudeva (the father of Kṛṣṇa) had as many as seventy-two thousand wives. (73)

36. Bāhubalī was taller even than five bow-lengths. (73)

37. A *muni* may receive food from a member of the *śūdra* caste. (73)

38. Heavenly beings (*devas*) can have conjugal relationships with human females. (73)

39. A woman called Sulasā produced thirty-two sons from one foetus. (73)

40. The first Vāsudeva called Tripṛṣṭha was born from a *nānati (?)*. (73)

41. Mahāvīra visited non-aryan regions. (74)

42. Mahāvīra preached to the *mlecchas* even in the fourth time period. (74)

43. There is no fault if a person who is fasting takes medicine. (74)

44. A *cakravartin* can have sixty-four thousand wives. (74)

45. The nudity of a Jina in the *samavasaraṇa* remains invisible. (75)

46. The sky-cladness (i.e., nudity of a *muni*) is a cause for producing passions. (75)

47. A *yati* may keep a [walking] stick. (75)

48. A *yati* may have ear ornaments (doubtful reading). (75)

49. Marudevī (the mother of Jina Ṛṣabhadeva) attained *mokṣa* while riding on an elephant. (75)

50. There is no fault if a weak *muni* takes food other than at the fixed times. (75)

51. A householder may attain *kevalajñāna* without undergoing the formal act of renunciation. (76)

52. A person born as a *cāṇḍāla* may become a *muni* and attain *mokṣa*. (76)

53. It is acceptable to worship an ornamented image of the Jina. (76)

54. *Mokṣa* is possible without giving up clothes and ornaments. (77)

55. The sun and moon in their original form came to greet Mahāvīra. (77)

56. The Digambara list of the eighteen faults from which a Jina is free is changed into a different list. (For example: They do not consider a *kevalin* to be free from hunger and thirst.) (78)

57. They also make changes in the list of thirty-four *atiśayas* of a Tīrthaṅkara. (78)

58. Camara, the king of the Vyantaras, went to conquer the king of the Saudharma heaven. (79)

59. Seeing his adamantine stick, Camara then came to take refuge at the feet of Mahavīra. (79)

60. When a Jina attains *nirvāṇa*, his body does not evaporate entirely like a lightning (contrary to the Digambara belief). (80)

61. If a householder sees a *muni* who is suffering from lust, he may offer a woman to him so that he does not abandon his mendicant life. (80)

62. Even the body of a *kevalin* can cause the destruction of beings. (80)

63. When Mahāvīra died, the gods gathered together and

worshiped his jaw-bone. (81)

64. At the *janma-kalyāṇaka* of Mahāvīra, he shook Mount Meru (with his toe). (81)

65. There are only fourteen dreams, not sixteen (as the Digambaras hold), that foretell the birth of a Tīrthaṅkara. (81)

66. Baṅgādevī lived for fifty-five thousand years. (82)

67. Cakravartin Bharata merely followed the ways of the world, i.e., he was unattached like a monk while still ruling his kingdom. (82)

68. There are not ninety-six *bhogabhumis*. (830

69. There is no fault in taking water from a leather bag. (83)

70. There is no fault in taking a meal prepared with ghee kept in a leather bag. (83)

71. There is no fault in eating food that has become stale. (83)

72. There is no fault in eating a whole (*sāre?*) fruit. (83)

73. The goddess Nīlañjanā did not dance in front of Ṛṣabha to make him renounce the world (doubtful reading). (84)

74. Vardhamāna resolved while still in the womb of his mother that he would not renounce the world as long as his parents were alive. (84)

75. Bāhubali was born as a twin (*yugala*) (doubtful reading of lines 4 and 5). (84)

76. Nābhi and Marudevī were twins (*yugala*) and Ṛṣabha was born to them. (85)

77. All *yugalas* have impurities in their bodies. (85)

78. All *śalākā-puruṣas* (included in the list of sixty-three) have *nihāra* (they respond to the calls of nature). (85)

79. There are not one hundred Indras, but only sixty-four Indras. (86)

80. There are only twelve abodes of heaven, and not more. (86)

81. The Yādavas, although they followed the path of the Jinas, partook of meat. (86)

82. A human being can go beyond the mountan called Mānusottara. (86)

83. There are not twenty-four *kāmadevas*. (86)

84. In the nine uppermost heavens, there is no minimum age limit (i.e., they all have the same age?) [The last line of verse 87 is missing. The meaning of the third line is not clear]. (87)

These are the eighty-four points [corresponding, that is, leading to rebirth in] eighty-four hundred thousand *yonis*. Those who believe in these indeed are sporting in the ocean of *saṃsara*. (88)

In the city of Agra, there lives the wise and learned Kaurapal. For his sake Kavi Hema composed this poem. (89)

I have not composed th is work with any grudge [against the Śvetāmbaras] not have I don this just to support my own view. This is a preaching consisting of truth. May it make good people happy. (90)

May these word of mine, which reveal the truth, illuminate the hearts of all. May they tear the cover of darkness in the form of doubt. Let there be an increase of knowledge and happiness. (91)

Thus ends the Caurāsī Bol, the Eighty-Four Points of Controversy.

253.690 VṚDDHIVIJAYA (1656), *Bālāvabodha* on Dharmadāsa's *Upadeśamālā*

JRK says Vṛddhivijaya was a pupil of Satyavijaya Gaṇi of the Tapā Gaccha, and wrote this work in *saṃvat*1713 (1656 A.D.); locates manuscripts.

254 HARṢANANDANA (1660)

Wiles, p. 165 says he is a pupil of Samayasundara Gaṇi of the Kharatara Gaccha, whom we have dated 1630 above. Since he wrote his commentary on the *Uttarādhyāyanasūtra* in 1654 this appears to fit the case.

254.691 HARṢANANDANA, *Ṭīkā* on the *Uttarādhyāyanasūtra*

There is a manuscript in Bikaner, Wiles reports (p. 165). Also cf. JRK p. 44.

(HARṢANANDANA, *Vivaraṇa* on the *Sthānāṅgasūtra*, see work #253.690 above).

255.692 VĪRAVIJAYA GAṆI (1660), *Praśnacintāmaṇi*

Vīravijaya Gaṇi was a pupil of Śubhavijaya Gaṇi of the Tapā Gaccha. The work was published at Bombay in 1919.

256 VINAYAVIJAYA GAṆI (1667)

NCC 9, p. 344 says that the *Nayakarṇikā* was composed in 1652 A.D. by Vinayavijaya Gaṇi, pupil of Kīrtivijaya of Tapā Gaccha." M. D. Desai, in his Introduction to the edition and translation of that work (B162.5.V4914 1995) gives more details. "Śrī Vinayavijaya was born in a *vaṇik* Śrāvaka family, in Gujarat, his father's name being Tejapāla, and his mother's Rājaśrī...(T)he date of his birth may be assigned to...*saṃvat* Year...1670." (ET, p. 214).

Desai spends several pages detailing the life of Vinayavijaya. He seems to have been a fellow student of Yaśovijaya (see below). "From his works it is certain that Vinayavijaya's preceptor's name was Kīrtivijaya Upādhyāya, who was a disciple of Hīravijaya Sūri, while Yaśovijaya was the pupil of Nayavijaya whose guru, Lābhavijaya, was a disciple of Kīrtivijaya's co-pupil Kalyāṇavijaya..."(ibid., p. 214)

"Vinayavijaya studied from his *guru* all the Jaina scriptures, and then asked his permission to go to Benares, well-known from ancient times as the most famous center of learning, to study the metaphysics of the non-Jaina schools of philosophy."

"Yaśovijaya joined him on his journey to Benares, and they soon reached that famous city. Here they found themselves compelled to put off their Jaina ascetic's dress because of the prejudices of Brāhmaṇas against the Jains who were termed *nāstikas* (heretics or atheists)...."Under the circumstances, no Brāhmaṇa Paṇḍita was expected to accept a Jaina as his pupil. Vinayavijaya and his companion Yaśovijaya, therefore, changed

their dress, and calling themselves Vinayalāl and Jasulāl respectively appeared before a learned Brāhmaṇa who was well known for his erudition in the six famous *darśanas* (systems) of Hindu metaphysics."

"It took Vinayavijaya and Yaśovijaya twelve years to complete their course of study, at the end of which they both adopted their original Jaina ascetic's dress. (After leaving Benares and following separate ways,) Vinayavijaya came to Junagadh, in Kathiawad, on pilgrimage to the holy Jaina Tīrtha, Girnar Hills, in S. Y. 1708" (1652 A.D.), in which year he also finished his grand and voluminous work *Lokaprakāśa*. About this time he must have repaired to the seaport Dīva (Dvīpa), where he composed the *Nayakarṇikā*. Then he went to Rādhanpur in S. Y. 1710" (1654 A.D.) "where he composed a commentary on Hemacandra's Grammar, called *Haimalaghuprakriyā*."

"As the tradition goes, Vinayavijaya halted at Cambay for four months. At this time Cambay was a great commercial port and its Jaina Śrāvakas were wealthy and prosperous, firm in faith and obedient to the monks. In this town there were many Brāhmaṇa Paṇḍitas. They often came and debated with Vinayavijaya, when later would proceed with his morning sermon (*vyākhyāna*). On account of this, Vinayavijaya could not go on smoothly with his lecture, and the Śrāvakas found the constant interruption a source of annoyance, and felt irritated and disappointed. Vinayavijaya sent for Yaśovijaya to put a stop to the disturbance. Yaśovijaya came and devised a novel plan. He wrote out a verse containing a large number of labials and affixed it to the door of the Upāśraya, with a note to the effect that he who wished to debate could enter within and debate only if he could repeat that verse without allowing his lips to come together. The test of a successful fulfilment of the condition consisted in the application of red lead (*saṃdura*) to the lower lip, so that if the upper lip received any coloring matter the candidate must be deemed to have failed in his attempt. In the morning, the sermon proceeded, and the Brāhmaṇa Paṇḍitas came as usual to carry on their debates. They read the verse and the remarks on the door, and, finding themselves unable to fulfil the condition, went away. The sermon went on without any hitch, and the Śrāvakas were pleased. Subsequently, Yaśovijaya, when asked by the Brāhmaṇas to repeat his verse according to his condition successfully performed the feat, as he had acquired the proper knack of doing so by long practice. Though the matter should have ended here, Yaśovijaya offered his readiness and willingness to open regular debates. He defeated his adversaries in argument; and in consequence five hundred Brāhmaṇas became converted to Jainism, in fulfilment of the condition transcribed on a copper-plate in the State assembly. (It is said that this copper-plate is still preserved in some Upāśraya temple or Bhaṇḍār at Cambay)."

"Vinayavijaya passed the rainy seasons of S. Y. 1716" (1660 A.D.) "at Gandhār, in Marwar, where he finished his composition *Śāntasudhārasa*. He spent the Caumāsa (rainy season) of the...years" (1663 and 1672) "at Rānder in Gujarat, and died at that place towards the end of" 1672, "leaving his Gujarati work *Śrīpala Rāsa* half finished. This unfinished work was completed by Yaśodeva." (Desai, ibid., pp. 216-219)

Kapadia 18, p. 17 writes: "Vinayavijaya Gaṇi...pays respect to Vijayasiṃha as if he is his *guru*. This Vinayavijaya is a celebrated author of *Lokaprakāśa* which is looked upon as a Jaina encyclopedia. Amongst other works may be mentioned *Kalpasubodhikā* (see Volume 17, part 2 of this series, pp. 59-152)." Kapadia says he died in *saṃvat* 1738. His father's name was Tejopāla and that of his mother Rājaśri.

256.693 VINAYAVIJAYA GAṆI, *Nayakarṇikā*

Composed in 1652. Edited quite a few times; cf. Bib, pp. 652-653 for references. Our ET is Desai 1995. Since the work is brief we provide Desai's entire translation here.

Translated by M. D. Desai

1 (ET224) After an invocation to Lord Vardhamāna, the work begins.

2 (ET224) The standpoints are the non-distinguished (*naigama*), the collective-generic (*saṃgraha*), the practical (*vyavahāra*), the straight-expression (*ṛjusūtra*), the verbal (*śabda*), the subtle (*samabhirūḍha*) and the such-like (*evaṃbhūta*).

3 (ET224-225) All objects possess two kinds of properties, viz., (1) *sāmānya* or the generalizing (general), and (2) *viśeṣa* or the differentiating (specific) properties; the general expressing the genus (*jāti*), etc. and the specific expressing the species, differences and distinctions.

4 (ET225) By means of general properties in each of a hundred (hundred here means "all") jars, one idea (that of jar-ness) is recognized and by means of specific properties, people distinguish each individual-particular jar as their own.

5 (ET226) The non-distinguished (*naigama*) standpoint regards an object as possessing both the aforesaid (general and specific) properties; (because) no particular thing in nature is possessed of a general property unaccompanied with some specific property, nor even of a specific property unaccompanied with the general one common to its class.

6 (ET227) The collective (*saṃgraha*) deals with the general properties alone of an object, while recognizing that there exists no *viśeṣa* (specific property) apart from *sāmānya* (general property), i.e., both *viśeṣa* and *sāmānya* are co-existing and coincident. *Sāmānya*, devoid of *viśeṣa*, is like a *khapuṣpa* (sky-flower), quite a nonentity, i.e., existing 'nowhere'.

7 (ET227-228) Not a single lime, mango or any other tree is ever conceived apart from (its general property) vegetable-ness. In the same way, fingers, etc., which are included in the idea of hands, etc., cannot be conceived of separately from the hands, etc.

8 (ET228) The practical (*vyavahāra*) takes into consideration an object as possessing specific properties only; as the specific, apart from the general, is a nonentity like a donkey's horns.

9 (ET229) If one is asked to bring 'vegetable' can one do so? Without the specification of particularity, e.g., mango, etc., such speech is vain.

10 (ET229-230) No wound, bruise or scratch can possibly be healed by the application of the general property of poultice-ness or ointment-ness. The healing properties only inhere in specific poultices or ointments.

11 (ET230) The straight expression (*ṛjusūtra-naya*) does not trouble itself with the past nor the future aspect of a thing; it is only confined to the present and refers to the *nija*, i.e., the natural state.

12 (ET230-231) Neither the past, nor the future, nor the non-natural qualities serve any purpose. They are false; (they are like) a sky-lotus (nonentity).

13 (ET231-232) The *ṛjusūtra-naya* recognizes only the real natural state of a thing out of the four, the name (*nāma*)*nikṣepa*, etc., in the same way, the succeeding *nayas*.

14 (ET232-233) The *śabda-naya* treats synonymous words as all having the same sense, for instance, *kumbha, kalaśa, ghaṭa*, etc. are all expressive of one and the same object (viz., a jar).

15 (ET233) The *samabhirūḍha-naya* holds that, with the difference of the words expressing the object, the significance of the object also differs: just as a jar (*ghaṭa*) and a piece of cloth (*paṭa*) are different, so a jar, a pitcher and a pot (*kumbha, kalaśa,* and *ghaṭa*, though synonyms) signify different things (according to their derivative sense: for instance a *ghaṭa* is that which makes a noise like *ghaṭ, ghaṭ* and so on.

16 (ET234) (For) if different synonyms (*paryāyas*) of a thing do not distinguish that thing, (there) can be no such (distinction) between a jar and a cloth, which have also different words (*paryāyas*) for them.

17 (ET234-235) *Evaṃbhūta-naya* (the such-like standpoint) verily recognizes an object denoted by a word only when the object is in the actual state of performing its own natural function (as suggested by the derivative meaning of that word).

18 (ET235) (For) if a thing be really recognized, even when it does not fulfil its function, then why can cloth be not called a jar?

19 (ET236) Each succeeding standpoint of these seven *nayas* is purer than the preceding one; each of them has a

hundred sub-divisions; therefore there are seven hundred *nayas* (in all).

20 (ET236-237) But if we include the subtle (*samabhirūḍha*) and such-like (*evaṃbhūta*) in the verbal (*śabda*) standpoint, then there would be five standpoints, and the same could be divided into five hundred.

21 (ET237-238) These (seven aspects) can be included in or grouped under (two, i.e.,) (1) the *dravyāstika* (which considers the common attributes of all the *dravyas*, that is to say, general properties of substances and objects) and (2) the *paryāyāstika* (which deals with the specific attributes, qualities and conditions of objects) *nayas*. The former of these includes the first four, and the latter the last three.

22 (ET238) O Lord! although all standpoints differ from themselves *inter se*, they collectively serve your Gospel, just as, on earth, kings, though hostile to each other, after having been defeated in military warfare serve at the lotus-like feet of, or pay homage to, the Sovereign-Emperor.

The 23 stanza lauds Lord Mahāvīra.

256.694 VINAYAVIJAYA GAṆI, *Lokaprakāśa*

M.N. Desai, in Desai 1915, p. 220, describes the present work as follows: "An original voluminous work of 20, 621 verses, dealing with the Jaina view of the Universe (cosmos). The author has cited more than 700 authorities, showing that he was a voracious reader and an exact writer. It has been published by Pandit Hirālā Hansarāj of Jāmnagar in 1910, and also in the DLJP Fund Series 65, 74, 78 and 86, four volumes Bombay 1926-1937, and with a Gujarati translation in the AgSS 57, 60-61, Bhavnagar, Surat 1929-1932. Also edited by Vijayasena Vijaya, Bombay 1990 in five parts (BJ1290.V66 1990). See JRK p. 339 for manuscript citations.

For a long summary in Sanskrit of the contents of this work see R. Mitra, *Notices*, Pt. 8, pp. 65ff. For its subject-matter also compare Schubring, Doctrine, Chapter V for further references.

For a manuscript citation see Strasbourg Ser. #137, pp. 195-196

256.695 VINAYAVIJAYA GAṆI, *Śāntasudhārasa*

Again from Desai 1915: "A treatise on the sixteen *bhāvanā* (points of moral and mental culture for meditation and concentration), including the four chief ones, *maitrī* and the like, and the twelve subordinate ones, *anityatva* (transitoriness), etc." It has been published twice to our knowledge, once with Gambhiravijaya's commentary by Jethlal Haribhai Sarma from Bhavnagar 1913, and again in Gujarati script by Municanda Giridharlala Kapadiya, Bombay 1976 (BL1354.V545). Velankar at JRK p. 378 says "It is a *Geyakāvya* like the *Gītagovinda*. It is in 15 chapters containing about175 Sanskrit stanzas." Velankar mentions other editions: by Bhimsi Manek in *Prakaraṇaratnākara* Vol. II (summarized in French by Guerinot, AMG 22, 1906), and also in the *Amīdhāra* by Pandit Ksamavijaya Gaṇi, Bombay 1924. Edited Patan Gujarat 1972 (BL1350.V54).

256.696 VINAYAVIJAYA GAṆI, *Ṭīkā* on Somasūri's *Paryantārādhanā*

See Velankar, JRK p. 32

256.697 VINAYAVIJAYA GAṆI, *Dvādaśabhāvanā*

Cf. JRK p. 184.

256.698 VINAYAVIJAYA GAṆI, *Laghuprakriyā*

This work was composed in *saṃvat* 1710 (1653 A.D.), and is published in the Jainadharma Prasaraka Sabha Series, Bhavnagar 1924, and previously from Bombay in 1892-93.

257.699 DEVARĀJA (1658), *Avacūri* or *Pañjikā* on Jinavallabha Sūri's *Saṃghapaṭṭaprakaraṇa*

NCC 9, p. 120: "Composed in 1658 A.D. L. 4018. Also consult JRK p. 411.

258.700 AMARACANDRA (1674), *Saṃyogadvātriṃśikā*

JRK p. 406 gives date and locations of manuscripts citings.

259 MATIVARDHANA (1681)

Velankar, BBRAS 1930, #1593, says: "pupil of Sumatihaṃsa, pupil of Jinaharṣa Sūri of the Kharatara Gaccha."

259.701 MATIVARDHANA, *Sugamāvṛtti* on Jinaharṣa's *Gautamapṛcchā*

Velankar 1930, ibid.: "Composed in *samvāt* 1738 (1681 A.D.)", gives the beginning and end and cites manuscripts. Also JRK pp. 111-112.

260. YAŚOVIJAYA (1688)

Consult Mohananlal Dalchand Desai, *Yashovijayaji. The Life of a Great Jain Scholar*, Bombay 1910. Also S.C. Vidyabhusana at JASBe n.s. 6, 1910, 463-469.

Besides the information reported above in connection with the relationship between Vinayavijaya and Yaśovijaya, more information is forthcoming from Dayanand Bhargava in his Introduction to his edition and translation of the *Jaina Tarkabhāṣā* (our E and T of that work below). He says on pp. xviii-xix there: "(His) date and life history can be fortunately known from *Sujaśavelibhāsa*, a work written in ancient Gujarati by his contemporary Kāntivijaya Gaṇi. Yaśovijaya was born in Kanodum near Kalola in Gujarat and died at Dabhoi in 1688 A.D. His father's name was Nārāyaṇa and mother's name was Sobhagade. He was a disciple of Naya Vijaya who was third in line to Harivijaya (1526-1595 A.D.) who was contemporary of Moghul Emperor Akbar. Hari Vijaya's disciple was Kalyāṇa Vijaya. Kalyāṇa Vijaya's disciple was Lābhavijaya. A businessman, Dhanaji Sūri, sent Yaśovijaya to Kāśi for higher studies in 1626 A. D. He made a special study of logic there and got the titles of Nyāya *viśārada* and Nyāyācārya.

Wiley pp. 239-240: "Yaśovijaya, Mahopādhyāya (1624-1688). Śvetāmbara Mūrtipūjaka Tapā Gaccha preceptor (*upādhyāya*). Born in Kanoda, Gujarat, he studied various branches of brahmanical learning in Banaras, focusing on the techniques of New Logic (*navyanyāya*). He studied the writings

of the Banārsīdās and was familiar with the doctrines of the Digambara Adhyātma movement, which he refuted. He wrote more than a hundred works in Sanskrit, Prākrit, Gujarati, and Rajasthani on a variety of topics. He is highly respected for his difficult works on logic, such as *Jainatarkabhāṣa*, *Jñānabindu*, and *Nyāyāloka*. He wrote a polemical work entitled *Adhyātmikamatakhaṇḍa* in which he defends Śvetāmbara doctrinal views on the nature of an omniscient being (*kevalin*) and the ability of women to attain liberation (*strīmokṣa*). He also wrote an important commentary on *Dharmasaṃgraha*, a work on lay conduct (*śrāvakācāra*) written by Mānavijaya in 1681, in which he rejects non-Jain elements that had been incorporated into the writings of certain of his predecessor. In his later years, under the influence of the writings of the mystic poet Ānandaghana, he wrote *Jñānasāra*, which discusses the mystical nature of the inner soul (*ātman*). He is often described as a reformer and standardizer of Jain practice."

260.702 YAŚOVIJAYA, *Anekāntavyavasthāprakaraṇa*

The work has been edited, with Lāvaṇya Sūri's *Tattvabodhinī*, by Daksavijaya. Botad 1951. Also edited Bombay 1987 (BC25.Y363 1987).

260.703 YAŚOVIJAYA, *Syādvādamañjūṣā* on Hemacandra's *Anyayogavyavacchedakadvātriṃśikā*

NCC 1, Revised Edition, p. 233.

260.704 YAŚOVIJAYA, *Tātparyavivaraṇa* on Vidyānanda's *Aṣṭasahasrī*

This commentary has been edited from Ahmedabad in 1937 (B162.5.Y34 1985); also from Bombay in 1988, and Poona in 2004.

260.705 YAŚOVIJAYA, *Aṣṭakaprakaraṇa* or *Jñānasāra* or *Dvātriṃśikādvātriṃśikā* with *Tattvadīpikā* or *Arthadīpikā* thereon

This work has been edited many times and translated into English more than once. We shall here refer to the edition

by Girish Kumar Parmanand Shah with translation by Amritlal S. Gopani, published from Bombay in 1986 (BL1378.Y3613). In Prof. Gopani's Introduction, pp. 11-15, he discusses the text and provides a helpful summary of its contents, which we provide selections from here. Also consult (BL1356.Y36153) (Ahmedabad 2002) in eight volumes, which contains both the two (?) commentaries by Yaśovijaya, and (PK3798.Y3.J515) from Bombay, 1972. Also edited by Surendra Bothra in (BL1378.6.Y3612) Jaipur 1995 (with Hindi commentary), and (BJ1290.J38 1978), and by Rajasekhara Vijaya (Bombay 1972).

Summary by A. S. Gopani

"*Jñānasāra* is constituted of thirty-two topics covering the whole range of spiritualism, each of which is briefly but exhaustively described in eight *ślokas* in easy and forceful Sanskrit which even a layman can understand and interpret..."

"The first *aṣṭaka* sets forth the goal of perfection. In the remaining *aṣṭakas* the factors and instruments responsible for its achievement are narrated in brief. Each *aṣṭaka* is a logical corollary of the previous one. Therefore, the second briefly relates to self-absorption, the third to stability of mind, the four to avoidance...(the fifth to knowledge, the sixth to) tranquility, the seventh, eighth, ninth, up to (the) thirty-second (the last) respectively relate to...victory over sense-organs, renunciation, religious activity, satiety, non-greediness, desirelessness, monkhood, sacred learning, discrimination, neutrality, fearlessness, avoidance of self-praise, philosophical insight, total prosperity, maturation of...*karman*, aversion to worldly existence, avoidance of world-consciousness, scriptures, possession experience, yoga, sacrifice, worship, meditation, penance and lastly the synthesis of all viewpoints."

"Just as perfection is not possible without self-absorption, this self-absorption also is not possible without stability of mind and so on and so forth. And thus we come to the last one which is the synthesis of all viewpoints. In other words, this also means that the succeeding *aṣṭaka* lays down the effect and the preceding, the cause...the ultimate effect...being perfection..."

"Now if we begin from this first and fundamental cause (synthesis of all viewpoints) and go upwards, we will come to penance which is its effect and so (on) and so forth. We ultimately come to perfection (*pūrṇatā*) which is the final result. In this way, all the *aṣṭakas* are interrelated, interlocked so to say."

"Perfection, fullness, total integration of self is the final goal (that) an aspirant should try to realize. But this can only be done if a person becomes self-absorbed. In fact, perfection and self-absorption are but...the two sides of the same coin. So long as the mind is wavering, there can be no merging in the self. Therefore, the mind should be stable. There are many temptations in the world and the mind is caught up in the snares of delusion. So the mind should be extricated from these snares and then only it can become firm. A person should first have real knowledge of...Reality. This will help him in weighing the pros and cons and thus he will be able to assess the value of every thing in a right perspective. As a result, delusion will disappear and the mind will become balanced. The ground should be cleared for...knowledge by divesting the intellect of its usual weakness, the weakness of becoming disturbed (by) off and on provocation. If tranquility of mind is ensured, knowledge will indeed follow. The victory of (the) sense-organs is a causative factor for renunciation which itself is responsible for religious activity. Satiety, non-greediness or desirelessness will follow one by one from...religious activity. This will ripen into accepting monkhood, which is dependent on...scriptural knowledge, discrimination and neutrality. All this is the outcome of fearlessness, avoidance of self-praise and philosophical insight. This last, that is to say, ...philosophical insight is due to one's aversion to worldly existence, avoidance of world-consciousness and comprehensive and deep study of the religious scriptures. This can never be ensured without the acquisition of yoga, worship, meditation and penance. Ultimately, (the) all encompassing synthetical view to glimpse the Real is the prime cause,...(the) fundamental ingredient of the spiritual formula which is offered here in the *Jñānasāra* by the author..."

260.706 YAŚOVIJAYA, *Adhyātmabindu*

NCC 1, Revised Edition, p. 148 advises us to "See p. 108, Introduction by H.R. Kapadia to his Edition of Śobhana's *Śruticaturviṃśatikā*, Agamodaya Samiti Series 51."

260.707 YAŚOVIJAYA, *Adhyātmasāra*

Edited several times. See also N.M. Kansara at ALB 38, 1974, 115-144 and also ABORI 57, 1976, 23-39. NCC 1, Revised Edition p. 153 says "Śvetāmbara on moral discipline". JRK, p. 6, says it is comprised of seven books containing 17 chapters in all and a total of 948 *ślokas*, and cites publication by Bhimsi Manek in *Prakaraṇaratnākara* Vol. I (summarized in Guerinot, AMG 22, 1906, who says it is "sur le discipline"; in Jainadharma Prasaraka Series 25, 1915, with Gambhīravijaya's commentary. Also edited by Munisri Nemicandra from Delhi 1976 (BJ1290.Y3716).

Kapadia 18, p. 172: "This is a metrical composition in Sanskrit in 949 verse. The 21 topics discussed here as under *adhyātmaśāstramahātmya, adhyātmasvarūpa, dambhatyāga, bhavasvarūpacintā, vairāgyasambhava, vairāgyabheda, samatātyāga, samatā, sadanujñāna, manaḥśuddhi, samyaktva mithyātvatyāga, asadgrahatyāga, yoga, dhyāna, smṛti, ātmaniścaya, jinamatastuti, anubhava* and *sajjanastuti*."

260.708 YAŚOVIJAYA, *Ādhyātmamatakhaṇḍana* and autocommentary thereon

The work is available in print from the Nyayacarya Sri Yasovijayakrta Granthamala, Bhavnagar 1909, 1965. NCC 2, p. 95 says the text with commentary is printed by the Jainadharma Prasaraka Sabha, but gives no date or place or Volume number.

260.709 YAŚOVIJAYA, *Vivaraṇa* on Samantabhadra's *Āptamīmāṃsā*

NCC 9, p. 129 says this has been printed in Jainagrantha Prakasaka Sabha, Ahmedabad 1937, and advises consulting HIL p. 481, and JASBe 1910, p. 468.

260.710 YAŚOVIJAYA, *Dravyaguṇaparyāyasāra*

NCC 9, p. 179 says: "(mixed with vernacular) and cites BORI 725 of 1892-96. It is edited by Bhimasinha Manaka in *Prakaraṇaratnākara* Volume II, Bombay 1876-78, and summarized by Guerinot, AMG 22, 1906, as "en vers hindis".

260.711 YAŚOVIJAYA, *Jainatarkabhāṣā* with *Tātparyasaṃgraha* thereon

The summary that follows is based on the published translation of Dayanand Bhargava in Singhi Jaina Series 8 (Delhi 1973) (BC25.Y37130). This is our "T". The publication also contains the text of the work, our "E". We have substituted the preferred translations of technical terms used in this Volume for those chosen by Dr. Bhargava, and the entire translation has been revised by the Editor for grammatical purposes.

1 (E1; T33-34) *Pramāṇa* is the ascertainment of itself and others.

Here "itself" means the very nature of knowledge, the "others" are objects other than that (knowledge), and "ascertainment" is that which determines both of them as they actually are.

The word "cognition" (*jñāna*) is used to avoid undesirable extension to vision (*darśana*). The word "ascertainment" is used to avoid that (viz., undesirable extension) to doubt, error and indefinite knowledge. The epithet "self and others" has been used to indicate the nature (of the *pramāṇa*) and by way of refutation of the Mīmāṃsakas, etc., who hold that the non-perceptibility of knowledge and of those who believe in the non-dualistic existence of knowledge, etc. and deny the existence of external objects.

Objection: Now, if right cognition (itself) is meant to be an instrument of knowledge, then what (else) is to be said to be its result (*phala*)?

Answer: Correct. Its result is the ascertainment of (knowledge it)self and of objects.

Objection: Now, in this way, the quality of being knowledge of itself and others will not exist in the instruments

of knowledge, since the instrument is the ascertainment of the others and the result is knowledge of itself.

Answer: No, because of the partial identity of (the two), the instrument and its result. It is the sense-organ alone which is involved in cognitive awareness (*upayoga*) by the self, because the self, when not involved in cognitive awareness, does not reveal such objects as touch, etc., since otherwise someone in deep sleep would also have awareness through sense-object contact with soft cotton, etc.

2 (E2; T34) (The *Tattvārthaślokavārttika* I.1.22 of Vidyānanda says) "Here the capacity of the self in the form of grasping an object is called the 'instrument' and this is not a contradiction", it being the attaining sense-organ that is the instrument, it having the power of grasping the object. But this is not correct, since the result attained by the instrument is itself cognitive awareness, and if by supposing that power to be imperceptible it is supposed that the knowledge of the instrument is unperceived whereas the result of the awareness is perceived, that results in acceptance of the Prābhākara theory.

Objection: The capacity of awareness is perceptible as well through perception of the substance--the self--which it qualifies.

Answer: That cannot be so; for if it were so, awareness could not be held to be self-illuminating like satisfaction, etc. Furthermore, it would then be wrong to say "I cognize the pot through (my) awareness (of it)", since, for example, one does not cognize the neck and the bowl when one perceives the pot, even though they are perceptible through one's awareness of the substance.

3 (E2; T34-35) Awarenesses are of two sorts, direct (*pratyakṣa*) and indirect (*parokṣa*). A direct awareness is one which, being an effect, depends on the senses, called "*akṣa*"). Direct awareness experienced by a self is called "*akṣa*" and is pervaded by having all those (kinds of) contents that can be gotten to by a self possessing awareness.

(Objection:) Then clairvoyance, etc. as well as immediate awareness, etc. will not count as perception.

(Answer:) No, for what we have just given is the etymological meaning (of *pratyakṣa*), but in usage it (perception) is that is which the clearest as a single expression having a single object. Here "clearest" is meant in comparison with, e.g., inference.

4 (E2; T35) Direct awareness is of two kinds: empirical (*sāṃvyavahārika*) and ultimate (*pāramārthika*). Empirical direct awareness is based on experience of everyday meetings and missings, i.e., on everyday experience of ourselves. So it is not ultimate. Examples of it are (awareness of) "you" (or "that"), etc. It is really indirect, since it takes place through something either sensory or non-sensory, for it is not different (in that regard) from the awareness of fire through (the awareness of) smoke. Furthermore it is really indirect since doubt, error and uncertainty (about it) are possible, as in those fallacious inferences called unproved, equivocal and contradictory, and because, as in inference, direct awareness can be ascertained by agreement or through memory.

5 (E2; T35-36) Empirical direct awareness is (itself) of two kinds: sensory and non-sensory. The sensory (kind) is produced by the eye, etc.; the non-sensory is produced by the mind. The mind functions also as a sensory organ, but since there it is a too-specific cause (*asādhāraṇakāraṇa*) there is no fault (in this classification).

Each of these two (sensory and non-sensory empirical direct awareness) is itself of two kinds: immediate (*mati*) and verbal (*śruta*). Immediate awareness is occasioned by the senses and the mind and is not based on words; what is based on words is verbal awareness. By "based on words" is meant being grasped inwardly through a repetitious expression such as, e.g., "a pot, a pot", where the connection between what is spoken and its content comes either from instructions by others or from scriptures.

(Objection:) If so, then verbal awareness will be indistinct awareness (*avagraha*) alone, and not directed awareness (*īhā*), etc. since those (directed awareness, etc.) involve use of words and must therefore be kinds of verbal awareness.

(Answer:) No, because though at the time of intimation (*saṅketa*) directed awareness, etc. are based on words, at the time of practical dealings they are not, since it is found that through practice even without language one's actions are based on the basis of a chain of conceptual constructions that issued from those (viz., directed awareness, etc.). Thus, since in dealing with the (scriptures, i.e., the) *aṅgas* and *upāṅga*, etc. and in the perception of words, etc. there is no dependence on words, it is (called) immediate (awareness), but since there also the meaning is known on the basis of words it is called verbal (awareness).

6 (E3; T36) Immediate (sensory empirical direct) awareness is itself of four kinds: indistinct, directed, determinative and focused concentration. The lowest (or basic) kind is indistinct awareness. It is of two kinds: initial (*vyañjanā*) and objective (*artha*). The initial (indistinct) awareness is that by which an object is made manifest. It is (a) the physical sense-organ having the specific power of cognizing a sound, etc.; (b) the substance transformed into the sounds, etc., (c) the relation of those two...

(Objection:) This is (immediate or any sort of) awareness, since no awareness occurs at that time, as in the case of the relation between sound and the ear of someone deaf.

(Answer:) No, because it issues in awareness, so by transfer of meaning it can (also) be called awareness. It can be inferred, just as we infer someone's dreaming from his movements, though it cannot be marked, like a single spark of fire, because of its subtleness.

7 (E3-4; T37-38) Initial awareness is of four kinds corresponding to (the differences between) the four senses other than vision and mental, which do not contact their objects; otherwise (if they did contact their objects) they should become wet or burnt when grasping water and fire respectively.

(Objection:) Well, the eye does get burnt when viewing the sun.

(Answer:) No, that is not found to happen initially (at any rate), and since the injuring of the eye through contact with the sun's rays is (due to the sun's heat), as is shown by the lack of injury when it is the moon that is seen. As for the mind, it is not the mind that is favored or harmed by the thoughts of dead or lost things producing weakness in one's chest, or the union with loved ones or riches producing a smiling fact, etc.; these thoughts belong to the self aided by the mind-substance in the form of masses of desirable or undesirable atoms changing into mental qualities; these things do not prove that the mind makes contact with its objects, any more than the correction of them through medicine, etc. proves it.

(Objection:) If the mind does not cognize its object by contacting it, how can a sleeper dream that he has gone to Mt. Meru?

(Answer:) That dream is false. The mind doesn't go (to Mt. Meru) any more than the body does. If it were not so a flower's fragrance should cure the body, or travel injure it.

(Objection:) (It's not just in dreams;) even when awake one can be favored by the sight of the Jina's bathing that one has seen in dreams, and harmed by failure to see it.

(Answer:) But the result of seeing that, viz., one's satisfaction, etc., is not a matter of dreaming, so it doesn't tell toward showing that the mind can literally contact its object.

(Objection:) One finds that dreams cause actual events, as in the case of a wet dream.

(Answer:) Yes, but that is due to the intensity of one's desire, not to actual contact with a woman--so what is the problem?

(Objection:) There is contact of the mind of a somnambulist with a song he hears.

(Answer:) No, for though one may think he is dreaming, nevertheless he is actually hearing the song.

(Objection:) How can the mind fail to contact even things like the heart that are close by to it, given that the activity of one's consciousness is spread over infinite points in time and at every point in time there is mind-body contact even when it is not in contact with an object; thus the mind should certainly contact close-by things like the heart.

(Answer:) It is said: "one who does not pay attention

does not cognize". Since (as you have just argued) one's mind is always in contact (with a thing) and yet fails to cognize it, even in the case of a nearby thing like the heart, unless there is close contact (of the mind with an object) cognition won't occur (even in the case of nearby objects), since contact is decided from the point of view of external objects. Again, failure to observe an object may occur because the cessation-and-subsidence of karmic veils over the mind, and the activity of the mind occurs only after the functioning of the auditory, etc. sense, and because of the etymological derivation of the word "mind" (*manas*) suggests thinking (*manana*) on objects, and indeed the mind cannot function without thinking of its objects. So it is to be accepted that the eye and the mind do not contact their objects.

8 (E5; T38-39) Objective awareness is awareness of the general (or universal) features without any distinction of form, name, type, activity, quality or substance.

(Objection:) How is that a *sūtra* says "he has grasped the meaning of (the word) 'word'", since he must already understand what "word" means.

(Answer:) Only the speaker (not the grasper) knows what the word "word" means, and what he has not grasped is its difference from color or taste, etc. If the ascertainment "that is (a) word" constituted objective awareness it would contradict (the Jain view that) an objective awareness occupies only one time-point, since pronouncing the word "word" takes less than 48 minutes (but more than one time-point).

(Objection:) Objective awareness can cognize particular as well as general features, so that later on the directed awareness, e.g., "this thing has sweetness, the sound of a stringed-instrument" may arise.

(Answer:) No, for if the awareness in question is of a specific factor as distinguished from what is not verbal at all, it must be perceptual, since it is not different from the usual perceptual appearance of a particular (or at any rate the distinction is vanishingly small). Moreover, the awareness "this is a word" cannot arise without directed awareness thinking of (what is a) word and not a color, etc., and directed awareness

of an object cannot occur if the object is uncognized, so it comes to our conclusion anyway.

(Objection:) Then objective awareness itself must have the form "this is (a) word", since it precedes directed awareness of that.

(Answer:) No. The meaning of word "word" is known only to the speaker at the time of objective awareness. Scriptures mention only the unmanifested hearing of a word, and since what is unmanifested is general in form, the objective awareness of it is of that form too. If the cognition of an unmanifested word were accepted to be what is grasped in an initial awareness, then it would become indistinct awareness itself.

9 (E4; T39-40) (Objection:) For a new-born child who lacks the conceptual constructions of "intimate" (*saṃketa*), etc. awareness is general, but for a man who already knows the object his awareness is specific: so it is not right to say (merely) "he understands the word 'word'".

(Answer:) No, for then conversance with a thing would merely be acquaintance with greater and greater numbers of particulars (of that sort).

(Objector:) What's wrong with that?

(Answer:) The scripture does not speak of degrees, but speaks of "one who does not know the word", so even the wisest should not speak of greater and greater numbers of that sort.

10 (E4-5; T40) (Objection:) Objective awareness is said to be preceded by reflection (*ālocana*), and reflection grasps the unmanifested general features of a thing, whereas objective awareness grasps the thing as distinct from other objects: so the scriptural statement--so what the *sūtra* says is all right.

(Answer:) That isn't right. Does the reflection precede the initial awareness of the object, or the reverse, or is it the very same awareness? It can't precede it, since one can't reflect on an object before one without becoming aware of it. It can't succeed it since at the conclusion of sense-object contact the initial awareness occurs and there is no place for reflection prior to that. And reflection cannot be the same awareness as the initial one, since then there would be nothing to reflect on!

Furthermore, how can an initial awareness lead to perception of an object unless there is reflection? And how can the reflection occur at the same time as the initial awareness, since the latter occupies one time-point while the former lasts of innumerable times? You should consider this.

(Objection:) We know that perceptions can be fast or slow, so an initial awareness can likewise be so (i.e., faster or slower): thus a perception too (like reflection) can last for a while and thus have particular object as its content.

(Answer:) No, these are other types of judgment, called "perceptual" through secondary usage of the cause-effect type (i.e., where one refers to an effect by naming it after its cause, etc.), since no (real) particulars can be grasped by a (momentary) initial perception.

11 (E5; T40-41) Otherwise, perception can be divided into two sorts: certainly real (*naiścayika*) and practical (or commonsensical, *vyavahāra*). The former cognizes only general features, the latter cognizes particular contents since it breeds curiosity about a (real) thing's further properties. In this way the possibility of quicker and slower perceptions arises, making possible reflection without (further) perceptions, and thus the chain of further awarenesses becomes intelligible.

12 (E5; T41) Directed awareness is the pursuit of the specifics of what has been indistinctly cognized: it removes the differences and makes clearer the points of agreement, as e.g. "this must be sound since it is grasped through the ear", or these sounds must be those of a conch-shell, since they are so sweet". It is not doubt, since doubt comes in the form of the awareness of contradictory properties in an object, and (directed awareness), involving certainty, differs from that.

13 (E5; T41) Determinative awareness is ascertainment of an individual thing that has been cognized through directed awareness, for example "(so) this is only sound", or "(so) this is the sound of a conch-shell."

14 (E5; T41) That (determinative awareness) when it is firmly fixed is focused concentration. There are three kinds (of concentration): persistence (of awareness, *avicyuti*), memory (*smṛti*) and trace (*vāsanā*). Persistence is the non-cessation of

cognitive application to a single object. Memory is the recognition at a later time of that very cognitive application in the form of "that is the same thing (as before)". And a trace is the *saṃskāra* caused by a memory that has persisted. Thus there are (thus) four types of perception--indistinct plus these three (viz., directed, determinative and firmly fixed)--the number of types of perception is fixed as four.

15 (E5-6; T41-42) (Objection:) Since *apāya* etymologically means removing (*apanayana*) and *dhāraṇa* means firm fixing (*dhāraṇā*), perception is the removal of a thing's not being a particular existent object and fixed concentration is the ascertainment (*avadhāraṇa*) of that thing's being the particular existent object that it is.

(Answer:) No, for though perception comes sometimes from seeing difference from others, sometimes from a thing's having certain qualities, and sometimes from both, these are not varieties of perception; perception is just ascertainment, for otherwise the inclusion of memory (as a kind of determinative awareness) would be redundant and there would not be just the five kinds of perceptual awareness.

(Objection:) There is no distinct stage called "focused concentration", since once awareness has lapsed there is no perception at all.

(Answer:) What is concentration? It is not merely the persistence of an awareness. And it is not memory nor is it a memory-trace, since by the time of memory the sensory perception of the object has already ended--if not, mere remembering would count as a type of concentration. So all three (persistence, memory and trace) must be accepted as distinct from perception.

16 (E6; T42-43) (Objection:) The persistence of awareness and memory, since they cognize what has already been cognized, are not instruments of knowledge. As for "trace"--what is it? Is it the destruction-cum-subsidence of the knowledge-obscuring memory-*karman*, or is it the power to generate that (destruction-cum-subsidence), or is it merely thinking of the object? Not the first two, since they are not awarenesses at all, and not relevant here (where we are

discussing kinds of concentration, a kind of awareness). And it is not the third--a memory-trace--since a trace lasts for but a moment and cannot constitute concentration.

(Answer:) No. Traces are caused in various ways. Some are clearer than others. Moreover, one can remember what was previously uncognized (e.g., the sameness of the object cognized by a series of awarenesses may only be recognized later on). Now granted, a memory-trace is not an awareness itself, but since it generates the destruction-cum-subsidence of the knowledge-obscuring memory-*karman* it gets classed as a type of awareness.

17 (E6; T43-44) These (four types of) awarenesses--indistinct, etc.--do not occur in a different order, or in a series minus one or another of them. Sometimes, because of habituation or of subtlety, etc., only some of them are noticeable. Indeed, each (of the four) has several varieties, so that, e.g., one can easily generate 336 kinds of sensory awareness, and one can depending on one's concern fasten on any of them on a given occasion. (Examples of this are reviewed.)

18 (E7; T44-45) There are fourteen kinds of verbal awarenesses--as syllables (*akṣara*), as discursive (*saṃjñin*), right (*saṃyak*), with beginning (*sādi*), with end (*paryavasita*), involving repetitions (*gamikāṅgapraviṣṭabheda*), contained in the main scriptures (*sapratipakṣa*) and the opposites of those (seven).

Classification of syllables is in terms of script (*saṃjñā*), expressing (*vyañjana*) and accepting (*labdhi*). The first two are called "types of awareness" only figuratively. "Accepting" involves cognitive application of the senses and the mind, or it may involve the destruction-cum-subsidence of the veil (of verbal awareness). This last does not necessarily require instruction: even children and cows hear sounds, and even single-sensed animals hear indistinct sounds. The opposite of syllabic verbal awareness comprises, e.g., a sigh through which one discerns that the sigher is in pain, etc.

The awarenesses of those having minds is discursive; the opposite is non-discursive.

The contents of the main (*aṅga*) and subsidiary texts are right; (the contents of) ordinary (*laukika*) (texts) are false. But a person of right vision's false judgments constitute right awareness, whereas even right awareness in a man of perverted vision is wrong awareness.

"Having a beginning" and "beginningless" can be understood in various senses--e.g., people have beginnings, as do territories, ages, sounds and efforts. Likewise with respect to having an end or having no end.

"Repetitions" occur, e.g., in the fifth (now lost) limb of scripture; non-repetitive is, e.g., the *Kālikaśruta*. "The main scriptures" are those composed by the *gaṇadharas*; the other scriptures are composed by the elders (of the monasteries).

19 (E7-8; T46) Ultimate (perception) depends for its origination on the activity of the self alone. It is of three kinds: clairvoyance, telepathy and omniscience. Clairvoyant knowledge depends on the self alone and cognizes those kinds of contents that are substances having many colors and shapes. It is of six kinds: following (*anugami*), increasing (*vardhamāna*), extinguishing (*pratipāti*) and their respective opposites. Following clairvoyance is perception that follows (its content) to places other than its origin, analogously to the sunlight's spreading to the west from the east where it originated; likewise, this kind of perception, though originating at one place, makes a man aware of objects as he moves from place to place. Non-following clairvoyance illuminates things only where it is generated, as an astrologer answers only questions that are asked. Clairvoyance increases as one goes on from the place of initial awareness, as the fire that starts from a few twigs increases as it gains fuel. Decreasing clairvoyance is like the flame of a fire as its fuel is removed. Extinguishing clairvoyance, once born, dies completely like a wave in the ocean. Non-extinguishing clairvoyance persists up to death or knowledge, just as one's awareness of one's sex lasts as long as one remains a male.

20 (E8; T46-47) Telepathy is direct awareness of the mind alone; it grasps only what is directly cognized; it cognizes external objects only through inference from a thing's

impossibility otherwise. Telepathy has two kinds: straight awareness (*ṛjumati*) and crooked awareness (*vipulamati*). Straight awareness grasps the general (*sāmānya*). Here "the general" means things more particular than those known by crooked awareness; otherwise cognition of mere universals would constitute telepathy. Crooked awareness grasps particulars (*viśeṣa*). One knows by straight awareness that one is thinking of a jar, etc., while by crooked awareness one becomes aware of modes. Both these (types of awareness) are known as partial (*vikala*) since they grasp only parts of their objects.

21 (E8; T47) Omniscience directly grasps all substances with their modes. So it is called complete (*sakala*) perception. Its sole cause is the destruction of obstructions, so it has no varieties. Here the obstruction is just action (*karman*), because it is our awareness that is obstructed and if all things were not in the range of our awareness there would be absence of pervasion, and without obstructions failure to know them could not occur. When obstructions are destroyed by right vision, etc. that are opposed to *karman*, omniscience is attained.

22 (E8; T47) (Objection:) Knowledge arises in a mind that has grasped the qualities arising from yoga.

(Answer:) No. Even a purified mind cannot generate knowledge, any more than the five kinds of sensory awareness can.

23 (E8; T47-48) (Digambara:) A person who eats food cannot have knowledge.

(Answer:) No, for eating food is caused by hunger-creating *karman*, and an unpleasant feeling like hunger is not contradictory to knowledge, since it can only contradict destructive *karman*.

(Objection:) Destructive *karman* is like a burnt rope.

(Answer:) No, for then age-determining *karman* (a kind of destructive *karman*) would not be capable of producing a length of life. Furthermore, how could the Lord's (i.e., the Jina's) body exist without food?

(Objector:) Because of his infinite energy!

(Answer:) Then that should be true of ordinary folks as well; but that is not the case, as has been explained elsewhere.

260.712 YAŚOVIJAYA, *Jñānabindu*

Edited with five more of Yaśovijaya's works, in *Nyāyācārya-Śrī-Yaśovijaya-kṛta-Grantha-mālā*, Bhavnagar 1909, 1965. Also edited YJG 1908, and by Sukhlal Sanghvi, Dalsukh Malvania and H.K. Devi in two volumes, SingJS 8, 1938; 16, 1942 (PK3798.Y3 J62 1942 (Ch: V.2 only))

260.713 YAŚOVIJAYA, *Jñānārṇava*

It seems likely this is an alternative name for another of this author's works. But see Jainagranthavali p. 107; also JASBe 1910, p. 469.

260.714 YAŚOVIJAYA, *Gurutattvaviniścaya* or *-nirṇaya* with autocommentary

Published as Jaina Atmananda Sabha Series 73, Bhavnagar 1927. "Canonical work on principles of authority (*guru*) in Jaina tradition". (BL1375.G87.Y37), in two volumes (Bombay 1985-1987).)

260.715 YAŚOVIJAYA, *Vṛtti* on Śivaśarman's *Karmaprakṛti*

NCC 3, p. 202 says it is printed in Jaina Dharma Prasaraka Sabha, Bhavnagar 1917. Cf. JRK p. 71 for manuscript citations. 475 *ślokas*.

260.716 YAŚOVIJAYA, *Nayacakra*

NCC 9, p. 345 says "based on Mallavādin's work; composed in 1657 by Yaśovijaya Gaṇi of Tapā Gaccha." See Viśvatattvaprakāśa, Introduction, p. 102.

260.717 YAŚOVIJAYA, *Nayapradīpa*

Printed in the collection cited (Bhavnagar 1909, etc.) above. Also edited by Vijayanemi Suri with a commentary by (Vijaya)Lāvanya Sūri, Ahmedabad 1947, 1957 (B162.5.Y378). It is "a work in Sanskrit dealing with *saptabhaṅgī*...and the seven *nayas*", says Kapadia 18, p. 33.

260.718 YAŚOVIJAYA, *Nayarahasya*

Printed in the collection cited (Bhavnagar 1909, etc.), as well as edited by Lavanya Suri with the editor's *Pramoda*, Ahmedabad 1946. Also edited with Hindi explanation by Durganatha Jha, Bombay 1983. Also ed. with commentaries Ahmedabad 1983.

260.719 YAŚOVIJAYA, *Nayopadeśa* with *Nyāyāmṛtataraṅgiṇī*

Edited by Vijaya Lavanya Suri, Botad 1951-1952, 1985 (B162.5.Y37) two volumes and by Premavijaya, Bombay 1987 (BC25.Y375). It is also printed in the Bhavnagar collection cited under 711.

260.720 YAŚOVIJAYA, *Nyāyāloka*

This work has been edited. with Vijayanemi Sūri's *Tattvaprabhā*, by Udayavijaya Gaṇi, Ahmedabad 1918. See Visvatattvaprakasa Intro. p. 101. Also see IOPB p. 1807. S. C. Vidyabhusana summarizes the contents of this work as follows: soul, emancipation, inference, testimony, direct knowledge, indirect knowledge, validity of internal things, inherence, negation, ether, substance, etc. (HIL p. 219). Cf. JRK, p. 222. Edited from Dholaka 1997 (BC25.Y372).

Kapadia 18, p. 37 "In this work *Jñānārṇava* and *Syādvādarahasya* are referred to."

260.721 YAŚOVIJAYA, *Syādvādakalpalatā* on Haribhadra Sūri's *Śāstravārttasamuccaya*

Edited by Hargovinda Shah, Bombay 1914, and by Badrinath Shukla, Chaukhamba Prachyavidya Granthavali 7, Varanasi 1977.

260.722 YAŚOVIJAYA, *Bālabodha* or *Vivaraṇa* on Umāsvāti's *Tattvārthasūtra*

Edited Ahmedabad 1924, and by Vijayadarsana Suri, Bhavnagar 1955.

260.723 YAŚOVIJAYA, *Syādvādarahasya* on Hemacandra's *Vītarāgastotra*

Edited Ahmedabad 1975 (B162.5.Y37 or Y38). Also edited, in three volumes, from Dholaka in 1992 (B162.5.Y385.

260.724 YAŚOVIJAYA, *Vyākhyā* on Haribhadra Sūri's *Yogaviṃśaka*

Edited by Sukhlalaji Sanghvi. Agra 1922, reprinted (B132.Y6.P2745 1991). Also (BL1310.5.Y3715 1982); by Candraskhara Vijaya, Ahmedabad 1966 (BL1316.Y37.U5); by Jayaghosa Suri, Dholalka 1998 (B132.Y6 H316).

260.725 YAŚOVIJAYA, *Upadeśarahasya* and *Svopajñavṛtti*

NCC 2, p. 355 says this work is in 203 versions. It has been edited at least three times, e.g., Bombay/Ahmedabad 1982 (BL1319,5,Y37150 1872).

H. R. Kapadia (GOS 105, p. xxiii) says that this work is one in which "the essence of (the) entire (*Uvaesapaya*, i.e. *Upadeśapada* of Haribhadra Sūri) is beautifully and briefly set forth." (Since that work was left unsummarized in Volume Ten of this Encyclopedia we here provide Kapadia's description of it.) "It points out, by means of the ten well-known illustrations, the immense difficulty one experiences in securing a birth as a human being. This is followed by the topic viz. the study of the Jaina scriptures. Then we have a detailed exposition of the four types of intelligence and subsequently the treatment about the method of receiving and imparting religious instruction."

260.726 YAŚOVIJAYA, *Adhyātmopaniṣatprakaraṇa*

NCC 1, Revised Edition, p. 154 says this work in 209 verses has been edited in Jaina Dharma Pravaraka Sabha 13, Bhavnagar 1908. Y. S. Sastri, *Traverses on Less Trodden Path of Indian Philosophy and Religion*, LD Series 109, Ahmedabad 1991, pp. 65-74, provides the following summary.

Summary by Yajneshwar S. Shastri

"In the beginning of the first chapter, he explains the

correct meaning of the word "*adhyātma*". "*Adhyātma*" has two meanings. From the *evambhūta* point of view (which declares that a thing bears a particular name only while it performs action or *kriyā* which entitles it to bear that name, not always) it means all kinds of religious or moral activities of the individual *jīva*, which assists in the spiritual advancement of one's own *ātman* or self. Secondly, the *citta* or the *antaḥkaraṇa* which is purified by the practice of virtue in one's life, such as friendliness, compassion etc., is entitled to be called as *adhyātma* from the point of view of *vyavahāra* or *ṛjusūtra*. The first meaning is concerned with spiritual activities (*kriyā*), and the second is with internal purification (*bhāva*). But [the] real meaning of "*adhyātma*" is to be understood on the basis of *anekāntavāda* which is free from any kind of contradiction and reconciles different viewpoints. From [the] *anekānta* point of view "*adhyātma*" means combination of spiritual activities and purification of *citta* (i.e., *kriyā* and *bhāva*. (I.2-5)"

"Then he tells us that there are many things in the world which are beyond our sense organs and mere reason, which have to be understood with the help of scriptures (*āgama*) utilizing reasoning. To achieve the highest goal the knowledge of *sūtra* (authority) is essential. The scripture which is possessed of governing capacity and irreproachable power of protection is called real *śāstra*, and that *śāstra* is only the words of [the] Omniscient and not any other. (I.12) Because an untruth cannot come out of the mouth of passionless and desireless Jina, therefore one must have right faith in the words of [the] Omniscient. Unfaith in his words is nothing but exhibition of great ignorance. The right faith in his words is so powerful that it brings attainment of all kinds of perfections. In other word, the Highest State can be obtained by having firm faith in the words of *vītarāga*, which is also called an eternal state, permanent abode, and peaceful state. (I.15)"

"The question is, there are many systems (*śāstra*), [so] on what basis is only the Jina *śāsana* considered the real *śāstra*? Is it not narrow-mindedness to say that ours is the only right system? The answer of Yaśovijaya is that the statement, i.e., Jina *śāsana*, is the real *śāstra*, is not made on the basis of sectarian approach but based on the examination of purity and truthfulness of words of all the different kinds of systems (*śāstra*). Just as gold is tested by a touch-stone by rubbing, cutting and heating, similarly genuineness of *śāstra* is to be determined by *kaśa, cheda* and *tapa*. (I.17) Jina *śāsana* alone can get through this severe method of examination. In *kaśaśuddhi* we have to see whether prescribed injunctions and prohibitions for one and the same act is non-contradictory or not. If these are non-contradictory then it is real *śāstra*. For example, Jainism prescribes injunctions and prohibitions in the case of self-restraint (i.e., *saṃyama*). In this case the injunction is to observe carefulness in walking, speaking, taking food, keeping and receiving things and evacuating bowels, etc., and control of psycho-physical activities of mind, speech and body, which are known as *samitis* and *guptis* respectively. Prohibition is to avoid injury to all living beings, speaking untruth, stealing, acquisition and so on. Here injunctions and prohibitions are for the perfection of *saṃyama* and non-contradictory in nature. Through *Jina śāsana* the same method is followed, in other words *Jina śāsana* prescribes means of liberation, and obstacles on the path of liberation are prohibited. But this is not the case with other systems (*śāstra*) where *artha* and *kāma* are dominant factors and *mokṣa* is secondary. Secondly, in Jainism non-contradictory injunctions and prohibitions are prescribed to protect particular religious actions while in other systems injunctions are found contradictory. Statements like 'no living beings can be injured and injury done for sacrifice is not injury' make their nature very clear. Such types of *śāstra* cannot be purified by *cheda* method. All other *śāstras* uphold only one-sided views and *anekānta* alone reconciles different viewpoints giving (an) all-sided meaning of Reality. Thus, Jina *śāstra* which upholds *anekānta* alone is real *śāstra*. (I.18-32). According to it *ātman* is one from the point of view of substance and many from the point of view of modifications. To judge things from all sides, *anekānta* is the only alternative."

"*Anekāntavāda* is systematic reconciliation of different kinds of *nayas*. *Naya* is a partial viewpoint about reality. It

cannot give (a) complete picture of a thing. (I.33-34) It is right in its own way. But when only one aspect is taken to be real then it becomes fallacious, because reality has many aspects.(I.37) There is no contradiction involved and no violation of (the) law of contradiction in applying opposite predicates to the same thing in different capacities, because they are applied to its different aspects such as matter, state, space and time. It is seen that mutually contradictory elements can exist in one and the same thing in different capacity such as: the same man is a father to his son, son to his father, husband to his wife, and so on. (I.38)"

"In fact, positive and negative aspects must both belong to everything. If only the positive aspects belong to it there would be nothing to distinguish it from another and all things would become *sat*. If instead, only the negative aspects belong to a thing, it would have not intrinsic value. (I.54-59) So, production, destruction and permanence is the nature of reality and this many-sided characteristic of reality is the basis of *anekāntavāda*. (I.44 and see I.60)"

"Yaśovijaya beautifully describes how no system of Indian philosophy can reject *anekāntavāda*. (The) Sāṃkhya system cannot reject *anekāntavāda* because it upholds the view that mutually contradictory attributes can exist in one and the same thing by stating that *prakṛti* consists of *sattva, rajas* and *tamas*. *Anekāntavāda* is not unacceptable to a Vijñānavāda Buddhist because he claims that *vijñāna* is one but takes different forms. That means *vijñāna* is one and many. Again, Naiyāyikas cannot reject *anekāntavāda* because according to them though conglomeration of several mutually exclusive colors belong to a single substance (*citrarūpa*), and its knowledge is authentic, it is one and many. In other words, according to Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas *citrarūpas* can exist in one and the same substance. Prābhākara Mīmāṃsakas will not object because they hold that though knowledge is one still indirect knowledge is different from direct knowledge. Kumārila Bhaṭṭa, who claims that reality is both universal and particular, identity-cum-difference, upholds the *anekāntavāda*. Even Advaita Vedāntins cannot refute *anekānta* because for them

ātman is bound as well as unbound. From the phenomenal point of view *ātman* is bound and *ātman* is unbound, even free, from the transcendental point of view. The Vedas upholding the different meanings of *mantras* would not have any complaint against *anekāntavāda*. In this way, Yaśovijiaya tries to show (the) all-pervasiveness of [the] *anekānta* doctrine. (I.45-51) He mentions that materialists (*Cārvākas*) approval or disapproval of *anekānta* is not worth pondering because they are too ignorant about metaphysical problems. (I.52)"

"Yaśodeva points out that both absolute eternalism and absolute non-eternalism are untenable because of their one-sidedness. If *ātman* is exclusively eternal, the experience of happiness and misery will thereby be rendered impossible. Eternal (*nitya*) means unchangeable. Unless *ātman* could pass from one state to another, there cannot be experiences of happiness and misery, one after another. Even injury and non-injury, merit and demerit, etc. are not possible, if *ātman* is taken to be absolutely eternal. Similarly if *ātman* is absolutely non-eternal (*anitya*), then merits and demerits, bondage and liberation become meaningless. Absolute non-eternality means an end of the law of retribution which requires (the) personal identity of doer and enjoyer. So both these views suffer from one-sidedness and the truth is that *ātman* is neither absolutely real nor absolutely unreal or changing, but real as well as unreal, eternal as well as non-eternal. *Ātman* is eternal, never changing, from the point of view of substance and it is ever changing, non-eternal from the point of view of modifications. Viewed from the transcendental standpoint it is unchained but viewed from the phenomenal point of view it is chained. It is one from the standpoint of *ātmatva*, it is many from the point of view of *saṃsāra*. This is a proper approach to everything which gives (the) correct picture of reality. This approach is called *anekāntavāda*.(I.54-60) It has no special affection towards any single *naya*. Ignorant of this fact, many others criticize it as method of doubt and so on.(I.64) Really speaking, one who is (an) aspirant of liberation must have not only erudite scholarship of the Jaina *śāstra* but have firm faith in it. (I.70)."

"The second chapter deals with (the) importance of knowledge and (the) consequence of its practical aspect. Mere knowledge of *śāstra* cannot lead one to the highest goal. The main aim of *śāstra* is to give (a) clear idea about reality and to show the path to realize it. But on its own it does not bestow the realization of *ātman*. Realization is a result of practice of those principles taught by *śāstra*. (II.3-5) It is a matter of personal experience. This highest goal is achieved by thinking that everything is (the) play of matter like magical figures produced by (a) magician and meditating on qualities of *ātman*. The *muni* who, engrossed in knowledge of *ātman*, has tasted the ambrosia of knowledge of *ātman*, cannot have attachment towards worldly objects. (II.6-7) *Ātman* is self-luminous and realization of *ātman* is real happiness. To attain this highest happiness is in one's own hand. Running after worldly things means invitation to misery. Thus, realization of self-luminous *ātman* is a state of supreme happiness which cannot be described in words and cannot be compared with any mundane pleasure such as embracing a beloved or anointment of body with sandalwood."

"In describing the nature of *ātman* Yaśovijaya follows the Upaniṣadic path. He even quotes Upaniṣads. *Ātman* is pure consciousness and this characteristic demarcates *ātman* from other objects. *Ātman* is really indescribable, beyond thought and words and independent from all kinds of objects. This *ātman* is pure Brahman and it cannot be known through even thousands of arguments of *śāstra*. (II.8-13) It cannot be realized by direct, pure experience. This non-dual experience of Brahman cannot be gained either by scriptures, or mind or intellect. It is indescribable, undivided experience. It is the highest state, *turīyāvasthā*, which is beyond the states of waking, dreaming and deep sleep. Existence of *ātman* cannot be logically demonstrated but it is felt within. Realization of *ātman* is called *svasamaya* (transcendental state) and attachment towards worldly objects is *parasamaya*. (empirical state). (II.15-26)"

"*Ātman* is pure consciousness by nature, free from all kinds of blemishes. This so-called impurity is superimposed on *ātman* by karmic matter. When the conception of duality about *ātman* (such as pure and impure *ātman*) vanishes, then there remains nondual pure Brahman (II.40) Here our author speaks like [an] Advaitin by stating that Brahman is [the] highest universal in which all divisions born out of different viewpoints merge, like waves of [the] ocean produced by ghastly wind, which merge in [the] ocean ultimately. (II.41) This highest universal touches all the six substances on account of substantiality. But (from the) phenomenal point of view, particulars are accepted for practical purpose. (II.49) Finally, Yaśovijaya wants to say that (the) nature of *ātman* is Existence, Consciousness and Bliss. (II.43) It is not contradicted by any kind of reasoning because it transcends all reasoning. It is a matter of yogic perception. Just as a small girl cannot understand the pleasure derived from the husband, similarly the bliss which is produced by yogic method cannot be known by ordinary people. (II.47)."

"In this chapter itself Yaśovijaya tells (us) that, in the beginning, aspirants of liberation must follow self-restraint, celibacy, etc., when they become really competent then only the real nature of *ātman*, and everything is Brahman, etc., must be taught. To teach 'everything is Brahman' from the very beginning is dangerous because (the) incompetent cannot understand such higher-level thought and it may lead him to self-destruction. Thus (a) *guru* must be careful in imparting his knowledge. (II.48-52)"

"(The) third chapter is devoted to explaining the importance of action. Yaśovijaya sometimes speaks in terms of [the] *Bhagavadgītā*. He states that even after realization of [the] self, the realized person performs actions, but he is unaffected by those actions. He performs actions for the benefit of others. His actions are ideal for society. He who wants to achieve (the) highest goal must follow the religious and moral duties. Without action, without practice, just knowledge is futile. Without walking, just by standing in one place, no one can reach his destination. (III.13) So, without conduct, knowledge cannot lead us to reach our destination. Actions are to be

performed to develop spiritual qualities and to keep *saṃyama* steady. (III.12) Following the code of conduct only one attains [the] state of *sthitaprajña*. (III.3) Wrong knowledge is destroyed by the right knowledge and right action. So, both can be simultaneously pursued. There are some hypocrites in the world who claim that knowledge alone is enough to lead us to self-realization and action is not necessary. Really speaking they are neither *jñānins* nor men of action. Equal respect is to be shown to both knowledge and action.(III.13 and 37-42)."

"In the fourth chapter Yaśovijaya describes the state attained by the *yogin*. An aspirant of *mokṣa*, riding on the chariot of sameness along with knowledge and action reaches the transcendental state.(IV.1-2) It is a state of desirelessness and equanimity. He is unmoved by any kind of worldly attraction. This state itself is like the blissful ocean. In this state all kinds of illusion vanish. Reaching this state on enjoys only bliss, nothing else.(IV.5-6) To reach this state of sameness (*samatva*) one has to give up mine-ness (*mamatva*). In this state *ātman* shines in its pristine purity. In this state of permanent bliss, neither worldly pain nor pleasure exist.(IV.8-23). It is a real state of liberation. Yaśovijaya says that for common people it (*samatā*) is a means to achieve liberation but for (the) liberated it is (the) state of liberation itself."

260.727 YAŚOVIJAYA, *Jaina Nyāyakhaṇḍanakhādya*

Edited by Badrinath Shukla, Varanasi 1966. (PK2971.K38, i.e. KSS 170). NCC 10, p. 246 says it has also been printed from Ahmedabad, and invites us to consult Visvatattvaprakasa, Intro. p. 101. Bhargava (Intro. to his edition and translation of *Jaina Tarkabhāṣā*, op. cit., p. xix) says this work "deals with soul, emancipation, momentariness, origination, destruction, non-absolutism, class and individual, space and time, determinant concomitant and determinate concomitant, etc." Also edited (BC25.Y3715) from Ahmednagar 1964; and by Sukhlal Sanghvi, Ahmedabad 1938 (294.408.Si64), reprinted (BC25.1873).

260.728 YAŚOVIJAYA, *Vādasaṃgraha*

Published in (BC25.U38 1974) or (BC25.Y380).

260.729 YAŚOVIJAYA, *Vairāgyarati*

Edited by Muni Ramanikavijaya, Bombay 1969. (BL1378.6.Y37).

260.730 YAŚOVIJAYA, *Yogadīpikā* on Haribhadra Sūri's *Ṣoḍaśakaprakaraṇa/Ṭīkā*

Edited by Buddhisagara. DLJP 6, 1911 (Emeneau 4180). Cf. JRK pp. 405-406. Also (BJ1290.C56 Pindavada 1950a).

260.731 YAŚOVIJAYA, *Vādamālā*

Edited with Vallabha's *Hemalata* by Jayaghosa Suri. Dholaka 1992 (BC25.Y37915 1992).

260.732 YAŚOVIJAYA, *Vairāgyakalpalatā*

Edited by Vijayajnanendra Sūri in (BJ1290.Y38), Saurashtra 1987.

260.733 YAŚOVIJAYA, *Pratimāsthāpananyāya*

Edited in Muktikamala Jainamohanamala, Baroda 1920 (BL1378.6.Y365 1920).

260.734 YAŚOVIJAYA, Revision of Mānavijaya Gaṇi's *Dharmasaṃgraha(ṇī)*

NCC 9, pp. 269-270 says this is in three chapters, composed in 1681 by Mānavijaya Gaṇi, patronized by Vijayarāja of Vijayananda Sūri Gaccha and revised by Yaśovijaya. See Indian Antiquary 23, p. 179. It has been published at least twice: (1) Palitana 1905; (2) DLJP Fund Ser. 26, Bombay 1915. Ed. Municandra, Bombay 1984 in three volumes (BL1376.M36 1984).

260.735 YAŚOVIJAYA, *Adhyātmamataparīkṣā* and *Vṛtti* thereon

NCC I, Revised Edition p. 148 says: Śvetāmbara in 184 Prakrit verses and Commentary in Sanskrit, both by Yaśovijaya; on the controversy between the Digambara and Śvetāmbara sects. See JASBe 1910, 463 ff. NCC I, same page gives two publications of it: (1) in *Prakaraṇaratnākara* II, Bombay 1876 (summarized by Guerinot, AMG 22, 1906 as "controverse contre le Digambaras du point de vue śvetāmbaras, par Yaśovijaya en vers prakrits"), and containing Yaśovijaya's Gujarati commentary; (2) DLJP Fund Series 5 (with *Vṛtti*), 1911 (Emeneau 4008).

260.736 YAŚOVIJAYA, *Bālāvabodha* on the *Bhagavatīsūtra*

Wiles p. 65 cites BORI Cat. 17:3, 1849, and says it has been printed 1917-18. However, the citation is lacking in the section on details that follows.

260.737 YAŚOVIJAYA, *Bālāvabodha* on Abhayadeva Sūri's *Pañcanirgranthasaṃgrahaṇī*

Published in Jaina Atmananda Sabha, Bhavnagar 1917

260.738 YAŚOVIJAYA, *Aṣṭadṛṣṭisvādhyāya*

Velankar, JRK p. 18 locates a couple of manuscripts.

260.739 YAŚOVIJAYA, *Ārādhakavirādhakacaturbhaṅgīprakaraṇa/Svopajña*

Velankar (p. 31) says it is published in Jaina Atmananda Sabha Series No. 55, Bhavnagar 1916.

260.740 YAŚOVIJAYA, *Bhāṣārahasya* and *Kusumoda* thereon

A work on the theory of knowledge published by Bhuvanabhanu Suri from Dholaka in 2002 (BL1356.Y376 2002).

260.741 YAŚOVIJAYA, *Bālabodha* on Dharmaghoṣa Sūri's *Lokanālikā*

JRK p. 339 says this was composed in 1608 (!), gives manuscript citations.

260.742 YAŚOVIJAYA, *Yogadṛṣṭi*

This work is edited by Bhimasena Manaka in Volume One of *Prakaraṇaratnākara* (Bombay 1876-78), and is summarized by Guerinot in AMG 22, 1906, p. 148 where it is said to be an "exposè de huit thèories à la meditation in vers hindi" (?).

260.743 YAŚOVIJAYA, *Dikpaṭa Caurāsī Bol Pratyukti*

This work, in Hindi, consists of a refutation of the points made by Hemarāj Paṇḍe in his *Caurasī Bol* above, #251.688. Padmanabh S. Jaini (in the article that provided the summary of that work above) says: "I give below a list of the items found in Upādhyāya Yaśovijayajī's [*Dikpaṭa*] *Caurāsī Bol* [*Pratyukti*] based on the headings appearing in the *Gūrjara Sāhitya Saṅgraha*, Vol. 1, pp. 572-597. (Numbers at the end refer to verses.)

Summary by Padmanabh S. Jaini

Introductory verses give an account of the origin of the Digambara sect in Vīra-nirvāṇa *saṃvat* 609, as narrated in the story of a *muni* called Sādhasamalla, a disciple of *ācārya* Kṛṣṇa. (1-17)

1. The [Śvetāmbara] list of the eighteen defects (*doṣa*) that are not found in a *kevalin* differs from that of the Digambaras. (18-19)
2. The *kevalin* does not eat food by morsel (*kevali-bhukti*). (20-23)
3. The Tīrthaṅkara's body has the same seven components (*sapta-dhātus*) as any other human being. (20-23)
4. The *kevalin* is subject to eleven kinds of hardships (*parīṣahas*). (24-33)
5. The *kevalin*'s speech consists of articulated words. (34)
6. All *śalākā-puruṣas* have *nihāra*. (35-37)
7. Human beings may go outside the boundary of the Mānuṣottara Mountain. (38-39)
8. Cakravartin Bharata attained *kevalajñāna* while still

in the state of a householder. (40-42)

9. *Mokṣa* is possible even of those possessing non-Jain mendicant insignia (*avyaliṅga-mukti*). (43)

10. It is possible for a woman, for example Malli-kumārī, to attain *mokṣa* (*strīmukti*). (44-47)

11. Even after becoming a *kevalin*, Bāhubali greeted respectfully (*vinaya*) Jina Ṛṣabha. (48)

12. Tīrthaṅkara's do indeed give gifts of wealth for an entire year prior to their renunciation. (48)

13. Kapila, a *kevalin*, danced [in order to convert five hundred thieves to the holy path of mendicancy as narrated in his story, and hence there is no fault in it]. (48)

14. Malli and Nemi were the only two Jinas who did not marry. (49)

15. Draupadī did marry all of the five Pāṇḍava brothers. (50)

16. A *muni* should collect alms by going from house to house (and not take his meal standing in one house as is the custom among the Digambaras). (50)

17. It is proper to worship an image of a Jina with items such as musk (*kastūrī*), etc. (51)

18. A naked image of a Jina is not auspicious; it is proper to worship an image of a Jina with ornaments. (52-53)

19. A Jina's nudity is not visible to anyone as Indra places an *ambara* (a piece of cloth) on his shoulder. (54)

20. The *gaṇadhara* Gautama did honor a *parivrājaka*, a mendicant of a non-Jaina order, for the sake of *dharma*. (55)

21. It is proper to make a *sthāpanā* of a Jaina monk (*guru*) in his absence similar to the image of a Jina. (56-57)

22. Śatruñjaya is a holy place (*tīrtha*). [This item is missing in the Digambara list.] (58)

23. A Jain monk may give initiation (*dīkṣā*) and even preach a sermon (both of which are auspicious activities) while still maintaining the *śuddha-upayoga*. (59-63)

24. Vasudeva (father of Kṛṣṇa) had seventy-two thousand wives (i.e., more than a *cakravartin*. This is similar to Bāhubali being stronger than Bharata). (64-65)

25. Jamāli was the son-in-law of Jina Mahāvīra and he

did start a wrong view (*kumata*, i.e., a *nihnava*). (66)

26. A disciple of Caṇḍarudrācārya attained *kevalajñāna* (while he was carrying his sick teacher on his shoulders). (67)

27. The *vyavahāra nyāya* is as important as the *niścaya naya*. (68-76)

28. The *dravyārthika* and the *paryāyārthika nayas* are equally important. (77-87)

29. Time (*kāla*) is not a *dravya*. (88-92)

30. Mahāvīra shook Mount Meru (with his toe) at the time of his *janmakalyāṇaka*. (93-94)

31. The *gaṇadhara* of Jina Munisuvrata was not a horse, contrary to what the Digambaras have alleged. (The true story is that a horse, a friend of the Jina in a former life, at the time of his death received the teachings from him. He was reborn in heaven, and he established an image of that Jina at Bhṛgukaccha. That place came to be called Aśvāvabodha. (95-102)

32. The *pañca namaskāra mantra* consists of sixt-eight syllables. [This item is not found in the Digambara list.] (103-107)

33. The Tīrthaṅkara teaches in Ardhamāgadhī. (108-109)

34. In the heavens the gods worship the jawbone of the Tīrthaṅkaras. (110)

35. One can attain *mokṣa* even if born in low families. (111-114)

36. There was the transfer of the embryo of Mahāvīra. (115)

37. The transfer of embryo does not result in Mahāvīra having two fathers. (116-121)

38. Bāhubali having attained *kevalajñāna* performed circumambulation (*pradakṣiṇā*) to the Jina Ṛṣabha, a proper thing to do. (122-123)

39. Mahāvīra sneezed. (124)

40. The bringing of the *yugaliyas* to Mathurā from Harivarṣa to establish the Harivaṃśa is a form of *acherā*. Such things do happen once in a while in the infinite time cycle. (125-129)

41. Camara arrived in the heavenly abode called Saudharma. (130)

42. Mahāvīra did wander in the non-aryan regions. (131)

43. Gods may have sexual relations with human females. (131)

44. The first preaching of Mahāvīra took place soon after his attaining *kevalajñāna*–and not after a silence of sixty-six days as believed by the Digambaras. (132-136)

45. The mother of a Tīrthaṅkara witnesses only fourteen drams–not sixteen as believed by the Digambaras. (137)

46. The thirty-four *atiśayas* of a Tīrthaṅkara are correct as they are listed by the Śvetāmbaras. (The Digambaras are wrong in including "absence of hunger" as an *atiśaya*. (138)

47. There is nothing wrong with taking water stored in a leather bag. (139)

48. It is not improper for a monk to receive food prepared from ghee that has been stored in a leather bag. (139)

49. Marudevī and Nābhi were twin brother and sister from whom Jina Ṛṣabha was born. There is nothing improper in this considering the time when it took place. (140-141).

50. It is proper for a *sāḍhu* to keep *pātras* for collecting food and water, clothes, and other requisites (*upakaraṇa*). (142-155)

51. The Jaina Āgamas are indeed still in existence (a fact disputed by the Digambaras). (156-157)

Hemarāj Pāṇḍe has composed Eighty-four Points (Caurāsī Bol). Accordingly, we also have refuted them in this spoken language (*bhāṣā*). There are in the words of Digambaras a hundred more faults, but why waste time on them? (158-159)

A learned person has faith in that which is truthful, while a fool delights in falsehood. But if he were to trust only the true words and keep the company of saints, he would surely ejjoy unbroken happiness. Thus says the Vācaka (i.e., Upādhyāya) Jasa (i.e., Yaśovijaya). (160-161)

261 MĀNAVIJAYA GAṆI (1688)

JRK p. 207 calls him Mānavijaya Gaṇi, pupil of

Śāntivijaya Gaṇi of the Tapā Gaccha.

261.744 MĀNAVIJAYA GAṆI, *Dharmasaṃgraha(ṇī)*

Emeneau 4122 says "revised by Yaśovijaya", published in DLJP 26, Bombay 1915, 1984.

261.745 MĀNAVIJAYA GAṆI, *Kumatiśikhāmātrasvādhyāya*

NCC 4, p. 200 cites Chani 3926 (with commentary) and refers us to JRK, p. 92a.

261.746 MĀNAVIJAYA GAṆI, *Bālāvabodha* on the *Uttarādhyayanasūtra*

Wiles, p. 166 dates this work at 1684 and directs us to the Prastavana p. 6, item 34 of BL1313.9.U776332.

261.747 MĀNAVIJAYA GAṆI, *Āgamaprarūpaṇasvādhyāya*

Velankar, JRK p. 21, cites one manuscript.

261.748 MĀNAVIJAYA GAṆI, *Avacūri* on a *Navatattvaprakaraṇa*

JRK p. 207 says "It was composed during the reign of Vijayānanda Sūri and is in old Gujarati", and cites manuscripts.

262 JÑĀNAVIMALA SŪRI (1688?)

NCC 7, p. 337 identifies this author as a "pupil of Nayavimala", and says he wrote a work titled *Śrīpālacaritra* in *saṃvat* 1745, which would equal 1688 A.D. In NCC 9, p. 349 several works are assigned to a "Nayavimala", with the remark that in those citations the author's "name is confused with that of his disciple Jñānavimala". However, one of the works thus cited is independently said to have been "composed in 1458(?)". We shall tentatively assign the two works cited on p. 349 to the present (later) Jñānavimala and for the moment ignore the dating of the first work, but the reader is forewarned that this whole entry is likely entirely misguided! Wiles gives the name of one of his pupils as "Dhīravimala of the Tapā Gaccha". However, JRK pp. 274-275 has it the other way

around, that Dhīravimala was the teacher of Nayavimala, who was a teacher of Jñānavimala Sūri.

262.749 JÑĀNAVIMALA, *Bhāṣyatraya* on the *Āvaśyakasūtras*

NCC 9, p. 349 says "composed in 1458(?) and cites JBhP I, 1986.

262.750 JÑĀNAVIMALA, *Vṛtti* or *Ṭīkā* on the *Praśnavyākaraṇasūtra*

NCC 9, p. 349 cites Jainagranthavali p. 6. Wiles, p. 96 says it has been published from Ahmedabad in 1938 as Muktivimala Jaina Granthamala 7.

262.751 JÑĀNAVIMALA, *Naravṛddhāṣṭāntopanaya*

NCC 9, p. 355 says "Printed Dayāvimala Granth, Ahmedabad 1916.

262.752 JÑĀNAVIMALA, *Bhāṣya-Ṭīkā* on the *Caityavandanāsūtra*

Manuscripts are cited at JRK p. 126. According to JRK p. 297 this is a commentary "in vernacular" on the three commentaries (on the *Caityavandana, Guruvandana* and *Pratyākhyāna-sūtras*) composed by Devendra Sūri. There is a manuscript of it dated *saṃvat* 1754 (=1697 A.D.).

262.753 JÑĀNAVIMALA, *Ṭīkā* on the *Pratyākhyānasūtra* (portion of the *Āvaśyakasūtra*)

JRK p. 263 cites a manuscript.

263 LAKṢMĪ GAṆI or LAKṢMĪVALLABHA (1688)

Wiles, p. 164, says he is a pupil of Lakṣmīkīrti Gaṇi of the Kharatara Gaccha (Kṣemaśākhā).

263.754 LAKṢMĪ GAṆI, *(Artha)Dīpikā* on the *Uttarādhyāyanasūtra*

A work in 15,000 *ślokas*, composed in 1688. It is printed Calcutta 1879 (Emeneau 3959); by Hiralal Hamsaraja,

Jamnagar 1935-39 (BL1313.9.U776434); by Muni Bhagyesavijaya, Ahmedabad 1984 or 1985 (BL1313.U77). Cf. JRK p. 44 for more citations.

264.755 AMṚTASĀGARA GAṆI (1689), *Bālāvabodha* on Dharmasāgaragaṇi's *Sarvajñaśataka*

The author was a pupil of Śānti Sāgara of the Tapā Gaccha. The work is printed at Kapadavanja 1967/8 as Agamoddharakagranthamalaya 36 (BL1351.2.D460).

265 JINAVARDHANA SŪRI (1690)

See *Jainism in Rājasthan*, p. 157

265.756 JINAVARDHANA SŪRI, *Sūktimuktāvalī*

Written at Udaipur in 1682 A.D.

266 LĀVAṆYAVIJAYA (1690)

NCC 9, p. 183 says he composed the work below in 1687 A.D., and that he was a pupil of Bhānuvijaya.

266.757 LĀVAṆYAVIJAYA, *Dravyasaptatikā* or *Dravyasattarī* and commentary thereon

NCC 9, pp. 183-184 says it is in Prakrit and is printed with Sanskrit commentary and Gujarati translation, Jaina Dharma Prasaraka Sabha, Bhavnagar 1901. (This is Emeneau's #4012.) Also edited Patan 1939 and Ahmedabad 1995.

267.758 DHARMAMANDIRA (1693), *Makaranda* on the *Uttarādhyāyanasūtra*

Cf. JRK, p. 44.

268 JAYAVIJAYA MUNI (1693)

The date given follows to Wiles, 209. JRK p. 339 calls

the author of the *Lokanālikā-Stabaka* "Jayavijaya, pupil of Vimalaharṣa", who we assume is the same person.

268.759 JAYAVIJAYA MUNI, *Bālāvabodha* on the *Pratikramaṇasūtra*

Wiles, p. 209 indicates an edition in Gujarati is published Ahmedabad 1977 (BL1313.9.A835 J3).

268.760 JAYAVIJAYA MUNI, *Stabaka* on Dharmaghoṣa's *Lokanālikā*

Cf. JRK p. 339.

269 ḌAḌḌHĀ (1700)

NCC 11, p. 59, says "Son of Śrīpāla".

269.761 ḌAḌḌHĀ, *Pañcasaṃgraha*

NCC 11, p. 59 says "in prose and verse...composed probably in 1700 A.D."

270 DHANAVIMALA (1700)

Wiles, p. 114 says he "composed before...1710".

270.762 DHANAVIMALA, *Bālāvabodha* on the *Prajñāpanāsūtra*

Wiles p. 114 cites JRK p. 258; also refers us to Malvania (Jaina Agama Series; granthanka 9, bhaga 1-2), Bombay 1969-71, volume 2, pp. 432-433.

271.763 MĀṆIKYA GAṆI (1703), *Sūtravyākhyānavidhiśataka*

This author was the pupil of Labdhi Gaṇi who in turn was the pupil of Dharma Sāgara Gaṇi. Cf. JRK p. 451.

272 YAŚASVAT SĀGARA (1700)

Johrapurkar, p. 102, says he was of Tapā Gaccha, and a pupil of Yaśa Sāgara. He lists a number of works by Yaśasvat Sāgara of which we select those below: it is not clear whether the others are philosophical works. Velankar calls him "pupil of Yaśaḥ Sāgara of the Tapā Gaccha"; cf. JRK p. 159. Kapadia 18, pp. 11-12 says "Y, pupil of Yaśaḥ Sāgara and a devotee of Kalyāṇa Sāgara, Cāritra Sāgara and Vidyāprabhu Sūri of the Tapā Gaccha".

More recently, S.A. Upadhyaya, in the Introduction to his edition of the *Syadvadamuktāvalī*, Bombay 1968, p. 3, says YaśasvatSāgara was of the Śvetāmbara sect and a resident of Gujarat, Cāritra Sāgara was his teacher, as well as Yaśaḥ Sāgara. He belonged to the Sāgara *śikhā* of the Tapā Gaccha. "The dates of his works indicate that the period of his literary activities extended from *vīrasaṃvat* 1721 to *vīrasaṃvat* 1782 (i.e., from 1665 to 1706 A.D.). For some time he must have lived at Samudayapura and Saṃgrāmapura during the reign of Jayasiṃha." (p. 7)

Upadhyaya lists the titles of some 15 works by Yaśāsvat Sāgara, including works on Jyotiṣa and "horoscopy" as well as philosophy.

272.764 YAŚASVAT SĀGARA, *Jainaviśeṣatarka* or *Syādvādamuktāvali*

NCC 7, p. 305 says this work is "in three *stabakas*". It has been edited by S. A. Upadhyaya in Bharatiya Vidya 25.3-4, pp. 50-74; reprinted Bharatiya Vidya Series 26, Bombay 1969. Johrapurkar gives the date it was written as *saṃvat* 1759 (=1703).

S.A. Upadhyaya, in his Introduction to his edition of this work cited above, p. 10, provides the following analysis of its contents:

First Stabaka

Stanza No.	Topic
1	*Maṅgala*
2	Enumeration of six *padārthas*

3-9 *sāmānya* and *viśeṣa*
10-23 *syādvāda*
24 Obeisance to Cāritra Sāgara
25 Author's own introduction

Second Stabaka

1-2 *jīva*
3-5 *jñānapramāṇa*
6 *yathārthyajñāna*
7-9 *samāropa* (or *apramānājñāna*) *viparyāya, saṃśaya*
10-13 Kinds of *kāraṇas*
14-15 *pratyakṣapramāṇa (sāṃvyavahārika; avagraha, īhā, avāya, sudhāraṇā)*
16-17 *avadhijñāna*
18 *manaḥparyāyajñāna*
19-20 *kevalajñāna*
21-23 *arhat*
24 Obeisance to Cāritra Sāgara
25 Author's own Introduction

Third Stabaka

1-2 *parokṣajñāna* and its five kinds
3-4 *smaraṇa*
5-6 *pratyabhijñāna*
7-8 *tarka*
9 *anvaya, vyatireka*
10 *vyāpti, parāmarśa*
11-12 *anumāna*
13-17 *hetu*
18-20 *dṛṣṭānta: sādharmya, vaidharmya*
21-23 *upanaya, nigamana*
24 Obeisance to Cārit Sāgara
25 Author's own introduction

272.765 YAŚASVAT SĀGARA, *Jainasaptapadārthī*

Johrapurkar, p. 103 says it was written in 1700,

Upadhyaya says 1701, and that it is "an introductory text-book in Nyāya". (Upadhyaya, ibid., p. 5). Edited by Himamsuvijaya, Ujjain 1934. "According to the colophon of the manuscript printed as footnote no. 1 on p. 31 of the printed edition, the title of the work is *Saptapadārthī*, and the work was composed in *vīrasaṃvat* 1758 at Samudayapura during the reign of Jayasiṃha." (ibid., p. 5)

272.766 YAŚASVAT SĀGARA, *Pramāṇapadārtha*

Johrapurkar, p. 103 says it was written in 1694, but Vadekar, JRK p. 269, says 1701, cites one manuscript. According to Kapadia 18, the title is *Pramāṇavādārtha;* under that title the work is listed by S.A. Upadhyaya, who says "composed in *vīrasaṃvat* 1759 (1703 A.D.)", and it was also composed at the same period as the previously-cited #764.

272.767 YAŚASVAT SĀGARA, *(Jaina)Tarkabhāṣā*

Composed in 1702, says JRK p. 159, which gives a manuscript citation. S.A. Upadhyaya says it is "a work on Logic, composed in *vīrasaṃvat* 1759 (1703 A.D.)." (ibid., p. 5)

272.768 YAŚASVAT SĀGARA, *Vicārasattrimśikā*

Kapadia, pp. 11-12, followed by S.A. Upadhyaya, p. 6, (cited above) says this was composed in *vikrama* 1721.

272.769 YAŚASVAT SĀGARA, *(Śrī Jaina) Syādvādamuktāvalī*

According to Upadhyaya this is a different work from #763 above. It was edited by Buddhisagara, Ahmedabad 1908 (BC25.Y36 1908). Upadhyaya discusses the odd fact that two different works seem to bear precisely the same title. The present text, unlike #769, "contains four chapters of 89, 77, 37 and 44 stanzas respectively. These four chapters deal with *pratyakṣa, parokṣa, prameya* and *sannayanirnāya* respectively.

272.772 YAŚASVAT SĀGARA, *Śabdārthasambandha*

Written in *vikram saṃvat* 1758, says Kapadia, pp. 11-12, which is 1702 A.D.

273.771 MEGHAVIJAYA (1653-1704), *Yuktiprabodha* with a *Svopajñavṛtti*

This author is fully treated on pp. 159-162 of P.S. Jaini's *Gender and Salvation* (op. cit.), from which, with the permission of Prof. Jaini, we quote:

"The *strīmokṣa* topic occupies nearly fifty of the total two hundred and twenty pages (pp. 76-125). The work is also known by another title, *Vārāṇasīya-Digambaramata-khaṇḍana*, that is, a refutation of the Digambara views held by the followers of Pandit Banārasīdās (1586-1644). In the concluding portion of this work Meghavijaya...gives a brief account of the reasons that led him to undertake this polemic against the Digambaras. Banārasīdās was a Śvetāmbara Jaina layman whose family had traditionally been devotees of Meghavijaya's spiritual lineage, which was called Tapā Gaccha. He came under the influence of the works of the Digambara *ācārya* Kundakunda through his friends residing in the city of Agra. He abandoned his faith and became a propagator of Kundakunda's teachings contained in the *Samayasāra*...Meghavijaya set out not only to correct what he termed the 'one-sided' (*ekānta*) view of Kundakunda on the nature of the soul but also to demonstrate the fallacious character of the Digambara views on as many as eighty-six doctrinal points, of which *strīmokṣa* was the most debated topic. This explains the choice of his title, *Yuktiprabodha* (Teaching Through Arguments), and a reason for presenting it as a 'drama' (*nāṭaka*; e.g., the entry of the Digambara in #1). The victorious hero represents, of course, the Jaina Teaching as propounded by the Śvetāmbara order, and the villains are the 'misguided' Digambaras, both old and new.

"In his lengthy exposition of the Śvetāmbara position on *strīmokṣa*, which is fundamentally identical with that of the Yāpanīyas, Meghavijaya matches almost all the rival arguments put forth by Prabhācandra and Jayasena. Prabhācandra, his main target, is referred to twice by name, and his twin works, the *Prameyakamalamārtaṇḍa* and the *Nyāyakumudacandra*, are alluded to as the forked tongue of the deadly Digambara snake...Prabhācandra had responded vigorously to the major issues of the debate initiated by the Yāpanīya author Śākaṭāyana against the Digambara position on *strīmokṣa*. However, he had also chosen, quite deliberately it would seem, not to re-examine, in light of the Yāpanīya criticism, the traditional Digambara interpretation of the term '*manuṣyinī*' (a 'woman' in its secondary meaning as a man). The Śvetāmbara successors to the Yāpanīyas–notably the twelfth-century Ratnaprabha (who mentions Prabhācandra in his *Ratnākarāvatārikā*), the fifteenth-century Guṇaratna, and the seventeenth-century logician Yaśovijaya, who examines several of Prabhācandra's '*prayogas*' in his *Śāstravartasamuccayavṛtti* and his *Adhyātmamata-parīkṣā*–had concentrated more on Digambara formal arguments than on the validity of that school's interpretation of the term '*manuṣyinī*'. Meghavijaya takes up this unfinished task in earnest and devotes a major portion of his work to prove that the Digambara interpretation contradicted their own position on the doctrine of *karman* and *guṇasthāna*, as explained in the authoritative work, the *Gommaṭasāra*, of the eleventh-century Nemicandra. The opening portion of the *strīmokṣa* section of the *Yuktiprabodha-Svopajñavṛtti* is thus replete with a large number of lengthy quotations and charts (of the *guṇasthāna* scheme) from the *Gommaṭasāra* and its commentary. He then makes an inventory of all the known Digambara arguments (fifteen in all) and sets out to refute them one by one. These are of course reformulations of the same counter-arguments, albeit presented with additional details, that had appeared earlier in the works of Śākaṭāyana and Guṇaratna."

"Meghavijaya's presentation of the Digambara view of *strīmokṣa* is masterly. He cannot be accused of misrepresenting the opponent's view, although occasionally he does employ worldly observations (of non-Digambara origin), especially on the fickleness of women and so forth, to strengthen the *pūrvapakṣa*. He not only reproduces Kundakunda's verses

describing the impurity of a woman's body, but furnishes further details, found only in the Jaina scripture, on the millions of beings (with two or three senses) that inhabit the birth canal or on the millions of sperm that are destroyed in a single act of coitus. He even makes a suggestion–not ventured even by the Digambaras–that the menstrual flow is not merely a biological function but is directly connected with a woman's libido, comparable to the seminal discharge of a man."

"Meghavijaya is also uniquely informative on the Jaina position regarding the hermaphrodite (*napuṃsaka*), who is introduced into this debate as an example (*udāharaṇa*) since such a person shares the same disability the Digambaras attribute to a woman in attaining *mokṣa*. The Śvetāmbaras cannot reject this example, for they too believe that a hermaphrodite does not qualify to be a mendicant. But Meghavijaya takes the opportunity to point out that this disability is not so much due to the physical gender of the hermaphrodite as to the insatiability of his libido, and hence he argues that this case is quite dissimilar to that of a woman whose libido is comparable to that of a man. He also excludes from this category those who are not congenitally hermaphrodites (e.g., the eunuchs), as well as those who may be born with deformed bodies (*huṇḍa*), and allows them entry into the Jaina mendicancy, a privilege denied by the Digambara sect, thus de-emphasizing the physical requirements for attaining *mokṣa*. His refutations of formal arguments are precise and methodical, but he is selective in choosing to respond to the opponent's suggestion on a variety of points highly relevant to the debate. He is silent, for example, on the Digambara argument of concomitance based on the relationship of the indicated and indicator (*gamyagamyakasaṁbandha*). He also fails to examine Prabhācandra's observations that a woman is incapable of overcoming shame (*lajjā*), and thus sexual desire, and hence is unfit for mendicancy. At the same time he has no hesitation in defending the Śvetāmbara practice of worshiping their female Tīrthaṅkara Malli's image in a male form on the grounds that showing her breasts would be against the code of decency."

"Meghavijaya may finally be credited for offering a new formal argument (*prayoga*) for *strīmokṣa* based on the ability of a woman to undertake the vows of the eleven *pratimās*. It is quite significant that his discussion concludes with the statement that "clothing and other requisites of monks are not possessions". The Yāpanīya *ācārya* Śākaṭāyana sought only to establish the mendicant status of women against the Digambara claim that they cannot progress beyond the stage of 'advanced laywomen'.

274.772 VIDYĀ SĀGARA (1724), *Bālāvabodha* on Devendra Sūri's *Siddhapañcāśaka*

Cf. JRK p. 437.

275.773 JĪVAVIJAYA (1727), *Bālāvabodha* on the *Prajñāpanasūtras*

Jīvavijaya was a pupil of Jñānavijaya of the Tapā Gaccha, wrote this work in 1727, according to JRK p. 258.

275.774 JĪVAVIJAYA, *Stabaka* on Devendrasūri's *Karmagrantha*

Cf. JRK p. 70.

276 DEVACANDRA (YATIPATI) (1738)

NCC 9, p. 102: "Pupil of Pāṭhaka Dīpacandra of Kharatara Gaccha." He composed the *Vicārasāra* in 1738 A. D. Kapadia 18, pp. 20-21 says "Devacandra–pupil of Pāṭhaka Dīpacandra, pupil of Jñānadharma, pupil of Pāṭhaka Rājasāra."

276.775 DEVACANDRA (YATIPATI), *Jñānamañjarīṭīkā* on Yaśovijaya's *Jñānasāra*

Edited by Lalitavijaya Muni. Bombay 1914.

276.776 DEVACANDRA (YATIPATI), *Nayacakra* and *Bālāvabodha* thereon

Edited by Bhimasinha Manaka in *Prakaraṇaratnākara* I (Bombay 1903), pp. 169-237, says NCC 9, p. 345. Cf. JRK p.

203 for manuscript citations. Guerinot, AMG 22, 1906, p. 147, says it is "sur l'existence et non-existence".

276.777 DEVACANDRA (YATIPATI), *Vicārasāra/Ṭīkā*
NCC 9, p. 102; JRK p. 353.

276.778 DEVACANDRA (YATIPATI), *Āgamasāroddhāra*
Kapadia 18, pp. 207-208: "A composition in vernacular called 'prākṛta'" by the author. It deals with substance, etc...The work composed in *saṃvat* 1776. It has been printed several times: (1) in *Prakaraṇaratnākara* Volume I (Bombay 1876-78); (2) in *Jinakāvyasārasaṃgraha* 102, Ahmedabad 1882; (3) in *Jainaśāstrakathāsaṃgraha*, Ahmedabad 1884; (4) by Premchand Dalsukhbhai, Padra, 1928, 1934.

277.779 RATNALĀBHA (1740), *Ṭīkā* on a *Navapadaprakaraṇa*
Cf. JRK p. 207.

278.780 MATIRATNA SŪRI (1747), *Stavaka* on a *Navaratnaprakaraṇa*
Consult CatPun 3573 for manuscript citations.

279.781 DEVENDRAKĪRTI (1750), Commentary on Amṛtacandra's *Samayasārātmakhyāti*
Cf. CatPun 3551 for location of a manuscript.

279.782 DEVENDRAKĪRTI
Kevalacandāyaṇoddyotana
NCC 5, p. 50 says "See Jaina Siddhanta Bhaskara. XIII.1.p. 35. (May not be philosophy.)

280.783 HAṂSARĀJA (1750), Commentary on Harṣavardhana's *Adhyātmabindu*

NCC I, Revised Edition p. 148 says JBhP I. 57, 88; Hpr IV. 9.

280.784 HAṂSARĀJA, Commentary on Nemicandra's *Dravyasaṃgraha*
Cf. CatPun 3551 for a manuscript citation; also JRK p. 182.

280.785 HAṂSARĀJA, *Ātmajñānaśikṣāviṣayaśata*
NCC 2, p. 46 cites BORI 686 of 1899-1915.

281 HARṢA VARDHANA GAṆI (1750)
NCC I, Revised Edition, p. 148 says he was a Śvetāmbara.

281.786 HARṢA VARDHANA GAṆI, *Bālāvabodha* on a *Navatattvaprakaraṇa*
NCC 9, p. 393; JRK p. 207.

281.787 HARṢA VARDHANA GAṆI, *Adhyātmabindu* and Commentary thereon
NCC 1, Revised Edition p. 148 .

282.788 RĀMACANDRA (1750), Commentary on Nemicandra's *Dravyasaṃgraha*
NCC 9, p. 183 cites JASBe 1908, p. 420b (no. 6640).

283 VIBUDHAVIMALA (or VIJAYAVIMALA (1756)
Velankar, JRK p. 52, makes him a pupil of Vimalakīrti of the Tapā Gaccha.

283.789 VIBUDHAVIMALA (1756), *Samyaktvaparīkṣā/Bālāvabodha*
According to JRK p. 425 (this?)Vibudhavimala was a pupil of Kīrtivimala of the Tapā Gaccha. The work is in 180

stanzas, and is published in the DLJP Series No. 28, Bombay 1915.

283.790 VIBUDHAVIMALA, *Upadeśaśataka*

Velankar, ibid., says it is published in DLJP Fund Series No. 28, Bombay 1915; lists manuscript locations.

284 RĀMAVIJAYA GAṆI (1760)

NCC 6, p. or 50 says "of Kharatara Gaccha, pupil of Dayāsiṃha".

284.791 RĀMAVIJAYA GAṆI, *Guṇamālā(prakaraṇa)*/Commentary

H.D. Velankar, JRK p. 105, tells us it was composed in *saṃvat* 1817 by Rāmavijaya Gaṇi, pupil of Dayāsiṃha, during the spiritual reign of Jinalābha of the Kharatara Gaccha. It describes the *guṇas* of the *pañcaparameṣṭhins* i.e. *arhant, siddha ācārya, upādhyāya* and *sādhu*. Hence it is sometimes called *Pañcaparameṣṭhiguṇaratnamālā*." Edited with Gujarati translation. Jaina Atmananda Sabha, Bhavnagar 1922. JRK p. 105 adds further manuscript citations.

"Guṇamālā is a Jaina work on the moral qualities and intellectual attainments, necessary for the *ācārya*, the *upādhyāya*, the *sādhu*, the *parameṣṭi* and the *śrāvaka*. It gives also stories in illustration and enumerates things which are to be discarded...The accompanying commentary" of Rāmavijaya "is an exhaustive one. In the course of explaining the 33rd *guṇa*, namely an intimate knowledge of all the Jaina and the other *samayas*, it fully notices all the different systems of philosophy notably that of the Bauddhas. It places Saṃkhya among the systems which recognize God as a *tattva*, and mentions Bṛhaspati as first propounder of a godless system of philosophy."[1]

284.792 RĀMAVIJAYA GAṆI (?), *Vivaraṇa* on Dharmadāsa Gaṇi's *Upadeśamālā*

The author of this work is listed at NCC 2, p. 351 as "Rāmavijaya, pupil of Sumativijaya", who may or may not be the same author as the one who wrote the previously-cited work. In any case manuscripts cited include: BORI 773 of 1895-1902; BORI D. XVIII . 250; L. 3283; Jainagranthavali p. 171; Weber 2004 (fr.). Velankar, JRK p. 50, says it was composed in *saṃvat* 1781 (1727 A.D.).

285 ṬODARAMALA (1767)

From an article by L.C. Jain and R.K. Trivedi, "Ṭoḍaramala of Jaipur (A Jaina Philosopher-Mathematician)", Indian Journal of the History of Science 22 (4), 1987, pp. 359-360, we glean the following about this author: "Ṭodaramala was born in 1720 A.D. and is said to have spent most of his life at Jaipur. He migrated to Siṅghānā in his later life. He was a government servant and died possibly in Kārttika white 24, *vikrama saṃvat* 1823, c. 1767 A.D. His father was Jogīdāsa and mother Rambhādevī. He belonged to the Godikā family of the Khaṇḍelavāla community of the Digambara Jain sect. He was married and had two sons, Haricanda and Gumānīrāma. He was a great critic and a socio-religious reformer."

Wiley pp. 220-221: "Ṭodarmal, Paṇḍit (flourished first half of the 18th century). Digambara lay teacher and leader of the Digambara Terāpanthī sectarian tradition. Born in Jaipur into a Khaṇḍalvāl family who were followers of the Digambara Terāpanth, he was a learned scholar who knew Sanskrit, Prakrit, and probably also Kannada. He frequently lectured at the Divān Badhīcandjī Sāh temple, the most important Terāpanthī temple in Jaipur. Through his lectures and his writing, he established the intellectual foundation for the Terāpanthī tradition. He wrote Hindi commentaries on a number of important Digambara philosophical works, including Guṇabhadra's *Ātmānuśāsana* and Nemicandra's *Gommaṭasāra, Labdhisāra, Kṣapanasāra,* and *Trilokasāra*. Ṭoḍarmal wrote [the] first of his independent works, the *Rahasyapūrṇa Ciṭṭhī* ("Spiritual Letter"), in 1754. In it, he answers questions that had been posed by some members of the Adhyātma movement and discusses the nature of the soul (*jīva*) in each of the 14 stages of spiritual purity (*guṇasthāna*).

At the time of his death, Toḍarmal was writing his most famous work, the *Mokṣamārgaprakāśaka*, in which he discusses the concept of wrong faith (*mithyātva*). This includes following Hindu, Muslim, or Śvetāmbara Jain traditions, and the worship of non-liberated deities, such as *kṣetrapālas* and *yakṣas/yakṣīs*. He also criticizes those who follow "false *gurus*," or the *bhaṭṭārakas*. This work is the most influential text of the Terāpanthī tradition and is very popular among Digambaras today.

After his death in the mid-18th century, his younger son Gumānīrām became a leader of the Terāpanthī community. In the 1770s, he established a stricter set of ritual rules for his followers, who became known as the Gumān Panth, although they prefer to be called the Śuddha Terāpanth Āmnāya ("The Pure Terāpanth Tradition"). "

285.793 ṬOḌARAMALA, *Saṃyakjñānacandrikā* on Nemicandra Siddhāntacakravartin's *Gomatasāra*

Summary by L.C. Jain and R.K. Trivedi

This summary is taken from the article cited in the previous paragraph, pp. 362-363. The text is published by G. L. Jain and S. L. Jain, Calcutta 1919, along with the following two works by the same author. There is also an edition by Yasapala Jain in Prakrit and Rajasthani from Sri Kundakunda Kahana Digambara Jaina Tirtha Suraksha Trasta, Jaipur 1989 (B162.5.N4531650 1989) in three volumes.

"(T)his commentary is divided into two portions. The first part consists of description which is without symbols. The second, known as the *Artha-Saṃdṛṣṭi Adhikāra*, is in about 308 printed pages, which consists of mathematical explanatory details through symbolism."

"Ṭoḍaramala starts by introducing the meaning of *arthasaṃdṛṣṭi*. The measure etc. of arbitrary fluents (*dravyas*), quarters (*kṣetras*), times (*kālas*), and phases (*bhāvas*) is called *artha*. *Saṃdṛṣṭi* means symbolism. Thus the chapter is on

symbolism and its manipulation of various types of measures or gauges (*artha*) is called *artha-saṃyagdṛṣṭi* (gauge-symbolism). Then he explains various kinds of symbols for numbers from conventional or universal (*laukika*) measure."

"The description of notations from post-universal (*lokottara*) measures (*pramāṇa*) appears next in the forms of number (*saṃkhyā*) and simile (*upamā*) measures. Herein, the use is made of various types of numerical (*āṅkika*), algebraic (*bījīya*) and figurative (*ākārātmaka*) symbols..."

"Details of operations, basic and logarithmic (*śalākā, ganana*), etc., elaborate the treatment of many types of sets. In all these types of operations the place of putting the sets and operators (*rāśis* and *karaṇas*) is decisive at various places and in various operations. Position value in case of subtraction in a series of factors plays an interesting role and reminds us of the application of zero in the place value notation."

"For description of karmic life-time (*sthiti*), various types of geometrical notations, triangular, linear, square, qudrilateral, and rectangular, have been depicted. Thus Ṭodaramala comes to the end of the introduction to symbolism, preliminary in character. After this follows the explanatory details of various complicated calculations with sets through numerical and algebraic symbols. The chapter on the measures based on numerous characteristic properties, controls (*guṇa*), and events (*paryāya*) of the sets of souls. It finishes through set theoretic treatment."

"The chapter on the theory of functional (*karman*) is begun by Ṭodaramala with details of *karman* spaces, that is, sets with mathematical structures in relation to *karman*, and of various systems defined on them. A few additional symbols may be found here explained by him. The manipulation here is more involved than that of the previous chapter as the karmic structure involves inputs (*āsrava*), outputs (*bhaṅga, saṃvara, nirjarā*) and state-transition (*satva-saṅkramaṇa*), etc. of karmic fluents (*dravyas*) with calculated energy-levels (*anubhāga, aṃśa*), life-time (*sthiti*), configuration (*prakṛti*) and mass number of particles (*pradeśa*). Ten types of conditions (*avasthā*)

in the description of bond (*bandha*) are explained."

"Then Ṭoḍaramala gives an account of distribution of particles in different configurations (*prakṛti*) without details of the dynamical system, let alone the rules of karmic operations. Although the set theoretic calculations and operations are precise and preliminary here, the foundations are deeper and require a probe through modern mathematical tools. The process of karmic annihilations (*kṣaya*) is also difficult to understand mathematically. Ṭoḍaramala has given details of mathematical steps left by his predecessors through his own efforts. This gives an easy access to earlier commentaries which are full of mathematical results depicted through symbols at several difficult contexts."

285.794 ṬOḌARAMALA, *Arthasaṃdṛṣṭi* on Nemicandra Saiddhāntika's *Labdhisāra* and *Kṣapaṇāsāra*

G.L. Jain and R.K. Trivedi, ibid., pp. 363-364 provide the following summary. The text is printed; cf. under the previous work. One may also consult L.C. Jain, "Elements of operational details in the *Labdhisāra* (sketched by Ṭoḍaramala)", Jaina Antiquary 36.1, 1983, pp. 21-32.

Summary by G. L. Jain and R. K. Trivedi

"At the outset Ṭoḍaramala describes the form of notations relating to the *Labdhisāra* and the *Kṣapāṇasāra* as per traditional convention correcting the scribe's mistakes. He is as precise as possible and entrusts the responsibility of future research and corrections to the learned posterity. He admits that he could not make out certain portions which should be made clear from the original commentary, and hence he leaves such portions unattended..."

"Here the knowledge of the previous *arthasaṃdṛṣṭi* is essential, with a few more additions. There are some common and certain uncommon notations in this chapter as compared with those in the former. The figurative forms of the symbols are in abundance here. A matrix column with particles as instant effective-bond (*samaya-prabaddha*) represents inflow

(*āsrava*) every instant (*samaya*). The elements or cells of the column matrix are called nisusus (*niṣeka*). It is a fundamental system-variable-matrix expression. In a certain position it denotes the variable number of karmic particles with a certain variable life-time, a certain energy-level (*anubhāga-aṃśa*) and a wave-phase denoting a characteristic configurational nature of a functional-type (*karma-prakṛti*). The problem of matrix-mechanics appears to be manipulated with the help of the tetrad of the configuration (*prakṛti*), particle-set (*pradeśa-rāśi*), life-time (*sthiti*) and energy (*anubhāga*), each of which is associated with the karmic fluents (*dravya*). These equations of motion are given in the geometrical symbolism. The forms are exposed in three steps, in accordance with the particles in output-trail (*udayāvalī*), geometric-progression (*guṇaśreṇī*), and upper-life-time (*uparitana-sthiti*), as different positions of the column-matrix."

"Before going into details of this geometric-symbolism, one may like to go through the detailed introduction of the *Labdhisāra* by Ṭoḍaramala. In this there are thirty pages containing description of the *karman* theory which has a modern set-up of automation, controls, optimization, and realization. This is given through numerical representation. He first introduces the ten kinds of conditions of the bonds of *karman*. These are known as operators (*karaṇa*). Then he relates the four types of karmic bond (*karma-bandha*), and details of instant-effective-bond (*samaya-prabaddha*). The variations of volition (*yoga*) effects the quantity of inflow (*āsrava*), as well as transition in state (*sattva*). Variations in affections (*kaṣāya*) effects the life-time (*sthiti*) and the energy-levels (*anubhāgan aṃśa*) while binding the karmic particles in (the) form of nisusus (*niṣeka*) placed in the *karman*-matrix. The dynamical configuration (*prakṛti*) is also effected by volition (*yoga*) so that transition in the layers of different sub-configurations follow for a particular bound configuration. Thus Ṭoḍaramala tries to sketch the involved structure of the nisusus of the *karman*-fluents (*karmadravya*)."

After this the theory of state (*sattva*) of dynamical

configuration (*prakṛti*), particle-number (*pradeśa*), life-time (*sthiti*), and energy-levels (*anubhāva-aṃśa*) in relation to functionals (*karmans*) is explained. Analogous description of the output in the form of bond (*bandha*), impedance (*saṃvara*), and disintegration (*nirjarā*) corresponding to *karman* is interesting. Various operational details follow the former."

"Then Ṭoḍaramala describes the process of annihilation or eradication (*kṣapaṇā*) in the *artha-saṃdṛṣṭi* of the *Kṣapaṇāsāra*, corresponding to the bond (*bandha*) and state (*tattva*) through the attainments (*labdhi*) of serene vision (*saṃyak-darśana*) and character (*cāritra*) is similarly described mathematically, in relation to the earlier mentioned tetrad. The brief description rendered by Ṭoḍaramala is easy to understand. After outlining the definitions, the process of eradications is given. The terminology introduced in the beginning is extremely useful. It gives a survey of all possible mathematical techniques applied by his predecessor, excepting a few operations. First, a survey of all types of life-time-structure (*sthiti-racanā*) is given. Then an elaboration of (the) division of karmic-particles (*karma-pradeśa*) is given with respect to quantity and intensity. Further specification in special circumstances of the states of existence (*sattva*) of *karman* due to inputs, outputs, completes the description."

285.795 ṬOḌARAMALA, *Bhāṣāvacanikā* on Nemicandra Saiddhāntika's *Trilokasāra*

Ths following remarks by way of summary are to be found on p. 365 of the above-cited article by L.C. Jain and R.K. Trivedi. The text is printed in the edition of the *Trilokasāra* edited by M.L. Shastri, Bombay 1918, pp. 1-22.

Summarized by L.C. Jain and R.K. Trivedi

"This work follows the commentary of Mādhavacandra Traividya and is in Sanskrit. Ṭoḍaramala wrote the *Bhāṣāvacanikā* in Dhūṇḍhārī. An appendix containing introduction to its mathematics appears in it. First, he describes the eight fundamental operations (*parikarmāṣṭaka*): *saṃkalana*, *vyavakalana*, *guṇakāra*, *bhāgahara*, *varga*, *vargamūla*, *ghana*, and *ghanamūla*. The method of finding the cube-root deserves attention. He also deals with fractions, the rule of three sets (*trairāśika*), treatment of progressions (*śreḍhī-vyavahāra*), and mensuration. He mentions the term *alaukika-gaṇita* (non-universal mathematics) in this appendix and gives certain symbols relevant to it. This is in twenty-two pages of the printed text..."

285.796 ṬOḌARAMALA, *Mokṣamārgaprakāśaka*

Published, with a commentary by Maganalala Jaina, by Hukamacanda Bharilla from Sonagarha in 1978 as Bhagavanasri Kundakunda=Kahana Jainasastramala Pushpa 99 (BL1375.S3 T62).

286.797 MĀYĀCANDRA (1769), *Jñānakriyā(saṃ)vāda*

Cf. JRK p. 147, who gives the author's date as *saṃvat* 1817. Velankar at BBRAS 1930, #1607, calls the work "a small dissertation discussing the relative importance of Jñāna and Kriyā, composed by Mayācandra, in *saṃvat* 1808."

287 JINALĀBHA SŪRI (1780)

NCC 7, p. 265 says his *dīkṣā* name Lakṣmīlābha; grand-preceptor of Kṣamākalyāṇa, author *Jīvavicāra-Subodhinī*; pupil of Jinabhakti Sūri, pupil of Jinasaukhya Sūri of Kharatara Gaccha (See Peterson IV. Index of authors, p. xli).

287.798 JINALĀBHA SŪRI, *Ātma(pra)bodha*

NCC 7, p. 265 (preceded by Peterson IV, p. xl) says this was written in *saṃvat* 1833 (=1777). It has been published at least twice by Hiralal Hamsaraj, in 1904 and in 1909.

According to Peterson IV, 1894, p. xl, Jinalabha was "born *saṃvat* 1784; died *saṃvat* 1834. In *saṃvat* 1819 he made a pilgrimage with 756 *sadhus* to a unnamed shrine of Gaṇḍī-Pārśveśa (Pārśvanāth); in *saṃvat* 1821 he conducted a similar

company of 85 *sādhus* to Mt. Abu".

Kapadia 18, p. 230 says: "Spiritual advice in Sanskrit. The main points discussed here refer to *saṃyaktva* (right faith), *deśaviratā* (partial cessation from sinful activities), *sarvavirata* (monkhood) *and paramātmasvarūpa* (nature of supreme being), and for each of these there is one *prakāśa*."

288 VIJAYALAKṢMI SŪRI (1787)

NCC 2, p. 348 says: "pupil of Vijayasaubhagya Sūri. JRK p. 48 adds that Vijayasaubhagyasūri was of the Ānandasūri-śākhā of the Tapā Gaccha."

288.799 VIJAYALAKṢMI SŪRI, *Upadeśaprasāda/Svopajñavṛtti*

It is edited with the auto-commentary in four volumes including a Gujarati *Ṭabbā* from Jaina Dharma Prasaraka Sabha, Bhavnagar, Bombay 1914-23. The work is in Sanskrit and consists of 24 chapters called 'pillars'. It was composed in *saṃvat* 1843"

Kapadia 18, p. 341: "Spiritual advice with Sanskrit elucidation and Gujarati explanation. This work starts with the enumeration of the twelve *vratas* governing the life of a *śrāvaka* endowed with *saṃyaktva*." It has at least 24 *stambhas* (pillars).

289.800 JYOTIRVIJAYA (1788), *Tattvāmṛta*

JRK p. 153 says the author was a pupil of Padmavijaya Gaṇi, gives the date of composition and cites a couple of manuscripts.

290 HAṂSAVIJAYA (1793)

NCC I, p. 240 and JRK p. 12 say he is a "disciple of Vijayānanda (Sūri)".

290.801 HAṂSAVIJAYA, *Anyoktimuktāvalī*

NCC I, Revised Edition, p. 240 says this was written in 1793 A.D. and that it is edited in *Kāvyamālā*, Nirnayasagara Press, Volume (or number?) 88, Bombay 1907. Velankar, JRK p. 12, says it contains "640 Sanskrit *ślokas*", and cites several manuscript locations.

291 KṢAMĀKALYĀṆA GAṆI (1800)

NCC 5, p. 147 says: of the Kharatara Gaccha; pupil of Amṛtadharma and grandpupil of Jinalābha Sūri (see BORI. D XIX. ii. 512); lived in the latter part of the 18th Cent. Works of his are cited as having been written in various years between 1772 and 1803. He also wrote a commentary on Annambhaṭṭa's *Tarkasaṃgrahadīpikā*.

291.802 KṢAMĀKALYĀṆA GAṆI, *Subodhinī* on Śāntisūri's *Jīvavicāra*

NCC 5, p. 147 says this was written in 1794 A.D. and cites Velankar 1930, #1622 (III), gives beginning and end. NCC 7, p. 295, however, says it was "written at Bikaner in 1793 A.D." See *Jainism in Rajasthan* p. 158. More manuscript citations in JRK p. 142. It is edited in *Prasthānatrayī*, op. cit. (B162.5.P740 1989).

291.803 KṢAMAKALYĀṆA GAṆI, *Vṛtti* on the *Gautamapṛcchā*

NCC 6, 230 cites "BORI 569 if 1895-98; Peters[on] VI. p. 114 (No. 569)". JRK p. 112 cites manuscripts dated *saṃvat* 1858 (1801 A.D.).

291.804 KṢAMAKALYĀNA GAṆI, *Praśnottarasāndhaśataka/Ṭīkā*

NCC 13, p. 116 says this is a "reply to 150 disputed points composed in 1792 A.D." It has been printed by N. S. Press, Bombay 1916. Cf. also JRK pp.. 277-278.

291.805 KṢAMAKALYĀṆA GAṆI, *Akṣayatṛtīyavyākhyāna*

Cf. JRK, p. 1.

291.806 KṢAMAKALYĀṆA GAṆI, *Ālāpapaddhati*
JRK p. 34 lists a manuscript at Surat.

291.807 KṢAMAKALYĀṆA GAṆI, *Caityavandanacaturviṃśikā/Svopajñavṛtti*
Edited in Gujarati by Vijayasusila Suri, Botad, Saurashtra 1965.

291.808 KṢAMAKALYĀṆA GAṆI, *Paramasamayasāravicārasaṃgraha*
Manuscript cited at JRK p. 236.

291.809 KṢAMAKALYĀṆA GAṆI, *Sūktaratnāvalī/Vṛtti*
JRK p. 448 says it was composed in *saṃvat* 1847, i.e., 1790 A.D.

291.810 KṢAMAKALYĀṆA GAṆI, *Vicāraśatikabījaka*
JRK p. 351.

291 PARAMĀNANDA (1819)
Wiles, p. 114 calls him "pupil of Ānandacandra", says he "composed (the work below in) 1819."

292.811 PARAMĀNANDA, *Stabaka* on the *Prajñāpanāsūtra*
It is printed in the publication of the *sūtra* with several commentaries from Benares in 1884.

292.812 PARAMĀNANDA, *Ṭīkā* on Dharmadāsa Gaṇi's *Upadeśamālā*
The ascription to this Paramānanda is a guess--cf. JRK p. 50 for a manuscript citation.

293 BHOJA (SĀGARA) (KAVI) (1820)
NCC 9, p. 184 gives his name as Bhoja Sāgara, pupil of Vinīta Sāgara, and says he composed his work in the 18th century. Consult M. D. Desai in Jaina Sahitya no Itihasa (Bombay 2944, p. 959).

293.813 BHOJA (KAVI), *Dravyaguṇayogatarkaṇā* and *Ṭīkā*
Published at least twice, at least once with the commentary by Thakur Prasad Sarma in RJSM 6, 8, Bombay 1905 (PK5013.B6.D8 1906); reprinted as RJSM 17, Agasa 1977 (B162.5.B540 1977). JRK pp. 182-183 adds that it is in 15 chapters, and that it was composed during the spiritual reign of Dayāvijaya of the Tapā Gaccha (*saṃvat* 1785 to 1809, i.e. 1727 to 1752 A.D.). JRK p. 183 gives manuscript citations.

294.814 UMEDACANDRA (1827), *Praśnottaraśataka*
Umedacandra was a pupil of Kṣamākalyāṇa of the Kharatara Gaccha, for whom see above. JRK p. 277.

295.815 DĪPAVIJAYA (1829), *Praśnottarasamuccaya*
Cf. JRK p. 277.

296 DEVACANDRA (1833)
NCC 2, p. 15 says he composed a work in A. D. 1833.

297.816 KASTURĀCANDRA (1842), *Ṭīkā* on Abhayadeva Sūri's *Jñātādharmakathāsūtra*
This author and his date are provided in JRK p. 167, with manuscript citations.

298 (ABHINAVA) CĀRUKĪRTI (PAṆḌITĀCĀRYA) (1845)
NCC 11, p. 235 gives his dates as 1790-1860, and says he was "of Elaṅkāḍu, near Wandiwash." H. R. Rangaswamy Iyengar provides the following account of the author: "Cārukīrti Paṇḍitācārya...was a native of Elankādu, a village near Sātamaṅgala in the Wandiwash taluk of the Madras Presidency. He was a Jaiṅa Brahmin, familiarly known as Jinnayya. He completed his study of Vyākaraṇa and Sāhitya in his village under distinguished pandits and sojourned to Sravanabelgola,

the seat of Jain learning in Mysore, for higher studies. He sat at the feet of the then Jaina Guru of the Mutt, Kambayya Swami, and studied several texts of Jaina religion. He seems to have thought that he could not get complete mastery over these texts without a thorough study of logic. He evinced a great desire for the study of Nyāya. Just about that time, one Brahmasūripaṇḍit of Mysore, who wielded great influence in the court of the then Maharaja of Mysore, Sri Krishnaraja Wodeyar III, came to Sravanabelgola to have a *darśan* of the Swamiji of the Mutt. Attracted by the personality and scholarship of Jinnayya, who was studying under the Swamiji, Brahmasūripaṇḍit asked Jinnayya to go to Mysore. Jinnayya agreed to go there, if special arrangements could be made for studying Tarkaśāstra. Brahmasūripaṇḍit agreed and brought Jinnayya to Mysore and arranged for his studies in higher logic. A few years passed and the Swamiji of the Mutt at Sravanabelgola breathed his last. Brahmasūripaṇḍit found Jinnayya, who had by that time gained proficiency in several branches of Sanskrit learning, to be the fittest person to succeed to the Vādi of the Mutt. He, therefore, got him elected and with the permission of the Maharaja installed him as the head of the Mutt at Sravanabelgola. Jinnayya was thereafter known as Abhinava Cārukīrti Paṇḍitācārya. He is known to have lived between 1790 and 1860 A.D." (*Prameyaratnālaṅkara of Abhinava Cārukīrti Paṇḍitācārya*, edited by A. Shantiraja Sastri, University of Mysore Oriental Research Institute Publications; Sanskrit Series No. 88, Mysore 1948, p. iv)

298.817 (ABHINAVA) CĀRUKĪRTI, *Prameyaratnālaṃkāra* on Māṇikyanandin's *Parīkṣāmukha* and *Arthaprakāśikā* thereon

The sole edition of this work is cited in the previous paragraph. Prof. Shantiraja Shastri there goes on to describe the work, as follows (pp. iv-viii).

"The work is divided into six sections, each section being devoted to the exposition of a single topic. They are known as *paricchedas* as in the work of Prabhācandra, while they are called *samuddeśas* in the *Parikṣāmukhasūtra* and its *ṭīkā* by

Anantavirya. The book opens with an inquiry into the nature of *pramāṇa* or valid knowledge. This inquiry is not for the satisfaction of intellectual curiosity but, as with the other systems of Indian philosophy, for the attainment of the *summum bonum*. It is by *pramāṇa* that one knows the true nature of reality and it is true knowledge that dispels our ignorance and leads us to the attainment of the highest objective in life. An inquiry into the nature of *pramāṇas* is absolutely necessary if we are to succeed in life and our actions to bear successful results.

Then what is *pramāṇa*? It has been defined differently by each system or *darśana*. After reviewing and refuting the definitions of Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika, Mīmāṃsā, Sāṃkhya, Bauddha and Vedānta schools, the author states the Jaina view that *pramāṇa* is the definite knowledge of a thing not already known. It is self-luminous, and like a lamp, it illumines itself as well as the objects presented to it. Its validity is intrinsic. It does not need the help of anything external to prove its validity. It is not a mere presentation, a hazy notion of a thing free from mental construction, but *savikalpaka*, *vyavasāyātmaka* or determinate. It is the definite knowledge of a thing as "this" and *not* as "that". This *pramāṇa*, which is knowledge, gives rise to or generates another piece of knowledge which is *pramā*. It is *pramājanakam pramāṇam* and not *pramākaraṇam pramāṇam*. It is not, therefore, right to conceive *pramāṇa* either as the operative cause (*karaṇa*) or the sum total of all causes (*kārakasākalya*), or the senses (*indriya*) of the contact (*sannikarṣa*) of the senses with the object, or the modification of the senses (*indriyavṛtti*) or the mental act of the perceiver (*jñātṛvyāpāra*). The object of this knowledge is not the universal or the particular, but uni-particular (*sāmānyaviśeṣātmaka*). This has been established in the fourth chapter, after refuting the views advocated by other systems."

"In the second chapter, the several views prevalent in Indian philosophical systems about the number of *pramāṇas* are discussed. While according to Cārvākas *pratyakṣa* is the only *pramāṇa*, the Buddhists recognize two *pramāṇas*, *pratyakṣa* and

anumāna; the Rāmānujīyas accept three: *pratyakṣa, anumaṇa* and *āgama*, the Naiyāyikas four: *pratyakṣa, anumaṇa, āgama* and *upamāna;* the Prābhākaras five, adding *arthāpatti* to the list, the Bhāṭṭas six, adding *anupalabdhi*, and the Paurāṇikas eight, adding *aitihya* and *sambhava*. But, according to Jainas, *pramāṇas* are two: *pratyakṣa* and *parokṣa*. All the *pramāṇas* other than *pratyakṣa* are brought under *parokṣa*."

"What is *pratyakṣa*? It is that knowledge which is *viśāda*, vivid or clear, i.e., immediate and direct, never depending on any other form of knowledge. It is of two kinds: *mukha* or primary and *sāṃvyavahārika* or practical. The former is completely independent of the senses and the mind, while the latter is conditioned by them. This practical knowledge is further divided into knowledge derived by the senses (*indriyajanya*) and knowledge derived by the mind (*manojanya*). The sense-knowledge is further sub-divided into four as *avagraha, īhā, avāya* and *dhāraṇā*, which probably form the four grades or degrees of definiteness of knowledge. *Avagraha* is indistinct apprehension, i.e., grasping of things as they are in themselves. *Īhā* is the desire to know more particularly and definitely of an object. *Avāya* is the determination, by means of reflection, of the nature of the object perceived with regard to its perfection and imperfection, merit and defect. *Dhāraṇā* is the final cognition of the object as it is and forming a definite notion of it in the mind. The supersensual knowledge or *atīndriyajñāna* is what is known as primary and is experienced by the omniscient soul or *sarvajña*."

"The third chapter is devoted to the study of *parokṣa*. Knowledge which is not *pratyakṣa* is *parokṣa*. *Smṛti* or memory, *pratyabhijñā* or recognition, *tarka* or knowledge of universal relation or invariable concomitance, *anumāna* or inference, *āgama* or scriptural testimony, are *parokṣa*. While several schools of Indian philosophy do not accept *smṛti* as a *pramāṇa*, the Jains maintain that memory should be regarded as valid as any other kind of knowledge. It is not merely a revival of the impressions of the past experience of a thing, but it is the knowledge of a previously experienced object as past. It is 'an

assertion of the past as past'. *Pratyabhijñā* or recognition is a kind of valid knowledge. It is a complex cognition. It is not pure perception or pure memory. It is conditioned by both perception and memory and yet it is a new kind of knowledge which cannot be resolved into them. It is the ascertainment of an object by means of perception through recollection. Devadatta, now before us, is he whom we recognize to have seen before by recollection. The *gavaya* that we now see is like the cow we have seen before. This knowledge takes such forms as 'this is the same', 'this is like that', 'this is different from that', 'this is the counterpart of that,' etc. What the Naiyāyikas called *upamāna* is, according to Jains, a form of recognition. Hence comparison is not considered by Jains as a separate *pramāṇa*."

"*Tarka* or *ūha* is the knowledge of *vyāpti* or pervasion based on the presence or absence of one thing in relation to another and takes the form: if this is, that is; if this is not, that is not. It is a universal relation either of co-existence (*sahabhāva*) or of succession (*kramabhāva*). This universal relation of co-existence is found between a certain substance and its attributes, or between a certain color and a certain taste, or between the *śiṃśapā* and the tree. The relation of succession is found between day and night, sunset and the appearance of stars, the river in flood and the rainfall, the cause and its effect."

"*Anumaṇa* or inference is the knowledge of the major term by means of the *sādhana* or reason. That is considered to be true reason which is invariably connected with the *sādhya*. Then follows the definition of *sādhya, pakṣa*, the division of inference into *svārtha* and *parārtha*, the description of the five parts of a proof formula, the division of *hetu* into *bhāvasādhaka* and *abhāvasādhaka*. Every one of them is explained in detail with suitable examples."

"Lastly, *āgama* is the knowledge which is derived from the words of an *āpta* or a reliable person who is dispassionate and always speaks the truth. It is secular or *laukika* when the word come from an ordinary reliable person and *śāstraja* when it proceeds from a liberated self, an omniscient perfect finite self."

"Having explained the true nature of the various *pramāṇas* accepted by the school, the author goes on to describe the end and aim of knowledge. It is completely practical. This knowledge is needed to attain the *summum bonum.* It dispels the darkness of ignorance in us and gives us true light to get what we consider as desirable, to reject what we consider as undesirable (*ahita*) or to assume an attitude of indifference (*upekṣā*). The soul becomes freed from its burden of *karman* and gets elevated."

"The last chapter deals with the enumeration of *pramāṇābhāsas* or fallacies with suitable illustrations as well as with the nayas or methods of comprehending things as possessing only one aspect while, according to Jains, objects possess more than one aspect (*anekānta*)..."

298.818 CĀRUKĪRTI, *Saptabhāṣāgītamañjarī*

Not clear if this by the (previous Abhinava-)Cārukīrti. NCC 7, p. 24 cites Sravanabelgola 86(b).

299.819 VĀCAKA SAṂYAMA (1857), *Syādvādapuṣpakālikā*

JRK p. 457 says this author was of the Kharatara Gaccha, gives the date and manuscript citations.

300.820 HARASUNDARA TARKARATNA (1876), *Upadeśaśataka*

NCC 2, p. 355 says it is printed at Mimensingh 1876, and to see IOPB 1897, p. 19.

301 NĀNAKACANDRA (1880?)

Wiles says he wrote the work below "before 1884", so we'll guess (!).

301.821 NĀNAKACANDRA, *Chāyā* on the *Prajñāpanāsūtras*

Printed with the text and other commentaries Benares 1884.

302.822 AUTHOR UNKNOWN (1890?), *Syādvādasiddhi*

Nagin Shah in LD Series 41, p. 14 of the Introduction says that the manuscript (preserved at the L. D. Institute of Indology) "belongs to c. 1950 V.S." The author of the work is not known. Shah gives a brief summary:

"The tract discusses the various points against the doctrine of *syādvāda* and refutes them one by one. Again, the author points out the instances where the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theoreticians have accepted the principle of *syādvāda.*"

303.823 RĀJACANDRA (1895), *Ātmasiddhi*

Edited and translated by J.L. Jaini Ahmedabad 1923; again by D.C. Mehta as *Self-Realization* (Bombay 1976). (PK1859.R248 A9130).

304 GAMBHĪRAVIJAYA GAṆI (1896)

A pupil of Vṛddhivijaya.

304.824 GAMBHĪRAVIJAYA GAṆI, *Ṭīkā* on Yaśovijaya Gaṇi's *Adhyātmasāra*

JRK p. 6 says it was composed in 1896. Edited Bhavnagar, Bombay 1909.

304.825 GAMBHĪRAVIJAYA GAṆI, *Ṭīkā* on Yaśovijaya Gaṇi's *Aṣṭakaprakaraṇa* (i.e., *Jñānasāra*)

Velankar, JRK p. 18, says it was composed in *saṃvat* 1958 (1902 A.D.), and cites a manuscript in Baroda. Also edited Ahmedabad 1906

304.826 GAMBHĪRAVIJAYA GAṆI, *Ṭīkā* on Vinayavijaya's *Nayakarṇikā*

Edited in YJG 7, 1912.

304.827 GAMBHĪRAVIJAYA GAṆI, Commentary on Vinaya Vijaya's *Śāntasudhārasa*

Edited by Jethlala Haribhai Sarma, Bhavnagar 1913.

305.828 DHARMA SŪRI (1905), *Pramāṇaparibhāṣā*

Published with the editor's *Nyāyālaṃkāra* by Nyayavijaya. Banaras 1913.

306.829 RĀDHA GOVINDA GOSVĀMIN (1906), *Bhāṣyarājainasiddhāntaratna* (?)

Published Calcutta 1906.

307.830 HĪRALĀLA (1907), *Jñānaśataka*

JRK cites a manuscript location.

308.831 LAKṢMĪVIJAYA (1907), *Praśnottarapradīpa*

H.D. Velankar at JRK p. 276 says "containing about 338 questions with their answers distributed over five chapters composed in *saṃvat* 1959 by Lakṣmīvijaya, pupil of Śubhavijaya of the Tapā Gaccha. It is published by Sanghavi Bhogilal Kalidas, Ahmedabad, 1909."

309 NYĀYAVIJAYA (1913)

NCC 1, Revised Edition, p. 147 says the author is a disciple of Vijayadharma Sūri, a member of the Asiatic Society of Bengal, the Asiatic Society of Italy, and the German Oriental Society. A collection of his works is published from Patna in 1949.

Wiley p. 161: "Nyayāvijaya, Muni (1890-1970). Śvetāmbara Mūrtipūjaka scholar-monk of the Tapā Gaccha. He was born in Mandal, Gujarat, and was named Narasiṃha. He studied in a Jain school established there in 1903 by Dharmavijaya (late Acārya Vijayadharma Sūri) and then went to Banaras for advanced studies. In 1906, he and four other students who were disciples of Dharmavijaya were initiated by him in Calcutta. He is the author of some 17 books in Gujarati and 23 in Sanskrit, including *Adhyātmatattvāloka* and

Nyāyakusumāñjali. For his work on logic and philosophy he was awarded the Nyāyaviśārada degree in 1910. In 1918, he wrote his most famous work, *Jaina Darśana*, which has been translated in to English as *Jaina Philosophy and Religion*."

309.832 NYĀYAVIJAYA, *Adhyātmatattvāloka*

Edited and translated by Motichand Jhaverichand Mehta, Bhavnagar 1920; again in 1938 as *The Spiritual Light*, edited and translated by M. R. Trivedi. In his Introduction to the latter volume Trivedi writes the following epitomization of the contents of the work (pp. 7-9).

Summary by M. R. Trivedi

"The first chapter is devoted to *ātmajāgarti* or *sambodhanā*–the awakening of the soul. The second chapter deals with *pūrvasevā* which consists of devotion or attachment to preceptors, parents, elders and God, etc., and is a step to the elevation of the self. In the third chapter on *aṣṭāṅgayoga* he distinguishes between the *sakarmaka* and *akarmaka* souls and explains the eight steps to *yoga*."

"He advises man to bridle his mind, speech and actions and to keep himself away from malpractices. He vehemently points out that man must preserve celibacy which is the soul of man's development. Without this, a man will ever be rotting in the weltering pool of misery. The fourth chapter preaches *kaṣāyajaya*–the conquering of all passions. Man should rise head and shoulders above these passions, and should not be allured by their tempting waters. These are his veritable foes and he has to conquer them for obtaining absolution. The fifth chapter named *Dhyānasāmagrī* speaks of the restraining or curbing of the fickle mind for the sake of meditation. The mind is difficult to be checked like the wind. Still however, by constant and proper practice this can be achieved. Evenness of mind and meditation are interdependent. In the sixth chapter on *dhyānasiddhi* he dilutes on the various kinds of *dhyāna*. Feelings play an important part in *dhyānasiddhi*, and one who has cultivated the feelings, mentioned in the chapter, attains to

a high level. The seventh chapter is devoted to *yogaśreṇī*. He treats the difficult subject of *yoga* comprehensively and points out the different modes of *yoga*. The highest progress of yoga leads the soul to a point from where it never goes down. The last chapter is replete with fervent appeals to men, emanating from the pious and benevolent heart of this sage. He sounds a warning to those who are slumbering in ignorance, to rise and perceive the truth held out by great men. All are not gifted with equal powers, yet there must be a deliberate and sincere attempt on the part of all to step to the path that leads to the uplift of the soul universal love, indeed, takes a man to the path of absolutism. This love not only benefits the man himself but also the whole world."

309.833 NYĀYAVIJAYA, *Nyāyakusumāñjali(prakaraṇa)*

Published and translated by Hiralal Rasikdas Kapadia. Baroda 1922. This is our ET. It is also printed from Ahmedabad in 1913 and Bombay in 1914. The summary is based on the author's (or perhaps the translator's?) "Analysis" (ET35-40, with more details given for sections deemed especially important or innovative. The translator, Prof. Kapadia, has provided many helpful notes.

Translated by Hiralal Rasikdas Kapadia

CHAPTER ONE

This Chapter deals with the life of Mahāvīra.

9 (ET32) There are two kinds of liberation, *jīvanmukti* and *paramukti*.

10 (ET35) Those who have attained *jīvanmukti* are of two kinds: (1) Tīrthaṅkaras and (2) general omniscients (*sāmānyakevalin*)

11 (ET40) How can there be complete liberation from the collection of beginningless *karmans*? Because every object that is experienced undergoes destruction.

12 (ET42) (Question:) How can a beginningless thing have an end?

(Answer:) There is no such rule. We see that a prior absence, which is without beginning, has an end.

13 (ET44-45) There must an omniscient being, since otherwise one could not explain (such occurrences as) lunar eclipses, etc.

(Objection:) The *hetu* (of this inference) is unproved.

(Answer:) No, it is established by postulation *(vikalpa)*. Anyway, how can you say that the *hetu* is unproved?

(Objector:) Because there is no instrument of knowledge to prove it.

(Answer:) How can you even say that without taking "it" to be proved by postulation?

14 (ET46-47) Just as larger sizes culminate in space (*ākāśa*), so the perceptual truths, etc., culminate in things known to the omniscients. In the face of this, where has the Mīmāṃsaka fled to?

CHAPTER TWO

1 (ET51-52) Some say God created the universe, but why should he have done so? Since there were (otherwise) no bodies or objects there was no suffering, so no occasion for compassion. And God, who has accomplished everything, can have no motive for doing so.

2 (ET53) How can God, the sea of mercy, not make the universe happy?

(Objection:) But living beings experience pleasure and pain through their *karman*.

(Answer:) So how is God responsible for that?

(Objector:) He causes actions to give pleasure, etc.

(Answer:) That cannot be so, since if he just refrained from doing so the selves would remain pure and happy.

3 (ET54) (Objection:) It is *karman* that makes people act, so God is not needed to provide pleasures and pains.

(Answer:) Fine, if God by nature gives both pleasure and pain; but if it is supposed that God created everything there is a great problem, viz., that God must have created pains as well as pleasures.

4 (ET55) (Objection:) But *karman* is beginninglessly connected to a self.

(Answer:) Then it is the cause of the universe; how is God required?

(Objection:) It is God who brings about the connections between selves and their *karman*.

(Answer:) Why should he have done so?

5 (ET56) (Objector:) God gives the appropriate results of the good or bad acts of living beings.

(Answer:) Why is one act good and another bad?

(Objector:) That is due to the will of God.

(Answer:) Then why doesn't cause everyone to perform good actions? And if he is omniscient and omnipotent, why doesn't he stop men from doing bad acts?

6 (ET57-58) Someone who fails to stop a person from falling into a well though he is aware of it and able to prevent it is merciless and mean. A king may not be aware that a man is doing evil, but if he learns of it he must surely stop it.

7 (ET58-59) Why shouldn't God have given right instincts to men so that He needn't cause pain to anyone?

(Objector:) It is because of a person's past *karman*.

(Answer:) Then God is not needed; pleasure and pain must result from *karman* alone.

8 (ET59-60) God must be either causeless or caused. He not causeless, for then Godhood should be the property of everything or of nothing. And there is no reason to suppose the other (viz., that He is caused).

9 (ET61) How could liberation occur without there having been bondage? Then consider why Parvatī's husband (Śiva) should be called "liberated", since He was never bound. How has He gained the power of good or bad results? Why can't other liberated selves have the same power, since they too are liberated.

10 (ET62) How can a Madhyamaka (here, a Śūnyavādin) preach knowledge of emptiness when he says knowledge is empty? How can he speak that way when everyday effects have to be performed? How can he preach emptiness when he runs away on seeing a lightning-flash?

11 (ET63) The Buddhist who teaches that everything is momentary is very stupid, for if that were accepted there would be no connection between a doer and what he does--a murderer would not murder, and how could recognition and memory guide ordinary activities?

12 (ET65) The Jñānādvaitins believe that there is nothing but awareness, and that the belief in external objects is an illusion. But that is unreasonable, because it is not supported by instruments of knowledge, because we directly perceive objects and they are regularly associated with awarenesses, and external objects are seen to act.

13 (ET66) The Sāṃkhyas takes awareness (*vijñāna*) to be a property of an inert *buddhi*, say that knowledge of the mere self (*nirlepapuruṣa*) has no content, consider *puruṣa* to be unbound and unliberated, and say that *ākāṣa* is created from sounds, etc. These are all absurd views.

14 (ET69-70) Does a Māyāvādin (i.e., an Advaitin) take *māyā* to be real or unreal? If it is real there must be two entities (*tattvas*). And if it is unreal, from whence does the experienced world (*prapañca*) arise? This is as stupid as believing a barren woman is a mother.

15-17 (ET70-74) Proofs of the existence of consciousness.

18-20 (ET75-77) *Karman* is real.

21 (ET77-78) *Karman* is necessarily material.

22 (ET79-80) Consciousness is not a property of the sense-organs, since one can remember an object seen by another. There are two kinds of sense-organs, *dravyendriyas* and *bhāvendrīyas*: we agree that the latter kind of sense-organ has consciousness.

23 (ET81-82) An object exists only at that place where its properties are seen.

24 (ET83) The self unity remains even though it pervades different sizes of bodies at different times.

25 (ET86) (Objection:) How can the self have the size of the body when it is not itself material (*mūrta*)?

(Answer:) What does "material" mean? If it means possessing color/form, then it is all right, since the mind, etc.

which do not possess color/form nevertheless pervade the body. And if it means having some size or other, anything that is not omnipresent must be "material" in that sense.

26 (ET88) (Objection:) How can something having color/form pervade another also having color/form?

(Answer:) Just as water pervades sand.

(Objection:) But a self pervades the entire universe!

(Answer:) What can a part of a self outside the body be?

27 (ET89) If the self of a worm pervades the universe entirely it must be as large as the universe. If it does so only partially the self would have to be considered to have parts.

28-30 (ET90-93) (Objector:) There is no problem in holding a self to have parts.

(Answer:) Then what is the problem about its being limited in size to the size of its bodies? Why can't the self expand and contract? The Jains accept that the self has parts from one viewpoint; (from that viewpoint) they hold that the self is not immutable, that it has modifications. Otherwise the variations in a self's qualities would be impossible.

31-34 (ET93-96) Why isn't sound a quality of atoms if it is admitted to be a property of space (*ākāśa*)?

(Objector:) If it were so, we couldn't hear sound.

(Answer:) But not all the qualities of space are directly perceived by us. Sound should be admitted to be a substance, not a quality of space, since otherwise we should not be able to hear it. Moreover, the sound-substance possesses motion, since we experience as coming (to our ear to be heard). So sound, which possesses motion, cannot be a quality (since a quality cannot possess motion).

35-37 (ET97-99) Sounds are created, so they can't be eternal.

(Objection:) The universally present sound is manifested (*vyañjya*) in a specific place, (and that manifestation is what is non-eternal).

(Answer:) Why isn't another (kind of) sound manifested at that place?

(Objector:) Because each sound has its own illuminator (*prakāśaka*), since it is heard nowhere else.

(Answer:) We don't find that. It would be as if a lamp brought by a person seeking to see a pot of curds would not be able to see the flour-cake lying in the same place!

38 (ET100) Darkness is a substance, since it makes contact with the eye, and so possesses touch as well as color.

(Objection:) No, darkness is the absence of light.

(Answer:) Then we shouldn't be able to see it.

39-43 (ET102-105) The Jain position (*siddhānta*) is praised.

CHAPTER THREE

1 (ET109-110) The number of the instruments of knowledge as held by each of several systems (Cārvāka, Buddhist, Vaiśeṣika, Sāṃkhya, Nyāya, Prābhākaras, Bhāṭṭas and Jains are stated.

2 (ET111) The Jain view is explained. Direct awareness (*pratyakṣa*) is of two kinds: empirical and highest. The four varieties of sensory awareness and of mental awareness (i.e., indistinct, etc.) are listed. The three kinds of highest awareness are omniscience, telepathy and clairvoyance.

3-4 (ET118-120) The five kinds of indirect (*parokṣa*) awareness are: memory, recognition, *tarka*, inference and scripture. Each is defined.

5 (ET125) A (valid) reason (*sādhana*) is a content that is correctly ascertained to have pervaded-ness (i.e., to be pervaded by the property to be proved, *sādhya*). It cannot be held to have three (or more) defining marks, for such specification will fail to cover (*avyāpti*) such a (valid) inference as "there is a moon in the sky for it is seen in the water", or it will overextend to such an argument as "the child in this woman's body is dark-complexioned because it is her child" through being ambiguous (*anekānta*).

6 (ET130-131) The thesis (in a valid inference) to be proved (*sādhya*) must be unsublated (*nirbādha*) (by any instrument of knowledge), desired to be proved (*abhimata*), and not already accepted as proved.

7 (ET134) Fallacious theses include (putative) theses that are incompatible with perception, with inference, with

one's own scriptures, with public opinion, or with other theses of one's own. Examples are given.

8 (ET135) Three kinds of fallacious reasons are specified: unproved, contradictory and inconclusive. An example establishes the relation between the reason and the thesis. It is vitiated in eight or nine ways. Verbal testimony (i.e., scriptural knowledge) is awareness occasioned by words that are not opposed to an instrument of knowledge.

9 (ET148) (Objection:) Verbal testimony can be subsumed under inference.

(Answer:) No, since knowledge comes immediately through verbal testimony, but depends on satisfaction of certain other requirements in the case of inference.

10 (ET149-150) Since one cannot understand others' opinions without inference, the Cārvākas must remain tongue-tied, since they do not accept inference. One can't know the idea of others merely by sense-perception.

(Cārvāka:) It becomes known through the speaker's gestures.

(Answer:) That is inference!

11 (ET150-151) (Buddhist:) Pervasion is grasped by awareness of conceptual constructions following perception.

(Answer:) Is conceptual construction an instrument of knowledge or not? If it is held to be, then there are more than the two instruments you (Buddhist Logicians) admit. If not, it is like expecting a eunuch to have a child!

12 (ET152-153) Someone who denies recognition as an instrument of knowledge should explain how we come by our knowledge of (the) identity (of a past thing with a present thing). It cannot arise from perception, since if so it would arise when an object is first perceived. And it can't be through perception when aided by inference, for nothing can operate on an object beyond its scope.

13 (ET154-155) (Objection:) Is it correct to view memory as not an independent case of indirect awareness? We perceive an object already inferred, and we can infer objects already cognized through *tarka*; still, perception and inference are regularly counted as independent.

14 (ET156-157) Absence (*abhāva*) is not an instrument of knowledge. Presumption (*arthāpatti*) is a kind of inference. Comparison (*upamāna*) is included under recognition. Tradition (*aitihya*) is just verbal testimony; if it is false is not an instrument of knowledge at all. Intuition (*pratibhā*) is included in perception and inference, while concurrence (*sambhava*) is contained in inference.

15 (ET159-160) (Sense-object) connection (*sannikarṣa*) is not itself an instrument of knowledge, though it is a supporting condition (*sahakāraṇa*) of perception.

16 (ET160-161) The visual organ does not produce sight by contacting an object; if it were, one could not see an object through a piece of glass.

(Objection:) Then one should be able to see a thing through a brick wall!

(Answer:) The visual organ does not have that capacity.

20 (ET172-173) The nature of a self is explained: it can illuminate itself as well as other things, is a doer, an enjoyer; there is a distinct one for each body, and it is of the size of the body it inhabits; it has *karmans* as its coverings, but itself is of the nature of awareness, and it undergoes change.

23 (ET201) As a man is at once both a father and a son from different standpoints, why can't a thing be both existent and nonexistent from different standpoints?

26 (ET204) The notion of a thing being existent from one point of view and nonexistent from another is not a case of doubt. Doubt occurs, e.g., in the doubt whether a thing is a pillar or a man, when the cognizer has failed to determine that the object has either of the attributes. That is not the case here, since every object exists in respect of its own nature and is not existent as something other than it.

27 (ET206) An object that is eternal only could not act either gradually or suddenly, and the same is true of an object that is absolutely non-eternal. If the self were solely eternal or solely non-eternal it could experience neither satisfaction nor frustration,

28 (ET207-208) and there could be no bondage nor liberation. But that problem fails to affect a self viewed as both

eternal and non-eternal (from different standpoints).

30 (ET210-211) Others (the Naiyāyikas) admit contact and disjunction of one thing (say, a monkey) with another (a tree), so there is no difficulty in our view of many-sidedness (*anekāntavāda*).

32(ET214-215) There are two kinds of universal properties, *tiryak* (e.g., cowness, the property of all cows) and *urdhvatā* (e.g., the gold that is common in all the modes of a substance (e.g., in golden bracelets, etc.). Another word for *urdhvatā* is "*viśeṣa*". But neither kind of universal property is completely distinct from (the) individual (qualified by it).

33 (ET216-217) Just as water assists fish in their movements, so an initiator of movement (*dharma*) helps both living and nonliving things to move, and an initiator of stasis helps them to stay fixed. Space (*ākāśa*) is all-pervasive and the number of its space-points is infinite. Matter has the qualities (touch, etc.)

36 (ET224-225) Vaiśeṣika and Nyāya arose from the conventional (*naigama*) viewpoint, while Sāṃkhya and Advaita arose from the generic (*saṃgraha*) standpoint. Buddhism represents the (temporally) immediate standpoint. But You, O Lord, who teach the view from which all viewpoints find their proper places are victorious!

CHAPTER FOUR

1 (ET231) Non-injury (*ahiṃsā*) is defined as compassion (*dayā*).

2 (ET235) Jaimini, who thought that animal-sacrifice scripturally sanctioned leads to *dharma*, feeling no pity towards those being killed, even though he felt the pain of his injuries, was confused.

3-9 (ET236-240) Further criticisms of animal-sacrifice.

10-12 (ET240-244) Criticism of the authorless-ness of the Vedas.

13-16 (ET242-246) Criticism of animal-sacrifice.

17-20 (ET247-249) Criticism of the ritual of feeding the departed by food eaten by Brahmins.

21-23 (ET250-251) Criticism of cow-worship.

24-26 (ET251-253) Critique of fire-oblation.

29-32 (ET255-258) Should we worship Brahmins because of their good conduct or because of their birth? Even if they are of good conduct, they cannot be superior to a (Jain) saint. And if because of birth alone a wicked Brahmin may be called a *guru*. A Brahmin contrasts with a saint: he can marry, he can be wealthy, he can eat anything, as opposed to saints. Saints observe the great vows (unlike Brahmins). Suppose God were like a Brahmin, without compassion!

33 (ET259-260) A person is called "the Lord" (*bhagavant*) who is omniscient, has conquered all internal passions, etc., who is worshiped everywhere and propounds the truth. Some of the several names of such a one are listed.

36-43 (ET266-279) Criticism of image-worship.

CHAPTER FIVE

1 (ET281-282) The nine Jain categories are listed, though there are really only two, self and what is not self.

2 (ET183) Selves are those who have awareness; the rest is not-self. The nine categories briefly explained.

3 (ET286-287) There are two kinds of selves, transmigrating and liberated. Mundane selves are of five kinds according to the number of senses each kind possesses: earth-bodied (5), water-bodied (4), fire-bodied (3), air-bodied (2) and vegetable-bodied (1), the last being fixed (in place) (*sthavara*) and having only touch. The other four kinds are called "mobile" (*trasa*). All selves are with powers (*paryāpta*) or without powers (*aparyāpta*).

4 (ET289) The six powers (*paryāpti*) are consuming food, having a body, having sense-organ(s), breathing, speech and thinking. The vegetable-bodied beings have four of these; those with five sense-organs (viz., earth-bodied) have six powers, and the rest have five. There are two kinds of plants, subtle and gross. Some of them have only one self (*pratyeka vanaspati*) while others are aggregates (*sādhāraṇa-vanaspati*). The former are gross; of the latter, some are subtle (i.e., *nigodas*), while others are gross.

5-6 (ET292) The five sense-organs and their objects are

identified. Examples of the kinds of embodied things that have two, three, four and five senses are offered. Five-sensed animals (*tiryak*) include aquatic, terrestrial, aerial, hell-beings (i.e., those who guard the hells), gods and human beings. They can be divided into those that think (*saṃjñin*) and those that don't.

7-8 (ET293-294) The ten "breaths" (i.e., powers) are language, body, mind, the five senses, length of life and breathing. Every self has at least four of them, viz., a body, the sense of touch, breathing and length of life. Beings are either of uterine or spontaneous birth. Gods may be male or female; those of spontaneous birth and the hell-guardians are neuter; the rest are of any of the three sexes. The five kinds of bodies (material, transformative, etc., are listed.

9 (ET298) There are four kinds of gods, called respectively *bhavanāpati*, *vyantara*, *jyotiṣka* and *vaimānika*. There are sixty-four *indras* (according to the *Śvetāmbaras*). The third and fourth kind of god abide in heaven, the rest in hell. Residents of hell are to be found tormented in one or another of seven hells.

10 (ET299-300) The residences of humans and animals are named. The universe has two parts, world (*loka*) and non-world (*aloka*), where there is nothing but space.

11 (ET301) The birthplaces of each kind of being is enumerated, the total of all of them (i.e., all kinds of beings) adding up to eighty-four lacs (*lakṣa*).

12 (ET302) There are an infinite number of selves, who can be divided into two groups. Those capable of being liberated are called *bhavya*, the rest *abhavya*.

13 (ET303) The *bhavyas*, being infinite in number, *saṃsāra* will never be without them, unless time comes to an end. Those who think otherwise because the number of selves is infinite were afraid that the universe might exist without any selves at all.

14 (ET307) It is as wrong to suppose that those liberated may still return to this world, since without karmic traces there is no occasion for rebirth, any more than a seed will sprout up after it has been burnt up.

15 (ET308) Only human beings can be liberated. A god

cannot be reborn in heaven or hell, nor can a hell-guardian; for animals and humans all four paths (*gati*) are open.

16 (ET308-309) *Samyama*, abandonment of sinful acts, is of two kinds: complete and partial. *Sādhus* have the first, seekers (*śrāvaka*) the other. One who observes the 35 rules of right conduct is eligible to be a seeker.

17 (ET311) There are five great vows for *sādhus* and twelve vows based on *samyama* for seekers.

19 (ET327) At the top of the world there is a land called *prāgbhārā* or *siddhaśīla* which sweet-smelling meritorious, lustrous. It is of the same size as the earth that humans inhabit and has the form of a white umbrella. Perfected beings reside one *yojana* above this land, and above it there is empty space.

20 (ET327-328) The omniscient go straight up to the top of the world when they leave their physical bodies. No one can go further than that, since in empty space no substances such as instigators of motion, etc. exist.

21 (ET328) The directions selves go depends on their *karman*. The (liberated) self that has reached the top of the world does not return, as it has no weight, and it does not go in any other direction, since it has nothing (no karmic traces) do cause it to do so.

22-23 (ET329-330) Eight kinds of qualities, attained by destroying the various kinds of *karmans* (knowledge-veiling, etc.), are found in a perfected being.

24 (ET333) The limited happiness experienced by kings and gods are not even the smallest part of the perfect bliss enjoyed by the liberated beings who have reached the top of the universe.

25 (ET334) The Naiyāyikas and Vaiśeṣikas who say that the liberated are without pleasure (or satisfaction) close the gates of the city of liberation.

26 (ET335) There is bliss in liberation. Refutation of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika view.

27 (ET337) (Objection:) But scripture says there is the non-existence of pleasure and pain in liberation.

(Answer:) It is so, both pleasure and pain do not exist in liberation.

28 (ET338) Comparison of ordinary pleasure with the pleasure experienced in liberation.

29-30 (ET338-339) (Objection:) Liberation is gained by knowledge alone.

(Answer:) No. A person who simply knows what pleasure is does not thereby gain pleasure.

(Objection:) Well, liberation is gained by action alone.

(Answer:) No, since one who makes false judgments about things fails to acquire them, even though he tries. Thus it is the combination of knowledge and right action that yield the desired result, and those two have been declared by the Lord (Jina) to be the means of attaining liberation.

31-46 (ET340-350) Concluding verses addressed to the Lord (Jina), requesting his devotion, asserting that asceticism is not required for liberation if one has faith and attends to the teachings of Jainism.

309.834 NYĀYAVIJAYA, *Nyāyatīrtha(prakaraṇa)*
Published at Ajmer, 1913.

309.835 NYĀYAVIJAYA, *Nyāyālaṃkāra* on Dharmasūri's *Pramāṇaparibhāṣā*
Edited. See #822 above.

310.836 DARŚANAVIJAYA GAṆI (1913), *Anyoktiśataka*
JRK p. 12: Published by Hiralala Hamsaraja, Jamnagar 1913.

311.837 PADMANANDIN (1914), *Prañcasaṃgrahavṛtti*
Published JPMJG 30, 1960.

312.838 MANGALAVIJAYA (1916), *Jainatattvapradīpa*
Published by A.B. Gandhi, Benares, 1917. "It describes the principles of Jainism in seven chapters", says JRK p. 144.

313 ĀDINĀTHA NEMINĀTHA UPĀDHYE (1906-1975)

The following was sent to the Jain Class, Manish Modi on December 19, 2010, by Prof. A.V. Narasimha Murthy, former Head, Department of Ancient History and Archaeology, University of Mysore:

"Dr. Adinatha Neminatha Upadhye was born at Sadalinga village in Belgaum district in 1906. He had his early education in Belgaum, Kolhapur, Sangli and Pune. He studied at Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, Pune and obtained Master's degree in Prakrit. Subsequently, he joined Rajaram College, Kolhapur, as Professor of Prakrit in which most of the Jaina works have been written.

"His mother wanted her son to become a lawyer and earn a lot of money. Young Upadhye told his mother 'If I become a lawyer, I will be arguing the cases involving murderers, cheaters, thieves and other bad elements. But now I can write about Jina, Tirthankaras, Jaina saints whom you respect most. Hence you should be more happy that I am choosing this career which is nearer to God than money.' His mother was extremely happy at this reply and blessed him.

"He dedicated himself to Jaina studies and contributed many books of great research value. His works include *Pravacanasāra, Pañcasūtra, Varaṅgacaritā, Kāṃsavaho, Līlāvatī, Kuvalayamlā* and numerous others. His contributions were admired by great scholars like Schubring (Germany), Winternitz (Prague), Keith (Edinburgh), Chatterji (Kolkata), R. Shamashastry (Kautilya fame). Honors came to him from far and wide. He visited Paris, Canberra, Belgium etc. He was the President of [the] 46th Kannada Sahitya Sammelana held in 1967.

"At the age of 65, he joined the Mysore University as the first Professor of the Deparment of Jainology and Prakrits at the invitation of the then Vice-Chancellor Prof. D. Javaregowda. The VC had a tough time in convincing the authorities for the appointment of Dr. Upadhye as he was 65. Mysore University came to the limelight among many foreign universities due to the presence of Dr. Upadhye on the faculty.

"There are many anecdotes revolving around Dr. Upadhye. In a function at Mysore, another great scholar, D. L. Narasimhachar, while welcoming Upadhye said, 'His full name is Ane Upadhye, meaning an elephant and he is like an elephant in Jainology,' and the audience applauded this statement. But while replying Dr. Upadhye said, 'If you write my name in English (Roman) it will be AN Upadhye and it is short for ANU meaning, just an atom.' The audience admired his humility and gave him a standing ovation for this observation.

"Dr. Upadhye being a great scholar at the international level was writing letters to scholars all over the world, and similarly was receiving letters from them. He used to go to the post box to post these letters. Once when he was in Kolhapur he felt the post box was too far from his house and caused great inconvenience. He wrote to the postal authorities requesting them to shift the post box near his house. The postal authorities were perplexed at this strange request. As they had heard of his greatness, they reacted positively to his request. They watched for a month the number of letters that were being posted by Dr. Upadhye and also the letters he received from others. They noticed that 90% of the letters in that post box were posted by Upadhye. Immediately they accepted his request and shifted the post box near to his house.

"Once Dr. H. M. Nayak, appreciating Upadhye's publications, told the youngsters to emulate the example of Dr. Upadhye, otherwise they will perish. Dr. Upadhye in his reply said 'Be careful in publishing. Many people have published and perished. Don't rush towards publication unless you are very sure of what you publish.' This advice applies to present times in a more emphatic way.

"I had the good fortune of knowing Dr. Upadhye intimately when he was at Mysore University. When we published a Prakrit inscription mentioning *cha a patharo* and showed it to him, he hugged me and demanded sweets. When I reminded him that he is a diabetic, he laughed and said 'Please don't remind me of my diabetes. I will eat sweets and take one more extra tablet.' He repeated the same sentence

whenever he came to my house for dinner.

"Though Upadhye was provided with a typist by the University he typed personal letters himself without depending upon the official typist. After retirement from the University in 1975, he went back to Kolhapur and died on Oct. 9, 1975, in his house...The Municipal Corporation, after his death, named the road as A. N. Upadhye Marg.

"The name of Dr. Upadhye will be immortal as long as Jain studies remain in any part of the world. By accepting to be at Mysore University at the age of 65 he made Mysore University proud."

314.839 BHUVANABHŪṢAṆA SŪRI (1989), *Gaṇadharavāda*

This is (B162.5.V46 1989) = *The Essentials of Bhagavān Mahāvīra's Philosophy*. Delhi 1989. This is a translation into English of a portion of a Gujarati work titled *Jain Dharmano Sarai Parichay* (An Easy Introduction to the Jain Dharma) purporting to report a discussion between Mahavīra and eleven of the Tīrthaṃkaras.

315.840 (ĀCĀRYA) TULSĪ (1989), *Jainasiddhāntadīpikā*

A brief explanation of Jaina tenets. Its translation by Satkari Mookerjee, with the texts provided, along with notes and an introduction by Nathmal Tatia, has been published from Ladnun, Rajasthan in 1985. It is edited from Rajasthan in 1950-51.

Wiley, pp. 221-222): "Tulsi, Ācārya (1914-1997). Ninth mendicant leader of the Śvetāmbara Terāpanthī tradition. He was born in Ladnun, Rajasthan, into an Osvāl Jain family and was initiated into mendicancy in 1924. He was named successor-designate (*yuvacārya*) by Acārya Kālūrām in 1936 and became *ācārya* the same year at the age of 22. He was interested in actively supporting non-violence (*ahimsā*) and moral conduct in society at large. In this regard, Tulsī introduced the Aṇuvrat movement in 1949, the Communal Harmony movement in 1954, and the New Turn movement

(*naya mod*) in 1960. At his suggestion, a boarding school was established in 1948 at Ladnun for the education and training of young women who wanted to be initiated as nuns. His interest in promoting education that incorporated spiritual and moral values was reflected in the establishment of the Jain Vishva Bharati Institute at Ladnun 1970. In 1980 he introduced a new category of novice mendicants called *samān/samanī*, who are permitted to use mechanized transport and to travel abroad to visit the diaspora community. For his contributions in strengthening the unity of India through the Aṇuvrat movement, Tulsī received the Indira Gandhi National Unity Award in 1993. He voluntarily renounced his position as leader of the Terāpanthī community in 1994 when he appointed his successor-designate, Yuvācārya Mahāprajña, as *ācārya*. He was the first Terāpanthī *ācārya* to be given the title *gaṇādhipati*, "Supreme Leader of the Order.| Under his leadership, the mendicant community grew rapidly Tulsī performed more initiations than any other Terāpanthī *ācārya*. He encouraged the interpretation of Jainism in light of contemporary society and modern scientific knowledge."

316.841 KANAKASENA (date unknown), *Svatantravacanāmṛta*

Translation by Padmanabh S. Jaini

"The single manuscript of this unpublished short Jaina poem is to be found in the collection of the Bibliotheque Nationale of the University of Strasbourg...(T)he work belongs to the genre of the *dvātriṃśikās* (philosophical compositions in thirty-two verses) popular among the Jainas from the time of Siddhasena Divākara (fourth century) the celebrated author of the *Ekaviṃśati-dvātriṃśikā*. The title of the present composition is not referred to elsewhere and although the name Kanakasena appears at the end of the poem we have no further information on his identity or his date. Since the name ends in -sena, the author may be said to belong to Senagaṇa, a mendicant order

of the Digambara sect.

"The text can be divided into three parts. The first (vv. 1-9) puts forth views of several of the traditional *darśanas* on the nature of the soul. The second part (vv. 10-24) expounds the Jaina view of the soul, seeking to overcome the apparent contradictions by recourse to the device of *syādvāda*. The third part (vv. 25-31) speaks of the triple path of insight, knowledge and conduct culminating in the state of *mokṣa*. Despite its brevity, the *Svatantravacanāmṛta* can be considered a complete exposition of the Jaina doctrine pertaining to the freedom of the soul from the bonds of *karman*."

1 "Salutations to the auspicious one who is free from passions!"

"We venerate that free soul who is emancipated from the cycle of cause and effect (namely the defiled state of bondage) and from the signs of embodiment and vital life and one who illuminates with his knowledge the entire range of the sentient and the insentient."

2 "There is the attainment of the true nature of emancipations when there is the total destruction of the *karmans* accumulated by the soul. And such a state is not to be found without the simultaneous presence of true insight, right knowledge and pure conduct."

3 "Here the nihilist (the Cārvāka) objects: "The wise consider the qualities (*dharmas*) only when there is a substance (*dharmin*) indicated; in the absence of a soul who attains emancipation (i.e. whose freedom can be talked about)?""

4 "(The *ātmavādin* says:) There is a soul. He is sentient and being the perceiver cannot be subsumed under (such substances) as earth, etc. (He must be considered different from the body) on the analogy of perception of goblins, etc. (who do not have gross bodies). This soul moreover is eternally and forever pure."

5 "The soul cannot however be (totally) free from blemishes because of the presence of such conditions as pleasure, sexual desire, anger, etc., which arise with the body. For these reasons the soul is the agent (of his actions) as well as the enjoyer (of the results); he certainly is not the lord of

himself."

6 "In the absence of this lordship he canot truly be established as endowed with thatness, (namely being the agent and the enjoyer),' so says a disciple of the Yoga school, the performer of sacrifices, (namely, a devotee of the Lord)."

7 "(Here the Buddhist says: If the soul is an existent, then it must be momentary. Such being the case, to whom would the result accrue? (The Jaina replies:) Surely this is wrongly perceived since your position is invalidated by recognition, etc."

8 "(Here the Mīmāṃsaka says: Actions are performed mixed with injury to beings as they are prescribed by the revealed scriptures (the Vedas). (The Jaina replies:) Surely that is futile (as injury cannot be the means of salvation)."

9 "As for the Advaita-vedānta, if there is only one reality, there can be no means to establish it. And if it is established, duality will result. (Moreover, there must be plurality) because of the deficiencies perceived in the pure (i.e. normal) consciousness of sentient beings. The Jaina view on the soul therefore is:"

10 "The soul is the perceived, the knower, the Lord, the agent, the enjoyer and possessor of qualities. (When freed from the *karmans* and the conditions of embodiment) the soul is of the nature to rise upwards spontaneously (reaching the summit of the Universe). (As an existent) the soul is enjoined simultaneously with production (of a new state), loss (of an old state) and the endurance (as a substance with its own qualities)."

11 "The soul is characterized by positive and negative aspects which rise from the assertion of his own qualities and the denial of others' in him. In this way when we look at his innate nature he will be seen as endowed with (perfect) qualities. When his defilements (arising from the contact of *karmans*) are however perceived he would appear to be devoid of such (perfect) qualities."

12 "Although truly speaking he must be distinct from the states where he is designated (as human, divine, animal, etc.) he must nevertheless be identical with the (changing) states of

happiness, etc. Similarly, he has a form when bound by karmic matters and its formless when hs is free from bondage."

13. "The soul can truly be seen as "non-dual" when one perceives his consciousness in its universal aspect (that is when the objects reflected therein are seen as modifications of consciousness and not distinct from it). But the same consciousness can be described as 'manifold' when one perceives its multiple operation in relation to particular souls."

14 "The soul is momentary (if one looks only at its modifications); it is not momentary however if one perceives its eternal qualities. It can be called 'empty' (*śūnya*) since it is devoid of *karmans* but the wise would call it 'nonempty' also as it is filled with bliss."

15 "The soul is sentient because of its cognition but (in a way) it is insentient too since it becomes the object of knowledge. It can be called 'describable' if one were to speak of it in a sequential order (asserting certain properties and denying certain others) but it would become 'inexpressible' if one were to attempt to express both the positive and negative aspects simultaneously."

16 "The soul is existent because of its own substance, etc. It can be called non-existent in as much as it lacks the substance (nature) of others. It is eternal (when on views) its durable substance, non-eternal however (when viewed purely) from the gain and loss of its modifications."

17 "Because of expansion and contraction--which do not however destroy it--the soul is said to be of the same measure as its body. However the same soul can be called "omnipresent" when it performs the act of 'bursting forth' (*samudghāta*) and extends itself throughout the universe (in order to thin out the karmic matter of the 'non-destructive' type (i.e., the *vedanīya karman*)."

18 "The soul is the agent only of its own modifications. It is not the agent of the states of other existents. It can be called 'the enjoyer' to the extent that it attaches itself to its own body and senses but it is not the enjoyer (if one perceives that fact that) it is not truly supported by the sense organs."

19 "The Jinas have declared that the soul is 'experienced'

only in reference to self-cognition but the same soul can be called 'beyond experience' when it becomes the object of others' cognition. For the very same reasons the soul is also described as the cognizer and the cognized."

20 "Thus the soul indeed is characterized by a manifold nature and it is to be known by (such apparently contradictory) expressions. By the *yogins*, however, the soul can be known in its own nature (endowed) with its infinite qualities."

21 "Through the method of applying the partial and comprehensive instrument of knowledge (the manifoldness of the soul) is well established. The *nayas* apprehend only portions of realities whereas the two instruments of knowledge (namely the direct and indirect perceptions) apprehend the totality of knowables."

22 "The nayas are primarily two-fold referring to the real and the relative, namely, the substantial and the modificational aspects. These are further divided as *naigama-naya*, etc. and each of these is further subdivided."

23 "The direct perception (i.e. the omniscient perception) is that which is clear and without blemish. The indirect perception (namely that which is mediated by mind and the senses) is partly clear and partly unclear. Both these are called instruments of knowledge by the wise since they determine the objects inclusive of the self and others."

24 "The object of knowledge is approached by the seven-fold viewpoints expressed as exists, does not exist, both, inexpressible, and the three combinations thereof, all statements qualified by the term *syāt* (in some sense). These seven statements will proceed (with having) in view (either) the substance (or the modes)."

25 "The emancipation of the soul is that state when the soul becomes free from karmic 'coloration', transcends the (fourteen) stages of the progress towards perfection, becomes the embodiment of pure being, pure consciousness, infinite knowledge and bliss and endures there eternally."

26 "The emancipation takes place when there is the total annihilation of nescience (*avidyā*) which is also known as the major karmic matter, the obscurer of perception and knowledge

and the producer of delusion and obstruction."

27 "Just as a piece of gold by coming into contact with a special kind of fire can become free from all dirt, similarly the soul gradually becomes free from (karmic) dirt by the destruction of attachment."

28 "The true insight is that which arises in the soul when there is the contemplation of the true self in the presence of the totality of the internal and the external efficient causes."

29 "The right knowledge is said to be that which shines like flame and is the immediate cause of perceiving the objects as well as discriminating between the self and non-self."

30 "The pure conduct is described as that which is firmness in that state (of discrimination), the complete stillness of all operations of the mind and the equanimity of all states."

31 "Only the combination of these three may be considered the proper means of (attaining) this (emancipation) and not those imagined by the disputants whose arguments are opposed to reasoning."

32 "These are the immortal words on the free soul coming from the moon-like mouth of Kanakasena (the poet), well established in his own self. Those devout souls, who with body, speech and mind receive this ambrosia of words through their ears and taste it with their tongue (i.e. listen to it and repeat it) surely will instantly attain to the state free from decay and death."

"Thus is completed the Immortal Saying of the Free Soul."

BIBLIOGRAPHY AND ABBREVIATIONS

ABORI = Annals of the Bhandarkar Oriental Institute (Poona)

AgSS = Agamodaya Sanskrit Series

ALB = Adyar Library Bulletin

AMG = Annales du Musee Guimet

Arrah = A catalogue of printed books in the Jaina Siddhanta Bhavana, Arrah. Edited by Suparava Das Gupta, 1919

BORI = Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute

Bib (or Bib 3) = Volume One of this *Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies*: Bibliography. Third Edition. Two sections. Motilal Banarsidass: Delhi, 1995

BORI Cat., see BORID

BORI D = *Descriptive Catalogue of the Government Collection of Manuscripts deposited in the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute.* 19 volumes. Poona: Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, 1916-1962

BORI Manuscripts, see BORI D

BP = Report on the search for Sanskrit manuscripts in the Bombay Presidency during the year 1883-84. By R.G. Bhandarkar. Bombay 1887

CatPun = Catalogue of Sanskrit and Prakrit Manuscripts in Munirāja Śrī Puṇyavijayaji's Collection. Part I. Ahmedabad 1963

CHJ = Asim Kumar Chatterjee, *Comprehensive History of Jainism.* Two volumes. Second edition. New Delhi:

Firma K.L. Mukhopadhyaya, 2000

CPB = Catalogue of Sanskrit and Prakrit Manuscripts in the Central Provinces and Berar. By Rai Bahadur Hiralal. Nagpur, 1926

Delhi = Five hand-lists of Jain manuscripts in five Digambara Jaina Bhandars, Nayamandir, Dharmaurta (23), Pañayatī Mandir, Masid Khajur (2) and Kūñcaseth, Delhi.

Desai 1915, 1995 = Mohanlal Dalchand Desai's edition and translation of Vinayavijaya's *Nayakarṇikā*, Library of Jain Literature, 1915, Reprinted 1995

DLJP = Devacandra Lalbhai Jaina Pustakoddhara Samstha Fund Series

Emeneau = Murray B. Emeneau, *A Uninon List of Printed Indic Texts and Translations in American Libraries.* New York: American Oriental Society1935; Klaus Reprijt Co. 1967

Folkert = Scripture and Community: Collected Essays on the Jainas (ed. John E. Cort). Atlanta 1993

GandS = Padmanabh S. Jaini, *Gender and Salvation:* Jaina Debates on the Spiritual Liberation of Women. Delhi: Munshiram Manoharlal Publishers Pvt. Ltd., 1991

GOS = Gaekwad's Oriental Series

GS = *Gomatasāra*

HIL = Satis Chandra Vidyabhusana, *A History of Indian Logic.* Reprinted Delhi: Motilal Banartsidass, 1971

Hpr = Haraprasad Shastri, Notices of Sanskrit Manuscripts. Calcutta 1900 ff.

IOPB = India Office Printed Books. London 1938

JAG = Jaina Atmananda Grantharatnamala (Bhavnagar), Bombay

Jainagranthavali = Jainagranthavali published by the Jaina Svetambara Conference, Bombay 1902. A List of Jaina works with indexes

Jaina sahitya (aur) itihasa = Nathuram Premi, *Jaina sāhitya aur itihāsa* (Bombay: Hindi Grantharatnakara, 1956)

Jainism in Rajasthan = Kailash Chand Jain, Gulabchand Hirachand Doshi, *Jainism in Rajasthan* (Sholapur 1963)

JAS = Jaina Atmananda Sabha (Series)

JASBe = Journal of the Asiatic Society of Bengal

JBBRAS = Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland, Bombay Branch

JBhP = A catalogue of 3168 manuscripts in the Jain Bhandars of the Panjab, Part I by Banarsi Das, Oriental College, Lahore

JDPS = Jaina Dharma Prasaraka Sabha

Jesalmere = A catalogue of manuscripts in the Jain Bhandars at Jesalmere. Gaekwad Oriental Series XXI

Jhalrapatan = A catalogue of Sanskrit manuscripts and other books in the Sri Ailak Pannalal Digambara Jain Sarasvati Bhavan, Jhalrapatan, with the title Granthanāmāvalī. 1933

Johrapurkar = V.P. Johrapurkar, *Bhavasena's Viśvatattva-Prakāśa:* a Treatise on logical polemics. Jivaraja Jaina

Granthamala Number 16. Sholapur 1964

JPMJG = Jñāna-Pīṭha Mūrtidevī Jaina Puṣṭakoddhāra Fund Series, Bombay

JRK = H.D. Velankar, *Jinaratnakośa*. An Alphabetical Register of Jaina Works and Authors. Poona: Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute Library, 1944

Kapadia 18 = Descriptive Catalogue of the Government Collection of Manuscripts deposited in the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, Volume 18. Ed. H.R. Kapadia. Poona: Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, 1952

KSS = Kashi Sanskrit Series

LD Series = Lalbhai Dalpatbhai Series

MDJG = Manikcandra Digambara Jaina Granthamala

NCC = New Catalogus Catalogorum. An alphabetical list of Sanskrit and allied works and authors. Edited by V. Raghavan, K. Kunjunni Raja et al. Madras: University of Madras Sanskrit Department, 1915-

N.S. Press = Nirnaya Sagar Press

PAIOC = Proceedings fof the All-India Oriental conference. Listed by volume and year.

Pannalal Bombay = Annual Reports of the Sri Ailak Pannalal Digambara Jain Sarasvati Bhavan, Sukhananda Dharmasala, Bombay. In five parts.

Pattan = GOS 76

Pattavali = Narendra Bhanavata Hastimala, *Paṭṭāvalī prabandha saṅfraha*. Jaina Itihasa Nirmana Samiti Jayapur 1968

Peterson 1-5 = Peter Peterson, Reports on a search for Sanskrit manuscripts with an index of books. Five volumes. Bombay: Society Library 1883-1889

RJSM = Rayacandra Jaina Sastra Mala (Bombay)

R. Mitra, *Notices* = *Notices of the Sanskrit Manuscripts* by Rajendralal Mitra. Calcutta 1871

Schubring, Doctrine = Walther Schubring, *The Doctrine of the Jainas:* described after the old sources. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1962. This is an English translatio of Schubring's *Die Lehre der Jainas* (W. de Gruyter, 1935).

Schubring 1944 = Walther Schubring, *Die Jaina-Handschriften der Preussischen Staatasbibliothek. Neuerwerbungen seit 1891.* By Walther Schubring, Gunther Weibigen, Preussische Staatsbibliothek. Leipzig: G. Harrassowitz, 1944

S(ingh)JS = Singhi Jain Series

SMS = Sastramuktavali Series (Conjeeveram)

Sravanabelgola = A hand-list of 407 manuscripts in the Śrīmaccārukīrti Paṇḍitācārya Jaina Bhaṇḍār at Śravaṇabelgola, Mysore State

Strassbourg = A list of the Strassbourg Collectin of Digambara Manuscripts

Visvatattvaprakasa = V. P. Johrapurkar's edition of Bhāvasena's *Viśvatattvaprakāśa*. JJG 16, Sholapur 1964

Velankar = *A descriptive catalogue of Sanskrit and Prakrit Manuscripts in the Library of the Bombay Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society*. By H. D. Velankar. Four volumes in three parts, 1926, 1928, 1930. The last part (1930) is on Jaina and Vernacular literature.

Weber = *Verzeichniss der Handschriften der Koniglilchen Bibliothek u Berlin.* Sanskrita- und Prakrta-Handschriften. Two volumes, the second in three parts. Berlin 1853, 1886, 1888, 1892

Weber, *Indische Studien* = Albrecht Weber, *Asiatische Studien: Zeitschrift für die Kunde des indischen Altertums.* Waldesheim, N.Y. 1973

Wiles = Royce Wiles, unpublished manuscript on the Svetasvatara Canon. A descriptive listing of Text editions, commentaries, studies and indexes based on editions held in the Library of the Australian National University. Compioled by Royce Wiles. Canberra, Australia July 1998

Wiley = Kristi Wiley, *Historical Dictionary of Jainism.* Lanham, Md.: Scarecrow Press, 2004

YJG = Yasovijaya Jaina Granthamala

GLOSSARY-INDEX

The following index attempts to provide a guide to references to names, titles and topics. It also indicates which Sanskrit words are likely to be translated by which English expressions and vice versa. Page references in bold face indicate the primary citation of the work.

References to authors and works primarily treated in Volume Ten (the first Volume in this Encyclopedia treating Jaina philosophy) are preceded by X followed by the number of that citation. References to authors and works are given by a number indicating the author's number in Volumes 14-15 followed by a serial number: thus e.g., 84/109. Though most dates of authors are given to a single year, they represent an estimate of a date when the author may have been alive on the basis of whatever evidence can be found; they are not necessarily authoritative, and are provided mainly for the purpose of ordering the listing of authors and works.

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